

Japan Fishing For Military Links With China

JAPAN

Shinsaku Hogen, a top aide to Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda departed for Communist China on April 28 for the second time in less than a month on what was officially billed as a "private visit" but which, the Japanese press has publicly conceded, is aimed at ironing out the final wording of a Japan-China peace treaty which will include a China-sponsored "anti-hegemony" clause directed against the Soviet Union.

The Japanese decision to accept the anti-hegemony clause reflects the Fukuda government's decision to cooperate with the Carter Administration in establishing Japan-China military cooperation — for use not only as psychological warfare against the Soviet Union but to establish a capability in fact to present the Soviet Union with a credible "two front" threat.

To this end, three military or military-related Japanese missions are now or have just been in China.

Hogen's trip was the outcome of a month of factional maneuvering by Fukuda against Japanese business opponents of his China policy. Hogen, a long-time factional supporter and former Deputy Foreign Minister in the cabinet of Kakuei Tanaka is well known for his vehemently anti-Soviet stance. Before he was fired by Tanaka in late 1973 for trying to sabotage Japanese government negotiations with Middle Eastern countries during the height of the 1973 oil crisis, Hogen headed the anti-Moscow-oriented Soviet Affairs Bureau inside the Foreign Ministry.

Fukuda's sudden decision to break with the last five years of Japanese diplomacy — which has rejected the "anti-hegemony" clause — has nothing to do with consideration of Japan's strategic national interests. The policy now being implemented originated from the office of current U.S. energy czar James Schlesinger during his tenure as U.S. Secretary of Defense in the Ford Administration. It calls for the creation of a "Peking-Tokyo-Washington" anti-Soviet axis in the Far East.

This scheme was first advanced by Schlesinger in his trip to Japan in 1975 in his meetings with then-head of Japan's Defense Agency Michita Sakata. Today Sakata, the self-proclaimed "Schlesinger of Japan," is using his leadership of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) defense affairs policy group to work actively with Fukuda for the China alliance.

Hogen not only sees eye to eye with Sakata on China and the Soviet Union, but one Brookings Institution source recently noted that it was perfectly understandable for the Chinese to invite Hogen to Peking "since Hogen and Schlesinger have exactly the same views on the Soviet Union."

Revealing the prospect for Sino-Japanese military

cooperation, a group of five Japanese military specialists are now in China for a three-week tour which began May 2. The group, consisting of members of the Sea Power Study Group, is headed by Motomi Hori, former commander of the former Imperial Navy, and includes Noboru Nagai, former vice-admiral of the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), Hiroaki Asonuma, former rear-admiral of the MCDF and Eiichi Nagasue of the Democratic Socialist Party. The delegation will inspect Chinese naval facilities during its three-week stay in China, and will advise the Chinese concerning the Soviet navy in the Pacific. It has also requested to visit the army and air force units guarding the country's northern frontiers with the Soviet Union.

That the timing of this visit was a considered government decision is indicated by the fact that the Chinese had extended a standing invitation for such a visit in 1975 but the Japanese government only delayed permission for the trip until now.

The Fukuda government shift was first signalled in early April when it allowed a Japanese defense official to visit China on an official invitation for the first time since 1945. The official, Hisao Iwashima, an authority on American military strategy who is familiar with Soviet military doctrine as well, was in China from April 5 to 17. He viewed a Chinese army drill in Canton and discussed the Carter Administration, U.S. military strategies and Japan's defense setup with Chinese defense officials.

It has been made known in Japan that Fukuda will make the final decision on whether to send Foreign Minister Ichiro Hatoyama to Peking in June after Hogen's return. Hatoyama's visit will be to sign the "friendship treaty" with China.

Japan is now known to be moving to accept a Chinese request to decrease the interest rate owed the Japan Export-Import Bank on five-year deferred payments from 7.5 percent to 6.5 percent. 7.5 percent is the rate set by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development for long-term loans to the East bloc and China, but some member countries have already reduced their rates. The U.S. has heretofore opposed Japan's reducing the rate, but is now believed to favor the reduction of Japan's rate to China (not to the Soviets) in line with its own overtures to China.

According to the Kyodo news service, Foreign Ministry sources say that Japan was taken by surprise last summer by a Peking request for a top-ranking Defense Agency official to visit China. At the time, the Foreign Ministry turned down the request because it didn't want to provoke the Soviet Union, the sources told Kyodo.

Both because of Japanese Defense Agency-U.S. connections and because of U.S. defense commitments to Japan, any ties between China and the JDA represent Chinese ties to the United States.

This suits Peking fine. Their attempt to augment Japan-China relations is long-standing, and Japan's

sudden acceptance augurs to realize China's goal of forging an Asian anti-Soviet cordon around the Soviet Far East.

There has not been any sign of lessening anti-Sovietism in China, since the last October purge of four leading Maoists, but it has in fact increased in intensity.

The chief obstacle to direct China-U.S. military ties as desired by Schlesinger-Carter circles here is the sticky question of Taiwan. So far, the Administration, especially Carter's National Security Affairs Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, has operated on the belief that China could be offered some empty verbal formula that would come short of the abrogation of the U.S. defense treaty with Taipei as demanded by China. An interview given the *Washington Post's* Hong Kong correspondent by a top Chinese official and published April 29 expressed in clearest terms yet that China cannot accept any compromises on this question. Few observers doubt that if this matter can be resolved, Chinese-U.S. relations would become quite close, an eventuality that would subsume the current Japanese overtures.

Storm in Japan

Fukuda's moves have not failed to raise a storm in Japan. The faction fight within the Japanese government bureaucracy was so great that Fukuda felt unable to go through normal Foreign Ministry channels to make his China bid. According to a leak to the daily *Yomiuri's* Minoru Hirano, Hogen, a private citizen, albeit with close links to one faction of the Foreign Ministry, was chosen by Fukuda to prevent the mission being blocked by opposition within the Foreign Ministry.

Business circles regard intransigence on the question of fishing rights as a direct response to Fukuda's provocative moves toward China.

Since April 1, Japanese fishermen have been barred

from traditional fishing waters inside the USSR's new territorial limit because the Soviets have decided to link the question of even an interim fishing agreement to Japanese territorial concessions on northern islands occupied by the USSR after World War II.

The May *Yomiuri* reported that Shigeo Nagano, president of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, said recently: "Fishery is one thing and economic cooperation is another. Should a deadlock of the fishery talks affect the two countries' economic cooperation, the bilateral relations would be jeopardized root and branch."

At stake is the entire prospect for Japanese multi-billion dollar investment and development of Soviet Siberia, desperately desired by many major business leaders in Japan.

Another business leader, Toshiwo Doko, president of the Federation of Economic Organizations, the leading business group in Japan, was quoted in the *Yomiuri* article as holding the view that the only way to resolve the outstanding Japan-Soviet dispute about possession of the four Northern Islands taken by the Soviet Union in 1945 — an issue used repeatedly by anti-Soviet circles in Japan to block closer cooperation with Moscow — was to join hands with the Soviet Union to develop the Tyumen oil fields. His point is that provocation of the Soviet Union is counterproductive if Japan ever wants the islands returned. It is only in the context of close economic collaboration and a dropping of the formal issue that Moscow might someday give up its claim.

Nonetheless, for the moment, Fukuda is achieving his objective of wrecking Soviet relations and realizing his China caper. The business and political opponents of Fukuda have not been able to muster the clarity on the issues, nor the decisive alternate policy options, to make Fukuda's moves inoperative.

Vietnam Negotiations: U.S. Stalls For Concessions

VIETNAM

The first round of talks between Vietnam and the United States on normalization of relations between the two nations were concluded in Paris this week. The U.S. delegation, led by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, announced that the U.S. would not block a Vietnamese bid to enter the United Nations, while the Vietnamese delegation, led by Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien, promised to intensify efforts to provide information on U.S. servicemen still listed as missing in action in Vietnam.

Though acclaimed in much of the U.S. press as the dawning of a new period of friendly relations between the two countries, it was evident that "little progress" was actually made, in the words of the *Washington Post*. Central to this failure was the Vietnamese refusal to separate the question of U.S. responsibilities to "heal the

wounds of war" — i.e., supply reconstruction aid — from the broader political questions of normalization. The Administration's balking on the question of aid underscores that its initiative is no more than a ploy to force political concessions that the Vietnamese are neither willing nor prepared to make.

On May 3, the first day of the negotiations the Vietnamese Communist Party daily *Nham Dan* declared that U.S. aid for reconstruction was "an undeniable obligation" rooted not only in the 1973 Paris accords but in "international law, morality and human conscience." It charged that the U.S. refused to "abandon erroneous policy" in refusing to give economic aid. In a press conference following the talks Pham Hien said the U.S. had promised \$3.25 billion in reconstruction assistance and an additional billion or one and a half billion in "concessional aid."

The Vietnamese demand for aid defines the basis on which they seek relations with the U.S., that is in terms of broad and mutually beneficial economic cooperation. This was strongly implied when Pham Hien, at the press