

Brzezinski Goes After Moscow . . . And The White House

During his trip to China and since his return, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski has been conducting an astounding campaign of psychological warfare which is aimed just as much at the highly susceptible Carter and his inexperienced Georgian staff as it is at the Soviets and Cubans.

FOREIGN POLICY

Despite his public pronouncements, President Carter is clearly terrified by his loss of popularity in the polls, and has been desperately seeking an opportunity to project an image of "firmness." Brzezinski has fed Carter's mania with false intelligence, hokey strategy, and just plain lies.

This poor man's rerun of the Belgian Congo intervention of 1960 and the 1962 Cuba confrontation has no basis in reality, neither in consolidating the projected alliance with the Chinese, nor in building any constituency domestically. There is no support for Brzezinski among the American people, the Congress, or the Democratic or Republican Parties. It is entirely an artificial crisis aimed at reversing the real progress toward SALT accords and undermining the coordinated international pattern of détente-and-development initiatives.

Betray U.S. Secrets To China

In China, Brzezinski betrayed national security secrets by passing on to the Chinese two highly restricted presidential review memoranda, PRM 10 and PRM 18, the contents of which have never been fully made available to either our NATO allies, or to the U.S. Congress.

The first document covers the deployment of forces into the European theater, and, according to reports, blithely accepts that West Germany would lose up to one-third its territory in the initial stages of a limited confrontation. The second covers the Brzezinski corollary to James Schlesinger's old "limited war" doctrine; namely, the development of a rapid deployment strike force which is intended to provide the U.S. with a military intervention capability in all parts of the world.

Passing on national security documents used to qualify you for seven years minimum in jail. Brzezinski not only carried out this indiscretion, but immediately asked for an exclusive interview in the *New York Times* to boast about it. Immediately after this interview, Brzezinski sought the opportunity to intervene in the private meeting between Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and President Carter to demand that the Soviets "confess" to their responsibility in the Zaire invasion. Gromyko quite

correctly denied any such involvement, whereupon Brzezinski raved, "They have lied in the White House...Why did they have to lie in the White House?"

For anyone with a memory, this sounded eerily like the 1962 Cuban missile confrontation. The following day, May 28, Brzezinski chose the medium of national television to throw down an ultimatum to the Soviets: "We have our proposals (on SALT). They will either be accepted immediately, or we will wait until they are accepted." This even evoked a reply from the otherwise restrained Soviets: "This is stiff, even for Brzezinski."

Admiral Turner and the National Security Council have played a critical role in the circumstances leading up to Brzezinski's coup attempt. It was David Aaron, a former Mondale aide and now Brzezinski's key aide at the NSC, who first conducted the phony intelligence evaluation to Carter and the White House staff that the Cubans were ultimately responsible for the Zaire invasion.

Over two weeks after this briefing, not one shred of evidence has been made public. In fact, it is known that a CIA report concluding the opposite has been suppressed.

Kennedy's Submarines

Following the NSC briefing Admiral Turner and Aaron went to Capitol Hill to lobby for the removal of the Clark amendment prohibiting U.S. covert operations in Angola. Senator Clark, surfacing as a Kennedy wolf among the doves, used this as the pretext to immediately publicly proclaim that, if the Carter Administration wished to intervene in Angola, it should do so openly. This NSC-managed operation, carried out without President Carter's knowledge or consent, lent credibility to the crisis atmosphere, and encouraged the impression that the Administration was giving mere lip-service to peaceful intentions, but was actually hell-bent on confrontation. In this atmosphere, Senator Clark urged the Carter Administration to directly punish the Soviets. He even hinted that SALT talks be suspended, a view that Senator Kennedy has reportedly endorsed in private (see below).

Kennedy's machine is the glue that holds Brzezinski's operation together. In the Executive, in Congress, and in the press, his surrogates are attacking such factional opponents as Ambassador Andrew Young, while generally whipping up hysteria.

Kennedy himself is playing a very reserved personal role, however; in this way he keeps his options open. While his machine builds the momentum for Brzezinski, he is also waiting for the very likely event that the whole scenario is destroyed — so that he can emerge as an

untainted counterpole to the then-discredited Carter.

At this point, President Carter can save himself only by firing Brzezinski. Otherwise Brzezinski's failure will become the Watergate of the whole Administration. Ironically, if Carter breaks with his "I'm tough! I'm tough" profile and fires Brzezinski and Turner, he will at last legitimately win the public support he so desires.

Brzezinski's Game Of Chicken

This is the text of an interview with a close associate of Senator Clark, provided to NSIPS.

Q: I understand that your hearings with Mr. Turner, Director of the CIA, are seen by some members of the Foreign Relations Committee as a testing of the veracity of material that is being given to the President. Some people are saying that the President was misled on Zaire.

A: No, no one is saying that he was misled. We hear two stories here. One, that the facts support what the President said and the other that those facts are open to interpretation.

The Zaire debate is structured on the Cuban role and so there are hard issues and evidence. It will be a test case of the whole debate of U.S. foreign policy. Are we trying to create a confrontation, and if so why? It will open up an entire debate of U.S. foreign policy, which is what we want to do.

Q: What have the Senators who are usually politically active in these same matters been saying now, such as Kennedy and Culver?

A: Kennedy has been strangely silent. Culver has recently had an interview and he came down similar to Clark.

Q: What has Senator Clark said about Cuban activity in Africa? I understand he said that SALT should be suspended until the Cubans are out of Africa.

A: He has expressed concern over Cuban activity in Africa. He says that SALT should be pursued though, that it is in our interest. But he said that if the Cubans and Soviets continue to mess around in Africa this would make it more difficult, the ratification process would inevitably be more difficult. We should make this clear to the Soviets, that the Soviets and Cuban activities shatter the concept of detente. Clark condemns their military role, that it is very destructive.

Q: What does he think our policy to Africa should be?

A: That we should bluntly tell the Soviets that it is not in their own interest to increase Cuban activity in Africa; that to get involved in Africa would effect SALT and the whole range of relations. We should also pursue the diplomatic initiatives such as the Anglo-American plan, so there is no opportunity for the Cubans to get involved. We should increase our foreign aid and this will increase our credibility with the Africans. We should take seriously majority rule.

Q: How does he think we can put pressure on the Soviets,

if not through stopping SALT negotiations — through cutting economic relations?

A: He doesn't dismiss that but he recognizes there are problems. Stopping grain shipments would make U.S. farmers very unhappy. Stopping technology transfers is a possibility, but it also creates domestic problems. But there are people in the U.S. who want concrete pressures put on.

Q: What about the approach taken by National Security Council head Zbigniew Brzezinski, a more direct confrontation approach?

A: It will increase the insecurity of the Africans who are dependent on the Cubans and they will invite more in. It seems the President is trying both policies and it doesn't work. The danger in Brzezinski's approach is that it is a game of chicken and the Soviets could call our bluff. Are we willing to make Africa a testing ground of Soviet-American relations and if we keep on Brzezinski's approach it will come to that and if we back down we are seen as chicken and if we get involved we are in another Vietnam. If we take Clark's approach we have many more options on our side.

Carter is currently on the line of hostile rhetoric. He thinks he can do both approaches, but he will reach a crossroads.

It Came From Brzezinski's Office

From an interview with a source close to Senator McGovern, provided to NSIPS:

Q: I understand that Senator McGovern has asked the CIA for its proof that Cubans and Soviets were involved in Zaire. What is the story on that?

A: On Friday, Vance was before the committee briefing them on SALT. The Cubans had told McGovern that they had no relations with the Katangese, they had not supported them or trained them. He believes the Cubans would not have made it up as it easily could have been proven false. McGovern asked Vance what proof he had and he said that he had not seen any proof and did not have any proof and that Turner should be asked. The Committee agreed to ask for a written report from the CIA. We will probably have Turner testify later on.

Q: If it turns out that the CIA has no proof of the Cuban and Soviet involvement then what does that mean? Is it that the CIA does not have good information or are people lying about this in the administration?

A: From what I have heard, I believe that the President was misled. People have told him the Cubans were involved and of course the President does not read the raw materials. We want to make sure that the source of this misinformation is discredited.

Q: And who is that? There are only a few people, such as the National Security Council who brief the President.

A: Well Brzezinski was out of the country. But the information was transmitted by the National Security staff. We are trying to demonstrate that the President should not rely on that source.

Q: Why would they misinform the President?

A: There is an effort underway — the split between Brzezinski, his staff and Vance, Young and the arms control people.

Q: So you are saying they would misinform the President to force their policy on the White House?

A: Basically they drew an inflated picture of the situation. McGovern clobbers Brzezinski for briefing the Chinese on the SALT negotiations which make the talks more difficult. He attacks him for briefing them on confidential National Security Council documents.

Q: What about the statements made by Senators Clark and Kennedy that SALT should be tied to Soviet activity in Africa?

A. We disagree with them. Others agree with McGovern though it has not yet come out publicly. At the staff level people are reporting that there is pleading going on with the President over this from Congress. The members of the Committee from the U.S. to the UN Disarmament Conference all were voicing concern over US policy to Africa.

Q: Who has Carter's ear now?

A. It looks like Brzezinski does. But McGovern in his statement does not yet attack Carter because it is not settled. But at some point later on Carter must take responsibility for overall U.S. policy.

Q: Where is the problem in the White House? Is it people like Hamilton Jordan who are listening to Brzezinski?

A: Yes, the problem breaks down with Jordan, Powell, and the other political types. There is no doubt that SALT can pass the Senate, but the White House is making it a problem. They are trying to convince the right-wingers that they are not fooled by the Soviets and thus the SALT treaty is not a giveaway, and so they should trust the agreement. But the thing is that no one will oppose SALT unless the Administration convinces them that it is linked to Africa, and that is what in effect the Administration is doing. They are playing a careful public relations game. You can see it in the President's press conference where he said the Cubans knew but did not stop the Zaire invasion, and so he implied their involvement.

McGovern: We Cannot Have A Foreign Policy Of Crisis And Confrontation

Here, portions of Senator McGovern's May 30 statement, as reprinted in the Boston Globe of June 1:

President Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, is apparently determined on a foreign policy of crisis and confrontation. Watching Mr. Brzezinski on "Meet the Press" last Sunday, we can only conclude that in his mind the Soviets and Cubans are 19 feet tall and about to take over the planet. He has apparently concluded the primary battle for world supremacy is to be fought in the jungles of Africa with the Cubans and the Russians arrayed against the Americans and the Chinese. True enough, Mr. Brzezinski invited the Europeans and the Africans to join the battle; but who really thinks they have any stomach for that?

Mr. Brzezinski's conduct in briefing the Chinese in detail on our strategic arms discussions with the Soviet Union was a strange, if not foolish, tactic. If it was designed to infuriate the Soviets, thus making more difficult the task of arms negotiations, it has doubtlessly done that. If it was designed to send a public signal that we like Chinese Communists better than Russian Communists, it has probably done that. But if it was designed to depict Mr. Brzezinski as a thoughtful, responsible and a sensitive national security adviser, it has not done that.

We cannot conduct foreign policy as though every stirring in Africa, Asia or the Indian Ocean is another Cuban missile crisis. Foreign policy must be selective in centering upon the few fundamental interests of the nation — not the sideshows and minor distractions. We cannot treat a factional quarrel in Angola as though it

were an attack on Berlin. We cannot believe that uncertain questions of help to the Katangans are more important than a strategic arms agreement designed to save humanity from nuclear catastrophe.

Russia has no dependable base of influence and power on the European continent except for its enforced presence on the eastern fringe of Europe. There is little Soviet influence or power anywhere in Latin America other than Cuba. The Soviets have few bases available to their naval and other military forces beyond their own borders.

Speaking of the Soviet Union, Mr. Brzezinski talks of "a sustained and massive effort to build up its conventional forces, particularly in Europe," and "to strengthen the concentration of its forces on the frontiers of China...."

There does seem to be evidence of such a buildup. But at a time when western military outlays are rising, when Mr. Brzezinski treats China as a NATO auxiliary, and global arms spending is on the increase, where else would one expect the Soviets to concentrate their forces if not on their common borders with Europe and China?

With or without an arms buildup, the Russians have a raw and agonizing memory of the devastation of two World Wars. The elderly, cautious men who now rule the Kremlin are not likely to invite another visitation of that agony. At the same time, we are well advised to do all that we reasonably can to induce restraints both on nuclear and conventional arms increases on the part of the Soviets, and on the part of ourselves and our allies. The defense of Western Europe is certainly a crucial American interest. That interest is better served by the

maintenance of our military deterrent plus quiet, patient negotiation with the Soviets rather than bombastic ultimatums and alarmist cries.

Mr. Brzezinski speaks of Soviet efforts "to stir up racial difficulties in Africa, and to make more difficult a moderate solution of these difficulties...."

It may well be that the Soviets are fishing in the troubled waters of Africa. But does anyone seriously believe that the Russians introduced racism to Africa or even that they are a major cause of the racial tension that marks that former domain of the white European colonizers?

It is, in any event, preposterous to assume that the African states struggling to be born represent fundamental security concerns for the United States simply because a few of them have the support of Cuba or Moscow. There has been no fundamental American interest threatened by anything either the Cubans or the Soviets have done or are likely to do in Africa. We might prefer that Ethiopia and Angola not have Marxist governments, but the fact that they do is an inconsequential threat to us and there is little we can do about it in any event.

There are said to be 30,000 Cubans in Africa — a vast continent of 300 million people. Anyone who assumes that 30,000 Cubans can impose their will on 300 million Africans should recall that even with 550,000 American forces and history's most murderous bombing, we failed to impose our will on 40 million Vietnamese. It is the sobering memory of that failure that has prompted several congressional restraints designed to prevent United States involvement in Vietnam-type conflicts in

Africa or elsewhere without congressional approval. Mr. Brzezinski does not like these congressional safeguards. But they would cheer the hearts of our founding fathers and they reassure millions of Americans today.

While Mr. Brzezinski is wringing his hands over alleged Soviet and Cuban misbehaviour in Africa, he might do well to recall that nothing the Soviets or Cubans are doing in Africa, the Middle East, Asia or Europe can approach the calamity we perpetrated for so many years in Indochina. But even more crucial than recalling the mistakes of the past is the avoidance of needless tragedy in the future. That is why we must nurture the hope of détente and the necessity of arms control.

Détente does not mean that the Soviets will not continue to be rivals of ours for influence and ideological propagation. Nor is détente any guarantee that the Soviets will cease what Mr. Brzezinski has described as a "shortsighted attempt to exploit global difficulties."

Détente does not even mean that the United States will refrain from exploiting opportunities for advantage over our Soviet rivals. Détente means simply that as rival powers there are a few areas such as arms control to avoid mutual extinction and retarding nuclear weapons proliferation where the United States and the Soviet Union have mutual interests.

It would appear that as of the moment we do not have a coherent foreign policy, but a collection of conflicting voices. Perhaps that tendency is always present in a pluralistic society. In any event, I pray that in the contest for the mind of the President, calm and common sense will prevail over the strategy of crisis and confrontation.

What McGovern Should Ask Turner

On May 31, U.S. Labor Party chairman Lyndon H. LaRouche wrote this proposal to Senator McGovern:

If Senator George McGovern wishes to expose Admiral Stansfield Turner (and Henry A. Kissinger) as a liar in the most efficient way, he should use the following crucial questions.

These questions are based on information received by me from the highest level of several Western European and African governments and their intelligence agencies. These governments know that Kissinger and Turner are lying, and know that President Jimmy Carter has been duped — so far, neither those governments nor their press wish to call President Carter publicly a dupe.

Fact: The Katangese mercenaries consisted of a combination of persons "in place" in Zaire's Shaba Province, plus more than 1,000 mercenaries, who infiltrated as unarmed civilians prior to the action. They were deployed for action from prepared arms caches in Shaba Province itself, arms brought in by means of transport under the control of Belgium-based mining and related firms.

Question One to Turner: Did the Soviet, Cuban, or East German governments or agencies controlled by them make any flights into Shaba Province during the period to two years preceding the recent Katangese mercenary action? Did such agencies control or use any adequate

means alternative to flights for delivering arms adequate for a force of about 2,000 persons during that period?

Question Two to Turner: Do the Soviet Union, Cuba or their allies have sufficient influence within the Belgian government or Brussels-based relevant mining and financial interests to have caused facilities of those entities to be used for delivering and emplacing the arms caches?

Question Three to Turner: Is it not true that immediately prior to the action representatives of the East German government had acted through the government of Congo-Brazzaville to reactivate comprehensive peace negotiations between the governments of Zaire and Angola?

Question Four to Turner: Is it not true that immediately prior to the action forces in Belgium had been enraged by the actions of President Mobutu Sese Seko in ordering payments for Zairean mineral exports to be processed through the Zairean national bank rather than Belgian financial institutions?

Question Five to Turner: Are you informed of the circumstances associated with the death of one Prince Johann von Schwarzenberg, an Austrian national also Ambassador of the Maltese Order? Are you aware that deceased Schwarzenberg was under investigation for indicated complicity in the terrorist kidnapping of

former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro? Do you understand the reason this question is properly raised in connection with the Shaba Province actions perpetrated by mercenaries of the Belgium-based mining interests in behalf of the interests of those mining interests?

U.S. Press Outraged At Deception

Following are excerpts from a wide range of U.S. press, addressing the current controversy over Soviet-Cuban involvement in Africa:

Boston Globe, May 31, "The Debate Over Africa":

... As a first step, the Administration should accede to the request of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for a full airing of the U.S. intelligence showing Russian and Cuban involvement in Zaire, the information which apparently touched off the latest debate on African policy. . . .

And even if that information reveals Gromyko and Castro as bare-faced liars and shows a forceful Soviet-Cuban presence in Africa, it will still be incumbent on those of the Brzezinski school (in which the President himself from time to time enrolls) to show what vital American interests are threatened . . . to show why over the long run, peaceful American economic assistance to African peoples won't be more effective than American involvement in some sort of "international response" . . .

Chicago Sun Times, May 31, "Kissinger The Leaker":

Henry Kissinger is nothing if not nervy

Kissinger is embarked on a long career of rewriting history — the sad duty of one who made too much history in too shabby a government. He will forever be taking credit for good things like detente while defending evil carnage in Vietnam by surrogate bellicosity in places like Angola

Chicago Tribune, May 31, "Percy: Facts Prove Cubans Role in Zaire":

Percy said that Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of the CIA, told him in a phone conversation last weekend that "solid evidence" exists linking Cuba with the bloody invasion of Zaire by Katangan rebels. In addition, Percy said, members of his staff in Washington were shown evidence "presumably intelligence reports" from the French Foreign Legion confirming Cuban involvement.

... "I think that this evidence will show that Senator McGovern was misled," said Percy.

Baltimore Evening Sun, May 31, "WHODONIT?":

... Somebody here is lying. In the continuing bloody struggle for the control of ever larger pieces of Africa, lying may seem a petty crime. But as regards the credence and support given a government by its own nationals — and, beyond that, by a higher suspicious world — lying can be a damaging circumstance. The good faith of the Soviets, also asserting innocence, deserves public inspection along this line.

Summary to Turner: If, after hearing these questions, Admiral Turner, you still assert there was any Soviet, Cuban, or East German "responsibility" for the affair in Zaire province, you, sir, are either a liar or a pathetic incompetent.

... What we have here is a genuine issue of national veracity at the highest levels, maybe also of national willingness to intrude in other nations' business while deliberately disguised by political falsefaces.

Los Angeles Times, May 31, "Send the Yankees on Cuban Tour":

... some action ought to be taken. But not of the kind most people have in mind.

Of all the stupidities this country has accomplished in the last 20 years, surely the creation of a big bad wolf in Cuban is the worst

The Black American, May 25-31, "The Truth About Zaire":

The old war cry of "communism" went to work. The radio, the TV, the N.Y. Times, the News, the Washington Post, they were all bleating about Cuba and the Soviets taking over Africa

So who'll kick off the war for dear old Britian? Can Uncle Sam be suckered one more time? Uncle Sam fell for it in Korea and again in Vietnam. Kissinger has got Carter heating up on the "Get the Cubans and the Soviets out of Africa." Can it work behind the flop of Zaire?

Chicago Defender, May 30, "See Cuba-Zaire Showdown":

The conflict between Z. Brzezinski and the National Security Council (NSC) on the one side and the U.S. United Nations' Ambassador Andrew Young and key sections of the U.S. State Department on the other seems to be heading toward a showdown.

Over the weekend Congressman Charles Diggs (D-Detroit) and Senator George McGovern (D-S.D.) called for an inquiry into the claims made by CIA Director Stansfield Turner which said the CIA had solid evidence that Cubans trained the Katangese rebels who invaded the Shaba province in Zaire.

Chicago Sun Times, May 31, "Why U.S. Tough Talk On Soviets?":

The Russians are concerned about what Carter is up to. There are several ways that the Russians could interpret the recent increase in vitriol from the White House (and it is clearly from the White House and not the State Department)

One theory and one that is most likely: it is in Carter's short-term interest to give Brzezinski free reign to boost his popularity if this is Carter's strategy, it could prove a dangerous miscalculation. . . .