

# Smith Rejection of British Proposals Puts Southern Africa on War Footing

Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith this week rejected the British Government's proposals for the basis on which to continue negotiations for the transition to majority rule in that country. Smith's rejection insures the collapse of the Geneva conference on Rhodesia.

Smith will soon announce that he intends to start negotiations to implement the so-called "Kissinger plan" with his own choice of black Rhodesian representatives, according to a source close to the Trilateral Commission. The source added that Smith's action will create a crisis in southern Africa, one which will give the Carter Administration the opportunity to "face down" the Soviet Union and Cuba in that region. Negotiating partners previously mentioned by Rhodesian officials include the leaders of ZUPO, primarily tribal chiefs on the Rhodesian government payroll, and Bishop Abel Muzorewa, who was recently denied further support from the five front-line states when they swung their unanimous support behind the Patriotic Front alliance between Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe.

Smith is now preparing for an escalation in the Rhodesian war. When he rejected the British proposal for resuming negotiations, Smith asserted: "The (Rhodesian) government is at this moment implementing measures to increase our fighting effort. There are additional plans in the pipeline, and speaking in general terms, a new and tougher line is being considered for our security effort." Smith added: "The interest and participation of the U.S. is something worth retaining."

British Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland warned Smith of the "calamitous consequences" of his rejection, a view shared by other Western European leaders. Throughout his diplomatic tour during the last month in southern Africa, British Geneva conference Chairman Richard had been consistently warning of a war worse than World War II if the Geneva conference is not reconvened and the crisis resolved peacefully.

The Smith rejection came only days after British business circles and pro-British circles in South Africa had pressured South African Prime Minister John Vorster into promising not to intervene militarily in Rhodesia and into lending his support to the British initiatives generally, if only as a maneuver to stall for time. The *London Times* characterized Smith's move as a "coup d'état" against Vorster.

While the British Government and press universally lambasted Smith's action and placed the sole blame for

the Geneva conference failure on his shoulders, newly-appointed United Nations Representative and Trilateral Commission member Andrew Young blamed the "fatigue" of British envoy Ivor Richard for the collapse, according to the *Washington Post* Jan. 26, and further stated that the United States does not accept the front-line states rejection of long-time agent Muzorewa and his partner, the Rev. Mr. Ndabaningi Sithole. Young has previously gone on record as believing that the U.S. should intervene into the affairs of black African states as well as those of the white minority ruled countries, and that the primary question in southern Africa is the purported Communist menace.

Young is leaving next week on a trip to front-line state Tanzania where he will meet with several African organizations and leaders, before going to Nigeria. He will attempt to carry out the Carter Administration policy of isolating the Patriotic Front and splitting up the front-line states. There are also reports that Young would welcome an opportunity to meet Vorster and Smith, although these meetings have not been confirmed.

Underlining the Rhodesian government's determination to start a full-scale war, assassins this week succeeded in killing Mr. Jason Moyo, the chief military advisor of Joshua Nkomo's organization, while Rhodesian police arrested the Rev. Mr. Canaan Banana, a leader of Robert Mugabe's faction inside Rhodesia.

Responding to such provocations and to the continued Rhodesian raids into neighboring Mozambique, the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity, Mr. William Eteki Mboumoua, proposed the creation of a pan-African military force to be stationed in the front-line states as a deterrent to further Rhodesian aggression.

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## Evans and Novak Back Smith

*The following are excerpts from the Evans and Novak column appearing in the Washington Post Jan. 28:*

While the Western democracies join in an orgy of recrimination against white leader Ian Smith for blocking peaceful settlement in Rhodesia, the present tragic impasse can be traced to an incendiary speech last fall that made clear black refusal to abide by the terms negotiated by Dr. Henry Kissinger.

The speech by Robert Mugabe, ostensible political

leader of Rhodesia's most powerful black guerilla forces, was delivered to his guerilla chieftains last September before the Geneva conference even started. He flatly forecast that Geneva would never produce a plan peacefully converting white-ruled Rhodesia into a new black majority nation. His words dripped with hostility for what he called the "Kissinger-British" peace plan.

Smith, prime minister of the white regime, in fact has been considerably more faithful to Kissinger's compromise than Mugabe and other nationalist leaders. To join the present browbeating of Smith by the British will not ease the Carter administration's apparent helplessness in the face of growing Soviet-backed guerilla war in Rhodesia...

Ironically, then, the post-Geneva record shows that Mugabe's "friends" also include many Western politicians, headed by chief British negotiator Ivor Richard, who are now flaying Smith as responsible for the collapse of Geneva.

Granted that Smith is a political anachronism who represents a tiny fraction of his country's 6 million population, it was not Smith who torpedoed the Geneva conference. "On balance," one of the best informed Western diplomats told us, "the responsibility was more the blacks' than it was Smith's."

Smith's grievous fault was not torpedoing Geneva, where his representatives never departed from the basic settlement formula Smith agreed to with Kissinger....

Without a threat of force or arms, the United States can do nothing on behalf of more moderate black nationalists....

Now, with Mugabe's guerrilla leaders plotting a repeat of Angola in far more strategically important Rhodesia, the Western position in southern Africa has dropped into an abyss. Climbing out of that abyss will not be made easier by political posturing against the unfortunate Ian Smith.

### 'The Outlines of a Policy'

*The excerpts below are from a Washington Post editorial on southern Africa Jan. 26.*

Suddenly, if not unexpectedly, the makings of a major crisis in southern Africa have been dumped into the new administration's lap. ... The outlines ... of a policy of the Carter administration's own were disclosed yesterday by Ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young.

Attributing Britain's announcement (of the collapse of the Geneva negotiations—ed.) to its ambassador's "fatigue" Mr. Young said the parties still had enough common interest to push towards a negotiated settlement. ... At the same time, Mr. Young made clear that the United States does not accept the African front-line states' recognition of the "Patriotic Front" (the Mugabe-Nkomo alliance—ed.) which includes the guerrillas, as in effect the coming government of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)....

What is unclear is whether the Carter administration will press something like the original Kissinger plan, which Ian Smith broadly accepted, or the later British proposals, which were devised to satisfy the front line states when forces in the Patriotic Front rejected the

Kissinger plan. ... Mr. Smith's argument is that since he has accepted the essentials of the Kissinger plan, the United States cannot let him down.

### Smith Held Responsible for Collapse of Talks

*The London Times covered Ian Smith's rejection of the British peace proposal in an article Jan. 25 by reporter Michael Knipe in Salisbury, Rhodesia. Excerpts appear below.*

In effect, Mr. Smith, the Rhodesian Prime Minister, made a second unilateral declaration of independence today when he refused even to negotiate on the British proposals for an interim government prior to majority rule....

If the British efforts to bring Mr. Smith back to the Geneva conference table had one basic flaw, it was in presuming that Mr. Smith was a rational and reasonable leader. Mr. Richard operated from the assumption that if there was any chance of producing a reasonable settlement, a responsible leader would grasp it. The fault in his premise was the assumption that white Rhodesians want the war to end at all costs.

(Knipe adds that white Rhodesian population is polarized sharply over Smith's declaration, with 25 per cent thinking him insane and 75 per cent as insane as he is.—ed.)

The whites here who opposed UDI (Smith's 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence—ed.) ... and who dearly want a settlement, have reacted with shocked incredulity today to Mr. Smith's decision.... In Cecil Square today, one man reacted with numb dismay. "How can he do this? ... I can't believe it. I'm beginning to think he's crazy."

In his broadcast (to the nation, rejecting the British proposals) Mr. Smith said the British proposals called for "immediate black rule which would be imposed from the outside" and that it would "in no sense be an elected Government." This is simply not the case.

The proposals involve free elections prior to independence. It is Mr. Smith who has so far refused even to contemplate any form of national, all-race elections....

For the West, the crucial question now is whether to make further attempts to reason with Mr. Smith or whether to take sides in the guerrilla conflict. Mr. Smith is openly hoping to win the support of the United States.

### British House of Commons Debate on Rhodesia

*The following excerpts are of the British House of Commons debate in Rhodesia as reported in the London Times Jan. 27. The paragraphs in parentheses are summaries of the debate report.*

(Foreign Secretary Crosland reported that it was with a deep sense of disappointment that the government learned yesterday that Mr. Smith, *alone of the parties* had rejected the ideas which the Government had put to him, even as a basis for further negotiation.)

As I told the House on December 14, I authorized Mr.

Richard to adjourn the Geneva conference and to undertake consultations in southern Africa with a view to laying the foundations for an agreement on an interim government.

In particular, I asked him to develop with the parties some new and positive ideas, including our ideas on the direct role which Britain would be ready to play in the transitional period.

Following Mr. Richard's first round on consultations, we set out what we had in mind in a document which was given to each of the Geneva delegations, the four African front line presidents and Mr. Vorster.

The suggestions in the paper did not constitute a cut and dried British plan, nor were they presented on a 'take it or leave it' basis. They were intended to provide a serious and detailed basis for negotiations, and were open to amendment and modification in the light of those negotiations....

They were designed to meet the concern of the nationalists that the transfer to majority rule should be rapid and irreversible and of the white Rhodesians that it should be peaceful and orderly....

It is therefore with a deep sense of disappointment that we learnt yesterday that Mr. Smith alone of the parties, had rejected the ideas which we have put to him, even as a basis for further negotiations. Mr. Smith claims to have left the door open for further negotiations by expressing his readiness to implement the "Five points" put to him by Dr. Kissinger in September last year.

But it was clear from an early stage of the Geneva conference that the nationalist delegations could not agree to accept these proposals as a basis for negotiation. That was why we put forward our own ideas which we believed offered a reasonable way of bridging the gap between the parties.

Mr. Smith has claimed that our proposals would have led to chaos and Marxist rule. But if there is such a risk, it is much more likely to be created by his rejection of these proposals. He has once more shown his inability to face reality....

Yesterday's events represent a serious setback to all our hopes for peace in Rhodesia. We must now give intensive study to any options which may still be open to use in this new situation. For our goal remains a peaceful and orderly transfer to majority rule in Rhodesia....

(Conservative Foreign Affairs spokesman John Davies accused the Government of "dilatatory and ineffective" measures in Rhodesia, denounced the Government's "discarding" of the Kissinger proposals, and asked if Crosland would discuss a new initiative with Vice President Mondale during the latter's visit to Britain. Crosland replied:)

"Britain was not in a position to discard the Kissinger proposals. These were not acceptable to the nationalist delegations; it was they who discarded them.

The notion that there was a Kissinger deal was inaccurate because the only deal that could be made was not one between the Anglo-Americans and the Rhodesian Government; the only deal that could possibly be made was one between the white and black Rhodesians.

(Another Conservative asked if Crosland and the

Americans were going to issue warning to the Soviets and the Cubans to "keep out of this dispute or the consequences for East-West relations might be sad." Crosland replied:)

This danger is one of the dominant facts in the situation.... This additional danger has been created by Mr. Smith's rejection of our terms.

(Crosland, however, ruled out the use of British troops in Rhodesia in the immediate future, but not in the long term.)

(Another Conservative member accused Envoy Richardson of "hobnobbing all the time with Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, "who is purely a terrorist"... and suggested instead encouraging relations between Smith and Abel Muzorewa, widely known in southern Africa as Smith's agent. Replying that Richard had indeed met with Muzorewa, Crosland went on:)

The Patriotic Front (Mugabe-Nkomo alliance—ed.) exists, so do the front line presidents and any notion of a solution without taking their existence into account is a total pipe dream.

## Return to Kissinger Plan Unlikely

*The following excerpts on Smith's rejection of the British proposals are from the Jan. 25 Financial Times of London.*

In rejecting the proposals put forward by Mr. Ivor Richard ... Mr. Ian Smith's Government has taken a fateful decision which is likely to be heavy with consequences, not merely for Rhodesia itself, but also for the rest of southern Africa. ... The gleam of hope that the Rhodesian problem might be settled through a peaceful, negotiated transfer of power, which unexpectedly flickered to life last autumn, has faded away....

It may well be that they (the British proposals—ed.) give rather more weight to the demands of the black delegations than the so-called Kissinger plan.... But within the context of a negotiation which was not about the principle of majority rule, but about the method of managing the interim government, the differences between the two sets of proposals should no reasonably be regarded as fundamental. Having publicly accepted the Kissinger plan, Mr. Smith may feel his position is morally unassailable if he now rejects the less attractive Richard plan; but that will not strengthen the chances of resuming negotiations on the basis of the Kissinger plan.

For one thing, the four black delegations have from time to time been quite deeply divided over the procedures for a transition to majority rule, and the tentative agreement hammered out between them and the five Presidents of the front-line States will be difficult, if not impossible to re-forge on the basis of a return to the Kissinger plan.

For another, the rigidity shown by the Salisbury regime in what is, after all, a negotiation, can expose it to the charge that it was deliberately aiming at a breakdown all along; and it is a charge which gains in credibility from the fact that Mr. Smith now appears to

be seeking a separate set of negotiations with partners of his choice, that is, only with the most "moderate" and malleable of black Rhodesian leaders.

Even if he should succeed in opening independent negotiations, it is far from clear that they could lead to meaningful conclusions. Bishop Abel Muzorewa has a substantial popular following inside Rhosdeia, but since

he does not have direct control over the guerrilla forces, an agreement between him and the Smith Government cannot be counted on to bring about an end to the guerrilla war. And without the prospect of an end to this war — which in practice means a settlement agreed with the guerrilla leaders and endorsed by the front-line Presidents — the outlook for Rhodesia is bleak indeed.

## The Benin Coup Attempt — Rockefeller's Die Spinne Network At Work In Africa

In an abortive replay of Israel's raid on Entebbe last summer, a plane load of mercenaries invaded Cotorou, the largest city of the West African republic of Benin, early Jan. 16 in a coup attempt against the pro-socialist government of President Mathieu Kerekou. The invasion was crushed by the quick response of the Benin army.

The Benin incident came only a day after a raid against the main railroad of the People's Republic of the Congo in Central Africa, carried out by the Front for the Liberation of Cabinda (FLEC), a CIA-sponsored organization that operated in the oil-rich Angolan enclave of Cabinda from Zaire during the Angolan war. Cabinda borders on the Congo.

Both operations are the work of the African section of Rockefeller's right-wing "Die Spinne" terrorist network. Like the Abu Daoud affair in France, they are aimed at disrupting the growth of anti-dollar trade deals between European and African countries and terrorizing those countries who are taking the lead in developing these relations.

The Africa section of "Die Spinne" operates out of Paris, working through the Brown Institute under the general direction of AFL-CIO official Irving Brown, former director of the Airican American Labor Center. In 1975 the Brown Institute set up the Organization Nouvelle de L'Afrique Libre (ONAL) specifically to train political dissidents and exiles from progressive African countries as mercenaries and terrorists, an operation similar to the anti-Castro Cuban terrorist networks in the U.S. ONAL provided the black mercenaries who took part in the raid on Benin. Both the right-wing Benin exile organizations and FLEC are member organizations of ONAL, which works in the Die Spinne networks with the France fascist Organization de L'Armée Secrète (OAS). The OAS tried to overthrow and then to assassinate French President Charles De Gaulle after De Gaulle granted independence to Algeria. OAS member Jean Kay, for example, is one of the leading members of FLEC, whose membership also includes black former Portuguese colonial troops and ex-members of the French Foreign Legion. Other member-organizations of ONAL include exile groups from the former Portuguese colonies, Nigeria, Guinea, the Congo, and virtually every other progressive African country.

Non-member supporters include, informally, the intelligence agencies of Israel, South Africa, and the

United States, and the governments of Senegal and the Ivory Coast. The latter two countries, charged Guinean President Sékou Touré this week, are using Israeli military advisors not only to train their armies but also to train the "terrorist elements" of the ONAL member organizations.

ONAL's founding in late spring of 1975, occurred as U.S. and South African-sponsored guerrilla bands were being mopped up in Angola, and as Secretary of State Kissinger was finishing his first African tour, meeting with Ivory Coast President Felix Houphouet-Boigny in Paris.

The invasion of Benin — planned at the Brown Institute, according to European diplomatic sources — started early on Sunday morning, Jan. 16, when a plane-load of mercenaries took off from Marrakech, Morocco, flew to Gabon to pick up other contingents, and landed at the airport in Cotonou. According to Prensa Latina, the Cuban press agency, the mercenaries split up into three groups, one to hold the airport, one to attack the presidential palace, and the third to take the military encampment of Guezo.

The swift counterattack by the Benin military, plus the failure of the attackers' plans suggest that the Benin authorities may have been forewarned. The presidential palace was attacked with mortars and bazookas, but President Mathew Kerekou was not there at the time. The sympathetic forces inside Benin who, according to the plan, were supposed to open warehouses of weapons to the invaders and participate in the attack, did not materialize.

The Benin army forced most of the invaders to retreat and flee in their plane, killing at least seven of the mercenaries and capturing a quantity of weapons, pictures of which appeared in a special edition of the Benin party daily, Ehuzu. The white mercenaries who were killed were disfigured by their colleagues to prevent identification.

Other African leaders responded immediately to the news of the coup attempt, announced by Benin radio the same day, and both Guinea and Algeria offered to send troops if necessary to help defend the country. Comparing the raid to the use of mercenaries by the CIA in Angola and to the raid on Entebbe, Algerian President Houari Boumediene said: "In all these actions, these new policies showed themselves to be a disaster for those