

"They (the troops) are no longer needed, so we're taking them out."

In this context it is usually said that China privately opposes U.S. troop withdrawal. This is usually cited by foolish U.S. conservatives as ammunition in opposing the Carter policy. In fact there is no evidence that this is the "real" Chinese position — especially if the U.S. withdrawal is part of an expanded, though not necessarily totally U.S. military front in East Asia.

The Chinese official opposition to a Korea deal is in fact a product of their Taiwan position. China will not be party to a four-power type agreement until Taiwan is settled, as that would set a bad precedent of accepting a divided Korea in some form while the "two Chinas" issue was still outstanding. Evidence that this is Chinese thinking can be found in a recent Peking *Peoples Daily* editorial on the anniversary of the Korean war. In the middle of the editorial's discussion of why Korea is one country and should be reunified, there is a paragraph (thrown in with no apparent reason) on Taiwan, the need to liberate it, and the existence of "one China."

Once Taiwan is dumped by Carter, the Chinese are free to complete the other part of the Second Front deal regarding Korea. More informed experts agree that the Chinese definitely want the U.S. troops out of Korea just as they continue to say publicly.

### The Redeployment Absurdity

On this basis the redeployment of U.S. ground troops from Korea makes sense as part and parcel of the Second Front strategy. For those who doubt this, we offer one last piece of evidence — culled from a recently released Congressional Budget Office (a Brookings Institute conduit) report on "Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces:

Forces Related to Asia." In the summary of the report the CBD puts forward this rationale and objective in redeployment of U.S. Forces from Asia to NATO:

The most demanding contingency against which U.S. general purpose forces, along with allied capabilities, are tested is a worldwide conventional war (sic) with the Soviet Union, centered in, but not limited to, the Western European-Atlantic theater. The planning for U.S. general purpose forces calls for them to be capable of dealing with not only that "major" war contingency but also with a "minor contingency" elsewhere.

The contingency of a major NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict has been treated in the public record in considerable detail by the Executive branch. In contrast no detailed rationale has been presented that attempts to derive much of the U.S. forward-force deployments in East Asia and the Western Pacific from threats and contingencies in that area.

That region could be a "second front" in a worldwide conventional conflict with the Soviet Union. Both the United States and the Soviet Union might hesitate to initiate hostilities in East Asia and the Western Pacific, but both might wish to "tie down" the other's forces in the region to constrain or prevent redeployment to the more demanding European-Atlantic conflict.

From this standpoint, the wizards of the CBO pose numerous options for "tying down" the Soviets while redeploying to Europe — such is the meandering nonsense from which "policy" is now being made.

## Military Coup Overthrows Bhutto In Pakistan

---

### PAKISTAN

---

The Pakistani military, led by army chief of staff Ziaul Haq, broke four months of national political and economic paralysis last week by removing Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's government from power. Haq carried out the bloodless coup d'etat and placed Bhutto and the opposition Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) leaders under "protective custody" at the point that both sides had given up hope that a civilian compromise on holding new elections could result from continued talks between them. In the hours before the coup, some PNA leaders, with close ties to the Carter Administration, announced their intention to take to the streets, to challenge the military to restore law and order by shooting civilians.

The ouster of Bhutto's six-year old government and the return of the military, classically the decisive political

force in Pakistan, represents a potential destabilization of a precarious balance of power and interests in both the Arab world and the Indian subcontinent. While the Carter Administration for months had picked up the PNA "human rights cause" in order to unseat Bhutto and bring in a cold-war military dictatorship in Pakistan, the Arab states, in particular Saudi Arabia, had worked with both Bhutto and the PNA to keep the civilian leaders in power. This effort became hopeless last weekend because of constant sabotage led by Air Marshal Asghar Khan, making military intervention a necessity. From that point, the issue was *how to prevent a pro-Carter coup* from destroying the fragile detente and development policies Bhutto had pursued toward neighboring countries.

Information out of Pakistan has been scarce since the coup, but there is speculation in many circles that Saudi Arabia may have played a role in bringing a moderate military faction to power temporarily, to preempt a bloodbath and a pro-U.S. military junta. Saudi King Khalid was the first foreign leader to communicate with

General Haq, Prensa Latina news service noted today.

Only hours after his military takeover had imposed martial law, Gen. Haq addressed the nation to dispel speculation that this was another bloody, U.S.-directed Cold-War style Pakistani dictatorship. Haq described his junta as an "interim government" necessary to fill the "vacuum created by politicians," but reiterated, "I genuinely feel that the survival of this country lies in democracy alone... I want to make it absolutely clear that neither do I have any political ambitions, nor does the army want to be distracted from its profession of soldiering..." Haq stated that the Oct. 7 national election date remains firm and that the winning party in elections supervised by the military and judiciary would govern.

Haq confirmed his intentions in his first action. After dissolving state assemblies, Haq appointed high court judges as governors of the provinces, instead of using the military to secure his hold on the countryside.

#### *What Led to the Coup?*

The sequence of events leading to the coup itself reveals the sense of hopelessness the civilian leaders — Bhutto and the PNA — had left in the general population. The economy stood shattered for four months, and all of Pakistan's sources of aid, both in the Arab world and the western banking consortium had tied aid to the return of stability. The PNA's main claim to justify civil disobedience was that Bhutto's party, the Peoples Party, won a landslide victory at the March 7 elections through rigging the ballots. The charges were substantiated in a handful of cases, giving the Asghar Khan faction of the PNA, heavily Carter-funded, an argument for bringing Bhutto down. Confrontations between the army, which stood behind the constitutional government of Bhutto, and demonstrators brought the death toll to over 500, and only the intervention of the Arab states forced both sides to the negotiating table to resolve the crisis.

Last week for the first time in four months of horse trading, agreement was reached pending only the signatures of both sides. Elections were set for Oct. 7. But a PNA central committee meeting then aborted the agreement. Asghar Khan's charges that his party negotiators had sold out to Bhutto, his refusal to endorse the agreement, resulted in the breakdown. Violent clashes broke out in Lahore, setting up a situation

nationally where the military's continuing to back Bhutto would have meant ruthlessly shooting demonstrators down.

Many unresolved issues face Haq and the military. Freedom of the press has been nominally restored, but national martial law prevails. Fundamental rights and portions of the constitution remain suspended, but scheduled election campaigns will necessitate restoring them. The biggest issue is which way Pakistan's foreign policy will swing: whether Haq will toe a pro-U.S. line and back down under Carter Administration pressure on Pakistan's commitment to nuclear technology (from France). This would change the development goals laid out by Bhutto.

The downfall of Bhutto has been the cause of much satisfaction in the U.S. State Department and at the *New York Times* — the two most vehement critics and saboteurs of Pakistani policies. Repeatedly, the State Department in the last few months has tried uncomfortably to deny Bhutto's charges that the Carter Administration has been actively engaged in undermining his government. Now it is uncomfortably silent in an effort to dispel speculation that it may have had a hand in the coup and-or is trying to determine the direction of Gen. Haq's coup through covert pressures. So, while military takeover has provided at least temporary administrative stability to Pakistan, the path for the country is less than clearly defined. Last April 29, Bhutto, as Prime Minister, charged that a section of the PNA was receiving CIA monies for its election campaign disruptions. There is no reason now for a Carter Administration to change policies.

Bhutto's own prospects for the election must be seen as an uphill task, fighting both the PNA's CIA-monied interests and defining a new economic program to pull the country out of economic chaos. Many experienced observers feel that a failure on the problem of economic policy definition, even in the campaigns, will ultimately determine whether Pakistan will or will not return to its 1950s role as the cockpit for international intrigue in the region. The greatest of worries in Pakistani circles now is that the Pandora's box of military coups is opened and the stability and authority of Gen. Ziaul Haq's apparently benign martial law can be threatened easily.