

# Plenty of Dissent in NATO Rejection of First-Strike Ban

Dec. 14 The final communiqué of the Foreign Ministers meeting of the NATO Defense Planning Group in Brussels last week rejected the Warsaw Pact's proposal banning first use of nuclear weapons. The NATO ministers' action has been widely depicted in the Atlanticist press as an expression of "unanimity" in NATO's ranks. Nothing could be further from the truth.

According to reports in the West German daily *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* a significant minority of the meeting's delegates, including Italian Foreign Minister Arnaldo Forlani and possibly the Dutch representatives, opposed such an outright rejection of the Warsaw Pact first strike ban. Forlani, who still signed the NATO communiqué, forced debate on the issue by emphasizing that economic and military security could only come from the maintenance of detente and the expansion of relations with Eastern Europe "in the spirit of Helsinki." The serious threat to world peace, Forlani correctly emphasized, comes from the economic situation and, in particular, "the lack of agreement at the North-South conference" in Paris, whose most recent sessions scheduled for this week were sabotaged by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in collaboration with the "Carter Team."

The earlier refusal of the European countries to fund the proposed airborne early warning defense system (AWACS), or to agree to any other increase in armaments spending has further notified the forces behind James Earl Carter that they hardly have Europe sewed up on the issue of war. Similarly, anti-war forces grouped around West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt not only recalled Foreign Minister Genscher to Bonn immediately after his speech, but issued prior statements through sources in Genscher's own Foreign Office that the Warsaw Pact proposals are "certainly worth consideration."

Perhaps the most significant remarks at the meeting,

in terms of future opposition from within the U.S. to Carter Administration confrontationist policies were delivered by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. While the text of his conference address is not presently available, his remarks and responses at a subsequent press conference are significant for their defense of security as defined by detente and the "multi-faceted" relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

The NATO communiqué itself stated that NATO could not give up its option to strike first with nuclear weapons if it is attacked with a "superior conventional force." It makes reference to the UN Charter as justification for NATO's right to "defend itself against aggression." But it is a well known fact, that the Warsaw Pact would never launch a purely conventional attack on the NATO sector. Soviet war-fighting policy is directed to maximize Soviet war-winning capability, which depends on the strategic-nuclear obliteration of North America in advance of a "conventional" force assault on Western Europe with ABC (Atomic, Biological, Chemical) support. The NATO communiqué's refusal to accept a ban on first use of nuclear weapons is either irrelevant, or must be interpreted as NATO holding open the option of a blitzkrieg attack on the Warsaw Pact at some future date.

Response from the Western socialist press and the Comecon sector was swift and harsh. East German radio noted that the U.S. had in the past used the UN Charter to justify such "defenses against aggression" as the Vietnam War. The Italian Socialist Party daily *Avanti* and the French Communist Party daily *L'Humanité* joined the denunciations of NATO initiated by the socialist sector press. The French Communists' *L'Humanité* of Dec. 15 reported on the joint Franco-Soviet (Gaullist-Soviet Parliamentarian) call for nuclear and total disarmament.

## Rumsfeld: NATO Has What It Needs—Defense, Deterrence

*Exclusive to NSIPS*

*Dec. 15 — The following is an excerpt from the transcript of a press conference held by NATO headquarters in Brussels, Dec. 8, by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld following the semi-annual ministerial meeting here of the NATO Defense Planning Committee, Dec. 7 and 8. Mr. Rumsfeld's remarks were not reported by any U.S. press.*

We've looked at the current military capabilities of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the kinds of expansions and their effort which we have seen over a period of some years now. We discussed the facts about the trends in the military balance. I believe that the meetings are helpful to all ministers in terms of judging our circumstances and in terms of them making the case for what I believe is necessary...an increase in real

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terms in our level of effort within the alliance....

I won't go into the details of what has been taking place from the standpoint of the Soviet Union. I think you are all aware of them. Their defense spending has been steadily increasing in real terms. The level of their effort, the size of their military establishment, the modernization of their strategic forces, the substantial modernization of their general purpose forces, the addition of some nearly 2,000 tactical aircraft since the early 1960's, the increase in divisions from 141 to 168 and the obvious, during that period, increase in the sophistication of those weapons as well as the institutional capability of the Soviet Union to produce additional weapons of increasing capability and sophistication.

The only other thing I might say is that it seems to me that, having looked at this alliance over a period of time, and hearing about its imminent demise from time to time, it is encouraging to me to see a very high level of cooperation within the alliance, indeed higher in terms of the smoothness of the cooperation than at any time during my experience. I think the alliance is healthy...I am, frankly, reassured by the fact that there is an Atlantic Alliance and that it is on watch and doing its job.

*Q.* What assurance were you able to give the other defense ministers that the assessment you make is going to be the assessment made by the succeeding administration in Washington?

*A.* ...What we discussed in there was not Rumsfeld's opinion, but *facts, facts don't change*. The military committee presented facts, the SACEUR presented facts, the various nations including the United States presented facts, and the facts are what they are. Those facts drive reasonable people, I think to certain conclusions. It certainly wasn't my role during this particular period to in any way suggest that I could speak for the new administration. The president-elect is obviously very capable of doing that...

*Q.* Mr. Secretary, do you consider what has been decided today on the Air Warning-Air Control System — can it be considered as a decision in principal in favor of the system?

*A.* Well, the question involves how you would characterize what transpired in the DPC from the standpoint of the discussion on AWACS. I would prefer to leave that to the secretary general to discuss. I think that, subject to how he describes it, and I would certainly defer to him since he is the secretary general, it seemed to me that there was general agreement that a capability to provide early warning and control, with respect to particularly low-level air, was generally agreed as a NATO requirement....

*Q.* Mr. Secretary, regarding the factual situation on the Soviet Warsaw Pact buildup, I would like you, if you would, to relate that to the recent history of what is called detente. Do you feel that we have lost ground in following a policy called "detente" and that "detente" may have been partly a hoax that we were on the receiving end of?

*A.* Well, the way I look at it, and I suppose everyone kind of looks at this subject a little bit differently, — but from the standpoint of free people, what we have to do is assure ourselves that we have the kinds of defensive

capabilities that will provide a deterrent so that there is peace and stability in this area of the world. The reality is that the Soviet Union exists; that it doesn't believe in the things that we believe in, by a darn sight; that they have substantial military power; and that their military capability has evolved over the past 20 years in a very substantial way. When one goes back to the post World War II Soviet Union and compares it with today, it is clear that they have moved from an ox cart society to a rather sophisticated military power. Now they are there, and they don't agree with what we agree with in terms of the dignity of individuals, in terms of freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, freedom of religion. It seems to me that it is perfectly appropriate, while we are maintaining defense and deterrence at an adequate level to assure peace and stability, that we engage in negotiations with the Soviet Union to test whether at that given point in time we can be successful in finding areas of agreement that, for whatever reason, are in our common interest. We have been doing that in the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), and I think that is useful to do. We have been doing that is the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna, and I think that that is useful to do. It, of course, requires that during that period — and everyone I know who has ever dealt with these subjects would agree — that during that period one maintains one's capabilities. So, I think that it goes too far in the context of your question to suggest that some sort of error is involved there. It seems to me that what you must do is you must maintain your defense capabilities, assure that the deterrence is healthy, and simultaneously engage in those discussions and see if it is possible to find some areas of agreement. If it is, wonderful. If it isn't, be patient and keep working and try to achieve them.

*Q.* In that connection, sir, what do you think of the continued granting of loans and credits on easy terms to the Soviet Union and its effect on their industrial capacity, and consequent effect on their military capacity?

*A.* A relationship between two nations is a multi-faceted thing, and to take out one piece of that multi-faceted relationship and try to examine it and say what do you think of that all by itself is really not a very useful exercise. It seems to me that what one must do is look to the entire relationship and judge the whole, and that is the way I prefer to do it. The question you asked, of course, is a question that falls more in the areas of ministers of finance and foreign ministers than secretaries of defense. I have my views on it, but it seems to me that it is very difficult to deal with it in isolation....

*W. German Press:*

NATO Reaches No  
'Agreements In Principle'

*The following are selected from West German press coverage of the NATO Defense Planning Committee's annual ministerial meeting earlier this month.*

*Süddeutsche Zeitung, Dec. 9: The West German Ambassador to NATO told the press yesterday that*