

that comes close to being acceptable to a considerable number of the elected representatives of the countries making up the NATO Alliance." Dankert's report, they state, was not rejected easily; and not without considerable debate. And as one Canadian delegate told the reporter for this paper, "It caused quite a stir. One helluva lot of fire broke out on this one."

What provided the spark which may have touched off the fire was a lead editorial in the Nov. 17 *Washington Post* quoting Senators Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Dewey Bartlett (R-Okla.) of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who had just been sent to the Continent to evaluate NATO's forces. Nunn and Bartlett brought back the report that Europe was not prepared to fight a conventional war and should therefore prepare for a short, intense war. The *Post* states that since "The alliance has been slow to react to the disturbing and unwarranted buildup of Soviet conventional forces in Eastern Europe... It should modernize its forces and plan to counter the kind of brief and intense attack the Soviets are now in a position to make on short notice." NATO should also attempt to delude the Soviets with promises of reducing the conventional forces even more while achieving the goal of conventional parity with "force modernization."

Another article appearing in the *Post* on the same day by Evans and Novak predicted that "the Warsaw Pact is now at the threshold of a military capability to make a lightning-like attack against Western Europe patterned after the World War II German blitzkrieg." The solution, they say, to the pressure on Europe to reduce its NATO commitments because of the financial crisis, "lies in only one place — the Oval Office of President Jimmy Carter after January 20."

Nunn and Bartlett's report was an undisguised statement of the line now coming out of CPD member and Carter advisor Eugene Rostow and Carter's Brookings' advisor Henry Owen: that the Soviets are preparing a "surprise attack" which NATO cannot withstand and therefore NATO must be prepared to attack first. The team also demanded an "eastward repositioning" of NATO nuclear forces, something the Soviets have warned of as being almost equivalent to a NATO declaration of war. The Nunn-Bartlett report was used as the vehicle by the U.S. controlled press to start a "great debate" on U.S. foreign policy. Evans and Novak stress that the Nunn-Bartlett report shows "détente has now been found dangerously wanting" and that Carter must "substitute reality for his previous pledges to cut defense spending" and force both the U.S. and Europe to increase arms production no matter how much austerity is involved.

Responding to these statements as tripwires to nuclear war, the European bloc fought back by centering discussion precise-

ly on economic questions as the priority, refusing to be trapped by the nuclear scare threats and what a delegate from Britain's Labour Party called "fear of Trojan horses from the Soviet Union. The real Trojan horse in Europe is economic and social erosion. The problems are not addressed now... We must match the Soviets militarily but first worry about our internal condition."

Another victory for the Europeans was the successful defeat of the U.S. proposal to put a floor price under raw materials and oil. The floorfight was carried out by Herr Lange, a member of the SPD and the West German "Senate" whose argument against it was essentially that it was a kind of indexation scheme which would prohibit individual oil-for-development trade agreements between European countries and the Third World and Arabs and would lead to international hyperinflation. In a special interview with NSIPS, Lange was asked what Britain was going to propose regarding the dollar debts which are crushing her economy. Lange replied, "We must freeze the debts to the dollar for 10 or 20 years." When asked if this was the policy of his government, Lange replied, "Yes. When push comes to shove, yes."

One of the initiating battles at the Assembly meeting took place over the U.S. centerpiece proposal to give NATO's Atlantic fleet commander, Admiral Isaac Kidd of Britain, authority to coordinate the merchant fleet operations of all NATO countries. This had long been a major item put forward by Kissinger as part of the supranational control package and in this instance the European bloc fought against it not only because it limited their own sovereignty but because the measure could be used to bolster the government of South Africa against the desires of many member NATO nations.

In order to emphasize to the Europeans that they could expect no leniency from the U.S., the final plenary session was addressed by biggest nuclear warrior of them all, Nelson Rockefeller. Rockefeller demanded that the meeting make a firm commitment to a united policy of nuclear offensive. He made no mention of détente, no mention of trade or development with the Third World, no statement on the economic crisis, and proposed a single solution, that the Trilateral group of U.S., Western Europe and Japan be strengthened and that an all-out drive to maintain nuclear parity be initiated.

But the Carter forces have already been given a taste of what they can expect from the military community within Europe. They will not tolerate a further escalation of the arms buildup, will not submit to the scare tactics, "Trojan horses," and anti-Sovietism, will not allow Carter's war cabinet to provoke another crisis in the Mideast to force up the price of oil, and will no longer follow the U.S. dictates on their relations to the Soviet Union and the Third World and Arab nations.

West Europeans Begin Bolt From NATO's Suicidal War Policies

Other voices than those of the West Europeans at Williamsburg have responded to this madness by publicly documenting the overall strategic superiority which the Soviet Union now wields. On the same day as Buchstaller's keynote speech for peace, representatives of the Boeing Company of Seattle testified before the Joint Committee on Defense Production of the U.S. Congress on a detailed report they had prepared on the unmatched Soviet capacities to withstand even the maximum nuclear response the U.S. could mount to a Soviet first strike. Entitled "Industrial Survival and Recovery After Nuclear

Attack," the report makes the following crucial points: "It seems logical to conclude, then, that these (Soviet) defensive preparations, combined with the increasing power of Soviet strategic offensive forces, have in fact destabilized the strategic relationship between the two nations. . . . The most probable outcome, then, is not nuclear war; it is more likely to involve increasingly costly concessions by the U.S. in order to avoid nuclear war."

The basis for the fully documented conclusions of the Boeing report are essentially simple. The Soviets have in place tested

measures to ensure the survival and rapid full recovery of nearly their entire workforce and productive plant through combined primary measures of dispersal of industry and urban populations. As cited by Boeing, the Soviet civil defense program has established four types of effective procedures for industrial dispersal since 1932: locating new industry away from major cities; separating adjacent factories by a distance greater than a single weapon's effective radius; separating the industrial buildings within a given factory; and establishing standby relocation facilities which can be rapidly started up. Population dispersal simply involves having the population walk from one to three days away from urban centers to standardized shelters.

On the assumption that half the U.S. nuclear arsenal survives a Soviet first strike, the Boeing report points out that the retaliatory strike could cover no more than 2 to 3 per cent of the Soviet Union. An effective Soviet dispersal, even in the face of a fallout-maximizing attack would reduce total fatalities to no more than 10 million people; within a week, the Soviets could be out of their shelters for an eight hour day in 97 per cent of Soviet territory, using machines that had been protected by "sandbagging" measures.

The U.S., by contrast, has no civil defense program: its industry and urban populations are much more concentrated; and it has at least a factor of three less total nuclear throw-weight and smaller individual nuclear weapons.

The size of the strategic gap is further delineated in the London Daily Telegraph of Nov. 18 by defense correspondent Clare Hollingsworth, who points out that the Soviets annually spend \$10 billion on civil defense compared with \$82.5 million in the U.S. To "remedy" the situation, which the Telegraph reports has greatly alarmed Committee on the Present Danger members Schlesinger and Paul Nitze, the U.S. Defense Civil Preparedness Agency is preparing a 72-hour population dispersal plan — to be completed by the mid-1980s!

Suicide Is No Deterrent

In Western Europe, the top-ranking senior scientist of the

Federal Republic of Germany, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Director of the prestigious Max Planck Institute, has provided elements in West Germany who are opposed to their own suicide with a powerful and cogent critique of the doctrine of flexible response. Significantly, Weizsäcker's uncompromisingly realistic book "Paths Through Danger" and a companion volume by Herr Ahfeldt, "Defense and Peace," received a favorable review by the military correspondent, Herr Potyka, of the Social Democratic-linked Süddeutsche Zeitung Nov. 17.

Potyka, in particular, focused attention on Weizsäcker and Ahfeldt's "doubts concerning the maintenance of the (NATO) second strike capability."

In the light of the clear-cut Soviet strategy of deploying occupying forces only after a total nuclear first-strike, Weizsäcker in his book sarcastically comments that "no knowledgeable officer today would characterize the strategy of flexible response as a logical masterpiece." No proper military doctrine at all, "flexible response is a kind of 'Prinzip Hoffnung' — wishful thinking." The logic of the flexible response "Prinzip" therefore means defeat — whether by surrender or annihilation: "How will we be able to fight — through threatening the enemy with suicide? . . . One day we will be forced to make good our threats or let them be exposed as bluff."

The final note in this vein is sounded Nov. 17 by Henry Stanhope, defense correspondent of the London Times, who reviews a study of the impact of urban sprawl on NATO's "cherished military doctrines." The study was conducted by Paul Bracken of the normally pro-genocide Hudson Institute, which advocates genocide, and was published in Survival, the journal of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a London-based think tank that has often differed with assessments of the RAND Corporation computers. Bracken's study, Stanhope notes, raises an embarrassing question about even the viability of NATO's response to a hypothetical Soviet conventional attack: "Can anyone take seriously a deterrent which calls for laying down several thousand nuclear weapons on the most urbanized terrain in the world?"

Industrial Survival and Recovery After Nuclear Attack

A Report to the Joint Committee On Defense Production U.S. Congress

November 18, 1976

Statement of Thomas K. Jones

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am Thomas K. Jones, Program and Product Evaluation Manager of the Boeing Aerospace Company. With me are Mr. John R. Potter, Director of Facilities for Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, and Mr. Edwin N. York, a specialist in nuclear effects. On behalf of The Boeing Company, I want to thank you for the opportunity to present our views on industrial survival and the findings of the study we have conducted on this subject. We have prepared for the committee a detailed study report that I would like to have placed in the record, and, with your permission, I will summarize for you some of highlights of that report.

It is most timely that your committee has taken an interest in this matter. The growing emphasis on industrial survival in the Soviet Union, coupled with the present lack of such emphasis in this country, could have far-reaching consequences with respect to the future security of the United States.

I recognize, of course, that Americans find it difficult to believe that civil defenses could provide effective protection against nuclear weapons. There is widespread belief that nuclear war inevitably would destroy both the United States and the Soviet Union, and that it might bring the end of mankind itself.

The avoidance of war, however, does not necessarily depend upon what Americans believe. It depends upon what the leaders of the Soviet Union believe, even if their belief should be ill-founded. We have only to look back at World War II, and perhaps even Korea, to recognize that a set of invalid assumptions can lead an aggressor into a war he neither wanted nor expected.

The threat of mutual assured destruction will provide an effective deterrent only if the Soviet rulers believe that the threat is indeed mutual. Examination of Soviet literature reveals,