

CIA Revamps FBI to Play New Law Enforcement Role


August 17 (IPS) — The resignation of Richard Nixon has marked the end of one phase in the Rockefeller plot to achieve “top-down” fascism in the United States and Western Europe. As the Watergating of the office of the Presidency continues, it should become even clearer that the essence of Watergate was not toppling Nixon, but the meticulous process of discrediting Constitutional government and the breaking and remaking of government agencies necessary to administer Rockefeller’s Nazi economic policies in the U.S.

A significant problem facing Rockefeller as the world economy began to unravel in the middle to late 1960s was the creation of a centralized nationwide political police — combining the extensive refinements of Nazi psychological warfare techniques developed by British Brigadier John Rees and his colleagues at the Tavistock Institute with the ruthlessness and brutality of Hitler’s Gestapo. If such a force could not by itself enforce division and despair on a working class looted ever more each year by the growing cancer of capitalist debt, it was nonetheless indispensable.

Rockefeller could not simply order the FBI to become the Gestapo; for one thing, J. Edgar Hoover was a sacred cow not easily sacrificed. Paying lip service to the traditions of bourgeois democracy in the U.S. and the traditional limitations on the FBI, Rockefeller concentrated at the outset on the “reform” of state and local police through their integration into a national funding network which would, by control of the purse strings, shape police into an effective instrument of social control. Under the direction of the CIA, the Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA) was set up to coordinate this process; with the passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, authorizing the LEAA, Congress ratified the plan.

Nothing But The Facts...

The FBI, which had built its reputation as a law enforcement agency on chasing a half-dozen well-publicized gangsters around the Midwest in the 1930s and hounding people who had at one time or another publicly identified themselves as communists during the witch hunts of the 1940s and 1950s, was by this date a simple roadblock to Rockefeller. Its grey flannel “nothing but the facts ma’m” style of gumshoeing looked good on television; but as means of controlling



whole sections of the working class, it was worthless. It was not important, however, that the FBI take the leadership of the LEAA’s Nazification of the law enforcement apparatus; it was important only that it be integrated into it. Here the principal difficulty was Hoover’s lifetime control of the Bureau. His self-glorifying Neanderthal political views — simple straightforward opposition to “communism, coons and conscientious objectors” — rendered him uncooperative with counterinsurgency schemes which largely rested on the active cooperation of youthful radicals and blacks.

Revamping the FBI was thus ultimately a necessity. The process is by no means complete; in fact it is questionable that the Bureau could be used for anything more sophisticated than its recently developed role as foil for the CIA in the latter's capers with its own terrorist creations such as the Symbionese Liberation Army. Certainly its blundering efforts to infiltrate the Labor Committees with Pontiac busing bomber Vernon Higgins, its outright refusal to investigate the kidnapping of the NCLC's Gail Roeshman, its Panther-style raid on the Detroit NCLC office hardly could be regarded as brilliant by expert counterinsurgents. In these instances, the FBI is simply a vehicle for harassment.

The FBI is now used **consciously** as a foil for CIA pressure to "upgrade" law and order via the military if necessary. It can undergo future redesign by its CIA masters as the political situation evolves. To understand how the CIA took over the FBI it is necessary to examine the period from early 1972 through the summer of 1973. It was during this time that the Bureau passed from the hands of J. Edgar Hoover and into those of present director and Law Enforcement Assistance Administration operative Clarence Kelley.

The De-Hooverization

The "Watergating" of the FBI began months before Nixon's Watergate and before Hoover's death in May 1972. A propaganda campaign, the main point of which was that the FBI, and more specifically its director, was obsolete, was in full swing at least as early as January 1972. Press coverage of the resignation of FBI assistant director W.C. Sullivan stressed that he left because he was unable to abide by the bureau's "fossilized bureaucratic traditions and obsolete policies." Key agitation for revamping the Bureau came from both the Princeton University Committee for Public Justice and the Ford Foundation, which, in response to a Committee conference, produced a WNET-TV special on the matter.

Hoover's death inspired a list of possible successors which included the CIA's top agents in law enforcement. Those considered front-runners were:

- D.C. Police Chief, J.V. Wilson, an avid LEAA supporter since the LEAA took on crime in early 1972;

- Peter J. Pitchess, Los Angeles County Sheriff, former FBI agent, and vice-chairman of the LEAA's "think" commission — the National Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals;

- M.J. Ambrose, U.S. Customs Bureau executive and director of the LEAA-nurtured Drug Abuse Law Enforcement Office;

- The LEAA director J. Leonard;

- California Attorney General J. Evelle Younger, OSS veteran and notorious CIA agent-in-charge of creating terrorist gangs.

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Nixon was not willing to appoint any of these candidates. He had Attorney General Kleindienst collect names "weighing what each person would do to the FBI and the Nixon administration politically" and then he appointed Deputy Attorney General-designate Louis Patrick Gray III. The CIA gauging that Nixon was still too strong, dug in for a siege that dragged Nixon and his appointee Gray through the mud for a full year—totally discrediting the old FBI and setting up the environment that would welcome "their man" Clarence Kelley.

The Watergating of the FBI

The *New York Times* immediately denounced the appointment of Gray as a "shrewd political maneuver which casts an ominous shadow over the FBI's future." This denunciation drew on the fact that Gray was a "long time friend of Nixon" and had no background in law enforcement. Gray's wife was on the Committee to Reelect the President, although when Nixon appointed Gray, he told Mrs. Gray to quit the Committee.

The Watergate burglary in June 1972 accelerated the assault on the FBI and Nixon. Added to the accusations of FBI obsolescence was the charge that the FBI was now becoming the political arm of the executive. The attacks on Gray continued throughout the rest of the year. Tom Wicker of the *New York Times* wrote an editorial February 6, 1973 urging Congress to insist that Nixon nominate a man of stature and experience (not Gray!) as new FBI head. The Senate Judiciary Committee opened hearings February 28 on Gray's nomination. The hearings grilled Gray on issues ranging from campaigning for Nixon through keeping files with obscene data on political opponents to the Watergate burglary. Not surprisingly, two of those most active in developing the case against Gray were from the CIA's press corps: columnist Jack Anderson and *New York Times* editor Tom Wicker.

The CIA carried out another operation during the same period. This one was a sophisticated psywar job zeroing right in on the hapless Gray. With the special involvement of Deputy CIA Director Vernon Walters, Gray was manipulated into respecting a fantastical CIA-FBI mutual non-aggression pact and also into believing that it was people outside the Agency who were conspiring to confuse things surrounding Watergate. The most vicious psychological assault on Gray, however, was

the truth—that from the time the FBI began investigating the burglary (five days after it occurred), in spite of all sorts of CIA sabotage, all signs pointed to Watergate being a CIA operation. [See IPS NO. 10 for details of the Walters-Gray episode.]

The Watergating of the FBI served a dual purpose. The Gray hearings became the long awaited hearings into the Bureau itself. They pointed to a failure of the existing relationship between the Bureau and the executive and they promoted the “liberalization” of the Bureau that was first forced in July 1972, shortly after Hoover’s death. (The “liberalization” took the initial form of joint programs with other agencies like the LEAA).

The other purpose of the Watergating of the FBI was to build the momentum towards the ultimate Watergating which reached a high water mark when Nixon resigned. Every slur against Gray and the functioning of the Bureau reflected right back on the President. The extent to which Gray was implicated in the burglary served to build the case for Nixon’s “interference” with the agencies of the executive branch.

A New Relationship

By mid-March 1973, the chances for Gray’s confirmation had all but vanished. In typical Watergate style, rumors started flying on March 18 that Gray’s

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nomination would be withdrawn. A disclosure was made March 14 that Gray destroyed documents pertinent to the burglary. With Gray out of the way, it was time to put forward the more essential issue — what a new relationship between the Bureau and the government should be.

Tom Wicker wrote in the *New York Times* April 5 that the battle over Gray’s nomination was a good oppor-

tunity to curb expanding executive domination over the legislative branch. According to Wicker, Gray was finished but it was crucial to salvage the FBI. On April 6, Senator Robert C. Byrd (D.-West Virginia) introduced legislation, co-sponsored by Senators Mike Mansfield (D.-Montana) and Lloyd Bentsen (D.-Texas), to make the FBI an independent agency.

With some seeds now sown for a new FBI, lobbying began in earnest for a more permanent successor to Hoover. The criteria had been laid out over the year. The director must be outside politics, must have experience in law enforcement, and — given the deteriorating morale in the FBI, intensified by Gray’s resignation April 27 — must be capable of gaining the respect of professionals in the Bureau.

In The Murphy Tradition

At the end of April, Senior FBI officials started sending telegrams to Nixon urging him to appoint a man from the Bureau. The *New York Times* was more on the CIA’s target, suggesting a law enforcement expert of the LEAA ilk, New York City Police Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy. The eventual nominee, Clarence Kelley, was squarely in the Murphy tradition.

Kelley was a twenty year veteran of the FBI, was not involved in politics, and just so happened to be one of the LEAA’s most innovative cops. Among the “reforms” Kelley introduced as chief of the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department were day and night helicopter squads, computers to speed police responses, new procedures for cordoning off crime sites, and a metropolitan squad covering a six-county area in both Missouri and Kansas. The innovations were all LEAA and Police Foundation funds to Kansas City.

Another of Kelley’s qualifications was demonstrated in a speech he made at the LEAA’s Fourth National Symposium on Law Enforcement Science and Technology in May 1972 on the “Management of Change.”

Amid continuing cries for review of the FBI, Nixon nominated Clarence Kelley to head the Bureau June 7, 1973. In essence, when the Senate Committee unanimously confirmed Kelley’s appointment June 26, they established the review of the FBI by none other than the CIA. They also confirmed the metamorphosis of a fossil from the last depression into a functioning part of Rockefeller’s current war machine.