

**\*SPECIAL REPORT\***

**THE COMING MIDEAST WAR: AN APPRAISAL**

Nov. 16 (IPS) --War in the Mideast, possibly nuclear war, will occur in the new few hours, or, at the most, in the next few days.

Within the past few days, Israel has made its final preparations for a war that it is not sure it can win, but which it feels it must fight. Last week the Israeli government implemented a wartime austerity budget. All credit except export credit was frozen. A ban on all non-military construction was decreed. Drastic budget cuts in all areas except defense were announced. The Israeli pound was devalued by 43 per cent and government-controlled food prices were increased by 100 per cent.

The result was riots in working class districts in Haifa and Tel Aviv, which required not only police but elite border guard units to suppress them.

Firsthand reports by persons recently returned from Israel paint the picture of a nation giving itself up to mass psychosis. By the time Rockefeller's laundered and manicured butcher Yasser Arafat, head of the CIA-controlled Palestine Liberation Organization, made his triumphant speech before the applauding United Nations Nov. 13, the Israeli population was already deep in a despair broken only by outpourings of wild national chauvinism and suicidal hysteria. The inability of the population to see any way out of the Rockefeller-induced economic collapse which now presses upon them has led large sections of the country psychologically to relive the holocaust of the 1940s--this time sadistically taking pleasure in the reversal of roles. Last time they burned; this time someone else will burn. The "Bettelheim Phenomenon"--the Jew psychotically outdoing the brutality of his real or imagined Nazi oppressor--has become the dominant factor in Israeli life.

One can imagine the way in which the psychological warfare experts of the CIA can manipulate the Israeli people to do Rockefeller's bidding.

Economically, the only way the present Israeli government can resolve this situation is by massive primitive accumulation--looting. However, the outside limits of primitive accumulation on the Israeli working class are being quickly reached. This means that Israel must now turn to the classic capitalist accumulation technique in times of crisis: expanding the available pool of labor for primitive accumulation through the subjugation of neighboring territories--in short, war.

Further, the traditional way in which the Israeli capitalist class has defused potential working class upsurge is through purposely igniting chauvinist hysteria--again, war.

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So, Israel is about to embark on a war that Rockefeller has ordered whose purpose is to cover for his Second Great Oil Hoax. More horribly, this war may be the pretext for a field test of the "conceptual breakthrough"--the Rockefeller policy of a nuclear exchange without massive nuclear retaliation by the Soviet Union.

### The Immediate Situation

At the United Nations Nov. 14, the Israeli UN Ambassador Yosef Tekoah circulated a speech which amounted to an ultimatum to the Lebanese government. Charging the Lebanese again with the years' old claim that Lebanon was harboring the murderers of the PLO, the Israeli representative railed that his country would not tolerate this threat to its security much longer. Almost simultaneously, Israeli forces bombarded the southern Lebanese town of Nabatiye with long-range artillery. If, by some chance, a Palestinian terrorist organization like Black September--whose control by the CIA is confirmed--should murder an important Israeli personage or commit another massacre, the occupation of the alleged PLO staging areas in southern Lebanon by Israeli forces--war--is ensured. Such an occupation would not be a retaliatory gesture on the part of the Israelis. In the short run, the occupation of Lebanon would immediately provide the urgently needed loot to shore up the debt-ridden Israeli economy. More importantly, it would enhance Israeli's bargaining position in any future negotiations.

The occupation of Lebanon is merely the first, and most likely, option that the Israelis have in order to alleviate the political and economic death grip that is now threatening to destroy their country. In spite of what the Israelis themselves believe, such a move would be extremely transitional. Below we shall outline, based on current military and economic preparations in the Mideast, exactly what the Israeli options are. These are the options that the Rockefeller forces are manipulating in order to restructure the whole Mideast into the appropriate environment for their fascist "development" projects.

### Strategic Limitations

One of the most important factors in present Israeli military capability is the economic situation exacerbated by the economic consequence of the 1973 war with the Arabs. During the 1973 war, Israel lost the equivalent of 60 per cent of its annual gross national product (the GNP is \$6.2 billion). This took the form of the loss of the equivalent of 40 per cent of the GNP in expended supplies, arms, ammunition, equipment, etc. Another 20 per cent was lost in the form of lost production when a significant part of the productive work force was mobilized in the reserves called to active duty.

Based on these figures alone, Israel would not be economically capable of waging a war of the type and scope of 1973 for at least 10 years. This is a result of several factors. First,

assuming the 10 per cent per year growth rate which held prior to 1973, it would take the Israelis approximately six years to rebuild the fabric of their economy to the level which determined their ability to wage the 1973 war. The actual rate of growth in 1974 has, in fact, been only four to six per cent.

Adding to this the devastating recent economic developments outlined above, it is clear that the Israelis will opt for short, "lightning" moves that will expand Israel's territorial holdings (for looting). Optimally, such moves should simultaneously eliminate the immediate threat of the further build-up of the Syrian forces, the Israelis' major opponents. By a lightning offensive, the Israelis could hope to outflank and diffuse Syrian military build-up (such as the large forces amassed at the Golan Heights front, which the Israelis cannot beat in frontal assaults). Thus, when the Israelis went back to a defensive posture, they would not have to deploy as heavily as before and could transfer economic resources from their defense sector to other pressed sectors of their economy.

#### Current Israeli Military Preparations

Right now the Israeli armed forces have 14 brigades on active service (10 regular and four reserve, with the regular units augmented by reservists assigned to regular brigades), the same 14 brigades which comprised the strike force used during the 1967 pre-emptive strike. In peacetime, the brigade is normally the largest military formation in the Israeli army. However, after operational plans have been formulated and when deployment for action is initially made, the brigades are formed into "task forces," in Hebrew "ugdass." It is important to note that the task forces are operational formations, not the normal standing formations of the Israeli army. These division-sized "ugdass" were, until recently, the largest possible formations of the Israeli army. However, recent reports on the maneuvers in the Golan Heights reveal that these task forces have been formed into larger corps, an unprecedented concentration of force.

Major maneuvers on the Golan Heights and the Lebanese frontier have been conducted over the last three months. These are reminiscent of the maneuvers conducted in the Negev Desert immediately prior to the 1967 pre-emptive strike in which reservists called to active duty were given further physical training and refamiliarization with various weapons systems to raise them to the preparedness level of the regular service troops. Additionally, major ground incursions into Lebanon have become an almost daily occurrence, as well as large-scale bombing and artillery shellings.

Even more illustrative is the current deployment of the Israeli army. There are four brigades on the Sinai front facing Egypt. Another brigade is on maneuvers in the Judean Desert and the Jordan Rift. Another brigade is deployed on the Lebanese frontier from the coast to a point 15 miles inland. Finally,

eight brigades are deployed on the Lebanese frontier and the Golan Heights from the mouth of the Zahle Valley to the Syrian/Jordanian border. The main points of concentration for these eight are the Marjayoun Road, Mt. Hermon, Kuneitra, and Boutmiya. The Israelis have the capability of mobilizing an additional 13 reserve brigades within 12 hours.

These deployments, as well as Israel's current technological level and political-economic condition, suggest several options which we consider to be probable scenarios of military action in the next Mideast war. Because of the aforementioned necessity for territorial occupation and neutralization of the Syrians, we limit ourselves to initial moves on the northern front.

There are two options available to the Israelis on the northern front. Their present deployment allows sufficient flexibility to initiate either.

Option #1: The invasion of Lebanon and occupation of the Lebanese coastal plain, perhaps as far north as Beirut. This option most immediately offers Israel the possibility of extensive primitive accumulation. It would involve a simultaneous thrust up the coast from the Israeli border through Tyre, Sidon, and finally Beirut and from the Marjayoun Road north and then to the sea. The inadequacy of the Lebanese armed forces would ensure paltry resistance. This would, in turn, alter radically the parameters of the conflict. Simply put, it would threaten the strategic position of the Syrians and pose immediate problems for the security of their capital Damascus. It would further threaten the oil pipeline from Homs to Tripoli and the distribution from Tripoli to Europe. The Syrians would be forced, if they chose to intervene, to place themselves in a disadvantageous position--having to cross two mountain ranges to reach the coastal plain, or having to bleed off forces from their Golan Heights position.

This seems at this point the most likely of the possible options.

Option #2: Outflanking the Syrians' Golan Heights position. Since 1969, Israel has conducted over 300 armed incursions into southern Lebanon, as well as over 70 major bombing raids and 1,000 shellings by artillery and missiles. These incursions have been concentrated primarily at the mouth of the Zahle Valley and secondarily on the Lebanese coastal plain. This area must be beginning to look like Vietnam. It is likely that these raids and incursions are--or are meant to look like--dress rehearsals for the landing of helicopter-borne commandos and paratroopers on the ridge of the Ante-Lebanese Mountains overlooking Syria. If such an airborne bridgehead were made, it could be followed up by Israeli armor and infantry coming through Marjayoun and up the Zahle Valley.

While such a movement would effectively outflank the Syrian position on the Golan Heights from the north, it could not be maintained. Following standard Soviet military doctrine (as the Syrians do), the Syrians would be able to mass artillery to shell the Israeli bridgehead off those ridges. Such a flanking action on the north would have to be matched with a similar sweep on the south. This would probably take the form of an Israeli armored strike along the Yarmuk River Valley, or through Jordan even further to the south.

Most likely, an Israeli move on the northern flank of the Golan Heights would be combined with token movement on the Golan Heights itself, so that both could fight for a more decisive blow to the southern flank. This would involve the Syrians in a highly mobile tank battle--in excellent terrain for armor--which could result in their envelopment by the well-trained Israeli armored units. At the very least, the Syrians would be forced to make extensive redeployments from the Golan Heights position.

These two options can also be combined. For instance, one option could be used to fix the Syrian deployment in such a way as to weaken their ability to counter the other. Moves to outflank the Golan Heights position could force the Syrians to redeploy while the Israelis then proceeded to occupy the Lebanese coast.

#### The Final Option

Israeli success in any of these options is not automatically assured. In the disastrous 1973 war, Rockefeller and the CIA ensured that the Israelis were beaten in their initial encounters with the Arabs. If the Israeli deep incursions are repulsed, by whatever means, and the Israelis are threatened with either a long "war of attrition" or tactical defeat, it is possible that they would hysterically use nuclear weapons.

After the first competent, public estimation of Israeli nuclear capability appeared in New Solidarity and IPS last month, IPS has confirmed from numerous sources the extent of Israel's capability to launch a nuclear strike.

The Israelis also possess several strategic and tactical delivery systems for these weapons, including:

\*The Mirage IIIC fighter bomber, which can deliver a small nuclear warhead up to 1,000 miles (double that if it is not necessary for the crew to return alive).

\*The Israeli-built Jericho missile, which can deliver a warhead 280 miles.

\*The U.S.-made Honest John missile with a range of 45 miles.

\*The 150 millimeter, self-propelled howitzer, which can send a small nuclear projectile 10 miles.

How then could this capability be utilized? We estimate that a strategic nuclear strike (against an Arab population center or center of industrial or petroleum production or distribution) is likely at this time only against a Syrian target. Rockefeller development projects are scheduled for both Egypt and Saudi Arabia, a fact which generally precludes their being primary nuclear targets for obvious reasons. Libya is largely out of range and does not provide the opportunity for conventional operations to follow up a nuclear strike for purposes of primitive accumulation. Iraq is closely associated with the Soviet Union and such a relationship tends to preclude a nuclear strike for political considerations, although we cannot rule it out altogether.

On the other hand, Syria has been the recipient of no such Rockefeller development projects. It has been denied major international credit by Rockefeller-dominated financial institutions and it has been the intended victim of CIA-directed psychological warfare operations for the last six months. In short, Syria has been largely written off by the Rockefeller interests--a potent argument for Syria's probable nuclear incapacitation. Further, an attack on Syria would have the additional asset to the Rockefeller forces of involving the actual destruction of oil production, refining, or distribution facilities or at least the implicit immediate threat of such destruction.

Another nuclear option exists in the form of use of tactical nuclear weapons. The terrain of the Golan Heights front is most conducive to their use. The fact that the bulk of the Syrian armored forces would have to mass on the narrow fronts of the Damascus/Kuneitra and Boutmiya Roads is of critical importance. It is exactly for targets such as those that tactical nuclear weapons were designed. Additionally, we have ascertained that Israel has deployed 150 millimeter howitzers on the Golan Heights front, as photographs of such weapons used on maneuvers on the Golan Heights have appeared in the Israeli press.

However, a new factor has appeared in the ability of Israel to utilize these nuclear weapons in initiating the war. The National Caucus of Labor Committees and the International Caucus of Labor Committees have exposed the nature of such a potential capability throughout the advanced sector working class and international press and diplomatic circles, thus limiting Rockefeller's ability to use Israel to implement his "conceptual breakthrough."

(To be continued: A more detailed analysis of the coming Israeli war will follow in the next issue of International Press Service.)