## New Prospects Raised For Pan-European Talks, MBFR

With the collapse of U.S. Secretary of State Vance's talks in Moscow on SALT, attention has shifted to the potential of disarmament negotiations in Europe as a political lever for both East and West Europeans to defuse the Carter Administration is confrontation policy. For Moscow to have a successful peace policy now, it will have to move into openings which Europe has already provided for such collaboration.

Herbert Wehner, head of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) parliamentary grouping in West Germany (BRD), called in a March 29 radio interview for the long-stalled Vienna Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks on armed forces reductions in Central Europe to move rapidly into "the stage of political negotiations." Wehner also asked that permanent pan-European commissions be established to institutionalize cooperation on the continent.

Wehner expressed "regret" that the two-year-old proposals of Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev, for pan-European conferences on transport, energy and the environment, have so far gone unanswered by Western Europe. Wehner's inclusion of Brezhnev's pan-European plan in the context of MBFR has a special irony, since in the period of his concentration on dealings with the U.S., prior to the SALT breakdown, Brezhnev has downplayed his own proposals and failed to mention them in his March 21 speech to a trade union conference. They were, however, featured in the March 26 communiqué signed by Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin and the President of Finland Urho Kekkonen, which anticipated discussion of "pan-European congresses on conferences among states" on these topics, including the late April meeting of the United Nations Economic Commission on Europe

Moscow's immediate response to Wehner was a radio broadcast urging that his plans be presented as official policy, a condition which Chancellor Schmidt went a good way to meet at his March 30 press conference. Not only did Schmidt support the formation of "a standing joing commission for energy and environmental policy" and a report that BRD initiatives for MBFR were in preparation, but he declared that the Soviet Union and East Europe should be drawn into the North-South dialogue between the industrialized West and the Third World—that is, that this repeatedly sabotaged forum for reorganizing international economic relations be reconstituted with the crucial inclusion of the Soviet sector.

Wehner's call and Schmidt's support of it received front page coverage in the BRD as a major policy initiative. Chancellor Schmidt revealed that Brezhnev will be visiting Bonn this year; the Sueddeutsche Zeitung rumored that a quiet renewal of cooperation negotiations between the BRD and East German (DDR) was under way. Gerhard Stoltenberg, chief spokesman for the industrialist wing of the BRD's Christian Democracy,

recently returned from a trip to the DDR to advocate just such a renewed dialogue.

The matter of whether and how to respond to Western Europe's initiatives is one pivot of factionalization in the East. When Wehner raised a less dramatic version of his MBFR proposal two weeks ago, the Soviet party paper Pravda failed to report it and picked up instead a secondary remark by Wehner on the importance of Soviet-American SALT. Hopes for an early SALT agreement with Carter was used by Washington to lure Brezhnev away from allying with anti-Carter Western Europeans and, most particularly, to block the Soviets from pressing use of the socialist sector's transfer ruble as the reserve currency for restored world trade. With SALT on the rocks, the Soviets' block to this is more readily removable.

What may be called the "transfer ruble" faction in the East has continued to make itself known most palpably through DDR and Czechoslovak channels, which have transmitted a recognition of fundamental political realities in the West. Exemplary is the DDR political journal *IPW*, which this month raised the question of Rockefeller influence on U.S. foreign policy as far from a dead letter after the 1976 presidential elections (see excerpt, below).

In Prague, the party paper Rude Pravo came close to calling for a Gaullist Europe, in its coverage of the French municipal elections. Rude Pravo attributed the losses by bourgeois parties to the absence of political and economic program as well as courage typical of General DeGaulle's rule.

### Rockefellers Have Decisive Role In U.S. Policy

The following excerpts are from a review of Ferdinand Lundberg's book The Rockefeller Syndrome appearing in the magazine of the DDR political economy institute IPW. The reviewer is Werner Hintzke.

Not philanthropy, but hard-boiled egoism, shady currency transactions, tax evasion and a notorious political practice not stopping short of professional murders, are characteristic for Nelson A. Rockefeller....It suffices to think of the pernicious influence of the latter on U.S. foreign policy, e.g. U.S. policy in Latin America particularly Chile. Here it was not just a case of "professional murder."

While the CIA was mounting the Chilean adventure, Nelson Rockefeller was a member of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, organ supposed to oversee CIA work. He held a strategically favorable position and it cannot be denied that he was an interested party.

But this means nothing less than that the almighty

Nelson A. Rockefeller bears heavy responsibility for the inhuman oppression of the Chilean people and the murder of Chilean patriots...Lundberg shrinks from this conclusion, in this treatment of the question...

The Rockefeller family, he says, already before Nelson's tenure as Vice-President of the U.S., exerted a considerable influence on official U.S. policy....The author comes to the significant conclusion that Rockefeller, even without being president or Vice-President of the U.S., will participate in U.S. politics in a decisive fashion: "One thing is certain: nothing will occur in American politics, including after the 1976 election, without Nelson Rockefeller..."

The book considers how and by what means the Rockefeller class controls its "financial nexus" and hundreds of enterprises, and states: "Capitalism operating through such cartels (as theirs) is known as finance capitalism in contrast to pure industrial capitalism....'

Lundberg observes that it is regrettable that the average U.S. citizen is totally uninformed about the significance of all this and about "its consequences for danger to world peace, the economic burdens of the working masses, etc..."

### Red Star On The Disastrous 'Inexpediency' Of Limited Nuclear War

The following is an excerpt from an article in the Soviet military newspaper Red Star, which issues an attack on the Schlesinger Doctrine of limited nuclear warfare. The article appeared March 26, under the title, "Take Into Account the Realities of the Nuclear Age," and was written by L. Semeiko, Sector Head in the U.S.A. and Canada Institute, Candidate of Military Sciences.

We are attentively following the reaction in various countries to the proposal of the Warsaw Pact on non-first use of nuclear weapons by all states who were participants in the all-European conference," stated comrade L.I. Brezhnev at the XVI Congress of Trade Unions of the USSR. "We would like all state leaders of the western countries - and primarily NATO members - to think over very well the meaning of this important proposal, and would renounce the thoughtless, mechanistic approach according to which, if a proposal comes from the other side, it is dangerous and must be rejected."

Indeed, the significance of this proposal for the security of the peoples of Europe and the whole world is difficult to overestimate. At issue is the real possibility for making a serious step towards strengthening political détente, supplementing it with military détente. The efforts of the Soviet Union, and other socialist countries, are directed at preventing any kind of war, including nuclear. Such an approach is aimed, furthermore, at eliminating the fear of the imagined inevitability of nuclear catastrophe.

But as it turns out, there is another approach. In the headquarters of NATO talk continues about the possibility and even the "expediency" of launching, "under certain circumstances," a first nuclear strike.

The same thing can also be heard in Washington. Two years ago, the Defense Minister at the time, J. Schlesinger, speaking in Congress, stated: "It should not be excluded that NATO would be the first to use nuclear weapons in the theater of military actions.... The attack must be sufficiently sudden and decisive...." Such a conception is in one way or another supported also by the present political leadership of the U.S.A.

It must be said that such a position is completely unsound; it patently ignores the military-political realities of the modern world. And it is not just that a firm political détente is unthinkable under the Sword of Damocles of nuclear threats. The stated conception of the U.S.A. and NATO concerning first use of nuclear weapons is adventuristic in its very essence.

On the political plane, avoiding a businesslike consideration of the proposal of the Warsaw Pact member states, speaks of the traditional imperialist support for force, for the use of nuclear weapons — including also the surprise use — for the achievement of political goals. They place their stakes on this even now, when, by the admission of the same American leaders, the so-called U.S. "strategic nuclear superiority" has become a thing of the past.

Proof is hardly needed that a nuclear conflict in Europe could be the beginning of a nuclear world war with all its devastating consequences. To whom is it not obvious that the calculations of western strategists are completely untenable, that a nuclear conflict, once begun, would be obliged to stay within its original bounds throughout its duration?! To whom is the untenability of the goal, announced by western strategists, of using nuclear weapons first, also not obvious?! This goal, in their own words, is to end a war (implying a war using only conventional weapons) on conditions "acceptable" for the U.S.A. and its allies.

In the West it is generally recognized what a colossal risk is involved in such attempts to halt military actions or even to achieve victory. Indicative of this, in particular, is the recent report of the Congressional Budget Office of the U.S., which expresses disagreement with the conception of first use of nuclear weapons by NATO countries. Use of such weapons, the authors of the report note, in no way insures "turning defeat into victory," but "more likely can evoke a massive retaliatory strike by the powerful Soviet nuclear forces ... against targets both in the U.S.A. and in Europe."

But what then does the report propose instead of the Pentagon's envisaged modernization of nuclear weapons and first use of them in crisis situations? Increasing allocations for conventional forces. And as in the past, preservation of American nuclear supplies in Western Europe. Why? "Nuclear weapons are an important symbol of American obligations in Europe." That's their answer.

And so some realistic considerations being mentioned on Capitol Hill, including a Presidential call for decreasing dependence of politics on nuclear weapons, are mixed with the previous approach — with threats of first use of these weapons. The proposals that have been advanced are now also taking on new variations: in order to decrease political dependence on nuclear weapons, it is supposedly necessary to increase support for conventional armed forces.

Such military-political zig-zags can hardly be evaluated as a contribution to détente. They are ocurring during a period when negotiations are being conducted on reduction of armed forces in Central Europe, including conventional forces. Washington and NATO headquarters evidently do not want to take into account the positive qualtiy of the proposals on non-first use of nuclear weapons for the Vienna negotiations. It can hardly be disputed that the acceptance of this proposal would create a totally new atmosphere at these negotiations — an atmosphere of "nuclear détente" — also facilitating détente — also facilitating détente in the opposition of conventional forces.

The U.S.A. and NATO frequently approach this

question one-sidedly. For example, the director (now former director) of the Agency for Arms Control and Disarmament, F. Ikle, proposed that the United States, "guided by moral considerations," should renounce the launching of first nuclear strikes against cities. Only against cities! That means that to launch first "selective" strikes against military objectives would be completely respectable from the moral point of view? This proposal reveals the contradictory nature of American military-political thought — the obviousness of the attempts to "observe morality" by giving up strikes against cities and the simultaneous striving to use nuclear weapons first against military targets, which cannot be evaluated as other than trampling on the elementary principles, not only of morality, but of rational military conduct.

# Soviets Will Not Conform To Carter Administration Psychological Profile

Beginning with President Jimmy Carter's highly provocative "Brezhnev sneezes" earlier this past week, the spokesmen for David Rockefeller's Carter Administration have successively outdone themselves in hysterical gloating over expected capitulations and panic within the Soviet Politburo. The wildest variant of this pre-coverage of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's Moscow visit is that reported in the *New York Post*, which leaked the obvious psychological warfare pressure on the Soviets, that the Soviet Politburo had better come to agreement with Carter, or face an upsurge of the "first strike" faction in the USA.

#### Internal Soviet Considerations

Two principal things are clear concerning the build-up for the Vance Moscow visit. First, the bankruptcy of the Eurodollar market and the imperiled financial position of a growing number of New York City-centered U.S. banking institutions has impelled the Carter Administration and its puppet-masters into an hysterical, manic fit of obsessive self-delusion concerning pre-profiled Soviet responses. Second, although these U.S. circles do have Leonid Brezhnev's "Henry Kissinger," Georgii Arbatov, in their pocket, and although the Arbatov doctrine is currently operational Soviet policy, the "destabilization" of the "SALT II" package-agreement previously sold to Brezhnev will result in a new "geometry" of Soviet policy, entirely unlike that predicted by manic Rockefeller public relations spigots feeding the press.

The Arbatov Doctrine's temporary adoption by a majority of the Politburo represented a conscious choice among two strategic options. The first option, which tended to become operational prior to the end of January, was to align in political and economic strategies with key Western European and developing-sector factions against the Rockefellers and the puppet Carter Administration. Oblomovism momentarily won out, to the effect that the Arbatov Doctrine was adopted, betraying West-

ern Europe, Japan, and the developing sector nations in favor of an effort to conciliate David Rockefeller et al.

The present confrontationist policies of Carter et al. leave the Soviets with two choices. Either they follow an essentially Oblomovist path of policy evolutions, and thus move rapidly into "Mother Russia's" preparations for early general war, or they — in their view — risk the alternative strategy of seeking to prevent general war through strategic cooperation with Europeans and developing sector forces against the Rockefeller interests.

Collateral to this deliberative process within the Soviet leadership: they know the truth about the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, whereas only a handful of leading U.S. circles do. The inclusion of a simulated assassination threat to Jimmy Carter reminds the Soviets of the planned-to-be simulated assassination attempt on Kennedy. That earlier simulation was to provide a pretext for a fresh confrontation with Cuba and the Soviet leadership. Although the responsible persons for the redirection of the simulation into an operational killing of Kennedy are not yet known to us, it is known that forces operating inside the Kennedy Administration's simulation deployment did the redirecting. (Hence the coverup of the affair.)

The inclusion of the "Garden Plot" scenario within the Carter Administration's overall, present crisis-management operations against the population of the USA signals clearly to the Soviet leadership's relevant agencies that the Carter Administration is committed to a presently operational policy of successive confrontations leading into a thermonuclear showdown qualitatively beyond the implications of Kennedy's 1962 "missile crisis." Furthermore, the past week's public and related conduct by puppet Carter is a direct parody of Kennedy's confrontationist posturings toward N.S. Khrushchev during the earlier period.