

# Rockefeller's 'Critical Choices' For Latin America

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Latin America: Struggle for Progress; Critical Choices for Americans, Volume XIV

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Nelson Rockefeller's Commission on Critical Choices for Americans issued this month a blueprint for assuring the New York banks' debt payments and looting rights to Latin America through violent internal explosions, civil wars, invasions and a showdown with the Soviet Union over Cuba. This masterpiece collection of scenarios, entitled *Latin America: The Struggle for Progress*, was coordinated by Nancy Kissinger; its authors were James D. Theberge and Roger Fontaine, respectively the former and present director of the Latin American division of a leading Rockefeller think-tank, the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The recommended options for controlling the continent all involve extensive use of violence, in each case perpetrated by agencies over which the United States will appear to have less and less control. "Violence should then be endemic in the coming decade in those societies that are the most socially fragmented, the most economically stagnant... Small scale violence, strikes, riots, terrorism and coups will continue." Argentina, Chile, Colombia and the Dominican Republic "could suffer from violent civil wars." "The inability to bring off a revolution will not lessen the turmoil."

For Mexico, the scenario for control of the nation that caused Rockefeller such headaches in 1976 is blunt. "Population control" may not be enough to control population pressures "which, combined with economic stagnation... may produce a violent, uncontrolled social and political explosion at our doorstep."

Venezuela, currently representing the most active danger to the U.S. from an incumbent Latin American government, will suffer activation of border disputes with Colombia and Guyana and possible invasion by Brazil, which is being prepared as a Nazi "breakaway ally" for the U.S. Between Brazil and Venezuela, the authors gloat, "the possibility of an inadvertent clash over national interests remains good..." Complementary to a Brazilian invasion, the report also threatens Venezuela with a military coup in the wings.

## *Brazil: The Nazi War Machine*

"Critical Choices on Brazil" presents the core of Rockefeller's strategy for Latin America. The success of all the various violence scenarios on the continent depends on the fragmentation of "Third World" Spanish America, and on a continuous threat to Brazil's pro-development northern neighbors of military attack and immediate potential occupation by that colossus. Profiling the potential for an upsurge in Brazilian nationalism, the report proceeds to describe precisely how it can be manipulated through "human rights" and other interventions to act as a "surrogate enforcer" independent of direct U.S. control.

The Commission "scenario," as events of the last weeks demonstrate, is now operational policy.

Through the phony "human rights" crusade, the Carter Administration is forging an "anti-U.S." united front of Southern Cone fascist regimes — a potential Nazi war machine led by the continent's "big power," Brazil, and profiled to march against Latin neighbors to the north and the socialist nations of Africa. The "human rights" intervention and U.S. armtwisting to sever Brazil's massive nuclear energy deal with West Germany has pushed Brazil to the brink of a total "breakaway" from the U.S. under the control of the most ultra-right political layers associated with former Brazilian president Medici; momentum is building within Brazil for rapidly gearing up domestic weapons production to supply not only Latin America, but foreign markets as well.

The Brazilian Air Force Commander, following the meeting of Latin American air force chiefs in Montevideo two weeks ago at which he organized for a unified Southern Cone command, made a special trip to Santiago for talks with his Chilean counterpart, Gen. Leigh. At a press conference March 24, Brazilian Gen. Araripe Macedo, with eager backing from Leigh, proclaimed the need for "emancipation" from dependence on U.S. and European arms supplies, based on the buildup of a Brazilian war economy. The Chilean daily *El Mercurio*, mouthpiece of the Pinochet junta, applauded the new Brazilian-Chilean "collaboration" in a March 27 editorial that called Brazil to take a "preponderant role" in forging an "anti-U.S." Southern Cone bloc. *El Mercurio* called on its neighbors to "subordinate local interests to the imperative of preserving the sovereignty and liberty" of the regimes targeted for military aid cutoffs by the Carter Administration.

## *The Essential Dangers*

The authors, who did the greatest part of their work

during 1976, detail profile after profile of the most important Latin American countries from the standpoint of how to manipulate and undermine any possible tendency toward the kind of development-oriented nationalism that created such great dangers to the Rockefeller empire during 1976.

Rockefeller terror of what could happen should Latin America follow through on the Third World's battle for debt moratorium and new world economic order is stated explicitly: "It is one thing for the region's republics to seek out Western Europe, it is quite another for them to join forces with the Third world, particularly those countries which are the most anti-Western, anti-democratic and anti-capitalist.... If as this report suggests, Latin America's development is sporadic at best, then the region may well join the ranks of the viscerally anti-Western, and by extension, anti-American bloc."

A combination of newly refined scenarios to control "nationalism" and unmistakable warnings of U.S. potential to destroy any government that gets out of line provide Rockefeller's answer to these essential dangers to his empire.

The U.S. destroy missions against the strong pro-Third World governments on the continent that participated in the battles of the Non-Aligned nations, particularly the stunning "success" of the Rockefeller coup against the progressive "Peruvian generals" are deleted from the report, but the implications of those operations are shouted throughout. "Politically, there will always be some regimes (usually left-wing) attempting to align themselves with the aspirations of the Third World. The trend now, however, seems to be against third worldism in Latin America, owing in large part to the serious internal difficulties of countries like Peru and Argentina, who once championed such a policy."

For Latin American internal consumption, the report offers something "better" than the battle of the Third World against Rockefeller's genocidal policies. "(Latin America) belongs neither to the First, Second, or Third Worlds. It is not developed or democratic enough for the First World; it does not (except for Cuba) have enough Marxist police state regimes to belong to the Second; and, finally, Latin America has been independent too long, and is too developed, economically, politically and socially, to fit easily into the Third World. Thus because it is not yet committed to any of them, *the U.S. has the opportunity to encourage Latin America's adherence to the First World...*" (emphasis added).

The authors argue that despite the obvious economic benefits for the continent of expanding trade relations with Europe and the Comecon countries, U.S. predominance will prevail, given "Europe's calculated indifference" and the Soviets' total "lack of commitment," as evidenced by the fact that they "refused to provide the massive economic aid that the Allende government sought and needed to survive." The report makes clear that "Soviet aid programs remain one of the few available instruments for expanding Russian influence in Latin America while at the same time weakening U.S. Latin American ties..." but the Rockefeller profile of the Soviets portrays that as unlikely to occur. "The Soviets have expressed support for the New World Economic Order provided that order does harm only to western

interests."

U.S. ties with Latin America involve two key economic premises: ensured raw materials supplies and debt payment.

"Foreign debt," the authors emphasize, "may be Latin America's most serious international concern in the coming decade. It could, for example, result in a series of emergency meetings of governments, international agencies, and private banks by 1985 but it is unlikely that any satisfactory arrangement short of *continual debt rollover* (a kind of creeping moratorium) will ever be achieved."

"Growing discontent in Latin America over the post-World War II monetary system," says the report, should be dealt with by following a policy of ensuring stable prices for key commodities.

The raw materials control proposed by Theberge and Fontaine is the "International Resources Bank... proposed by (Henry Kissinger) at UNCTAD IV in Nairobi.... Both host country and investor would from the beginning receive a fixed share of the raw materials."

Venezuelan and Mexican oil reserves are defined as key "strategic supplies," and the report demands — almost obsessively in the case of Mexico — U.S. "access" to oil supplies. One of the Commission's top "policy options" regarding Venezuela is the need to force a Venezuelan retreat from its nationalist adherence to Andean Pact Decision 24, the clause which strictly limits foreign investment in the region. Regional blocs such as the Andean Pact and SELA — which might threaten U.S. rights to raw materials looting and continued financial control of the continent — will not be able to withstand the predicted internal upheavals and regional conflicts, imply the authors of the study.

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## Cuba and the Caribbean

Behind optimistic press reports that the lifting of travel restrictions and plans to exchange sports teams mean that prospects are good for renewed relations with Cuba, the reality of Carter Administration policy on Cuba stands indecently exposed by the Commission on Critical Choices report. One consistent priority emerges from this report: "the removal of the Soviet presence from the Caribbean."

It has already been obvious to anyone with an ear tuned to recent visitors to Cuba, such as Benjamin Bradlee of the *Washington Post* and William Atwood of *Newsday*, that Cuba will never bow to demands that it considers interfere with its internal affairs. The demands that President Carter has identified as preconditions for the normalization of relations are Cuba's release of political prisoners, withdrawal from Angola, and an end to Cuba's so-called interference in this hemisphere. These are all endorsed by the report.

But what has been only implied or half stated in previous reports on the Caribbean, such as that of the Linowitz Commission, is made explicit here: "There are three parties with substantial interests in the matter: the United States, the USSR, and Cuba." The report links

any concessions on the U. S. presence at the Guantanamo military installation to Soviet withdrawal of its military presence from the Western Hemisphere.

The apparent policy options offered for the Caribbean as a whole, and for Cuba in particular are exposed as one policy by the previous emphasis on the elimination of the Soviet presence from the region. The three policy options on relations with Cuba are described as: "rapid normalization of relations," "limited, conditional rapprochement," and "direct opposition to Cuban interventionism." In fact, these are merely stages of the actual policy — the conscious end of which, confrontation with the Soviets, has been the goal all along.

The Commission is explicit that the cost of this policy to sever Cuba from the Soviet Union may be U.S.-Soviet confrontation. As they state it: "Neither the Soviets nor the Cubans are likely to alter their course until they are sometime confronted by the United States."

Since the Cubans have made it clear that their revolution is "non-negotiable", the definition of the goals of this policy makes it clear how inevitable that confrontation is:

"The long range goal of U.S. policy towards Cuba should be the reintegration of a democratic Cuba into the Western Hemispheric system. . . . Impracticality and inconsistency are the objections usually raised. Western success in 'rolling back' Communism has not been merely limited, it has been non-existent. Nevertheless, Cuba is a test case for the United States. The most enduring of police states, the Soviet Union, still strongly resists the free flow of information and people within its borders and from the outside. Its leaders' fears, moreover, are probably justified. Therefore, if the Soviets have reason to be concerned, then how much more vulnerable is Cuba — far less remote, far smaller, and far more Westernized than Soviet Russia.

"Making Cuba the Socialist camp's first true deserter is good policy because it is a possibility, and is perfectly in line with the axiom that the Communist world is not a monolith."

Roger Fontaine, of Georgetown's Center for Strategic and International Studies, who authored most of this report, retailed to a reporter recently the line that the Cuban situation is not "homogenous." "The most important thing to take into account when you are looking into the Cuban situation," said Fontaine, "is that you have two tendencies. . . you have Fidel, who, depending on his public, can be very hard or somewhat conciliatory. But remember," he said, "there is Carlos Rafael (the Cuban minister of Foreign Affairs) who represents an accommodationist tendency and has to be always considered." Fontaine's ulterior motive is to develop a justification for a U.S. hard-line backlash, at the point that Cuba predictably rejects the "accommodationist" line the CCC has put in their mouth.

On the Panama Canal the Commission is equally explicit, and its importance as a statement of intent should not be underrated given that Special Canal Treaty Negotiator Sol Linowitz is a member of the Commission.

There are two things notable about Fontaine's scenarios — first, a direct link is made between the Panama Canal situation and direct confrontation with Cuba. Second, the report makes clear that opposition to the negotiation of a treaty that would give Panama control of the canal is as much a part of the regional confrontation plans as are the negotiations themselves.

"How the matter will be resolved (and it may well not be within the next decade) is also very unclear. Nevertheless, the following scenarios are offered as the most likely. In the first, the Senate would ratify in 1977 a treaty that returns the Canal and the Canal Zone to Panama after a fixed period of continued U.S. management and defense. The immediate consequences in Panama would be a defusing of the issue, with Torrijos given credit for a victory over American imperialism. However, Torrijos would be criticized for not immediately obtaining sole Panamanian jurisdiction over the Canal. Within ten years that criticism should mount, especially if the United States is perceived as not surrendering control fast enough. That in turn might mean that Torrijos, or his successor, would be strongly tempted to renegotiate the treaty in order to shorten its duration and exact other concessions. That campaign would very likely be punctuated with low-level violence in Panama directed at the United States. Since the United States has already accepted the principle of American withdrawal, it could well be tempted to shorten the time period and thus spare itself additional trouble in Panama and the rest of Latin America.

"The more likely chain of events, however, would begin with the Senate rejection of the treaty. The first likely consequence will be the overthrow of Torrijos, who has risked his prestige on getting a favorable treaty. This would not damage American interests but it would add another element of uncertainty to an already uncertain situation. Predictions of what would happen next have varied from low-level violence to guerilla warfare. The former is certain to occur because it is part of the Panamanian political way of life. Demands, of course, will be made for renewed negotiations with the United States, but the atmosphere would hardly be conducive to orderly negotiations. Conceivably, after a prolonged period of trouble, a new treaty would be offered to the Senate whose terms would not be better and possibly worse than the earlier version.

"The worst possible outcome would be a prolonged campaign of terrorism and outright guerrilla warfare. In such a case, U.S. military forces would be employed to protect the Canal as well as American lives and property. But the effectiveness of our counterinsurgency would be limited because of the sanctions that Panama proper would offer to the guerrillas.

"The prospect is an unhappy one, but at the moment it remains an unlikely occurrence. No group

in Panama recommends that course of action. More importantly, no group is now capable of conducting such a campaign. If it were to do so in the near future it would require outside help. That help could only come from Castro's Cuba. In such a case, the United States should certainly take the measures necessary to protect itself from outside intervention."

## Brazil and Argentina

The success of all the "Critical Choices" scenarios depends on a continuous threat to Brazil's neighbors to the north of military attack and immediate potential occupation by that "colossus."

The authors spell out the fact that "there are problems (with the Brazilian military) that could give the United States difficulties in the years ahead" — the potential for an upsurge of Brazilian nationalism. The report then proceeds to profile this nationalist potential, and describes precisely how it can be manipulated through "human rights" and other interventions to do the Rockefellers' dirty work independently of direct U.S. control.

Such manipulation is essential to "keep Brazil from siding with the Third World...and to give the Spanish Americans another incentive to...adopt the Brazilian economic model."

"The new Brazilian military is more likely to be more rigid in domestic affairs and more aggressively nationalistic in foreign policy," the report says. The authors then draw on an historical example to describe the key traits to be worked on. They detail a "long and bitter" dispute between Brazil and the U.S. on the issue of Brazil's seeking a U.S. market for instant coffee: "Clearly the United States misjudged the stubbornness of Brazil. The key to understanding Brazilian behavior is relatively simple. Its leaders are determined to make their country a major power...to do that it must develop rapidly....All attempts to inhibit that growth...will be strongly resisted."

From this profile, the rationale for Carter's present strategy emerges. How to keep these stubborn, nationalist officers in line under conditions of economic stagnation? Manipulate their desire to be world power, and manipulate a "breakaway" from the U.S., while forcing Brazil to become an agricultural, soybean economy, with deindustrialization of all but its arms production industry.

"Brazil is emerging rapidly as a middle level world power...national rivalries make it extremely unlikely that a united Spanish America will emerge...to counter the colossus.

"By 1985, Brazil may well approach major power status...and at the end of the century it may surpass Great Britain or France...

"Brazil's special position in the hemisphere has been complemented by its unique historical relation with the United States....neither could easily join in the many Spanish American schemes of confederation....The United States has at times appreciated

Brazil's uniqueness but we have not done so consistently and behaved accordingly. In part this has been because of a well grounded fear of adverse Spanish American reaction. But in the coming decade, the choice will become even more clear cut, and so will the need for a strategy to implement that choice...."

In conclusion the authors provide three policy options which are not options at all but successive evaluations of moments of the Carter strategy. Here then are all the necessary clues to the whys, hows, and whens of Carter's strategy for controlling and coopting any real nationalist potential into a military threat against "Third World" Spanish America without the stigma of "surrogate Yankee policeman."

1) "Maintaining the recent course (of low profile, high level diplomacy)...would...do nothing to discourage the building of a nuclear explosive capability by Brazil. Moreover, letting Brazil alone would do nothing to convince the Spanish Americans that Brazil is not the surrogate Yankee policeman.

2) "A *Politically Activist* policy...of heavy U.S. pressures on Brazil's leaders to clean up the regime...could draw on Brazilian nationalism and turn it against the meddling United States, needlessly straining our relations. Moreover, it would put those Brazilian moderates working towards changes in a difficult position.

3) "*Integrating* Brazil into the Western Community (entails): Brazil is no longer considered just another Latin American Country;...is gradually included in the...OECD...; and would be encouraged to abandon a wholly independent nuclear development policy...(while the) U.S. would continue quiet diplomacy on political issues like repression."

This policy, according to the authors, "would deliberately try to bring Brazil closer to the West...keep Brazil from siding with Third World countries...and give the Spanish Americans another incentive to...adopt the Brazilian economic model...and thus bring all of Latin America closer to the North Atlantic world."

The "Critical Choices" authors elaborate the expected backlash against the moderates under Carter's political activist strategy more thoroughly in the case of Argentina, where they describe the certainty that Argentine President Videla, a more moderate fascist, will be overthrown by the "Pinochetista" extremist wing of the military:

"The Argentine military government will continue to give the highest priority to eliminating the terrorist groups...Success will require even harsher measures. These will divide the military itself and result in outside calls for respect of human rights. The latter would not ordinarily have much effect on Argentine actions but since they will probably influence the size and conditions of foreign aid, the matter must be considered seriously by the regime. It is likely though, that if President Videla slackens the anti-guerrilla campaign he will be replaced by tougher, more nationalistic officers."

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## Mexico

The Commission on Critical Choices report puts together all the key aspects of the Carter Administration's policy towards Mexico, which in the past have only been presented in isolated fashion.

After leading with an introductory "background" section which warns that Mexico under the previous administration of Luis Echeverria "has begun to move away from its dependence on the United States," the report goes straight to the point: How can the U.S. keep Mexico, and primarily its oil away from the Third World, OPEC, Europe and the Comecon sector, and under tight control by the U.S. It is especially worth noting that while the report was written several months before the announcement of major new oil finds in Mexico, great emphasis is placed on insuring "U.S. access to Mexican oil."

The Carter Administration's strategy for insuring control over Mexican oil is candidly presented in the sections of the report dealing with "Critical Problems" and "Policy Options." Echoing statements by agronomist William Paddock and Carter advisor George Ball, warning that Mexico's population growth — and increasing "illegal immigration" to the U.S. — is a threat to the U.S., the report states that "Mexico's burgeoning population is its most pressing problem" and warns that "family planning programs may well prove insufficient." The solution: "population pressure combined with economic stagnation may produce a violent and uncontrolled social explosion," which, as Paddock had originally presented two years ago would lead to "the reduction of Mexico's population by one-half."

As an essential part of this scenario for generating a "social explosion" the report calls for "better policing of the border by both nations." This plan was originally presented by Carter advisor Daniel Bell in December when he stated that U.S. troops might have to be deployed to the Mexico-U.S. border — and possibly into Mexico — to deal with a "social explosion." In addition to placing Mexico under direct military threat, this plan to prevent Mexicans from emigrating to work in the U.S. will shut off the "safety valve" for the large unemployed population in Mexico, thus intensifying social tensions. The Report's excerpts on Mexico follow.

*"Critical Problems:* For the long term, Mexico's burgeoning population is its most pressing problem. One estimate places Mexico's population at 135 million by the year 2000. Despite recent official endorsement, family planning programs may well prove insufficient. Population pressure combined with economic stagnation may well produce the worst-case situation: a violent, uncontrolled, and therefore unpredictable social and political explosion at our doorstep...

"Poverty and population pressure...have promoted heavy illegal immigration to this country...But whatever the number, it is quite likely to increase, and increase rapidly, if there is a slump in

the Mexican economy...

*"Policy Options:* Since no single issue is likely to be settled amicably, all problems should be handled in an interrelated fashion. The outstanding issues of the next decade are illegal immigration, the maintenance of Mexico's rate of economic development, and access to Mexico's oil exports. To handle these problems in a systematic fashion, a U.S.-Mexican Commission with broad authority to work out agreements on immigration, trade, and development might prove of value. The first item of business would be better policing of the border by both nations, while a fixed number of legal migrant workers would be permitted entrance... Moreover, the commission could complete an agreement which would guarantee a secure U.S. market for Mexican oil at a fixed price below present price levels over a long period of time. This is especially important over the next decade because of Mexico's stability and proximity in glaring contrast to the Persian Gulf states.

It is not expected that any of these problems can be dealt with seriously over the short run. This is especially true of oil, since Mexico has already announced its interest in securing Third World markets and maintaining OPEC price levels. However, after two or three years, the advantages of a close (that is, low-transportation-cost), large, and secure market should become equally apparent to the Mexicans."

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## Venezuela

The Commission on Critical Choices evaluation of the prospects for Venezuelan democracy over the next decade is most striking in its emphasis on the continued threat of a military coup, and the threat of border conflicts or actual war with Brazil. While the bulk of the Commission study is based on a profile of Venezuela authored by specialist Philip Taylor in mid-1975 — and does not take into account most recent political developments — it develops a strategy for keeping President Carlos Andres Perez in line through the threat of coup and regional war, which is fully operative now. (Taylor, it should be noted, was deported from Venezuela while Andres Perez was Interior Minister for "interfering in the internal affairs" of that country.)

"While the 1973 election results were encouraging, in their apparent massive grant of public confidence to social democratic parties, the habits of some 40 years of excessive partisanship make it difficult for 'loyal opposition' to exist and for political legitimacy to be maintained. The Perez government is clearly setting, at least in theory, an exceedingly broad table of possible investment opportunities and supports for the private sector, but at the same time, it is proposing that the largely tax free meal for the national private sector is over, and it is now up to the latter to cast its vote for economic legitimacy by demonstrating confidence

in the future of the country . . . The government may go too far . . . in search of private sector support. Yet at the same time . . . the government has sought by executive decrees and legislation to maintain or create jobs and to freeze or to support the costs of basic articles of general use at a level not responsive to market mechanisms. Finally, the current leaders are not so old as to forget the country's shabby experience with rule by the dictates of a military tyrant: and there are some in the country who, unwilling to participate in the constitutional and republican interplay, would support a return to such a system.

"National policy toward employment and worker rights also reflects this system's insecurity. In 1962 and 1969, labor stability laws were introduced into the Congress . . . both of the bills were bottled up in committees by business oriented legislators, but the governments were the victims in terms of lost credibility in the political arena. In both 1974 and 1975, Perez has taken similar steps for distributive reasons and employer reaction has been identical . . . The Perez originated steps seem to revert to the country's authoritarian past, which often excused itself as motivated by a mixture of paternalism and Rousseauian theory. Entrepreneurial reactions may, in the future, assume vital importance for support and survival of the social democratic system. . . .

"The armed forces' political intentions remain a potentially decisive uncertainty. The military's experience of several decades as an armed bureaucracy, as well as post-1958 efforts by some stubborn persons . . . to make of it an armed political party, still cause nervousness. The ghosts are by no means all laid to rest. The internal issues that might have caused direct military pressure have gradually been put to rest . . . (but) there are still a number of international border controversies and, in the past, there has been good evidence that the 'die-hards' of the armed forces have sought to use these issues to cloak themselves in patriotism in order to gain leverage on the government . . ."

#### *On the threat of regional war:*

"Venezuela's foreign policy goals will almost inevitably cause some heightened tension in international politics. Brazil has for at least a decade regarded itself as the inevitable beneficiary of the developmental process in Latin America . . . It is not improbable that the greater sense of Venezuelan identity and strength, which — if achieved — will more firmly base a bid for international influence, may lead to a "new kid on the block" attitude, especially in the Caribbean, in which more than a hint of imperialism may seem visible."

"(The) multilateral or cooperative approach that Venezuela hopes to maintain in future relationships with its Latin American neighbors (specifically referencing Venezuelan policy in Central America and the Caribbean —ed.) may in fact break down over the issue of Brazil.

". . . In abstract terms, the aggressive Brazilian

efforts of the past two decades to stabilize and expand its internal economic structure, and to broaden its areas of economic and political influence in both Latin America and the world, are quite understandable in light of its large and rapidly growing population. Yet the frictions caused by its neighbors on the South American continent are hardly easy to bear. Further, and probably more alarming to the neighboring countries, is the peculiar Brazilian mixture of nationalist ethnocentrism, militarism, and professed anti-Communism that has been brought to bear, not only on its own people, but also in the countries that have come explicitly within its sphere of influence. . . . While it is 'conventional wisdom' among anti-United States ideologues in both North and South America that Brazil is the South American agent of Yankee imperialism, in fact Brazil proves repeatedly that it is an independent actor and increasingly self-directed.

"The nervousness of Brazil's neighbors is not lessened by the increasing efficiency in Brazilian army directed adventures . . . Venezuela's response to these Brazilian initiatives has been one of pre-occupation . . .

"The relations between the two countries are officially low keyed . . . the possibility of an inadvertent clash over national interests remains good in this writer's judgment. Bailey and Schneider point to Brazil's substantial advantage over Venezuela in case of conflict . . . Actual conflict would have only a one-sided result."

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## Nuclear Terrorism

The Critical Choices report devotes considerable space to the question of nuclear energy development perspectives in Latin America — an issue which has gained political prominence with the U.S. efforts to dismember the extensive nuclear technology transfer accord between Brazil and West Germany. The strongest argument against "the spread of nuclear technology in Latin America" posed is the alleged threat of "nuclear terrorism." Echoing the recent forecast of fellow Center for Strategic and International Studies member Walter Lacquer (a top international terrorist controller), the report predicts that Argentina, which is described as "no model of stability," is a likely site in the immediate future for outbreaks of "nuclear terror." The relevant excerpts from the report:

"Apart from Latin American efforts to develop nuclear explosives, another grave danger to hemispheric security is the possibility of nuclear theft, extortion and terrorism. Nuclear installations, particularly in less stable countries, are vulnerable to terrorist activity. Furthermore, unclassified information now exists to enable well-trained persons who are able to acquire fissionable material to construct a portable nuclear weapon, and the massive spread of fissionable materials increases the likelihood that some will fall into the hands of unscrupulous individ-

uals or groups. There are more than fifty well-financed and armed international terrorist groups, five of them in Latin America. Thus, the rise of international terrorism accompanied by the proliferation of fissionable materials further increases the risks of criminal misuse of nuclear technology.

"The theft of fissionable material is by no means a remote possibility. In Argentina, there has been at least one case of reported loss of fissionable materials, and an armed terrorist group attacked and briefly held part of the Atucha nuclear power plant in March 1973."

## 'The Quest For Order'

The Critical Choices report represents as Latin America's "Quest for Order and Progress" a scenario of unmitigated disorder and chaos — terrorism, civil wars, and continued violation of "human rights" — which, in the same breath, it claims will accompany the return to more "democratic" governments in the coming decade. Presented in the context of economic depression — populations making excessive demands on "scarce resources" and abandoning rural areas for overcrowded cities — the chapter outlines how social chaos will be provoked and manipulated. This is the basis for Brazil to ultimately march on the continent as the "major partner" of the U.S.

The chapter predicts that the process of "social modernization" will be responsible for such problems as the increasing rate of urbanization and urban demographic growth. Governments will be increasingly unable to meet growing popular demands which could result in the "social unrest predicted for the 60s." This "demand overload" will result in endemic violence, which, however, will not cause a major revolution or overturn the old order. No group, it says, can organize the broad support required for such a venture or politicize either urban or rural working-class layers. It warns however, "the inability to bring off a revolution, however, will not lessen the turmoil."

"Radical groups, furthermore, have not been able to exploit the misery that does exist. *Those who are genuinely frustrated are far more likely to resort to apathy, alcohol, or religion than to political action.* Such political activity as exists is extremely sporadic and tends to support conservative-authoritarian politicians (and ex-dictators) like Rojas Pinilla of Colombia, Juan Perón of Argentina, and Pérez Jiménez of Venezuela. Short of extreme economic reversal, the trend of passive support for the system among Latin America's urban poor will probably continue through the next decade.

"Violence should then be endemic in the coming decade in those societies that are the most fragmented socially, the most economically stagnant and ruled by corrupt and repressive political leaders. Since instigators of violence (ranging from urban guerrilla assassins to shopkeepers

who go on one-day strikes) usually come from the middle class and are from relatively advanced economies, countries such as Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Colombia and Peru, may be the most turbulent in the coming decade.

"On the other hand, the turmoil, while destructive, will not be great enough or sufficiently focused to push any society out of the seemingly endless round of strikes, coups, and acts of terrorism that will plague Spanish America in the coming decades. Radical change resulting from sweeping social revolution is unlikely anywhere in Spanish America but economic and demographic growth will inexorably lead to fundamental socio-economic structural change in the long run.

"It is against this background that the human rights question must be considered. Abuses of human rights by Latin American and other governments (in the sense of physical abuses of prisoners or detainees) are nothing new and have a long history. As long as Latin American governments face violent attacks on their authority, grave violations of human rights will occur as official efforts are made to destroy insurgent groups and reestablish domestic peace. In general, human rights flourish only when the basic political order is accepted by nearly all; for without that consensus, non-violent political competition is extraordinarily difficult to maintain.

"The culprits will not simply be the right-wing military dictators, however. Human rights have already been violated by left-wing, essentially civilian, regimes (Perón's Argentina, Allende's Chile, and Castro's Cuba) as well as by the highly personalistic regimes of Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican republic and Francois Duvalier in Haiti. *There is no reason to expect that future regimes, of whatever political make-up will be any great respecters of human rights, particularly when any of them are under violent attack.* Therefore, there is no end in sight for human rights abuses, even though Latin governments are becoming more aware of the domestic and international political reactions created by gross violations of human rights."

## Conclusion

*The following are the conclusions from the Critical Choices report:*

"It is one thing for the region's republics to seek out Western Europe, it is quite another for them to join forces with the Third World, particularly those countries which are the most anti-Western, anti-democratic, and anti-capitalist. If economic development does take place, then in a decade much of Latin America would find itself allied with the developed and near-developed world. If, as this report suggests, Latin America's development is sporadic at best, then the region may well join the ranks of the viscerally anti-Western, and by extension, anti-American bloc.

"That unhappy prospect raises the general problem of relating internal conditions to relations with the United States, which is both more difficult and more important to assess. As we have seen, most of Latin America will make some progress but only in fits and starts, and not enough to satisfy pent-up demand. Some countries will make no progress at all. This will not be because of a lack of potential — the region has natural resources in abundance. Latin America could be a major exporter of food, fuel, and minerals as well as manufactured goods of an increasingly sophisticated nature. But bad governmental management and political turmoil will continue to hamper the region economically.

*"Politically stable regimes will be the exception.* In ten years, however, there may well be another swing back (albeit temporary) to civilian governments after a number of militaries discover that officers have no special taste or talent for government. But the new civilian regimes in most cases will be no more in control than their predecessors. They will continue to be plagued by periodic subrevolutionary violence which will be more than enough to turn out in most countries the fragile government of the day.

"What will this development mean for the United States? Nations with economies desperate for development in general, and foreign exchange in particular, will engage in bitter disputes on trade issues. Any protectionist move made by the United States, though little noticed in this country, will be widely denounced throughout the region, even by our traditional friends. The issue will be further aggravated by the servicing of mounting *foreign debt* — a problem which may be Latin America's most serious international concern in the coming decade. It could, for example, result in a series of emergency meetings of governments, international agencies, and private banks by 1985 but it is unlikely any satisfactory arrangement short of continual debt rollover (a kind of creeping moratorium) will ever be achieved. Besides trade and debt, foreign invest-

ment will continue to be a sensitive issue. U.S. investment will probably stagnate but renewed interest in foreign capital will be shown by some countries which had earlier discouraged it through radical (and radically unsuccessful) social and economic experiments of their own. The wary investor, however, may be very difficult to coax back into the region.

"On the political side the United States can expect trouble from several directions. First, if the civilians do replace the soldiers in some countries there will be considerable outcry directed at the United States for past "supporting" military dictatorships. Indeed, human rights may even become as sensitive an issue as it has been here. Democracy may become *fashionable* once more and talk of ideological pluralism will grow less frequent. The more to civilian regimes may be followed by a perceived drift to the left in those countries and old issues like U.S. corporations will again be ripe for expropriation or contract cancellation.

"Thus, *between the economic pinch and political turmoil*, the United States is not likely to enjoy in 1985 the best of relations with the republics of the old Good Neighborhood. There will, no doubt, be great concern expressed over this in the United States, and *if there is a new administration in 1984, a 'fresh look' at Latin America will be taken.* It should be pointed out, however; that much of what happens is beyond our responsibility and ability to correct. That should not prevent the United States from protecting its interests, and doing those things which are beyond immediate self-interest. The United States can, for example, keep its market open for Latin American exports. It can begin now to explore an *equitable debt-servicing scheme.* It can encourage military regimes to share power with responsible civilians, and *take a firm position on human rights where it is necessary as long as no double standard of conduct is permitted:* that is, to attack only non-Communist dictatorships when the region's only Communist dictatorship holds the record for the oldest, most repressive regime in the hemisphere.

"The United States can also, unobtrusively to be sure, encourage economic rationality in the region. *In the meantime it can and must resist those 'reforms' of the OAS which are solely aimed at embarrassing the United States.* It should refuse to accept the thesis advanced by left-wing partisans which hold this country accountable for all the region's political and economic ills. It must be resisted not only because it is false *but because its articulation is inevitable.* It is inevitable because the root of the problem is not generally what we have done or what we will do but what we are and will remain: the freest, richest, and most powerful nation in this hemisphere.



# Members Of The Commission

## Ex-Officio Members

**The Honorable Nelson A. Rockefeller**

The Vice President of the United States (Chairman of the Commission until February 28, 1975)

**The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger**  
The Secretary of State

**The Honorable Mike Mansfield**  
Majority Leader, United States Senate (Member of the Commission until March 6, 1975)

**The Honorable Hugh Scott**  
Minority Leader United States Senate

**The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.**

Majority Leader, United States House of Representatives

**The Honorable John Rhodes**  
Minority Leader, United States House of Representatives

## Acting Chairman

**William J. Ronan**

Chairman, Port Authority of New York and New Jersey

## Members

**Guido Calabresi**

John Thomas Smith Professor of Law, Yale University

**Leo Cherne**

Executive Director, Research Institute of America, Inc.

**John S. Foster, Jr.**

Vice President for Energy Research and Development, TRW, Inc.

**Luther H. Foster**

President, Tuskegee Institute

**Nancy Hanks**

Chairman, National Endowment for the Arts

**Belton Kleberg Johnson**

Texas Rancher and Businessman

**Clarence B. Jones**

Former Editor and Publisher, The New York Amsterdam News

**Joseph Lane Kirkland,**

Secretary-Treasurer, AFL-CIO

**John H. Knowles, M.D.**

President, Rockefeller Foundation

**David S. Landes**

Leroy B. Williams Professor of History and Political Science, Harvard University

**Mary Wells Lawrence**

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Wells, Rich, Greene, Inc.

**Sol M. Linowitz**

Senior Partner of Coudert Brothers

**Edward J. Logue**

Former President and Chief Executive Officer, New York State Urban Development Corporation

**Clare Boothe Luce**

Author; former Ambassador and Member of Congress

**Paul Winston McCracken**

Professor of Business Administration, University of Michigan

**Daniel Patrick Moynihan**

Professor of Government, Harvard University

**Bess Myerson**

Former Commissioner of Consumer Affairs, City of New York

**William S. Paley**

Chairman of the Board, Columbia Broadcasting System

**Russell W. Peterson**

Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality

**J. George Harrar**

Former President, Rockefeller Foundation

**Walter Levy**

Economic Consultant

**Peter G. Peterson**

Chairman of the Board, Lehman Brothers

**Elsbeth Rostow**

Dean, Division of General and Comparative Studies, University of Texas

**Walt W. Rostow**

Professor of Economics and History, University of Texas

**Sylvester L. Weaver**

Communications Consultant

**John G. Winger**

Vice President, Energy Economics Division, Chase Manhattan Bank

**Wilson Riles**

Superintendent of Public Instruction, State of California

**Laurance S. Rockefeller**

Environmentalist and Businessman

**Oscar M. Ruebhausen**

Partner, Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons and Gates, New York

**George P. Shultz**

President, Bechtel Corporation

**Joseph C. Swidler**

Partner, Leva, Hawes, Symington, Martin and Oppenheimer; Former Chairman, Federal Power Commission

**Edward Teller**

Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University

**Arthur K. Watson\***

Former Ambassador to France

**Marina von Neumann Whitman**

Distinguished Public Service Professor of Economics, University of Pittsburgh

**Carroll L. Wilson**

Professor, Alfred P. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

**George D. Woods**

Former President, World Bank

*Members of the Commission served on the panels. In addition, others assisted the panels.*

**Bernard Berelson**

Senior Fellow, President Emeritus, The Population Council

**C. Fred Bergsten**

Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution

**Orville G. Brim, Jr.**

President, Foundation for Child Development

**Lester Brown**

President, Worldwatch Institute

**Lloyd A. Free**

President, Institute for International Social Research

\*deceased