

peace.

The Israelis understand and sympathize with Sadat. Sadat wants to ally with Morocco against Algeria and Libya, with the Sudan against Ethiopia, and with Israel against Syria and Iraq.

The plan according to which Sadat and Begin are operating is as follows. They will announce after a time that Egypt and Israel have made peace, a separate peace. Then, second, they will announce, Balfour Declaration-style, an Israeli willingness to negotiate other settlements — including a Palestinian homeland or entity — provided that the other parties engage in direct talks. The PLO is excluded from this process; they will be killed off. That is the payoff to Israel.

*From an interview with a distinguished Washington-based Middle East specialist:*

We're in one of those frequent Mideast situations where everything looks like it's falling apart but it really isn't. Egypt and Syria are continuing their old awkwardness in the Mideast, so the question is where the complex of power remains. Look at the way the Lebanon civil war ended, by the Saudis pulling the Riyadh conference together. We're back in that historical mode, and it's up to the Saudis again to pull things together. I see that happening in about a month, at another conference called by the Saudis. What the Saudis are really thinking is unknown, but this much can be said: They're worried about rejectionist influence increasing. And they'll act to change all that around.

*From an interview with a Washington-based source close to Energy Secretary James Schlesinger.*

Habib is in Moscow to tell the Soviets to rein in their operations and stop f...g up our operation in the Mideast.

Meanwhile, there is a movement in Cairo to pull the Arabs into the Cairo conference. There's a deal in Cairo. The Israelis are ready to offer a great deal: Golan, Palestinians, everything — enough to bring the Syrians back in. The Syrians don't want to be the stooges of Moscow, to get caught with those rejectionist characters.

The number one rule of the past three weeks has been a change in U.S.-Soviet relations. Vance and Brzezinski are on the offensive. This is healthy. It's forcing Carter to take a long look at the Soviets, at what they're doing in Africa. Carter has been *provoked* by the Soviets, and he's finally reacting to what they're doing in Africa. Carter's response will be hard-nosed, more so than six months ago. His recent statements on Cuban involvement were authorized leaks.

The PLO now is *out* and the so-called genuine nationalists of the West Bank are *in*, and unless Arafat comes around, all the way over, and accepts Resolution 242, he'll be dealt *out*. We'll get some kind of homeland deal without sovereignty, with hopes that it will last for years. In the short run, we'll smudge over the sovereignty question, and the autonomy issue, and we'll see a limitation of Israeli settlements. There will be a deal, too, over the Lebanese refugees, offering them cash to smooth over the right-to-return problem.

## Dayan Has Begin's Ear

Israel's negotiating stance with Egypt is not finally resolved, but is now clearly working on the assumption that Egypt's recent leanings toward a separate peace should be encouraged. The prevailing view at the moment is that of Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, who last week openly called for a separate peace "at any time" with Egypt. In London for a state visit, Prime Minister Menachem Begin declared that a separate peace with Egypt was "possible," thus shifting his earlier stance that a separate peace would be regrettable and that Arab disunity was not to Israel's ultimate advantage.

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### ISRAEL

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According to a U.S. correspondent for a right-wing Israeli newspaper, Begin, Dayan, and Deputy Premier Yadin are "all agreed on strategy, but how long this lasts will depend on Sadat. If he leans in the direction of a separate peace, Dayan will prevail, but if he holds firm for a comprehensive settlement, Begin and Dayan will split and Dayan will be on the outs."

The current Begin-Dayan convergence has undoubt-

edly been abetted by Sadat's diplomatic break with Syria. According to France's *Le Monde* Dec. 7, ruling circles in Israel are "clapping their hands" over the Egypt-Syria split since it expedites a separate Egypt-Israel peace.

Begin is also echoing Dayan formulations. On Dec. 7 in London, he bitterly attacked the Soviets and stressed that Israel would welcome a Geneva conference without the Soviets — one of Geneva's two co-chairmen — if Sadat preferred that.

Begin also interceded with British officials to form a bloc against France in the European Economic Community, exactly one week after Dayan in West Germany counselled West German leaders to break with the French "pro-Arab" line. According to the *Jerusalem Post*, Dayan played upon "dormant anti-French feelings" in West Germany, and was overjoyed that West German officials had privately told him that the country would not recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization.

#### *A Mood For Concessions*

Despite this government view, there exists in Israel increasing sentiment in favor of the government formulating a forthcoming position in peace negotiations. Israeli Finance Minister Simcha Ehrlich declared in an

interview last week that "peace" took precedent over "principles," an expression of the feeling that the more mystical aspects of Zionist nationalism must give way to the will to seriously negotiate a peace settlement.

A Dec. 4 political analysis by the *Jerusalem Post's* political correspondent Mark Segal claimed that subtle changes in the direction of concessions are occurring within two of Israel's most "hard-line" parties, the ruling Likud and its coalition partner, the National Religious Party. Segal identified Defense Minister Ezer Weizman as a key figure in determining the Likud's policy directions, expecting him to "emerge as a tough-minded realist."

But the consensus view in Washington is that it is Begin himself who most personifies the historical moment in Israel, and who will determine whether the country plunges toward a new war or develops a serious peace approach.

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### The Egypt Option vs. the Jordan Option

*The following excerpts from a commentary by Shmuel Segev in the Nov. 28 Israeli daily Ma'ariv discuss the ongoing debate and factional splits inside Israel over the shape of a Middle East peace settlement.*

The Egyptian president's recent moves in Jerusalem did have an immediate outcome: the "closing of a circle" in Israel's policy, which is now characterized by Moshe Dayan's "Egyptian orientation," in lieu of Yigal Allon's "Jordanian orientation." The struggle between these two concepts has been characteristic of Israeli cabinets since the six-day war. Thus, for example, when in the summer of 1970 Moshe Dayan conceived the idea of an interim settlement with Egypt based on an Israeli withdrawal from the Suez Canal, Allon was among the opponents of the idea initially, and he was also supported in this position by former U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers. It was Henry Kissinger who, in his capacity of President Nixon's national security advisor, supported Dayan's idea. And when Sadat publicly adopted the idea in February 1971, a respite began in the internal struggles, and since then Israeli policy has sought to reach that settlement.

The contest between the "Jordanian option" and the "Egyptian orientation" continued during Yitzhak Rabin's cabinet, when Yigal Allon was inclined to support the U.S. urgings for a settlement with King Hussein while Rabin and former Defense Minister Shimon Peres preferred further settlements with Egypt. Now the circle has been closed and Israel's policy has been hermetically "locked" on Moshe Dayan's "Egyptian orientation."

Regardless of how attractive a separate agreement with Egypt may seem to Israel, the dangers inherent in such a move cannot be disregarded. Success for Sadat's policy depends on his ability to draw Jordan along with him and thus isolate Syria among Arab confrontation states. In order to enable Sadat to draw Jordan with him, however, Begin's cabinet has to change its conceptions regarding the future of Judea and Samaria. Should Israel carry on with its present West Bank policy, Hussein will

have no "incentive" to follow Sadat, and his loose alliance with Syria's President Hafiz Assad is likely to tighten. Thus the threat to Israel from the "eastern front" would not lessen but increase in the long run. And even if Assad and Hussein alone are unable to defeat Israel, they can certainly harass it from various sectors....

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### Begin As Peacemaker: An Assessment

*The following excerpts are taken from an interview with a distinguished Washington-based Middle East specialist.*

Unfortunately, I see little movement from Begin. He's coming out with the same old line now in Britain. I wouldn't necessarily quarrel with him on the PLO as such, but there must be a Palestinian state formed somewhere down the line. It's a must. Israel *must* accept the idea that there is a way to create a Palestinian state that they're not afraid of. If Israel is so goddamned strong that it can boast about being able to clobber every Arab state put together, then why are they so worried about a pipsqueak state of one million inhabitants? Begin, of course, raises the spectre of Soviet influence, but how can a modern state with more aircraft than Britain or France be afraid of a little rump Soviet state no bigger than Rhode Island? Ridiculous! This is overemphasis on security from a limited standpoint. This Israeli illogic just doesn't track.

In Israel, Abba Eban is now saying the most important things. He's changing. Eban is the key to the situation, because back some months ago he was playing games with Begin, supporting Begin unconditionally, but now you see a change...Even a guy like (Defense Minister) Weizman thinks that security is based on air superiority, not territory, so he might be accepting some changes in his thinking too.

As for Begin, he now has his chance. What does he want? He wants to go down in Israeli history as a great man. He fought with Ben-Gurion over the creation of the state, bitter battles that often were literally battles. Then Begin went into a 30-year eclipse in the opposition. But now he has the chance to be a hero, so the question now is what kind of hero he wants to be. Does he want to get more territory and have the world accept it, or does he want to be a big peacemaker, to transform a dream into reality and remove Israel from this dreadful cycle of war, paranoia, and economic disaster? Intransigence, though, won't go anywhere. Begin thinks of himself as the father of the country, but I don't know exactly how his thinking processes now are going. He *could* transform the dream of peace into a reality, but the question of his choice is not resolved at this point as far as I can see.

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### Israeli Scientists Propose Joint Israel-Egypt Nuclear Center

*The following excerpts are taken from an article by Ya'acov Friedler in the Dec. 5 issue of the Jerusalem Post.*

Serious consideration should be given to the establishment of a joint Israeli-Egyptian nuclear energy centre in Sinai, Technion professor Shimon Yiftah said yesterday at the opening session of a nuclear energy conference at the Technion (in Haifa).

Apart from that optimistic note, the conference atmosphere was gloomy owing to the continued delay of the U.S. government in supplying the nuclear reactor for Israel's first nuclear power plant.

The reactor was ordered by the Electric Corporation, but the Carter administration's review of its nuclear export policy has again delayed delivery.

The conference...is sponsored by Israel's five nuclear societies in the fields of nuclear sciences, radiation, and medicine.

Yiftah, who is president of the Nuclear Sciences Society and a member of the Atomic Energy Commission, proposed that while the U.S. reconsiders its nuclear export policy, Israel work out a nuclear policy of its own. He suggested that it be based on five points:

\*A clarification of whether the option for the supply of our first reactor from the U.S. is still open.

\*A study of the possibility of buying a reactor from France, Germany, Japan, or Canada.

\*A study of the feasibility of building our own reactor, possibly with the aid of other countries.

\*The immediate stockpiling of uranium fuel, and the production of uranium from Negev phosphates.

\*A serious study of the possibility of a joint nuclear energy centre in Sinai together with Egypt. He believed

that in view of the recent political developments in the region such a scheme was now "within the range of feasibility."

Yiftah proposed that the mooted Sinai center comprise large nuclear power plants linked to large-scale water desalination plants, which together would support a giant sub-tropical farming project to make the desert blossom. The centre should also include a large plant to produce nuclear fuel for both countries.

He believed that the farming project, with its use of modern methods and technology, would serve as an example for the whole world, while the centre as a whole would demonstrate the tremendous potential for developing the region. Israel would contribute its vast know-how in desert farming and water desalination to the project.

The centre would demonstrate the advantages of large-scale production for more than one nation at a time and would provide an answer to the fears about exporting sensitive technology to a single country, Yiftah said. He was sure that such a project would have no difficulty in attracting international financing.

Yiftah foresaw the possibility of a "nuclear isolationism" trend in the U.S. which might drive Third World nations to seek nuclear technology elsewhere or to make an even greater effort to develop their own.

He did not rule out the possibility of the cartelization of nuclear fuel supplies by the producing countries, possibly through the establishment of a "nuclear OPEC" (including South Africa).

## Is A Palestine Gov't In Exile The Next Break For Peace?

The question of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) forming a government in exile in preparation for negotiations has again come into the news.

A Palestinian government in exile could remove some major political stumbling blocks that have impeded progress toward a comprehensive settlement of the Mideast. Most importantly, Palestinians outside the PLO umbrella such as certain Palestinian West Bank and Gaza mayors could be brought into the government. As well, the constitution for such a government could be worded in such a way as to recognize the sovereignty of all nations of the Mideast — a de facto recognition of Israel.

After the summit of hardline Arab states at Tripoli last week, the French daily *Le Monde* reported that there may have been a reconciliation between PLO chief Yasser Arafat and the radical left-wing elements of the PLO led by George Habash and Nayef Hawatmeh. In a report from Cairo, *Le Monde* noted that such a rapprochement might have been to bring these "rejectionist elements" within a framework amenable to setting up a Palestinian government. Since the Tripoli summit, only Zuhair Mohsin, the leader of the Syrian wing of the PLO

As-Saiqa, has demonstrated a willingness to undermine such a reconciliation, by making a grab for command of the liberation organization (see below).

*Reporter for Events magazine, Salim el Lozi, editorialized in the Nov. 18 issue of the formation of a Palestine government in exile. Here are excerpts:*

Many people in the Middle East, like myself, cannot understand why there has been so much delay in the announcement of a Palestinian government. The conditions are ripe, the provisions are available and many Arabs and Palestinians have come to believe that the formation of such a government would help solve the problem of a Palestinian representation in Geneva. The U.S., because of the nature of its administration and its international role, cannot deal with revolutionary movements.

More than once, the Americans have made it clear that they represent major international legitimacy, which is opposed to international revolution. Consequently, they cannot work with a revolutionary organization, whose program includes striving for the destruction of a state