

Special Report on Hilex 75

The Soviet Nuclear War-Fighting-Strategy

Although James R. Schlesinger has been removed from the office of U.S. Secretary of Defense, his criminal collaborators Henry Kissinger and Nelson A. Rockefeller remain entrenched in their governmental positions, Schlesinger's insane "limited nuclear war" strategic doctrine continues to define U.S. military policy, and the operational capabilities and machinery associated with the "Schlesinger Doctrine" remain in place and untouched.

This reality, given the publicly stated determination of the Rockefeller clique to defend their worldwide financial empire at all costs and the current actual deployments backing up that determination, poses the immediate threat of a general thermonuclear Third World War.

As U.S. Labor Party presidential candidate Lyndon H. LaRouche identified in his Dec. 14 campaign statement, "Scenario for World War III," the Schlesinger and related RAND-type war-fighting strategies

are based on the fatal misconception of step-function-like escalation which can be interrupted at various points by conflict-limiting or conflict-terminating negotiations. Contrary to such idiotic wishful thinking, however, it is precisely the unfolding of such an obviously preplanned pattern of escalating war deployments and provocations which at a certain — imminent — point must convince the Soviet leadership that all-out war is inevitable.

Thus the most important thing to be understood in the present world political situation is: once the threshold point to full-scale war is reached, once even the smallest commitment to thermonuclear war is made, then we have entered an entirely new manifold of thought and actions, a different universe governed by radically altered laws.

The deterrent aspect of nuclear war is operable only as long as actual nuclear war-fighting is still seen as avoidable. Beyond that point the

fear of further escalation is no longer in effect, and no sane person can be expected to take seriously a call for negotiations or implied constraints.

Instead, policy-making will now be guided by accepting all contingencies of unlimited escalation and will seek to define military and political victory, even of a most marginal sort, in terms of the inescapable parameters of generalized thermonuclear exchange.

Before proceeding to a more detailed characterization of the situation, it should be noted that the maxim of subordinating politics to the goal of achieving every conceivable military advantage once the initiation of war-fighting has been determined to be inevitable is as much part of the classic Clausewitzian doctrine of war as the characterization of war as the continuation of politics by other means. Thus we are not adducing here new principles of warfare

exclusively determined by the conditions of nuclear war-fighting, but rather principles which even Schlesinger and his followers know full well to be the firm conceptual basis of all Soviet military thinking.

The Nuclear First Strike

Once a determination of the inevitability of actual fullscale war-fighting is made, there will be hardly any argument within Soviet or U.S.-NATO military circles that a decisive net advantage accrues to the side launching a total first strike. Nor should there be any illusions to the effect that the Soviet Union, if actually forced into a war-fighting posture by the insane Rockefeller clique, would or rationally could limit itself to a counterforce first strike i.e., a strike limited to military targets. A total (that is, counterforce plus countervalue — industry and population centers) Soviet first strike is necessitated by three interrelated considerations:

- (1) The U.S. retaliatory capacity,
- (2) The Soviet military forces structure,
- (3) The need to exploit marginal technological advantages.

Given the virtual strategic nuclear parity between the U.S. and USSR, victory in a nuclear exchange can only be defined if one is simultaneously prepared to accept the obvious — the unavoidable destruction of a sizeable percentage of one's own population and industrial capacity. Given this fact, it is necessary to minimize the destruction percentage by ruthlessly exploiting every marginal, military technological capability.

This, of course, is possible only if one does not at the same time entertain all sorts of illusions about negotiations and early conflict termination — constraints of precisely the kind that would preclude bringing into play certain marginal capacities whose very utilization could only signal total war, rapid 0 to 100 per cent escalation.

(1) The unfeasibility of a Soviet damage-limiting counterforce first strike

To successfully launch such a strike, the Soviet Union would have to have the capability of simultaneously destroying the bulk of U.S. ICBM's (intercontinental ballistic missiles), SLBMs (Submarine-launched ballistic missiles), and SAC (Strategic Air Command) bombers. No such Soviet capability exists.

First, while a number of U.S. ICBMs might be destroyed by a Soviet strike, the re-entry-vehicle-fratricide factor forces Soviet launching over a sufficiently extended time period such that even after "categorical warning" (an actual hit, avoiding the uncertainties of launch-on-warning), a majority of U.S. "Minutemen," etc. would still be intact and ready to fire.

Second, about half of the 8,500 independently targetable U.S. strategic nuclear weapons are SLBM-mounted and highly invulnerable to pre-emptive attack.

Third, the U.S.'s 500 SAC bombers are equipped with terrain-following radar (TFR) and are relatively difficult to pick up once on an actual attack mission.

This should suffice to prove that the Soviet Union could not conceivably limit a first strike to military targets (and note that we have not even taken into account the 22,000 or so land or aircraft-carrier based U.S. tactical nuclear weapons). It simultaneously shows the urgent need on the part of the Soviet Union to avail itself of the first strike advantage! The latter point is further underlined by:

(2) The Soviet military forces structure

While no detailed analysis can be developed here (and so ignoring in this context the overwhelming Soviet conventional forces superiority in Europe), two things are of immediate relevance.

First, the much smaller number (2,500) of independently targetable Soviet strategic weapons is not distributed among ICBMs, SLBMs, and long-range bombers in the same advantageous (for assured destruction second strike) fashion as in the U.S. case. A significant majority is

ICBM-mounted, and the Soviet long-range bomber threat is presently negligible.

Second, aside from the SLBM-carrying nuclear submarines, the remaining surface and subsurface components of the Soviet Navy are principally geared to preventive first strikes against U.S. aircraft carriers, etc. Thus these components would be of very limited value if employed otherwise than as indicated by a total first strike.

Broadly, these conclusions from the Soviet force structure cohere with conclusions to be drawn from:

(3) The necessity of utilizing marginal technological advantages

Material for a case study — though due to limited information some of the following will be only hypothetical — is provided by recent U.S. press reports (Aviation Week, Baltimore Sun, etc.) on the blinding of U.S. communications satellites by the Soviets using beams of intense infrared radiation.

Here are the relevant details: On Oct. 18 one of the three U.S. synchronous-orbit satellites warning against Soviet ICBM launchings was struck by an extremely intensive infrared beam. This "blinded" the satellite and therefore possibly impaired the entire three-way synchronous-orbit system, but did no permanent damage. The U.S. military thought that the apparent beam sending might have been the result of sensor malfunction of the satellite itself.

However, on Nov. 17-18 three U.S. satellites were simultaneously hit with the same intense infrared radiation, originating from the western part of the Soviet Union. Two of the satellites were high-orbit communications satellites used in the United States' SAC bomber command net, and the third was another of the U.S.'s synchronous early-warning satellites. The radiation lasted for more than four hours.

The implications of this development are as follows:

If the reported radiation indeed originated from Soviet lasers — and there seems little reason to doubt that it did — then since laser radiation obeys an inverse square law, and since at least some of the blinded satellites were in high 25,000 mile orbits, the Soviet Union must possess lasers far more powerful than those of the U.S. These lasers at closer range would not only be able to blind satellites, but knock them down and, given appropriate targeting procedures, might do the same to incoming missiles. But even ignoring such much more far-reaching implications, a Soviet capability to even temporarily blind early warning satellites or, say, navigational satellites used in getting an accurate positional fix for nuclear submarines, would be the kind of marginal technological capability which could reduce by some percentage points the levels of destruction incurred by the Soviet Union as the result of an unavoidable U.S. second strike. As such, it would play an extremely significant role once actual nuclear war fighting has been judged inevitable.

Of course exploitation of such laser blinding and similar techniques is conceivable only in the context of a preventive first strike strategy. In a "limited nuclear war" strategy its utilization would be unthinkable, because it would immediately indicate a rapid escalation intention.

Marginal Technologies: The Broader Implications

There exists significant specific circumstantial evidence that the Soviet Union actually possesses the laser capability implied by the satellite blinding incidents. Aside from the immediate short-term military-strategic consequences, the broader implications for the interconnectedness of military strategy and strategies for scientific research and development are, briefly, this: As evidenced by the "Strategic Studies" document, the ability to arrive at the correct political and military strategic estimates and to define the necessary general parameters for advances in theoretical natural sciences are based on identical epistemological premises. To the extent that Soviet scien-

tists and military experts approximate or actually share these premises in limited areas, we are not surprised at their apparent, potentially crucial advances in the indicated fields.

"Fixed position" strategies are equally lethal in political, military, and scientific research policy planning, and decisive qualitative advances depend on the identification of apparently marginal, "infinitesimal" aberrations which, despite their momentary quantitative significance, define precisely the imminent capacities of present constellations for evolution into qualitatively new global forms. It is the concentration of limited resources on the development of crucial technologies — the crucial nature of which emerges from an evaluation of their significance for fundamental advances in theoretical science — which now through advances in laser technology may have broken open not the race toward controlled thermonuclear reactions (fusion power) but also the strategic arms race.

While the U.S., under the sway of the Schlesinger Doctrine, concentrated on developing more and more gadgetry (warheads of all imaginable sizes, MIRVs, MARVs, etc.) but essentially in the same fixed mode, the USSR bypassed all RAND-type options by covering itself through the deployment of extremely high payload ICBMs and under that shield developing the kind of revolutionary though initially quantitatively marginal new technologies which, once globalized, would in one strike render the entire RAND-determined U.S. strategic arsenal obsolete.
