

indicates that they intend to use this method to get a "fix" on a non-moving OTH target object, such as a city, mountain, or other large body. (The choice of 10-per-second pulses is excellent for such "fixed" object identification using Doppler shift methods.) The strength of the pulses introduces perturbations in the ionosphere which become significant with respect to the disturbances occurring naturally. This considerably improves the signal-to-noise ratio for this "fixed" object, requiring minimum processing, and is subject to minimum jamming since the OTH radar controls all the parameters of the pulses.

Why use radar to locate stationary bodies? It is a logical inference that the Soviets will use the time in between the 10-per-second pulses to introduce lower amplitude but higher pulse repetition rates — 100 pulses per second or higher — to identify fast-moving objects such as planes or missiles! The overpowering 10-per-second pulses would not necessarily be noise to the transmitting station, for since their frequency is known, they can be processed out relatively easily. And the precisely located "fixed" object serves as a range reference for the moving object!

In other words, the Soviets don't need the Cyber 7600 or other "real time" computers to track U.S. missiles. They have instead relied on their ability to modify and control the plasma of the ionosphere — in this case with high-energy radio pulses — which demonstrates once more that the Soviets have an edge over the U.S. precisely because of their continuing commitment to applying their researches in basic physics to the problems of high energy technologies.

This puts the issue of "technology transfers" in the proper focus. The Soviet Union has demonstrated again and again its willingness to work together with the United States for cooperative development of fusion power and other high energy technologies, to the benefit of both nations and the entire world. American politicians and military men who foolishly continue to ignore these offers, and instead tag along after the Carter Administration's war mobilization, will be leaving the Soviets no choice but a one-way "technology transfer" that will leave this nation a heap of smoking rubble.

— M. Bacco

General Keegan: An Appreciation And A Critique

Major General George Keegan's March 11 speech at an American Security Council press luncheon, reprinted in full in the April issue of the ASC's *Washington Report* under the title "Strategic Balance: Trends and Perceptions," demonstrates his patriotic contribution and merit, but at the same time reveals his failure, thus far, to develop a coherent *positive political strategic conception* necessary to redirect the United States during a period of grave international political crisis which finds the U.S. government isolated and threatening nuclear war as the rest of the world breaks with the dollar.

General Keegan, recently retired chief of U.S. Air Force Intelligence, is exemplary of a great American tradition originating with our Founding Fathers. The product of a technology-proud Maine farming family, a graduate of Harvard University, an accomplished scientist with a degree in physics, and a military intelligence officer of the highest calibre, Keegan took the extraordinary step, in the face of Rockefeller and Rothschild-controlled government, intelligence and university bureaucracies, of organizing from his position as chief of Air Force Intelligence a *cadre* force composed primarily of young scientists to re-evaluate the nation's strategic-military posture and that of its ostensible enemy, the Soviet Union.

In recent months, General Keegan has been sounding the alarm. Over and against the efforts of leading financiers and their puppet Carter Administration, Keegan has managed to get a vitally important message across to the American people. Despite "Tory" ravings, the "Whig" Keegan has scientifically established that the Soviet Union has prepared, if necessary, to fight and

win a nuclear war, surviving as a viable society. He has demonstrated that the considerable military superiority of the USSR over the United States is a direct result of breakthroughs in Soviet fusion technology whose military application to high energy beam weaponry threatens to shortly make the ballistic missile obsolete. He has exposed the bankruptcy of current U.S. strategic doctrine which is based on the imbecilic mutually assured destruction (MAD) "deterrence" formula, and he is trying to rally leading political, military and intellectual layers of the population to take urgent measures in behalf of the national interests of the country.

But General Keegan's March 11 address barely touches upon those positive programmatic considerations necessary to a political strategic conception that would extricate the nation from its present plunge toward depression and general thermonuclear war. This problem is rooted primarily in the General's failure to grasp the full implications of Clausewitz's famous dictum that "war is a continuation of policy by other means," specifically that *war-fighting is a branch of political economy*. General Keegan's lack of comprehension of the political economic determination of military conflict — "war is an act of human intercourse," as Clausewitz puts it — leads him into several errors and, in fact, keeps him within the bounds of the very strategic view he is otherwise in the process of rejecting!

Seeds of a Political Economic-Cultural Perspective

General Keegan, in his remarks, does plant the seeds of a positive political strategic conception which in fact

do touch upon fundamental political-economic and cultural questions, though these thoughts are not yet part of a coherent worldview.

The General states, "When people in the United States talk about our technological superiority — I suggest to you that they do not know what they are talking about. Our superiority is something which exists only in the minds of men and in the productive and laboratory potential of this great country. It remains to be bought and paid for, to be manufactured, distributed, and deployed to our forces. I think we should stop living on such misleading promisory notes." The General explicitly appeals to this country's "creative genius, wealth, and unmatched industrial knowhow" to "assure that the Soviets will never be tempted (as these new weapons give them a heightened sense of security) to challenge the basic institutions and worth of the free world."

Further, the General seeks to mobilize the creative energy of the intelligentsia to contend with matters of strategic intelligence and policy, and inform the general population of the nation's political strategic situation. "I quarrel with the concentration and centralization of intelligence vital to the survival of the free world in so few hands. I object to the failure to observe the normal checks and balances, of letting the public know, letting the leaders know, letting the press know, and letting the full range of uncertainties get into the open — lest we make the kind of mistakes that have gotten us into every war this country has ever been in.... I think the time has come when the public in this country has the right to know and they ought to be apprised of the facts, they ought to be allowed to examine the evidence. Our universities and graduate schools ought to be allowed to ... examine classified information which is not really sensitive. They should then be encouraged to publish their findings ... letting the scholars of this country base their work and their judgmental process upon fact and upon evidence rather than hope, illusion and mirror image."

General Keegan is also explicit about from whose hands he wishes to remove matters of strategic intelligence — "a vast mythology about Soviet strategic objectives has been imposed upon the intelligence community, mostly by members of the National Security Council staff, the CIA, the State Department, and the Rand Corporation."

An Ironic Correct Military Policy

General Keegan's call for technological development, although specifically oriented toward direct weapons production, and his decisive break with the "national security" mind-set constitutes an incipient formulation of an aspect of a positive programmatic conception.

Technological development is indeed the basis for a correct U.S. military policy — but not for the reasons General Keegan has given. In fact, U.S. development of weapons systems that Keegan himself favors and recommends, including the already obsolete B-1 bomber, the "Buzzbomb" cruise missile, technological improvements in the accuracy of U.S. ICBMs, and even replication of Soviet charged particle-high energy beam weapons applications, would hardly eliminate Soviet

capability for a first strategic ABC strike — a "kill" aimed at the population and logistical centers of the United States designed to destroy the United States in the first hour of general thermonuclear war as a functioning nation and thereby eliminating the in-depth war fighting capabilities of NATO forces.

Rather, *massive, broad-based* technological progress — thereby scrapping the present U.S. austerity policy — to be achieved through a new monetary system based on the International Development Bank proposal of U.S. Labor Party chairman Lyndon LaRouche would not merely enable the U.S. to overtake and surpass the Soviets in technology within a few years, it would also, indirectly, *eliminate the possibility of war.*

The propelling force toward war is *not* Soviet military superiority vis-à-vis the United States, as Keegan believes. Rather it is the *irrepressible conflict* generated by the commitment of financial circles typified by David Rockefeller to attempt a stabilization of monstrous bubbles of financial speculation through debt-collection policies which seek to enforce worldwide deindustrialization and to destabilize delicate political-military relations in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Europe. Failing to appreciate this political-economic basis of the war danger, Keegan, in his speech, attempts to square the circle and solve what is a political problem with an inadequate and incompetent "military solution."

Keegan's suggestion to break through the "national security" mind-set, fostered by the present financier establishment and to involve broader layers of the intelligentsia and the public in deliberation on strategic issues is the brilliant kernel of a correct approach to a proper political strategic conception given the existing strategic realities.

U.S. Labor Party Chairman Lyndon LaRouche has elucidated a fuller development of a similar conception as the foundation for the broad-based technological development efforts necessary for a correct military policy in this period.

In discussing the U.S. Labor Party and Fusion Energy Foundation's already tremendous successes in organizing the nation for fusion energy development, LaRouche explains: "We (the U.S. Labor Party — ed.) ourselves have two specific competences to employ in dealing with the problem of 'national security.' First, through our collaboration with some leading physicists and related studies, we have put together a conclusive overview of the fact that the Manhattan Project succeeded despite the 'national security' environment in which it operated; but for a revolt of the scientists against the pertinent ignorance of the FBI and others involved, the conditions of work for the project's success would not have been established. Free-wheeling communication among scientists is the essence of a research and educational environment for proliferation of effective scientific cadres. Second, we have come into the forefront of several areas of current theoretical work, and have demonstrated that a certain type of political campaigning among scientists, industrialists, workers and others is indispensable to realizing the preconditions for broadly based breakthroughs in scientific knowledge.... The extension of this campaign into the ranks of industrialists and working people — especially

skilled workers and technicians — produced evidence of the potential for assembling a significant social force behind the cause of a broadly based, but fusion-research-issue-centered campaign for science.”

The very same principle, developed by Keegan with respect to strategic intelligence estimates, also finds its political application in the chief means at the United States’ disposal to develop war-fighting capability in depth — the rapid development of forms of organization based on the principle of the militia. Even if the United States had a first-strike capability, it would nonetheless lose any war with the Warsaw Pact nations because of the complete lack of political qualifications of the U.S. Army and NATO military forces. In fact, the present all-volunteer army is a pathetic throwback to eighteenth century set-piece warfare.

As Washington, Hamilton et al., and later the first French Republic, and still later Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Clausewitz et al. conclusively demonstrated, armies composed of recruits from backward, poor urban and farm layers (mercenaries) cannot stand up to modern armies integrated with a well-trained militia composed of urban skilled workers and technology-proud farmers. Therefore the United States in the future must develop a *universal militia system*, relying primarily on the productive strata of the U.S. population and based upon the soul of the individual soldier trained in those processes of judgment conducive to creative and innovative activity under actual war-fighting conditions.

Upside Down

General Keegan’s failure to appreciate that “war is the continuation of policy by other means” also contributes to the serious errors contained in his speech both with respect to his recommendations for U.S. strategic posture as well as the real nature of the Soviet political-military strategic posture. The General, in other words, is guilty of an un-Clausewitzian military reductionism which skews his thinking on all strategic questions.

As Clausewitz was the first to systematically develop, there are three fundamental broad war-winning objectives — the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces, the occupation of his country, and the political purpose for which war is fought, the establishment of peace. It is significant and telling that in his talk before the American Security Council, of these General Keegan mentioned only the destruction of the enemy’s military forces as “a fundamental principle of war.”

The reason for his omission should be obvious. The United States is, in fact, in no position to establish a real war-winning objective — with respect to the Warsaw Pact nations. A country that is itself auto-cannibalistic with respect to its own industrial base and the labor-power of its population as well as with the economies of the Third World and Europe is in no position whatsoever to carry out the political-economic objective of war — the establishment of a viable peace resting on desirable political and economic transformation in the defeated nation.

The General, during the question and answer period following his talk, exposed the fact that his strategic posture is really the very “deterrence” position that he has so ruthlessly criticized when he stated, “I would say

our most urgent requirement is for the development of greatly improved missile accuracy for the purpose of negating the destabilizing effects of the USSR’s war survivability and military hardening programs....” In other words, unable to come up with a political solution to the present international crisis, and in part still caught up within the framework of the existing political-economic geometry, Keegan is still looking for, but of course failing to find, a war-winning military strategy within a loser’s bankrupt political and economic policy!

Keegan’s blindness to lawful political economic realities — such as the Rockefellers’ uncollectable \$180 billion debt overhang — cause him to believe that even a workable U.S. “military development” program could be had cheaply within the existing monetary system through further austerity: “But for the cost of a few gallons of gasoline per person per year... I would do many things differently, but not on any great scale... Now we do not have to stand this country on its head to avert another mindless and needless holocaust....”

Paranoia About Soviets

He makes the very same mistake of subsuming the political strategic perspective of the Soviet Union under the USSR’s war-winning military posture, concluding that “because of the failure in our perceptions (he means here the inability of most analysts to understand that the Soviets have a war-winning capability — ed.), we are inviting a global conflict — a conflict which I believe is now in gestation. Sometime in the future such a conflict is more likely than not to occur — principally because of what the Soviets are doing and what we are not.” This, of course, leads him in the direction of pushing a foolhardy arms race, which would not at all eliminate the underlying basis of the irreconcilable conflict and would have destabilizing effects of its own.

The Soviet leadership does not in fact want war. They will only go to war if *forced*, that is, *provoked* by a U.S. policy of imposing fascist regimes on the Third World and fostering confrontations in critical strategic areas including Africa, the Middle East and Europe. In reality, the Soviets, while protecting allied socialist nations such as Cuba and Angola, have a policy of seeking the neutralization of Third World nations allied or potentially allied with the U.S. and NATO as a means of lessening the general thermonuclear war danger. In fact, they are presently on a political-economic offensive successfully establishing development projects with both the Third World and Europe, which undercut the driving force toward war — the U.S. financiers’ looting of the industry and labor power of the advanced and developing sectors, which is modelled upon the Nazi example.

Similarly, refusing to grasp that the Soviet Union adopted a nuclear war-winning capability in response to monetarist threats to its very existence as a nation, Keegan falsely concludes, in a perception bordering at points on paranoia, that the Soviet political leadership seeks to “impose its way of life over the rest of the world.” Thus, in General Keegan’s reductionist perspective the Soviet Union — which should in reality be viewed as essentially *analogous* to an industrial capitalist nation committed to fighting for progress at home and abroad — becomes “the greatest imperialism of history.”

Pushing this paranoid strategic perspective to its logical extreme, and failing completely to appreciate the underlying *real economic* basis of Soviet power, Keegan ridiculously analogizes between the Soviet Union and Hitler's Germany and claims that the U.S. today is making the same mistake with respect to the Soviet "threat" as did the United Kingdom in the period 1935 to 1939 with respect to Nazi Germany.

In the same vein, Keegan hypothesizes that the Soviets have been preparing themselves assiduously for blitz warfare to "take Europe by force of arms with a minimum of fighting, in 24 to 36 hours with or without the use of nuclear weapons." In fact, a Soviet occupation of Europe could only follow an ABC first-strike at NATO's

real war-fighting capability in depth, that is, the population and logistical support in NATO's "center of gravity," that is, the United States. Such a Soviet attack would occur only in the context of extreme political and military provocation by the Trilateral Carter Administration.

General Keegan is indeed a real American. He has forced the real strategic situation out into the open, and taken some war-precipitating trumps out of the hands of the deranged financiers. Nevertheless, his breaking through on his "mind-set" about the USSR is of crucial significance to the building of a governing Whig coalition.

—Bob Cohen