

way did Schnell contradict the basic concept of the ministry... And, the government in Bonn has still not poured cold water on this atomic drive and its proponents.

NATO Admiral Hill-Norton's 'Swan Song'

Dec. 8 - "Why Does the Admiral Cry SOS," a commentary by Tass political reporter Vladimir Goncharov is excerpted below.

On the eve of yesterday's press conference of Adm. Peter Hill-Norton, Chairman of the NATO military committee at the NATO headquarters, where the NATO council is currently meeting, journalists were exchanging confidential remarks such as "Admiral Hill-Norton will resign," "The captain of the NATO ship is leaving the bridge," "Hill-Norton's report to the present NATO council session will be the last," and "What will poor old Peter tell us?"

At last the admiral presented himself before journalists assembled to hear his "swan song." He struck an exceedingly gloomy note, judging from the reports of newsmen who heard it.

However, Admiral Hill-Norton lamented not his own

fate and the prospect of wiling away his time by the fireplace. The admiral was anxious about the fate of NATO.

He said that events were developing extremely unfavorably for the North Atlantic bloc, that the Soviet military threat to the West was growing and that Warsaw Pact strength was increasing rapidly while that of NATO slowly; in a word, that the NATO ship was about to sink! SOS! SOS! SOS!

After uttering this naval distress signal, the admiral made a dramatic pause; then an inspired look came into his eyes again.

Reports on the press conference say that in conclusion, Admiral Hill-Norton called on the political leaders of the NATO countries to increase allocations for armaments in order to strengthen the bloc's military potential.

In other words, his final statement means that the NATO ship could avoid being wrecked, but only if the hole in the hull is immediately stopped with dollars, pounds, marks and guildens!

This brought to a close the melodramatic act put on by the British admiral before he retired. However, this bit of theater is unlikely to impress the West European public as Hill-Norton had hoped. It is not the first time such farces are acted out on the NATO stage, each preceding another dangerous spiral in the arms race.

MILITARY STRATEGY

Furor Over Soviet Civil Defense Program Betrays U.S. Confusion on Soviet Strategic Posture

Dec. 10 (NSIPS) — Major articles appearing in *Science* magazine and the *National Observer* this week indicate that the recent report by the Boeing Aerospace Corporation on the Soviet civil defense program has forced the question of Soviet strategic warfighting superiority out of intelligence back rooms and into the public spotlight. The raging debate over Soviet civil defense capabilities and their ongoing development also betrays the fact that most U.S. analysts are attempting to adduce Soviet policy from the available "hard" facts, not from estimations of the significance of those facts in the light of long-standing of oft-stated Soviet strategic policy.

Science, the official weekly publication of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, gives extensive coverage of reactions to the testimony by Boeing analyst Thomas K. Jones, a former member of the U.S. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) staff, that 98 per cent of the Soviet population would survive a nuclear war and that Soviet industry would recover in two to four years, while the U.S. would be devastated for more than a decade. Strongly supporting Jones' analysis

is the leading member of the nuclear-confrontationist Committee on the Present Danger, former Navy Secretary Paul H. Nitze. Nitze argued in the January issue of *Foreign Affairs* that the Air Force M-X, a mobile ICBM, is needed to alleviate the strategic imbalance. According to *Science*, beyond Nitze and an expert on Soviet civil defense, Prof. Leon Gouré of the University of Miami, Florida, the strongest intelligence agency supporter of the Jones thesis is the Air Force Intelligence Service. The CIA, on the other hand, is reportedly skeptical of realized or planned Soviet advantage, while the Defense Intelligence Agency, which is in overall charge of the armed services' respective intelligence operations and officially responsible for intelligence on targeted Soviet cities and facilities, has taken an intermediate position. The *National Observer* adds Nobel Laureate and physicist Eugene Wigner, a close associate of Nelson Rockefeller's advisor Dr. Edward Teller, and Conrad Chester, chief of the Emergency Technology Section of Oak Ridge National Laboratory, to the list of those who concur in the Boeing finding of a decisive "civil defense gap."

The Flak over Hard Facts

As the *Science* and *National Observer* articles make clear, the existing evidence of realized Soviet civil defense capacities, while substantial, does not in and of itself make the case one way or the other. The evidence includes discovery of among others an eight million square-foot factory hidden under a mountain "west of the Urals and east of Moscow; 30,000 blast- and fallout-proof shelters for military personnel and equipment; population shelters in major cities such as Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev; 40 underground grain silos; and a pattern of dispersal of new industrial plants away from urban centers. The difficulty in assessing the significance of these facts as such is supposedly related to uncertainty about two basic questions: do the Soviets have plans to disperse their entire population out of the cities into quick-dug "hasty shelters" and into dirt-covered urban shelters? What percentage of strategic Soviet industry is or can be rapidly "hardened" through dispersal? Neither *Science* nor the *Observer* mention one of the essential findings of the Boeing report — the experimentally verified ability to effectively protect semi-dispersed vital machinery with suitable shock-absorbent packing.

As *Science* has put it: "All sides agree, however, that the crux of the question for U.S. strategic policy lies in the Soviets' program of industrial hardening. The United States has assumed it could destroy 75 per cent of Soviet industry, and the question is whether that assumption is still valid." *Science* alleges without citing any sources that a secret interagency report came to the conclusion that "the recent study of Soviet civil defense has not revealed any major changes in the Soviet program since about 1971, nor does it suggest a crash program. Rather, the Soviets have been proceeding gradually but steadily to implement decisions evidently taken previously."

In a similar vein, *National Observer* quotes John Collins, a senior defense specialist at the Library of Congress, on the results of a recent crash study undertaken by an interagency task force: "Nobody really knows how good the Soviet civil defense program is...what it all means to our national security still isn't clear."

The issue has thus been largely divided between the Committee on the Present Danger camp which offers evidence of a Soviet military buildup as proof of aggressive intentions of "Soviet imperialism." Notable arguments for this side were offered by Admiral Sir Peter Hill-Norton at the recent meeting of NATO defense

ministers in Brussels. Opposing them are those less overtly ideological intelligence analysts who cling to the position that no firm conclusion can be drawn from available discrete elements of physical evidence.

An approach which tends at least in a direction more proximate to guiding Soviet principles was developed by Defense Department Research chief Dr. Malcolm Currie at the recent Texas meeting of the Electrical Engineering Society, and reportedly by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld at the NATO Defense Ministers conference in Brussels. While not coming directly to terms with motivating Soviet strategic doctrine, Currie and Rumsfeld both made clear that quantitative Soviet advances based on a broad and expanding scientific research program had given the Soviets a qualitative edge. Rumsfeld concluded that this reality necessitated a re-thinking of Western defense policy.

Behind the present flap over the Soviet civil defense preparations lies the more basic point that while the West has periodically factionalized over the strategic issue of the Schlesinger-Schnell brand of tactical nuclear warfare versus the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction, the Soviets have with near-perfect consistency proceeded from the standpoint of coordinating all offensive forces and defensive systems for victory is a *total* thermonuclear exchange if Western political-economic policies render war unavoidable. Available information on civil defense coheres with this policy, which is based on optimal use of limited resources to gain marginal strategic advantage. This is exemplified in the design and force build-up of the MIG-25 Foxbat aircraft, whose systems are not suited to one-on-one "dogfights" but are superior for total force deployments against squadrons of incoming fighters and bombers, and of Soviet communications, anti-communications, and anti-missile systems.

Given the overall Soviet posture, and the definitive evidence of its application across the full spectrum of weapons systems as well as in overall strategic capacities, there can be little doubt that such a vital ingredient as civil defense preparations is at least at the threshold of providing survivability to the majority of the populations and industrial facilities. Given the extensive training of the Soviet population in civil defense procedures, and the high level of organization of civil defense under General-Colonel A.T. Altunin, who ranks with the heads of the Soviet armed forces, the threshold can be rapidly crossed in the course of a full mobilization.