

Carter Goes Public with Campaign for Showdown with Soviets

Dec. 30 — Just days after Jimmy Carter named former defense secretary and nuclear counterforce strategist James Schlesinger to a top White House advisory post, the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) boldly took its preparations for a nuclear showdown with the Soviet Union before the public. The CPD, formed by Schlesinger and other Carter advisors, is the architect of Carter's foreign policy.

The object of the current CPD propaganda campaign and the accompanying provocations to the Soviets around the world is to create a climate of psychosis — the Schlesingerian "aura of power" — in which the U.S. population will passively accept World War III.

In a series of public pronouncements and private interviews this week, the CPD crowd announced their determination to provoke a global confrontation. The New York Times advertised in a front-page lead article Dec. 26 that a group of "outsiders" was recently brought into the Central Intelligence Agency to debate the agency's estimate of Soviet strategic capabilities and reach "grim conclusions." The "conclusions," authored by CPDers Paul Nitze, Thomas Wolfe, and William Van Cleeve, among others, echoed the CPD contention that the Soviets "intend" to provoke a crisis. Not surprisingly, the "outsiders" named are Carter's *insiders*, including warhawks who were ousted by President Ford in the 1975 "Halloween Massacre" as a threat to world peace. These

warhawks subsequently regrouped in the CPD to propagandize their war conspiracy.

One of the "outsiders," Thomas Wolfe of the Rand Corporation and a member of the inner circle of National Security Advisor-designate Zbigniew Brzezinski, told an interviewer this week: "We must stop stressing deterrence and prepare the population for war." The big bluff strategy to face down the Soviets was reiterated in a press briefing by former CIA official Ray Cline.

These Carter backers are not waiting for Carter to enter the White House Jan. 20. Since the provocative designation of Schlesinger as special presidential assistant, the Rockefeller financial cabal behind Schlesinger and Carter has coordinated assaults in major hotspots of the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, targeted Cuba, and drawn a bead on Eastern Europe — the surest way to force the Soviets to launch a nuclear strike.

The most immediate provocation to the USSR is the Carterites' plan to extend NATO's orbit into Latin America, beginning with the inclusion of Brazil in large-scale NATO naval maneuvers which begin in the Caribbean Jan. 17. These maneuvers set the precedent for formation of a South Atlantic Treaty Organization as NATO's junior partner in the South Atlantic, an intolerable strategic threat to the Soviet Union, and its Cuban ally in the Caribbean.

Hawks Issue 'Grim' Estimate Of Soviet Power

Dec. 28 — The following are excerpts from a lead front-page article in today's New York Times by David Binder entitled "New CIA Estimate Finds Soviets Seek Superiority in Arms," and subtitled "Intelligence Evaluation Grim, Somber Assessment Is Attributed to Outside Advisers Brought Into Study for First Time."

WASHINGTON, Dec. 25 — President-elect Carter will

receive an intelligence estimate of long-range Soviet strategic intentions next month that raises the question whether the Russians are shifting their objectives from rough parity with United States military forces to superiority.

In reporting this, high-ranking officials of the Central Intelligence Agency said their annual so-called national estimate of Soviet strategic objectives over the next 10

years, just completed, was more somber than any in more than a decade. A top-level military intelligence officer who has seen the estimate commented: "It was more than somber — it was very grim. It flatly states the judgment that the Soviet Union is seeking superiority over United States forces. The flat judgment that that is the aim of the Soviet Union is a majority view in the estimate. The questions begin on when they will achieve it."

Previous national estimates of Soviet aims — the supreme products of the intelligence community since 1950 — had concluded that the objective was rough parity with United States strategic capabilities....

There have always been officials in the intelligence community who took a grim view of Soviet strategic objectives, but until this year, according to insiders, they constituted a small minority....

The more somber view represented — "more somber" being the phraseology of the C.I.A. — developed in an unusual fashion, according, to a number of participants. They said it came about primarily through continuing dissents by a long-term maverick in the intelligence community, Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan Jr., whose voice was strengthened this year by like-minded outsiders. General Keegan, who is retiring Jan. 1 as Air Force chief of intelligence describes himself as "the eye of controversy" in the intelligence community and has been contesting the estimates of Soviet intentions for 22 years...

Guidance of American Policy

The long-range estimate provides guidance for the size and shape of the United States defense budget, the Government's policy approach to East-West relations, including strategic arms negotiations, civil-defense planning and, ultimately, the entire concept of strategic deterrence, based for two decades on nuclear-tipped intercontinental missiles and antimissile defenses. The estimate also influences the annual "secret posture statement" sent to Congress by the Secretary of Defense as a guidance for the protection of the United States....

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General Keegan became convinced that the Soviet Union was preparing for offensive war against the United States. This prompted him to oppose a 1972 treaty curbing offensive nuclear weapons...

Last June Mr. Bush and William G. Hyland, Mr. Ford's deputy assistant for national security, selected a panel of seven outsiders to join, experimentally, in drafting the next long-range estimate. The conditions were that the outsiders be mutually agreeable to the advisory board and to Mr. Bush and that they hold more pessimistic views of Soviet plans than those entertained by the advocates of the rough parity thesis.

Those selected were Richard Pipes, Professor of Russian History at Harvard; Thomas W. Wolfe of the RAND Corporation; Lieut. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, ret., former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Paul D.

Wolfowitz of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Paul H. Nitze, former Deputy Secretary of Defense; John Vogt, a retired Air Force general, and Prof. William Van Cleve of the University of Southern California, formerly a delegate to the strategic arms talks...

As related by participants in both the team headed by Professor Pipes and the team headed by Mr. Stoertz, controversy boiled up immediately, not only on interpretation of less easily defined strategic objectives but also with regard to missile accuracy.

'We Left Them Speechless'

"Sometimes we left them speechless," one of the outsiders remarked. "We had men of great prestige, some of them with memories going back 25 years or more, and they made devastating critiques of the agency estimates." A C.I.A. estimator described the work as "a rather unfair setup" in which the outsiders felt they had a somewhat broader mandate, and used it.

Another intelligence officer spoke of "absolutely bloody discussions" during which the outsiders accused the C.I.A. of dealing in faulty assumptions, faulty analysis, faulty use of intelligence and faulty exploitation of available intelligence. "It was an absolute disaster for the C.I.A.," this official added in an authorized interview. Acknowledging that there were more points of difference than in most years, he said: "There was disagreement beyond the facts."...

Dispute on Strategic Objectives

All those interviewed acknowledged that the greatest disputes arose over Soviet strategic aims.

The outsiders asserted that the ultimate intention was to develop forces capable of interfering with the free flow of ocean transport, denying raw materials to the West, disrupting fuel supplies, defeating the "projection of power from sea to land" by Western forces, defending nuclear capability from American nuclear submarines and developing strategic forces that would ultimately have a superior first-strike capability.

The insiders retorted that hard evidence did not permit such extrapolations, according to a C.I.A. participant. He said with regard to Soviet military preparations: "For us the question is not whether the Russians are coming, but whether it is feasible for them to get here and how soon. That comes back to the question of United States will and determination. If we don't have it, then there is superiority."

After a series of clashes the teams convened Dec. 2 and 3 before the President's advisory board and presented their estimates and critiques. In the judgment of outsiders, the C.I.A. estimate, which formed the basis for the national estimate, was strongly influenced by their group. General Keegan was said to believe the insiders shifted 180 degrees as a result of the exchange...

There is a prospect that the Carter Administration might look further into the somber side of the estimates because Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President-elect's designated national security advisor, recently received a briefing on Soviet military programs from General Keegan.

**War Policy That Leads
To Permanent Destruction of U.S.,
Would Force Soviets to Back Down
CPD'er Says**

Dec. 28 — The following is a full transcript of an interview today with Dr. Uri Ra'anah, professor of government at the Fletcher School of Diplomacy, Tufts University, Boston, and a member of the Committee on the Present Danger and the Trilateral Commission. Ra'anah is a friend of Zbigniew Brzezinski, diplomatic trouble-shooter whose specialty is Eastern Europe and the Balkans. He was a leading participant at the June 1976 Ralph Bunche Institute conference on international terrorism where the Entebbe and Croatian hijacking scenarios were first spelled out.

Q: Now that President-elect Carter has announced his entire round of Cabinet appointments, what is your assessment of the new administration?

A: Well, the appointment of Zbiggy is encouraging, but overall it does not look good. Some of the things coming out of Brown, Carter, and that UN Ambassador Young are absolute hogwash. I could not believe my ears when I heard that Brown had categorically dismissed the Team B report as an exaggeration. (*The Team B report is the findings of the "outsiders" study group on Soviet strategic and military policy that collaborated with the official CIA team in preparing the annual agency report to the administration. Team B was made up exclusively of members of the Committee on the Present Danger and like-minded utopian warmongers including Paul Nitze, Gen. Daniel O. Graham, and Thomas Wolf -ed.*) And to top it off, Carter comes out and backs Brown by publically stating he still believes there is a strategic military balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Then he quotes from Kissinger that the Soviets have never told a lie. I mean, really! What was the Cuban missile crisis all about? Then the UN ambassador comes out calling for a strong Vietnam — to guard against the China threat. This is straight, unadulterated MacNamara policy. Haven't these people learned a thing since then? Brown, Vance, Young — these people represent a very dangerous tendency in the new administration. And Carter himself is behaving like James I. I mean, really, quoting Kissinger of all people.

Q: Well what about Schlesinger and Brzezinski?

A: Of course I'm a close personal friend of Zbiggy and I am sure he will play a constructive role in the administration. Back in 1964-65 he was very tough minded, but he may have changed since he was last in government. Jim Schlesinger is, of course, also a good appointment. However, Jim is being placed into an impossible job. Before he can actually get moving and establish his presence in the administration, there will have to be some fundamental changes in Congress.

Q: From the pessimistic perspective you are presenting, I wonder whether you would have preferred another four years of Ford and Kissinger.

A: Absolutely not. Kissinger consistently undermined the willpower of the U.S. administration. Under a Ford-

Kissinger administration our chances were absolutely zero. Under Carter I would say we have a one-in-eight or one-in-ten chance of really changing things. But from Carter's recent behavior I'm afraid I don't see any hope over the next six months.

Soviet 'Blackmail'

Q: Do you foresee a Soviet policy of testing the new administration and, if so, what initiatives do you believe they will take?

A: They absolutely will test. Soviet policy now is a policy of blackmail. They will squeeze for a rapid SALT II agreement that would be absolutely horrendous for the U.S. They will initiate expanded surrogate warfare operations to be run through the Soviet puppet states outside of the Warsaw Pact — and by this I mean Cuba, Vietnam, and North Korea.

I can foresee two or three scenarios for Yugoslavia if the succession crisis occurs. I honestly don't know at this point if I would prefer to see Tito still alive — despite his movement toward closer ties to Moscow — or the unfolding of some sort of confrontation initiated by the Soviets. I also expect an increasing emphasis on the Caribbean, particularly Panama, Guyana, and Jamaica. These areas are all targeted for Cuban operations.

Q: Have you read the Linowitz Commission Report? One section of that study suggests that negotiations may be initiated between the U.S. and Cubans. It puts forward the hypothetical case of a U.S. agreement to crack down on Cuban exile terrorists in return for Cuban promises to permanently stay out of Angola and refrain from new interventions.

A: I haven't read the report yet, but I can tell you that we could never sit down and negotiate with the Cubans. Any time an open society and closed society sit down to negotiate on anything, the closed society will win.

Besides, the Soviets are active everywhere around the globe and that's a fact. They are all over south central Africa, and I can tell you now that the Cairo meeting between Syria and Egypt was no peace discussion in preparation for Geneva. That was a Soviet-initiated planning session to gird for the next attack.

You talk about the Cubans staying out of Angola. Do you know that the Cubans were based out of Syria before they even went in to Angola? And do you think that has changed? The Soviets plan to run a picket fence operation in the Middle East. They'll trigger the Syrians and Egyptians into a provocation against Israel. They'll move their own direct military forces into the area, and then they'll dare us to fire the first shot of World War III.

Q: In this context, what significance do you place in the Soviets' transferable ruble initiatives, particularly as they will effect the posture of our NATO allies in Europe?

A: Don't overestimate the Soviets' economic initiatives. They believe in the unconditional primacy of maintaining the Soviet economy. The British are the only European nation to be in severe enough financial shape to be potentially swayed by this.

Q: In a recent interview from Europe, Senator Javits took quite a different view. He expressed a fear that all of Europe could establish some kind of bloc with the Soviets if the economic collapse is not countered by some kind of Marshall Plan initiatives by the U.S.

The Problem is 'Political Will'

A: Look, Javits is on entirely the wrong track on this question. The problem is not economic. The problem is one of political will, and until the United States demonstrates to its Western allies that the will to stand up to the Soviets' blackmail is the overriding theme of U.S. policy, then nothing will improve.

Q: Then what is your message to the Carter administration? What are the policy recommendations that you are conveying to your friend Brzezinski?

A: First, no summit meeting with Brezhnev under any circumstances. Second, initiate an immediate program of military buildup, and I mean both R and D and production. I know of some specific R and D programs but I'm not at liberty to discuss them now. Under no circumstances can we abandon the Cruise missile program, and I don't care what kind of offer the Soviets make to discard the Backfire program. Third, make it absolutely clear to the Soviets that the U.S. will tolerate no "adventurism" from the Bolsheviks. There is no need to be any more specific. Just use the term "adventurism."

The Soviets have an absolute military strategic superiority at this point, and the key to that superiority is their civil defense program. A full-scale thermonuclear war would claim only 5 to 6 per cent of the Soviet population — a loss that we of course would not be willing to accept but the Soviets would — given their history in World War II. We, of course, would be totally wiped out by such a war. I have known this for years.

I have reviewed the data used by Team B. They all know that the Soviets do not buy MAD (*Mutually Assured Destruction -ed*). They have a war-winning policy and a war-winning capability — and its about time that fact became known to the U.S. population.

Q: Dr. Ra'anana, you have posed a paradoxical situation from the standpoint of what you are saying. If, as you say, the Soviets are playing a blackmail operation, won't your proposal to stand up to the blackmail despite the fact that the U.S. does not have the military capacity to really back up that stand lead to a Soviet first strike?

A: No, absolutely not. You are forgetting a fundamental principal of politics: the role of will. Remember, the Soviets, as I said before, do not go in for adventurism. Bolsheviks are scientists. Even though the U.S. is at least three to four full years behind the Soviets in military strategic capabilities, the fact of a U.S. administration expressing the political will to resist the Soviet blackmail by launching a military buildup would prompt the Soviets to back down. They believe time is on their side and they will postpone their blackmail for another 20 years if they see the U.S. initiative.

The fact that we would adopt a policy that would lead to the permanent destruction of the United States in order to go under fighting represents the kind of resoluteness to which the Soviets would back down. Remember, there is a dialectic at work: foreign policy is the process of resolution through conflict. And, I might add, that a U.S. policy initiative of this kind would have a tremendous impact on our European allies and on the Chinese. Such a move might just put an end to Chinese-Soviet rapprochement.

*Clandestine Operations
in Soviet Bloc*

Q: Would you favor a policy of clandestine operations directed against the Soviet bloc as an integrated feature of such a dramatic policy initiative?

A: Absolutely. Right now we are making no attempt whatsoever to exploit the weaknesses in the East bloc. The ferment there is not restricted to Poland. You wouldn't believe the unrest in the Soviet military service. And I don't just mean the base in the military. The officer corps, despite the fact that they enjoy a relatively high standard of living, are in real ferment.

Remember, 50 per cent of the Soviet population conceives of itself as a colonized people. There is a deep recognition that the Soviet leadership always lies. But the military and the population go along with the leadership now because they see the tremendous weakness in the West and assume that there is no real resistance. Take away that sense of weakness and all hell will break loose. We can do great things for the people of the bloc. We must create broad-based dissident committees; we must reactivate Air Liberty. This is crucial. Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America are so rotten that they have been absorbed as an accepted part of East bloc entertainment.

It has been accepted military doctrine since the time of Clausewitz that weakness won't win. Only will and power can shape politics. In a narrow area of the West, a tradition has grown — a tradition that says that man is enlightened and rational. This is a disgustingly laudable principle, but it doesn't work.

Wolfe:

Educate Public For War

Dec. 30 — The following are excerpts from an interview with Thomas W. Wolfe of the Rand Corporation, a member of the "outside team" brought in to contest CIA intelligence estimates of the USSR's strategic capability and intentions.

Q: Mr. Wolfe, David Binder's article in Sunday's *New York Times* emphasized your team's criticisms of the CIA's overall ability to evaluate Soviet military capabilities and strategic aims. Do you think that the public exposure of your criticisms will result in implementation of some of the various proposals to split the CIA into two separate branches, one for covert operations and the other for intelligence?

A: Well, I wouldn't say that these reforms will be put into effect as an *immediate* or direct result, but I do think press coverage of the problem will provoke some thinking about the procedures the CIA now uses to gather and evaluate intelligence.

Q: Could you elaborate a bit on what you see the chief problems in current intelligence-gathering methodology as being?

A: First, there is too much of a tendency to assume that

there is a parity of values between the Soviet Union and us. This is an absolutely incorrect assumption, and it tends to distort the way in which intelligence is evaluated. We (*the "outside team"*) found that a lot of people in the CIA had views even grimmer than ours on the Soviet-U.S. military balance, but the institutional process within the CIA had relegated these views to a few footnotes buried at the end of reports. So there definitely is a fundamental problem that has to be dealt with.

Q: When you say that it is wrong to assume parity of values between the U.S. and the Soviets, what exactly do you mean?

A: The Soviet Union approaches the whole relationship from an entirely different standpoint than in this country. We don't prepare the population for the actuality of war, but place all our emphasis on deterring war rather than fighting one. The Soviets, on the other hand, begins from the position that if, at some point, you have to make a decision to have a war, then you better have put yourself in the position to win it! The Soviets have a massive civil defense program, they spend far more of their overall budget on weapons, their literature is replete with the assertions that they must achieve superiority. This isn't rhetoric....

Q: Given all this, and given the views of the "outside team" that the Soviets are surpassing us militarily, what do you think needs to be done?

A: I'm not a policymaker myself, but from my own view there are several things that should be done. First, we have to get out, through people like you, the facts about the situation to the American public. Eighty per cent of the U.S. population doesn't want to think about these questions, but they're going to have to realize that their lives depend on making some important decisions. The most important thing we can develop is informed public opinion, or else the policymakers won't get far. Henry — Henry Bratcher from the *Washington Star* — is doing a good job along these lines. The second thing is to get a lot of the currently classified materials dealing with the strategic balance declassified, so that the American public has greater access to raw facts. And third, we have to persuade the Soviet Union that the U.S. is not going to allow itself to be maneuvered into a position of weakness. We have to stop making concessions to the Soviets. We've been letting the Russians wrest concessions from us right and left. I'll give you an example. Take the SALT talks. It's the Soviets who have been blocking the talks, not us, but you'd never know that. The average American doesn't know it's the Russians' fault!

Q: Do you think that Carter's decision to bring Schlesinger into the government will mean that the new Administration will be more realistic about the current global balance of power?

A: Well, I don't know how much input Schlesinger will be able to have on these questions from the position he'll have. I think that Carter's advice on national security matters will come primarily from Vance and Brzezinski. I just hope they know what to tell Carter to do.

Q: I was struck by the similarities between the views of the "outside team" and those of a new organization, the Committee on the Present Danger....

A: Oh, I'm not surprised by that at all. Several members of my group (*the "outside team" -ed.*) are also members

of the Committee, and although I myself am not, I know most of the individuals who belong to the Committee very well. They were formed to warn the American people about the Russian military buildup. Their thrust is generally the same as ours.

Cline Spells Out Assassination Plots Against 3rd World Leaders

Dec. 29 — After briefing a number of select journalists in his office today, Ray Cline, executive director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former CIA officer, granted a second interview. The following excerpts give the substance of that interview.

Q: How do you view the CPD (Committee on the Present Danger) report published in the Dec. 26 *New York Times*?

A: I disagree with the Pipes (CPD) report, but only in part. There are three ways to look at this. First, that the Soviets are not trying to gain a strategic, warfighting edge over the U.S. This view is wrong. Second, that the Soviets are trying to gain such an advantage and they are planning to use it against the U.S. This also is wrong. It is true they are going for an arms buildup but only in order to have psychological and political clout vis-à-vis current U.S. trading and political allies and the nonaligned countries. They want to gain political and economic concessions in these countries by looking like they will attack the U.S.

Q: Isn't it dangerous for the so-called Pipes line even to be put out?

A: That depends on how the government reacts to it and how the press reacts to it.

Q: YOU don't see a nuclear war on the horizon?

A: Oh, no, no! We will have to play it cool and keep level-headed.

Q: Particularly in places like the Middle East?

A: Sure. In the Middle East the USSR is trying to use their arms buildup to gain the leverage they have been losing ever since the U.S. bought off the Arabs by paying high prices for oil. Egypt and Syria were the recipients of these price hikes and they came over to the U.S. side. The USSR supports the radical Arab states that are inclined to terrorism. They will, for instance, use Libya and Palestine Liberation Organization terrorists to destabilize the Middle East. Syria however, was weaned away from this course to a pro-U.S. position. The Soviets will try to knock out Sadat (*Egyptian president -ed*), Khalid (*Saudi Arabian king -ed*), and even perhaps King Hussein (*of Jordan -ed*), by working with Libya.

Q: Knock them out — what do you mean?

A: They will work with Libya and use their hit squads to assassinate these leaders. Sadat knows he may be a target for assassination. They's why he has a bodyguard.

Q: What should the U.S. do about this situation?

A: Since terrorism wins out eventually, we've got to continue with the conservative Arabs and defuse the PLO thing. Maybe you could use Geneva. At a Geneva conference there would be one Arab side and one Israeli

side. The PLO would be a minor part of the general Arab position. The PLO would be submerged. We also want to buy off the PLO....

Q: Buy them off?

A: Yes, give them a state, cushy jobs, limousines. Let them have the same benefits that the other Arabs got in the oil-price hikes. The more conservative Arabs like those on the West Bank would have the biggest voice in such a Palestinian state.

Better Than Kissinger and Nixon

Q: What do you think about Carter's attitude in refusing to meet with foreign leaders unless they come one by one to meet with him in Washington?

A: That's great, certainly better than Nixon's and Kissinger's style. Now they're going to have to come to us. That's the way it should be. We don't want to get into

situations like those Kissinger and Nixon got us into where we had to make concessions. This way is preferable.

Q: Did you read the article in today's *Washington Post* that blew the State Department role in backing the Brazil coup against Goulard in 1964?

A: No, but I heard about it. Goddamit, there's some narrow political faction, really vary naive faction, that's trying to hurt our relations with Brazil. This big city press...the *Washington Post*. This is a leak. It's a leak. There's a whole attitude around this city! Jeez. You have to expose the evils of the Greek coup, the evils of South Africa, the evils of everything. These narrow-minded liberals. You have to work with all kinds of governments.

Q: Won't this hurt the upcoming joint U.S.-Brazilian landing maneuvers?

A: Yeah, it might hurt them badly.

Soviets Caution Against 'American Global Strategy'

In a comment in effect on the consolidation of the Carter confrontation Cabinet, the Soviet military paper "Red Star" Dec. 26 point-blank warned the West against using NATO to carry out "an American global strategy." "In our nuclear age. . ." cautioned Red Star, "relying on the growth of military potential, no matter how it may be covered over with anti-Soviet camouflage, is as hopeless as it is dangerous."

Red Star's year-end wrap-up "Balance of the Outgoing Year" reviewed NATO's 1976 blitzkrieg type maneuvers which placed "unprecedented" amounts of troops at the borders of the socialist countries.

But the "hawks" in Washington are not only espousing a policy of a hopeless "short intense war in Europe," stated Red Star. Recently in Washington, alluding to the interests of the West European countries, there has been more and more talk of the 'necessity' to widen the sphere

of activities of the North Atlantic bloc." Enunciating stated Soviet policy that attempts by NATO to incorporate the Third World is a war issue, Red Star warned: "Several years ago the U.S. claimed that the 'oil-rich' Persian Gulf was the 'eastern flank of NATO.' Now they would like to transpose this flank even further east. General Haig (NATO Commander-in-Chief—ed.) for example has already spoken of 'an Atlantic community extending from Japan to the Near East to the North American continent and Western Europe.'"

Plans to create an "American-NATO global militarist system" declared Red Star, is "one of the most serious obstacles" to a stable peace. At the same time, "influential and powerful circles in capitalist countries" have rejected recent Warsaw Pact initiatives such as a treaty to ban first use of nuclear weapons. Such a situation, concluded the military daily, demands "high vigilance and combat-readiness" of Soviet troops.

NATO and Brazil Participate in Caribbean Maneuvers

Beginning in mid-January, elements of the Brazilian Navy and Marines will participate in a five week exercise in the Caribbean along with four NATO countries, code named CARIBOPS. These maneuvers, described as "routine" in a release from the commander of the United States Second Fleet stationed in Norfolk, Va., will begin Jan. 17, and will involve 47 separate naval and coordinated marine commands from Canada, the United States, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Brazil.

This year, however, CARIBOPS will take place within a climate of political tension fostered by the State Department's drive to extend NATO with the creation of

a South Atlantic Treaty Organization involving Brazil. SATO has been denounced by the Soviet bloc press. Specific training for the Brazilians will be in amphibious landings and anti-submarine warfare, while overall, the exercise will concentrate on training in anti-air and submarine tactics as protection of "opposed transit"—a polite term for military blockades. Much of the maneuver will be run near the Cuban coast coordinated from U.S. Naval bases in Puerto Rico and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Contacted by NSIPS, a spokesman at the U.S. State Department Public Affairs Desk was unable to find any reference to CARIBOPS in his quarterly bulletin which

lists every maneuver scheduled to take place over the next year. The official stated that he should be aware of the maneuver if it is going on, explaining that the State Department and Department of Defense consult and jointly work out details of maneuvers because "we don't want to land troops on some beach where some president is being inaugurated." When briefed on the political tensions building in the area, the official expressed

concern over the potential for CARIBOPS to be used as a provocation against Cuba. Several Pentagon officials were equally baffled by their inability to locate any listing of announcement of CARIBOPS in their records. CARIBOPS was first announced in the Brazilian newspaper, *Jornal do Brazil*, printed several days before the Second Fleet release was issued.

World Press on the Issue of War

Within the last week, the press in the Federal German Republic has been filled with a debate on the question of war centered on the financing of a NATO proposed AWACS air control system and on the leaked report in the New York Times Dec. 26 that the U.S. intelligence agencies had been won over to "outsiders" views that the Soviet Union is seeking immediate military superiority.

Die Welt Dec. 20—"Brandt Statements on MBFR Weaken The West," by Wolfgang von Raven. "Does Bonn want the West to alter its previous position on the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks? Brandt's statements (i.e., his call for a token small conventional force reduction on both sides—ed.) indicate this. . . Is there a contradiction between Brandt and Schmidt on the one hand, and Genscher and Leber on the other? . . . These questions must be answered quickly, because otherwise the Allies will get the impression that the FRG, which awaits Brezhnev's visit, wants to avoid necessary agreements in the alliance, and that they plan to go it alone. . . . A dangerous matter, which would have the effect of weakening the unity of the West. . . . Symbolic reduction. . . could give the Warsaw Pact a form of co-determination within the NATO formation. . . . Bonn must avoid this, since they would not want to opt for the neutralization of Central Europe, nor does it want to harden the East's position toward the West."

Der Spiegel Dec. 20—"Expensive Ten Minutes." "The Americans want to protect the West from a surprise attack from the East by using their airborne early warning system AWACS. But the question of how the project, running into the millions, will be financed is still disputed. . . . How high the final bill will be is, moreover, a completely unanswered question. . . . Under these conditions, Bonn's generals and the top military men think it will be impossible for the NATO partners' financial experts to agree on a formula in January as planned. The decision will be made, if at all, only in April during the (European) defense ministers' meeting. . . . What's more, Defense Minister Leber will only agree if "as many NATO countries as possible" participate in its production and operation. A two- or four-nation program is out of the question for financial and political reasons."

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Dec. 21—"Numbers Are Not Supreme—Soviet Military Superiority and Western

Strategy," by Adalbert Weinstein. "Western Germany is prepared neither for its own destruction, nor for the damage which the enemy could incur. We have no anti-air raid organization, no bunkers, no energy reserves. This is not a reproach. The core of our strategic conception is deterrence. There is certainly talk about the next step, the transition to a military confrontation. But we cannot accept this in our minds. . . . The core of our weakness is the strategic conception. Formulated simply, the West is prepared for a total non-war. . . . We don't dare think beyond the boundary where the unthinkable begins. The Communists take the unthinkable into account, and are ready for a total war. United States thinking. . . offers us an alternative: the limited war. . . . A limited war in Europe today would be the same as collective suicide."

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Dec. 23—"Leber Demands Fair Sharing of Cost of NATO Early Warning System," an interview of the West German Defense Minister with Adalbert Weinstein. "'AWACS must not turn into a matter which only the Americans and the Germans handle amongst themselves. . . . First, our sources of funds are not unlimited. And second, every financial contribution is immanently a political contribution as well. The dollar is not merely a means of payment; it is also a demonstration of solidarity.' . . . 'I would rather be publicly rebuked by my partners than to enter into a commitment which has not been gone over centimeter by centimeter for its workability.'"

Bayernkurier Dec. 23—"Targetted Detente Policy," by Eric Morton, reviewing a recent study by Brian Crozier of the London Institute for Strategic Studies, entitled "Security and the Myth of Peace." "Cutting off the seaways and therefore raw materials, however, is not the only Soviet threat to Western economies and security. Along with infiltration, subversion and terrorism supported by the East, there is psychological warfare, as well as political and diplomatic pressure supported by military superiority, in pursuit of the immediate goal of transforming the European nations according to the Finland model. . . . If the new President of the United States does not want to lead his country into a strategic isolation and political defeat, then he must decide to drop the policy of placation and take up the forward policy." Carter must call a special NATO

conference where "all aspects of the Eastern threat are analyzed, forward policy is coordinated, and joint defense measures against terrorism and subversion are agreed upon.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Dec. 28—In reporting the competing Central Intelligence Agency evaluations of Soviet strategy, Jan Reifenberg writes that "Just as in 1960, when the fight over the 'missile gap' introduced a basic change in U.S. strategy, so these days Carter's judgment of the background of Soviet rearmament can decisively shift the essence of U.S. defense policy. The burned children of 1960—who following Kennedy's takeover found out that the 'missile gap' was a fantasy—will be in power again in January." A "powerful group of hawks," including Schlesinger, Nitze, and Jackson, are trying to influence Carter. Since people like Nitze doubt whether it is possible to reach a new SALT agreement, the question is coming up whether the U.S. President alone should make the final decision on the launching of nuclear weapons.

London Times Questions Times' Motives

In a Dec. 29 article, London Times Washington correspondent Fred Emery questioned the motivation behind a report "leaked" in the New York Times on Sunday, Dec. 26 that the U.S. intelligence had been won over by "outsiders" to the view that the Soviet Union is seeking immediate military superiority. "The fact that the top secret so-called 'national estimate' of Soviet objectives has reached the New York Times in such a timely fashion," writes Emery, "has raised suggestions here today that the defence hardliners wanted deliberately to ensure as much exposure as possible before the new man took office." This switch in thinking is likely to "precipitate political controversy" and is obviously "the stuff of fierce debate," notes Emery. He sees the key item of contention as the report's conclusion that the Soviets are bent on disrupting fuel and raw materials supplies and on developing first strike capabilities. The newspaper quotes Carter's designated Secretary of Defense Harold Brown as saying in an interview with the Los Angeles Times that "the belief on either side that you can survive a strategic thermonuclear war as a going society—when you cannot—is the worst possible situation for the world to be in."

London Times Scoffs At Carter's Summitry Attempt

Carter's announcement that he will meet with Brezhnev next year should be greeted with "mixed

feelings" writes the London Times in a lead editorial Dec. 29. Mutual distrust between the Soviet Union and the United States "is not going to be removed by handshakes and reassuring words" and even agreement on strategic weapons such as SALT should not be seen as the "end all" of relations between the superpowers, says the editorial. "Their military significance is strictly limited and they become politically significant only if they fit into other arrangements that lower the level of confrontation or lessen the danger of conflict." Carter of course "can make progress. . . but there is something a little dispiriting about his way of starting." A man-to-man summit is a "familiar routine" which can not really resolve any fundamental differences. Carter "would probably have been wiser to say cautiously that he would be happy to meet Mr. Brezhnev as soon as he was convinced that serious business required the personal attention of both men.

Venezuela's *El Nacional*:

Jimmy Carter: Portrait of a Robot

. . . This Mr. Carter has a marked vocation for order, discipline and method. . . .

However, being a formidable organizer may help win elections, but I am afraid it does very little for running the United States. We are in the presence of a great executive. . . . But he is not a statesman.

. . . His total lack of humanist education is frightening. He is a reader of briefs and memoranda. . . .

What would this technocrat do when confronted with international crises of the calibre of those of Berlin (1948), the Suez (1956), the Bay of Pigs (1961), or the Missile Crisis (1962)? I suspect that Jimmy Carter, given his psychological makeup, would get along better with the hawks than with the doves. The language of military officers must be more familiar to him than that of politicians.

He will surround himself with technicians, with specialists incapable of thinking in abstractions, with men who have quick answers for extremely complex problems. If this hypothesis is correct, I believe that Mr. Carter's finger will be closer to the trigger than that of Mr. Ford. . . .

Then, supposedly, there is the religious theme. Carter is a believer, but that doesn't change anything. Truman was perhaps the most religious of all American presidents and he did not hesitate to inaugurate nuclear war. Mr. Carter is no monk. . . . His Christianity will be no obstacle in adopting aggressive attitudes.