

realize that a technologically progressing America would be their nation's best partner in peace. Otherwise, it is high time that we demand a decent level of sophistication in Soviet news media. Without such

sophistication, our journalistic colleagues from the socialist camp will remain the incorrigible suckers of imperialist psywar games.

— Criton Zoakos

## Pravda Says No To Carter's SALT Proposals: That's Final

"I've been somewhat concerned lately," said Jimmy Carter at a press conference in Washington, "that (Soviet leaders) have decided to go public as much as they have." This was Carter's reaction to the publication April 14 of an extraordinary 5,000 word editorial in *Pravda*, excerpted below, exposing in detail his policy on strategic arms limitation (SALT). The Soviet government's rejection of the proposals put forward by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in Moscow last month was final, said *Pravda*, and furthermore the Administration's package was never intended for serious discussion. The whole charade about a negotiating process, *Pravda* charged, was a pretext for accusing Moscow of "intransigence."

Carter's "deep cuts" proposal would have reduced Soviet nuclear weapons arsenals by half while leaving U.S. stockpiles virtually untouched, and would have forced a halt to the Soviet R and D programs which are far advanced of those in the U.S. Carter's "fall-back" proposal was to proceed with the 1974 arms limitation agreement signed in Vladivostok, but omitting the U.S. cruise missile and the Soviet "Backfire" bomber. The Soviet Union has long maintained that this represents a breach of the Vladivostok accord by the U.S., and the *Pravda* editorial for the first time explained why: the Ford Administration had secretly agreed to include bombers carrying cruise missiles with ranges over 360 miles, as equivalent to a vehicle with multiple warheads. Carter's crew simply threw this agreement out the window.

*Pravda* rejected both of Carter's "packages" out of hand, just as Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko had done in his Moscow press conference following the collapse of the talks with Vance.

Carter's response? He told reporters after his press conference that the Soviets have rejected the "deep cuts" proposal because they "prefer to take our second option." Carter dismissed Soviet statements to the contrary, saying primly that "it's very encouraging to know that now Mr. Brezhnev and his other leaders, through *Pravda*, are explaining the Soviet position to the people of Russia."

The strategy the Carter Administration has now adopted may be an even bigger miscalculation than its original expectation that the Soviets would agree to bargain with Vance in March. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski frankly told reporters April 13 that U.S. policy is now to persuade the Soviets to "comment on" the U.S. proposals, thereby to restart the "bargaining process." After *Pravda* did "comment" in no uncertain terms, some Administration officials

crowded: you see! We got them to do it! "*Pravda* is discussing our proposals in a way," said one specialist interviewed by the *Washington Post* "despite the Soviet contention that they do not warrant discussion."

This behavior from White House circles can hardly have a reassuring effect on Warsaw Pact leaders. In a speech given during Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov's recent visit to Berlin, East German Defense Minister Hoffman warned that the alliance of the fraternal armies of the socialist countries makes for a fighting force which is invincible and superior to the "imperialist aggressors." The danger comes from "the reactionary circles of international finance capital (i.e. Carter's Wall Street backers, not the "military-industrial complex" as Rockefeller's agent in Moscow Georgii Arbatov would say), and their policy of economic and military pressure on the socialist countries combined with psychological warfare.

### 'The Limitation Of Strategic Weapons— A Problem Which Can And Must Be Solved'

*The following are excerpts from the editorial of the April 14 issue of Pravda.*

... The essence of the position of the Soviet Union, and the principled evaluation of the proposals which the American side put forward in these negotiations, was outlined at a press conference which A.A. Gromyko held in the name of the Soviet leadership on March 31. It was underlined that the principles of equality and identical security of the sides must be consistently embodied in a new agreement, and that limits must be established which effectively curb the strategic arms race, and at the same time do not give unilateral advantages to anyone. The Soviet Union will never waive its legitimate interests and sign an agreement which damages its security . . . .

The Soviet Union never has and does not now consider the limitations established at Vladivostok as a final stage in the efforts of the countries on the path of curbing the nuclear race and lessening the war danger. It is known that both sides have already agreed that after the conclusion of the new agreement, they will continue negotiations on further steps in the field of strategic armament limitation and reduction. And the Soviet Union is true to its word. In his speech in Tula, L.I. Brezhnev underlined that the USSR "is prepared to go further in the questions

of strategic arms limitation and reduction. It is only necessary first to strengthen what has already been achieved and to realize what was agreed upon in Vladivostok — all the more so, since the interim agreement comes to an end in October of this year. . . .”

“The new Washington administration from the very beginning behaved as if it was not at all bound by the agreement reached in Vladivostok and by all that was done to embody it in the text of the agreement. The very posing of the question in this way cannot be called acceptable — what stability in international relations can there be if each American administration renounces the commitments adopted by its predecessors? . . .

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It was proposed by the American side to reduce the total ceilings for strategic arms carriers established at Vladivostok from 2,400 units to 2,000 or 1,800 units, and the number of launching installations of missiles with Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVS—ed.) from 1,320 units to 1,200 - 1,000 units. Outwardly this appears to be an attractive proposal. But only outwardly. In reality, the very proposal of equal substantial reductions by the USSR and the USA from the earlier agreed levels of strategic arms — which is put forward separate from and without considering a number of factors as the American nuclear forward bases in Europe and Asia, the aircraft carrier aviation of the USA, the nuclear arms of U. S. allies and others — can pursue only one goal: to guarantee one-sided advantages for the USA. All these numerous nuclear weapons would not be affected at all according to the American plan, and consequently their role and significance would grow correspondingly, to the detriment of the USSR's security, in case of the proposed reduction of the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missiles and heavy bombers.

In order thoroughly to expose the meaning of this kind of “daring” proposals, as Washington nicknamed them, one need only imagine in what situation the Soviet Union and its allies would find themselves with the elimination by both sides of all intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missiles and heavy bombers. What would happen then? After such a step, which would deprive the USSR of the means of delivery to the United States territory, the United States would still have forward-based nuclear systems in the immediate vicinity of the Soviet Union (about 800 carrier aircraft and land-based missiles). . . .

An inseparable part of the American “package”,

which is being advertised in the USA as nearly a historical step towards disarmament, was the proposal that the so-called cruise missiles with a range up to 2,500 km. would not be subjected to any limitations. In other words, it was now proposed — contrary to the Vladivostok agreement — to give the “green light” for the production and development of a new type of offensive strategic weapon. . . .

What good are the loud but false words being articulated in Washington in favor of a “radical” reduction of a strategic arms and a lessening of the dependence on nuclear weapons, if in reality it turns out that along with the remaining intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missiles on submarines and heavy bombers, a fourth component of strategic armaments would be created, i.e. thousands and thousands of long-range cruise missiles, threatening people with the same nuclear death?

Proceeding from the Vladivostok agreement and striving to close down a new channel of the strategic offensive weapons race, the Soviet Union resolutely has and continues to come out for strict limitations on long-range cruise missiles.

Not only did both sides reach a principled agreement on the inclusion of strict limitations on cruise missiles in the agreement being worked out, but during the negotiations in 1975-76 they studied concrete variants of such limitations.

What is more, in respect to “air-ground” cruise missiles a formula was already agreed upon, according to which heavy bombers equipped with cruise missiles of a range of more than 600 km. . . would be equivalent to missiles with multiple warheads and would accordingly be counted in the levels fixed for such missiles.

Concerning sea- and land-based cruise missiles, the question of the nature of limitations on such missiles remained unsolved. The Soviet Union for its part proposed and is still proposing that such missiles with a range of more than 600 km. should be generally banned.

The new Washington administration now attempts to cast aside everything that had been achieved at the cost of considerable efforts in the negotiations up to the present date and to completely revise the previous American positions. It insists on a completely free hand concerning the development of cruise missiles of all three types, with a range up to 2,500 km. These, it turns out, are those “strict limitations” on cruise missiles, which, it is now being asserted in Washington, were proposed in the framework of the American “package.”

For clearly propagandistic — or more precisely, fraudulent — purposes, the proposal by the American side to include a clause in the prepared agreement which allegedly bans the creation of “any new weapon systems” is being played up in the USA.

In reality however, the American side proposed to ban only the creation of new types of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and not at all new weapon systems in general. As in the past, they do not want to listen to the proposals of the Soviet side, for example, to ban such new weapon systems as the “Trident” type submarine and the B-1 type bomber in the USA and the analogous weapon systems in the Soviet Union, although those

proposals, as has been repeatedly stated, remain in force....

Thus, by taking a closer view of the much-publicized American "package," which is being presented as allegedly the last work in questions of armament limitation and disarmament, it becomes completely clear that not only does it have no constructive basis, but it cannot in general be the subject of serious discussion. It clearly was not even intended for such discussion. This was clearly said to U.S. Secretary of State Vance in Moscow in confidential discussions as well as publicly in the press conference of the USSR Foreign Minister. Therefore some quarters are trying in vain to make it seem as though the Soviet side did not give a final answer and that

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it allegedly needs time to study the new American proposals because of their "radical character."

Their meaning is perfectly clear: they represent a complete revision of the Vladivostok agreement, and signify the creation of new obstructions on the way to an agreement. It is no coincidence that statements have now appeared in the USA acknowledging that the American side was aware of the deliberate unacceptability of its position. One asks oneself: why then was it necessary to bring such a position to Moscow? Was it not to be able to speak afterwards of the "intransigence" of the other side? The result of such a tactic is apparent: the negotiations are stalled. But the intended propagandistic effect is also lacking.

The American side also proposed in Moscow a so-called "narrow" version of the agreement. However this version also meant a revision of the Vladivostok accord

and the Soviet-American accords derived from it, and did not in any way correspond to the very purpose and tasks of Soviet-American negotiations on strategic arms limitation.

Suffice it to say that according to this variation, all cruise missiles would have been placed outside the framework of the agreement, i.e. no limitations at all on them, neither in quantity nor in range, would have been introduced: make as many of them and any kind you like. . . .

Wishing, evidently, to "play it safe" by making this version even more unacceptable to the Soviet Union, the American side proposed to discuss during the ensuing negotiations the question of the Soviet medium range bomber, named "Backfire" in the West, together with the cruise missiles — that is to say, a plane which does not belong in the category of strategic armaments and therefore cannot be a subject of the negotiations. All necessary explanations on this account were given to the American side at the highest level, and not only once; to return again to this question means consciously to complicate things further.

In an attempt to somehow justify the link of the "Backfire" question with that of the cruise missiles, Washington put out the argument that the range of this plane (2,200 km.) is the same as the range of the cruise missiles (2,500 km.). The absurdity of such a linkage is self-evident. Even a layman understands that with such a range the Soviet plane is unable to reach U.S. territory. The picture is different when it comes to the cruise missiles of that range: these missiles are strategic weapons because, when placed on submarines, warships, bombers, or the territory of U.S. allies, they will certainly be quite capable of hitting targets of the territory of the USSR. . . .

On the other hand, (the Soviet Union) has every basis for raising the issue of American forward based nuclear systems, that is, the nuclear arms and means of delivery in Europe, around Europe, and in other regions from which Soviet territory is accessible, and also the aircraft carrier aviation and U.S. submarine bases located near the USSR. There is no doubt that in setting limitations on strategic offensive weapons, these nuclear systems and these factors cannot be left out of consideration, in view of the necessity of strict observance of the principle of equality and identical security for both sides. The one-sided character of the latest American proposals only confirms once more that it is right for the Soviet side to raise the question of the American forward based systems. . . .