

ventional armed forces.

Such military-political zig-zags can hardly be evaluated as a contribution to détente. They are occurring during a period when negotiations are being conducted on reduction of armed forces in Central Europe, including conventional forces. Washington and NATO headquarters evidently do not want to take into account the positive quality of the proposals on non-first use of nuclear weapons for the Vienna negotiations. It can hardly be disputed that the acceptance of this proposal would create a totally new atmosphere at these negotiations — an atmosphere of “nuclear détente” — also facilitating détente — also facilitating détente in the opposition of conventional forces.

The U.S.A. and NATO frequently approach this

question one-sidedly. For example, the director (now former director) of the Agency for Arms Control and Disarmament, F. Ikle, proposed that the United States, “guided by moral considerations,” should renounce the launching of first nuclear strikes against cities. Only against cities! That means that to launch first “selective” strikes against military objectives would be completely respectable from the moral point of view? This proposal reveals the contradictory nature of American military-political thought — the obviousness of the attempts to “observe morality” by giving up strikes against cities and the simultaneous striving to use nuclear weapons first against military targets, which cannot be evaluated as other than trampling on the elementary principles, not only of morality, but of rational military conduct.

Soviets Will Not Conform To Carter Administration Psychological Profile

Beginning with President Jimmy Carter’s highly provocative “Brezhnev sneezes” earlier this past week, the spokesmen for David Rockefeller’s Carter Administration have successively outdone themselves in hysterical gloating over expected capitulations and panic within the Soviet Politburo. The wildest variant of this pre-coverage of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance’s Moscow visit is that reported in the *New York Post*, which leaked the obvious psychological warfare pressure on the Soviets, that the Soviet Politburo had better come to agreement with Carter, or face an upsurge of the “first strike” faction in the USA.

Internal Soviet Considerations

Two principal things are clear concerning the build-up for the Vance Moscow visit. First, the bankruptcy of the Eurodollar market and the imperiled financial position of a growing number of New York City-centered U.S. banking institutions has impelled the Carter Administration and its puppet-masters into an hysterical, manic fit of obsessive self-delusion concerning pre-profiled Soviet responses. Second, although these U.S. circles do have Leonid Brezhnev’s “Henry Kissinger,” Georgii Arbatov, in their pocket, and although the Arbatov doctrine is currently operational Soviet policy, the “destabilization” of the “SALT II” package-agreement previously sold to Brezhnev will result in a new “geometry” of Soviet policy, entirely unlike that predicted by manic Rockefeller public relations spigots feeding the press.

The Arbatov Doctrine’s temporary adoption by a majority of the Politburo represented a conscious choice among two strategic options. The first option, which tended to become operational prior to the end of January, was to align in political and economic strategies with key Western European and developing-sector factions against the Rockefellers and the puppet Carter Administration. Oblomovism momentarily won out, to the effect that the Arbatov Doctrine was adopted, betraying West-

ern Europe, Japan, and the developing sector nations in favor of an effort to conciliate David Rockefeller et al.

The present confrontationist policies of Carter et al. leave the Soviets with two choices. Either they follow an essentially Oblomovist path of policy evolutions, and thus move rapidly into “Mother Russia’s” preparations for early general war, or they — in their view — risk the alternative strategy of seeking to prevent general war through strategic cooperation with Europeans and developing sector forces against the Rockefeller interests.

Collateral to this deliberative process within the Soviet leadership: they know the truth about the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, whereas only a handful of leading U.S. circles do. The inclusion of a simulated assassination threat to Jimmy Carter reminds the Soviets of the planned-to-be simulated assassination attempt on Kennedy. That earlier simulation was to provide a pretext for a fresh confrontation with Cuba and the Soviet leadership. Although the responsible persons for the redirection of the simulation into an operational killing of Kennedy are not yet known to us, it is known that forces operating inside the Kennedy Administration’s simulation deployment did the redirecting. (Hence the coverup of the affair.)

The inclusion of the “Garden Plot” scenario within the Carter Administration’s overall, present crisis-management operations against the population of the USA signals clearly to the Soviet leadership’s relevant agencies that the Carter Administration is committed to a presently operational policy of successive confrontations leading into a thermonuclear showdown qualitatively beyond the implications of Kennedy’s 1962 “missile crisis.” Furthermore, the past week’s public and related conduct by puppet Carter is a direct parody of Kennedy’s confrontationist posturings toward N.S. Khrushchev during the earlier period.

Whether or not the U.S. press and general public wish to perpetually regurgitate and credulously swallow once again the popularized myths concerning the Kennedy Administration, certain leading forces in the world's governments know the truth and operate on the basis of that knowledge. Excepting Georgii Arbatov and his accomplices, who are admittedly in David Rockefeller's pocket, the Soviet policy will be premised on the truth about the Kennedy Administration precedents for the current crises, and not the delusions popularized in the U.S. press.

Internal Soviet Considerations

The Soviet leadership overall is stupid on only one crucial point. That stupidity is this: because of their nationalist-Oblomovist tendencies, for lack of any competently sensuous grasp of the "outside world's" internal social-political life, and because of wishful, almost obsessive illusions concerning Communist organizations in the OECD and developing nations, the Soviet leadership is methodologically incompetent in matters concerning internal political processes in those "outside world" nations. In practical matters otherwise, in matters of military strategies and statecraft, they are well informed and capable.

Internally, within the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations, the principal political problems are two.

Within the Soviet Union and CPSU itself, the most glaring problem is Soviet agriculture's backwardness. This is partly a technical-economic problem of adequate mechanization and so forth, but is also a reflection of pervasive political administrative incompetence by those sections of the state apparatus and party which have ongoing, historic responsibility for such administrative incompetence and its results.

Secondly, with respect to the bloc, since Soviet primitive accumulation against Eastern European countries at the end of World War II, in the effort thus to reconstruct the war-shattered Soviet economy, subsequent political-economic relations within the bloc have involved a struggle to dump the irrational cooperation in *parallel national-economic* development policies of the 1950s and so forth, and to move toward bloc-wide centralized planning, thus enhancing the overall division of labor in especially capital goods production. This involves a problem for Poland, because of its internal agricultural and related political problems of underdevelopment, and the irrational autarchical tendencies to be overcome in Rumania. This is also an internal problem for the Soviet leadership, because of implied Soviet political and economic concessions to the bloc overall in institutionalizing

such centralized economic planning bloc-wide.

These problems are most relevant as key background considerations in the composition and balance of CPSU tendencies on all issues, and are very weighty matters respecting the intermediate-term and longer-term implications of CMEA's transfer-ruble role as a gold-based currency in the forming of a new monetary system. The CMEA countries have a more than adequate growth-potential under such new monetary agreements, but that growth depends upon success in accelerating the per-hectare and per-man-hour productivities of agriculture, and upon centralized bloc-wide planning in the capital goods sector.

For related reasons, the underlying determinants of Soviet factional and related policy configurations are not competently understood in even those OECD circles which have the relevant facts at their disposal. Chiefly, understanding the Soviet and CMEA problems requires a method of political-economic analysis which most "Western" monetarist circles would not wish to see applied to the capitalist sector.

Possible Soviet Reactions

In the case in which the Arbatov Doctrine is dumped by the Soviet leadership, there are, as we have indicated, two overall "scenarios" which will alternatively predominate in the Politburo. The first would be an embittered retreat from the hateful "outside world" to "Mother Russia." Under conditions of current Carter policy, that "scenario" leads to an early general war, in which one may be absolutely assured the Soviet military will destroy the United States with a total commitment of all available strategic strike forces within the first hour (e.g., the death of 160-180 millions of the U.S. population). The second would be a reversal of outward-focused strategic options from Carter pacts to commitments to Western European and developing forces.

Under the second variant, the Soviet leadership would not permit Carter provocations to determine the timing and subject of Soviet counteraction. They would, instead, go for vulnerable flanks of their choosing against the Rockefeller interests. Their included option, in this case, for minimizing the danger of early confrontation with Carter would be to launch an international campaign emphasizing the fact of Carter's mental imbalance — sympathizing with the plight of the otherwise Soviet-beloved U.S. nation, which is obliged to temporarily suffer the pains of having a certifiable lunatic and Rockefeller puppet as President.

— Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

Georgii Arbatov: Rockefeller's Man In Moscow

Recent cross-checking of information from high-level sources in several nations has established as fact that Soviet Communist Party Central Committee member Georgii Arbatov is not only the Rockefeller brothers' agent in Moscow, but is significantly part of a New York City-based apparatus going back to at least the 1938 period of British intelligence executive Colonel William

Stephenson's Rockefeller Center-based operations. This element in current global relations must be exposed and removed as the single most probable contributing factor in causing an early thermonuclear war.

Although our recent findings to this effect depend significantly on crucial pieces of information supplied to us by high-level sources, our ability to solve the puzzle in-