The Mexican statement also demanded that any new funding schemes must represent additional funds for real development beyond "recycling" (refinancing) of old debts.

IMF Controversy At ECLA

The swelling anti-IMF sentiment in sections of the continent has factionalized this week's ministerial level meeting of the UN Economic Commission on Latin America (ECLA) in Guatemala City.

The IMF representative at the conclave was hit May 1 with charges that his institution was serving as a "financial policeman" against Mexico. His "rebuttal" took the form of a recitation of IMF interference in Mexico that fully supported the charge! Among other revelations, Julio Gonzalez admitted that the IMF "recommended" as early as 1974 that Mexico devalue its peso because ambitious government expenditures for development projects were creating "disorder" in the public accounts. Gonzales then warned that the current IMF program for Mexico would mean "at least four years... of austerity policies."

The draft document to be considered by the ministers as a petition addressed to the ongoing North-South dialogue in Paris calls on the U.S. (to be represented at the forum by U.S. Ambassador to the UN Andrew Young) to "accept the fact that present international relations are unjust and that a New World Economic Order is essential." Mexico and Peru have insisted that ECLA's technocrats go beyond monetarist statistical indices to include "social indicators." These countries are reportedly concerned that ECLA's statistics fail to reflect the devastating effects on the labor force of the IMF-sponsored "shock treatment" in Chile.

In counterpoint to the defensive postures of the IMF and its defenders at Guatemala City, the representative of the Comecon told the assembled delegates that no economic crisis or debt problem stood in the way of increased trade and cooperation with the socialist bloc. Lev Lukin added that Comecon was pleased by "the way in which Latin America is becoming aware of the importance of increased trade with the socialist countries," and stressed Comecon's support for the demands of a new world economic order. During the week he met privately with delegations from most of the 32 countries that are participating in the sessions.

'IMF's Economic Stagnation Unacceptable'

The following are excerpts from the principal conclusions of the Second National Congress of Economists:

National development is a task that is everyone's responsibility, which can only be achieved through a mobilization of the population for the interests of the majority.

National and popular interest demand — as the only option — socially shared development based upon democratic participation...and an intransigent defense of independence and national sovereignty....

This is not a rhetorical statement on social justice. Salaried workers and the millions of unemployed and underemployed cannot continue to carry the weight of inflationary stagnation which only helps a minority.

In the words of our Constitution, the increasing participation of the State in the economy is imperative and unquestionable....

Economic stagnation favored by monetarist-stabilization criteria, sponsored in particular by the International Monetary Fund, is an unacceptable option....

Energy And Industrial Policy For Venezuela And The Caribbean

The following is the complete text of a draft economic program for Venezuela and the Caribbean Region released by the Latin American Labor Committees (CLLA) last month.

Introduction

Developments surrounding the Current Mideast tour of Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez have made it clear that Venezuela has assumed a leadership role in the Third World for establishing a new world trade and monetary system, admirably continuing the momentum generated by the administration of former Mexican President Luis Echeverria. Perez's diplomatic efforts and public pronouncements during the past six months have consistently defended the developing sector's right to industrial development and access to the most advanced technology, in the face of the most malicious onslaught of a Carter Administration intent on destroying every trace of scientific progress worldwide, in a futile effort to save the dying IMF monetary structure. As Perez has insisted, the task is clear: without the New World Economic Order, "there is no possibility for the development of our countries, not for the large countries of the region nor for the rich of the region."

Perez and his allies within the government and among pro-progress industrialists have gone further: they have indicated in outline the appropriate policies required for attaining this objective. Spokesmen for this tendency,



such as Carlos Acedo Mendoza of the powerful Mendoza industrial group, have identified their policy as one of productively investing Venezuela's vast "petrodollar" reserves into large-scale industrial projects, instead of unproductively freezing them in New York accounts.

This strategy has already run head-on into major factional opposition, both from the Wall Street White House in the United States, and its house-servants within Venezuela. Wall Street's objectives, made clear in the recent Rockefeller Commission on Critical Choices paper and the Pentagon report prepared by former Exxon executive Melvin Conant, are to seize total control of Venezuela's oil as a "strategic buffer" for the U.S. This would be done by including Venezuela and Mexico with the U.S. in a hemispheric oil cartel that would bust OPEC. As one source close to the Trilateral Commission commented recently, "We want to reinforce Venezuela's traditional marketing dependence on the U.S."

Within Venezuela, traitors such as Finance Minister Hector Hurtado are trying every trick to prevent Perez from withdrawing petrodollar funds from Wall Street for productive investment. Development investment is "inflationary," lies Hurtado, demanding instead that the Federal budget be cut and that investments be "pragmatically" slashed.

The forces around President Perez have countered this double subterfuge with an aggressive policy of cooperation with the EEC and the Comecon to diversify markets and technology sources, and by *expanding* productive investment programs and shifting still small amounts of non-invested petrodollars from U.S. to European accounts. Simultaneously, Perez has rejected Hurtado-IMFdemands for austerity and stated his unequivocal commitment to the development of "human resources" as the fundamental premise of all economic and social progress.

Although these Perez policies are coherent with the creation of a New World Economic Order, what is lacking in Venezuela is a concrete program that is both a plan for immediate implementation and simultaneously a link to the construction of a new international order. Most significantly, it must be a program around which to rally the Venezuelan working, peasant, and industrialist classes in support of the progressive policies of the Perez government.

The current official V Plan de la Nacion falls short on a number of counts. First, the V Plan is not regional. As President Perez himself stated in his historic April 13 address before 20 Latin American planning ministers, "We cannot constrain planning to the limits of our borders." More concretely, the entire Caribbean Region (including Central America, Northern South America, and the Caribbean nations as such) is one of the most energy- and mineral-rich areas in the world, "a potential that completely ignores political boundaries." Full realization of these capabilities is impossible with planning conducted on an exclusively national basis. Moreover, there is simply not enough labor power in Venezuela to even begin marshalling the existing industrial and energy potential. The population of the entire region must be seen as a single, invaluable resource, and developed with that in mind.

Secondly, as mentioned above, the V Plan is not being used to *politically* mass educate the population towards an understanding of their role in the process of industrial development. The development of human resources cannot be limited merely to technical training.

And third, and most significantly, the V Plan is flatly *wrong* — by omission — on the crucial question of energy. It is time this issue was directly addressed.

The V Plan correctly seeks to replace oil as Venezuela's principal trade commodity with self-expanding industrial production. But the current policy of oil conservation is a Malthusian blunder that will only ensure Venezuela's continued dependence on oil and *prevent* the necessary industrialization. Since the world confronts a global problem of the depletion of fossil fuels, the single most critical imperative for ongoing world industrialization is guaranteeing the transition to a world economy based on unlimited *thermonuclear fusion power* by the late 1990s. This strategic consideration necessitates an enormous threshold of industrial activity by that time, in Venezuela and in the entire Third World, which in turn means the most rapid development of the Caribbean Region's tremendous non-nuclear energy sources as a transition to the fusion era. Depletion of oil is no problem — if this depletion is matched with rapid industrialization and development of new energy technologies. Critical in this effort will be Venezuelan leadership throughout Latin America in the development of continental fission power programs. The alternative to this, "pragmatic" as it may sound, actually means Zero Growth and economic collapse.

In light of these strategic necessities, the Latin American Labor Committee (CLLA) submits the following draft program for industrial and energy development of the Caribbean Region.

Doubling Oil Production

Within the "Caribbean Region" the so-called Northern Tier (Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana and Surinam) will become the regional focal point for heavy industry and energy generation, with Venezuela, given its relatively advanced infrastructure, playing the central role. Venezuela has both the ability and the responsibility of politically and financially organizing the entire region around an integrated plan, thanks to its crucial possession of oil and oil revenues. Its more than $8.5 billion in foreign exchange reserves, plus its financial and trade channels to the EEC and OPEC, enable Venezuela to begin financing regional development projects and to trade its oil, which can be processed entirely in Venezuelan and Caribbean refineries, for capital goods. To adequately finance such a regional program, which would include developing the area's vast potential in steel, aluminum, and other raw materials-related heavy industries, the first priority is to approximately double Venezuela's present oil production.

The only serious obstacles to increasing output from the present 2.3 million barrels per day (bpd) to around 4.5 million bpd are political. Venezuelan production has fallen from a high of 3.6 million bpd in 1970, largely due to political sabotage by Rockefeller Standard Oil operatives, such as zero-growth quack Juan Pablo Perez Alfonso. Perez Alfonso and his Malthusian co-thinkers not only lack the "daring and audacity" called for by President Perez as the requisite for progress; but like Jimmy Carter, they are rabid fanatics of deindustrialization in the guise of "conservation." (To date the zero growthers have yet to claim that if no petroleum at all is pumped it will last forever, but we expect them to reach this conclusion shortly.)

In fact, since the solution to Venezuelan and regional needs, once oil reserves are depleted, depends exclusively on industrialization and nuclear energy, which require massive investment *in the short term* of returns from oil exports, cutting oil production can only benefit those forces intent on keeping nuclear and other industrial technologies away from the Third World. The only way to ensure Perez' policy of reducing the nation's dependence on petroleum is to productively exhaust existing reserves as rapidly as possible. Leaving Venezuela's oil reserves in the ground is as foolish as leaving its financial reserves in Wall Street banks — there is no productive social use value in hoarding.

Exxon's hysterical denials to the contrary, a production rate of 4.5 million bpd of oil is geologically possible in Venezuela. The Ministry of Energy and Mines currently limits its definition of "capacity" at 3.5 million bpd merely due to the fact that vast amounts of natural gas associated with the oil deposits must be either flared or reinjected into the ground as the oil is pumped out. As a result, not only must oil output be held back, but Venezuela's huge proven natural gas reserves are being severely underexploited. At the present rate, the 1.1 trillion cubic meters in reserves in fields now in use will last 70 years. New deposits now being explored, such as the Gulf of Paria and the cretaceous zone south of Lake Maracaibo, would boost the total to 4.5 trillion cubic meters — which would last almost 300 years at current rates of extraction!

The obvious solution to this bottleneck is to minimize flaring and reinjecting by rapidly expanding natural gas consumption, gearing new industry for natural gas use and setting up a regional gas-powered electrical grid. A doubling of the present extraction rate of crude petroleum, possible within two years, would release an estimated 80 billion cubic meters of associated natural gas. Once harnessed, this gas will easily double current electricity consumption levels, with reserves lasting approximately 60 years. Until downstream industries are completed to receive such an increase in gas production, reinjection can continue, while existing oil installations allow petroleum output to rise to 3.5 million bpd within one year.

Natural gas can be piped, even under water, thousands of kilometers at relatively low cost with existing technologies. Within two or three years, under a high-priority program Colombian and Venezuelan natural gas, modestly estimated at over 5 trillion cubic meters in reserves, could be piped throughout the Northern Tier and eventually into Central America.

The simultaneous development of a regional petrochemical industry could have ammonia plants on line within approximately the same time frame, by taking advantage of the Caribbean's huge refining infrastructure. With the elaboration of natural gas into am-

This graph is a hypothetical illustration of the transition from present energy sources toward the eventual goal of fusion power in the Caribbean Region. Although it is not possible to predict precise quantities, the growth in energy output during the first five years will be based on immediate utilization of natural gas and hydroelectric potential. In two to three years, once a regional pipeline grid is completed and connected to industrial centers and generation plants, natural gas consumption could more than double. Hydroelectric projects, which take longer to install, would begin to come on line at the end of the first five-year period. Venezuela and Colombia alone have a shortrun hydroelectric potential of 75,000 MWe. Since most of the islands will be beyond the range of these two sources, the region as a whole must embark on a coordinated nuclear energy program, with fission reactors in operation during the second five-year phase. Although the "Northern Tier" countries will not have to rely as much on fission, they will also need reactors as supplementary energy sources and for providing the technological infrastructure crucial for the transition to fusion. Oil, which will be used primarily for export, will be gradually phased out as an energy source. Venezuela's presently known conventional reserves, at an extraction rate of 4.5 million bpd, will last approximately 12 years. However, the development of new extraction technologies would open up such areas as the 700 billion barrel Orinoco heavy crude deposits, and would, of course, alter the above transition "profile" significantly.



monia fertilizers, and with additional ammonia provided as a by-product of the region's steel potential (see below), the area will become one of the world's major fertilizer producing centers. Within five years, the region can be exporting millions of tons of fertilizers to major potential breadbaskets in the Third World, such as the Rio de la Plata, and to the advanced sector. Returns on these exports, in the form of agricultural produce and capital inputs, will spur further leaps in the Caribbean Region's industrialization.

Venezuela's nationalized oil industry infrastructure, the most advanced in OPEC, is readily suitable for vastly increased production. The domestic steel industry already supplies half of the annual needs in tubing for the country's 6,000-mile pipeline grid. Expanded exploration and drilling do not present significant technological or logistical problems. The country has by far the largest refining capacity, 1.5 million bpd, outside of the advanced sector, with the single 700,000 bpd Amuay refinery exceeding the capacity of almost every OPEC nation. Amuay and the Cardon refinery, both located on the Paraguana Peninsula, pump a combined 110,000 barrels per hour into port facilities that can serve 180 large tankers per month. By combining this potential with the enormous refineries of Aruba, Curazao, Trinidad and other Caribbean islands, plus the smaller facilities of Central America, the entire region has a total immediate potential of more than 4.8 million bpd, or roughly one-third the installed capacity of the U.S. and half that of the entire Comecon.

Minerals for Industrialization

The region's enormous, largely untapped mineral resources are tailor-made for providing a basis for integrated heavy industry. Our medium range objective is thus to convert the region into a major international center for the elaboration of these minerals into steel, aluminum, finished nickel, and other metals. These will, in turn, supply downstream manufacturing located in areas now equipped with rudimentary manufacturing infrastructure and skilled manpower, such as the Bogota-Medellin-Cali triangle in Colombia, the center coastal zone of Venezuela, central Guatemala, Cuba, and other Caribbean islands, as well as the advanced sector.

The mineral wealth of the Northern Tier, which will be the hub of basic raw materials processing, completely overlaps political borders. Specifically, there are two primary sites that are optimal for heavy industry concentration. The first, now only partially developed, is outlined by the immense veins of very rich iron and bauxite deposits extending from the state of Bolivar in eastern Venezuela, through Guyana, into Surinam. Venezuela's iron deposits, up to 2.5 billion tons of some of the richest and most easily mined ore in the world, have been surveyed right up to the Guyanese border, with every indication that this geological formation extends into the largely unexplored Guyanese Esequibo area. Similarly, the rich bauxite veins of Surinam and Guyana, which together with Jamaica supply most of the West's bauxite, have been shown to include at least 164 millions tons of the mineral in eastern Venezuela.

Juxtaposed to this shared mineral potential is a single, enormous hydroelectric capacity resulting from the extreme dropoff of large rivers from the inland plateau to the coastal plain. The largest waterfalls in the world are located in this area. Venezuela has already marshalled part of this potential in the Guri hydroelectric complex, a natural source of energy for that nation's iron and steel industry. According to government plans, this complex will generate 9,000 megawatts (MWe) per year by the mid-1980s, the equivalent of one-half of the nation's total present electricity consumption. Similar projects must be rapidly undertaken on the Guyanese side of the border, particularly on the Mazaruni and Curuni rivers.

Power from such projects will be able to feed a one million ton per year aluminum refinery and related industries in Guyana, plus a steel complex on the Esequibo river, within five years. In eastern Venezuela, by rapidly investing the benfits from the huge volume of trade that will result from doubling oil exports, the government's current modest plan to increase steel production in Puerto Ordaz to 4.8 million tons per year by 1980-81 can be expanded to roughly 9 million tons without major infrastructural problems.

The potential for a center of basic industry in the west, involving the integration of Colombian and Venezuelan hydroelectric, natural gas, iron, and more precious metals, is even greater. The immense bituminous coal veins extending from northeastern Columbia into the Venezuelan state of Zulia, representing a combined total of some 15 billion tons in reserves, are the largest in Latin America, and can be easily converted to coke for steel furnaces. With the full exploitation of Colombian iron deposits, a potential 40-50 million tons annually with proper infrastructure, this zone could easily feed a steel industry producing on the order of 15 million tons a year by approximately 1985. The presently dilapidated Paz del Rio complex near Bogota, and the Maracaibo area in Zulia, where the government already plans to produce 5 million tons of steel per year within a decade, will be the central poles of this industrial zone.

Through the use of the Jordan steel process, which has the double advantage of being more efficient than conventional coke processes and producing large amounts of ammonia as a by-product, this zone will also be a major nitrogenous fertilizer supplier. By-products and inputs of the steel industry will be integrated with the large petrochemical potential centered around the natural gas deposits of the Guajira peninsula and southern Lake Maracaibo. These areas together can supply approximately 30 to 50 billion cubic meters of gas annually within three to five years. Additional energy will be generated by an integrated hydroelectric project in the Arauca and Meta basins, which are shared by Colombia and Venezuela.

This sector will also specialize in high-technology elaboration of more precious metals. Although exploration has barely begun, already significant deposits of copper, nickel, silver, zinc, cobalt, uranium and lead have been discovered in this section of the Andes, particularly in the Perija range along the Colombian-Venezuelan border. A 1975 survey revealed that Venezuela's undeveloped deposits of titanium, an extremely valuable metal used in the aerospace industry, are larger than those in the U.S. and Mexico.

A proposal for an integrated industrial Bogota-Maracaibo industrial corridor is not merely an economic necessity. Organizing internationally for such a plan is the only way to politically bury, once and for all, the Rand Corporation's scenario for manipulated border hostilities. As President Perez has noted, it is "a poorly understood nationalism" that leaves Latin America open to such manipulation: "Whenever we try to develop some form of integrated system, we want to take out a micrometer screw to measure what advantages have been gained by the other countries, instead of seeing what our own country has gained through complementarity with other nations."

Both the Bolivar-Guyana and Maracaibo-Bogota heavy industry foci will be coordinated with other development projects in Central America and the Caribbean. Guatemala has already begun to develop oil and nickel deposits, while iron and bauxite potentials are being explored in other Central American countries. Cuba's nickel is already highly advanced, and Haiti and the Dominican Republic have promising off-shore oil and gas fields. Jamaica's aluminum industry, which should be expanded to 2 million tons annually, will be integrated with plans for the aluminum output of the Bolivar-Guyana-Surinam zone.

Manufacturing

The elaboration of these processed raw materials into secondary products and consumer goods must also be planned on a regional basis. It is immediately obvious, for instance, that the Northern Tier will have a social cost advantage in the production of materials for construction. Steel beams and reinforcement, plus aluminum fixtures and panels, will provide the basis for sorely needed urban reconstruction and housing for most of Latin America. Colombian and Venezuelan cement, among the highest quality in the Third World, will also be expanded to meet regional needs, and eventually become a major export item. The region's enormous energy resources will make this relatively high energy-intensive product comparatively inexpensive, enabling expansion from a current combined capacity of approximately 8 million tons per year to 25-30 million in five years. Prefabricated housing, already exported by the Mendoza group in Venezuela, can easily be expanded even with existing technologies.

Auto is another sector that will be spurred by steel expansion. Colombia now has the most advanced forging and engine plants in the Andean Pact, but produces only 50,000 vehicles annually. Venezuela will produce 175,000 units by the end of this year, and is presently entering into Phase II of its auto program, which will develop plants for producing engines, gear boxes, and differentials. Under an integrated program, half of Colombian-Venezuelan capacity should be converted to tractor production, yielding some 90,000 tractors per year by

1980, to fill the chronic shortages of mechanization in the agricultural sector.

When this mechanization is combined with the region's vast fertilizer potential and the water control advantages resulting from hydroelectric projects, agriculture will be pulled out of its present intolerable backwardness. The Colombian-Venezuelan "llanos," and areas of Central America, present excellent potential for cattle raising in particular. Temporate-climate grains, especially wheat, will be imported from the Rio de la Plata as trade accelerates.

Trade and Financing

In sum, this program represents 5-7 years from its initiation a total potential yearly output of more than 30 million tons of steel, 5 million tons of aluminum, 5 million bpd of crude oil, 100 million tons of iron, 80 to 100 billion cubic meters of natural gas, 100 million tons of coal, several millions of tons of other processed minerals, and a wide array of manufactured goods produced throughout the region. To accomplish this, capital formation during the first five years must be at least double the rate now programmed under Venezuela's V Plan, to the tune of approximately $15 billion per year. Imports will constitute the bulk of this capital formation.

As long as the U.S. continues under the anti-progress policies of the Carter White House, the Caribbean Region must turn to enormously expanded trade with the EEC and the Comecon. Moves in this direction have already been made by Venezuela, Jamaica, and Guyana, in particular, with Caracas becoming a center of attention for trade and cooperation missions from Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and the Soviet Union during the past six months. These overtures must be quickly concretized into specific agreements.

Infrastructure is the most immediate physical constraint to both trade and development. Northern Colombia, despite its tremendous potential, is shockingly undeveloped. A single railroad connects the manufacturing interior to the coast, and all highway links in this area are unpaved. Port capacity is less than 4 million tons per year. The Esequibo region of Guyana is almost totally unexplored. Venezuela's iron and oil shipping terminals are excellent, but its remaining ports, especially La Guaira, are already severely congested.

Technology and equipment for expanding the region's ports several-fold can be easily obtained from the EEC and the Comecon. With the cooperation of an East German technical delegation, Venezuela plans to install prefabricated docks in two key ports within mere months. Under the V Plan, Puerto Cabello will be expanded with similar techniques to a capacity of 7.5 million tons annually, which is more than the total tonnage of Venezuelan imports during 1976. Technology for extremely rapid construction of roads and rail lines can be obtained from the British, Italians, and Soviets. The Czechs and Poles have already offered to help develop Venezuelan and Colombian mining, while Japan and the Soviet Union are obvious sources for heavy capital equipment, particularly electric turbines.

Production Potential Of The Caribbean Region

(per year)

	1977*	1983-85
iron ore**	20.0	100
coal**	4.0	100
petroleum (crude)***	2.5	5
petroleum (refined)***	3.5	5
steel**	1.5	50
aluminum**	1.0	5
natural gas (consumption)°	20.0	100
hydroelectric°°	10.0	75
cement**	10.0	30
labor force°°°	20.0	35

*present production
**million tons
***million bpd
°billion cubic meters
°°thousand MWe
°°°millions of literate adults as potential members of the industrial and modern agricultural workforce.

The above table shows estimated production potentials of strategic items on the basis of a regionally integrated, massive industrialization program, and its requirements for a minimally skilled labor force.

Given the continuous sabotage of Caribbean trade by Rockefeller-linked shipping multinationals, the rapid development of NAMUCAR, the integrated Caribbean-Central American shipping consortium, is a top political priority. Despite Venezuela's projected increase in shipping capacity to 645,000 tons by the end of this year (including 14 nationalized tankers), the region will not attain trade and marketing independence without expanding the NAMUCAR fleet with new ships from the advanced shipyards of Japan, Scandinavia, Italy, West Germany, and the Comecon.

A trade program as ambitious as this would, for most countries, be impossible even to consider before the institutionalization of the New World Economic Order, given the amount of financing it requires and the illiquidity of the current dollar system. Venezuela, however, with its large financial reserves and income, is excellently situated to kick off this regional program, while organizing internationally to create the new economic order which will pull into the area far vaster flows of transfer-ruble based credits. Immediate Venezuelan steps in this direction should include: 1) withdrawing all petrodollar deposits out of dollar accounts, and transferring these holdings into gold and politically stable currencies like the Italian lira; 2) organize the rest of OPEC to do likewise; 3) give full political support to Third World declarations of debt moratoria.

In combination, these measures more than suffice to put an end to the long-suffering IMF system.

The Question of Labor Power

The chauvinist hysteria that is instigated by the Rand Corporation and its agents against the immigration of Colombian "illegals" into Venezuela is inimical to the national interests of both countries. The fact is that Venezuela does not have sufficient manpower to industrialize in the manner we have outlined. Excluding illiterates and the largely unskilled peasantry, Venezuela has an estimated minimally skilled potential labor pool of merely 2.2 million people — clearly inadequate for building this country into an industrial hub. Venezuela will immediately *need* millions of workers, not only from Colombia, but from Central America and the Caribbean as well. Industrial workers from the large Colombian cities of Cali, Medellin, Bogota, and Barranquilla, where literacy rates among urban adult males is almost 90 percent — among the highest in the Third World — and totalling almost 4 million men, will be essential in this process.

Simultaneously, the region's peasantry and unskilled urban population must be integrated into the industrial proletariat region-wide, through massive literacy and training programs, and by freeing rural labor as agriculture is intensively mechanized. Millions of peasants will be absorbed by the enormous construction tasks outlined above as the first step in moving up through successively higher-skill occupations.

For the region in its entirety, the industrial program outlined above will, within five years, require a workforce totaling approximately 40 percent of the total population, or about 35 million healthy, literate,and at least semi-skilled workers. Presently, the potential total of urban, literate population ranging from unskilled to skilled is roughly only 20 million.

If the Caribbean Region is to survive the ongoing collapse of the dollar system, the first educational task in developing the remaining 15 million workers must be the immediate *political* education of the entire population on the need for regional development and how it can be accomplished. If President Perez, in particular, is to succeed in his struggle for development and free his country from dependence on oil, he must slice through the vicious pettiness of the opposition and the treason within his own party and cabinet on behalf of Rockefeller and the IMF by mobilizing the population around the kind of specific objectives we propose here.