

**IPS INTELLIGENCE REPORT
YUGOSLAVIA TARGETED:
CASE STUDY IN PSYCHOLOGICAL
WARFARE THROUGH THE PRESS**

(IPS) — The following report from the IPS Intelligence files is a case study in the use of the press in psychological warfare: in this instance conducted against Yugoslavia by the Rockefeller interests in the United States and Western Europe. The two-pronged psywar operation was geared towards breaking Yugoslavia out of the Soviet bloc by circulating terror stories about Soviet plans for invading Yugoslavia, and toward stirring Western European nationalist frenzy against the Eastern European "red menace."

By mid-February of this year Yugoslavia had been targeted by the Rockefeller/CIA forces for special attention in the European-wide "red scare" and psychological-warfare attack against the populations and governments of Western Europe and the Soviet bloc. Two bizarre campaigns focused on Yugoslavia emerged simultaneously from Vienna and Rome aimed at stimulating military paranoia and political polarization. A complementary press campaign against Yugoslavia was undertaken in the United States, stressing not the nationalist hysteria appropriate to Rockefeller's planned Balkanization of Europe, but the American susceptibility to "liberal anti-repression" anti-communism.

The Viennese Campaign

On Alfred Payrleitner's February 20 nationally televised discussion program "Cross Currents," originating in Vienna, an interview was broadcast between Werner Stenzl and Major General Jan Sejna, former First Secretary of the Czechoslovakian Defense Ministry, who fled to the United States in 1968 and became a U.S. "military advisor." This interview, presented as "having been recorded in December 1973 at an unidentified location," claimed to reveal the Warsaw Pact countries' plan for invasion of Yugoslavia via Austria as soon as Tito's death sent Yugoslavia into internal chaos. According to Sejna, this plan (allegedly code-named "Operation Polarka") was drawn up in 1967. Its timely exposure by Sejna was lent the necessary credibility and authority by Austrian Defense Minister Karl Luetgendorf, whose comments were appended to the Sejna interview. In another interview at the same time, handled by Hans Zerbs, Luetgendorf identified himself as a qualified expert since "among other things I held the position of Intelligence Officer of the former German Eighth Army [in Austria]" — a qualification which recently led to his consideration for the post of Chief of Austrian Espionage. The broadcast called on the Austrian population to meet the invaders with armed resistance; in addition to being given assurances of Austrian military might, the audience was told they could "count on active support."

Official Consent

According to the Austrian Communist Party organ *Volkstimme* in its issue of February 22, Sejna's revelations were issued "with the express consent of the competent American authorities of Austrian Radio and TV." The "Cross Currents" broadcast itself stated that "the Austrian Defense Ministry knew about [the invasion plans] as early as 1971, although this was confirmed only this week [week of February 20] by Minister Luetgendorf to the Austrian newsmagazine *Profil*."

Austrian Chancellor Kreisky was forced to deny publicly on February 28 that Luetgendorf would be asked to resign because of the broadcast or his attitude on the "Operation Polarka" affair. Kreisky stated that "there were no differences between himself and Luetgendorf on the Polarka affair... that he had only considered the military essence of the Polarka plans as likely, but that he expressly excluded that political motives could be

involved." By March 1, Kreisky had been pressured into admitting that "television had been misused," according to a news report of that date from *Arbeiter-Zeitung*.

The Roman Campaign

Simultaneously with the creation in the Austrian media of a "red scare" specifically linked to Yugoslavia, ominous rumblings were issuing from Rome about three border markings set up by Yugoslavia at crossroads in the now-notorious Zone B between Italy and Yugoslavia. This press campaign continued to gain momentum locally until March 11, when Rome sent an official note to Belgrade protesting the "terrotorial violations."

Following this official stamp of approval on the Italian press campaign to stir up nationalism, the rightwing French press and the reactionary Springer network of publications in West Germany began to spread the manufactured crisis throughout Europe. According to the Yugoslavian newspaper *Tanjug*, gloomy speculations originating in Vienna about Tito's health and potential internal political chaos in Yugoslavia were consistently linked in the press to the Italian "terrotorial violations" articles. By March 19 an interplay between the Italian and Austrian psywar messages was circulating throughout the press.

According to *Kurier*, quoting Austrian Foreign Minister Kirchschaeger, Vienna expressed interest in a quick resolution of Italy's manipulated emotional border controversy — an interest coming in response to an increased tempo of scare articles in the Austrian press on the stepped-up activities of the Warsaw Pact "with an eye to Yugoslavia" (*Die Presse*, March 19). The *Die Presse* article catalogued troop movements in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, mentioning a 5-kilometer violation of Austrian airspace by Czechs, and closed by remarking: "The sandtable games [scheduled for April] are to take place under the simulated conditions of a worldwide crisis." Concurrently, as reported in the March 20 *Volkstimme*, Luetgendorf's intelligence service claimed discovery of current "blitz war preparations" and "new Polarka-style provocations" by the Warsaw Pact.

The day after Foreign Minister Kirchschaeger expressed hope for an end to the Trieste crisis, the Yugoslavs protested NATO Adriatic maneuvers code-named "Operation Dark Image '74" and the docking of the Sixth Fleet in Trieste, while two American destroyers docked in Dubrovnik on March 26 for "sightseeing purposes."

The Italian newspaper *Corriere della Sera*, in an April 5 article entitled "The Seven Fears of Yugoslavia," mocked Yugoslavia's official protests against the "routine NATO activities" and pointed out that her real fears of invasion, stemming from anxiety about post-Tito collapse, were located in her reaction to Warsaw Pact maneuvers, a reaction which consisted in virtually mobilizing without making any official clamor.

Effects of the Campaign

Yugoslavia repeatedly assessed the Austrian and Italian psywar campaign as developed through the rightwing press as "an application of that branch of propaganda called psychological warfare," and spokesmen all the way from *Tanjug* to Tito identified the purposes of the operation as follows:

- To crack efforts at detente in Europe; especially by sabotaging the efforts of the European Security Conference in Geneva (interestingly, the Conference was discussing formulations of the principle of territorial integrity and inviolability during this period);
- To sabotage the NATO-Warsaw Pact troop reductions conference meeting in Vienna in this same period;
- To punish Yugoslavia for her efforts among non-aligned states regarding the oil-energy crisis;
- To sabotage self-management socialist goals and national unity drives in Yugoslavia prior to the May 27-30 Tenth Party Congress;

to intimidate Yugoslavia with regard to Soviet-Yugoslav friendship while spreading throughout Western and Eastern Europe alike the notion that without Tito Yugoslavia cannot possibly exist.

The claims of the Yugoslavs to the contrary, there is hard evidence that the campaign has wrought significant damage:

— The difficulty which each of the pre-Congress conferences of national subsectors has experienced with nationalists has been severe, even to the point of reshufflings and purges in the two key sectors, Serbia and Croatia. The renewed vigorous activity of the Croatian Party in Exile (a Frankfurt-based operation with possible ties to the Ustashi — the Croatian Fascist organization), openly calling for Soviet intervention to help set up a separate Croatian state, received wide publicity in West Germany, and a special Ettore Petta dispatch in *Corriere della Sera* on April 14 — just as the Croatian LCC conference was being held and as Executive Committee Chairman Josip Vrhovec's opening speech strongly attacked foreign pressures on the LCC.

— The Yugoslavs responded to U.S. import restrictions against Yugoslavia with the pathetic comment that there must be some mistake — the regulations were supposed to be aimed at *Communist* countries!

— In a major speech on April 15 in Sarajevo Tito asserted emphatically that the Yugoslavs do not fear the Soviets. The strong implication was that the psywar campaign had had discernible consequences, and had produced a significant popular attitude of fear of the Soviets which Tito was forced to address.

Transatlantic Strategy

While the European continent was being fed Red Army takeover stories and territorial/nationality-violation bulletins, Americans were assaulted on *their* point of vulnerability: the anti-Soviet bogey of "thought control," repression of intellectuals, and violation of individualism. The "evidence" came in the form of Yugoslavia's persecution of the eight Belgrade philosophy professors (the "Praxis" group) under attack by Tito as "anarcho-liberalists." February 22-25 the *New York Times* raked these coals. A committee of American scholars was formed to rally to the defense of the Belgrade 8; among its luminaries were State Department socialists Daniel Bell, Stanley Hoffman, Noam Chomsky, Robert S. Cohen, Charles Frankel, and Herbert Marcuse, as *New York Times* writer Raymond Anderson announced as early as January 31.

Eric Pace reported February 23 the special persecution of Professor M. Markovic, who was denied a passport to come to the American Association for Advanced Sciences California symposium on "Problems of Forbidden and Discouraged Knowledge." Markovic is identified as the intellectual who was first persecuted in 1965 for an article on Soviet prison camps claiming that the Russians, not the Nazis, invented concentration camps. PEN-American Center President Jerzy Kosinski linked the Yugoslav campaign to the Solzhenitsyn deportation; while Pennsylvania University Professor of Philosophy Richard C. Jeffrey noted in a letter that Markovic was a faculty member of the University of Pennsylvania last year and had had an essay published in the *New York Times*, and that Z. Pesic-Golubovic, also of the Belgrade 8, was denied a passport to visit the University of Pennsylvania this year.

Significantly, it is out of the University of Pennsylvania that Tavistock co-thinker Eric Trist operates his criminal Wharton School network of menticide and slave labor against ghetto youth, as extensively documented in *New Solidarity*.

At the very outset of coverage of the persecution campaign, Raymond Anderson reported in the *New York Times* that the Belgrade 8 had been offered non-

teaching positions at full salary by the Yugoslav authorities, but that "they favor leaves of absence for a few years to take teaching posts in the West."

The U.S. press overlooked Major Sejna's revelations, which so scandalized Europe. When the Yugoslav-Italian border dispute became official in early March, the *Times* occupied itself with recounting how housewives in Yugoslavia would not be able to participate directly in the national political process (*New York Times*, March 9); how two Britons accused of spying on Soviet airlifts during the October Mideast war were appealing for freedom in Belgrade (*New York Times*, March 16); and how Yugoslavia was planning a national celebration of the founding of its State Security Police, who were quoted as needing modernized equipment (*New York Times*, March 17). Only on March 22 did the Zone B dispute receive mention, and no editorial comment appeared until March 31. The dispute was then treated as a clumsy and even pathetic propaganda ploy on the part of the two nations involved to build up respective internal unity.

The significance of the anti-Yugoslavia campaign can be measured in its capacity to wreck what the Rockefeller interests had analyzed as Soviet expectations for the New Year (as drawn up by Hedrick Smith, the *New York Times* slick man in Moscow, in an article entitled "Soviet Exults in the West's Problems"). According to Smith, Soviet expectations for 1974 were: (1) increased Soviet stature and credibility in the Mideast; (2) an advantageous world trading position; (3) Warsaw Pact solidarity and European detente; (4) East-West troop reductions; (5) Yugoslavia and Rumania "lured" closer to the Soviet orbit; (6) political unmooring of and economic competition with Western powers. These expectations were rendered virtually inoperative by late April through the Rockefeller/CIA offensive on numerous fronts: from the heating up of the cold war by Rockefeller's brinkmanship operative U.S. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger; to Rockefeller's created explosions in the Mideast, accomplished through the offices of Dr. Henry Kissinger; to the rupture in East bloc relations achieved by the psychological-warfare operation under examination in this case study of Rockefeller's use of major sections of the bourgeois press.

CHINESE TO INCREASE TRADE WITH ROCKEFELLER/CIA GENERALS

May 17 (IPS)— The Brazilian Export Association mission is back from China, and China is due to return the visit this year. At that time, official economic relations will be re-established. In 1973, China bought \$100 million worth of commodities from Brazil, of which \$58 million was direct purchases and the rest mediated through third parties [*Diario Las Americas*].