

are good." True, he took note of past U.S.-Soviet collaborative efforts, including the World War II alliance against Hitler. True, he pointed out that "there are no ideological victories to be won by the use of nuclear weapons."

But stripped of its modest amount of "peace and cooperation" rhetoric, the basic policy framework enunciated by the President cohered completely with the "new world order" of his Peking-oriented apostle of U.S.-Soviet confrontation, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. Saner forces in the Administration, typified by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, arms control negotiator Paul Warnke, and UN Ambassador Andrew Young, are apparently pursuing a program of "peaceful coexistence" with Brzezinski, rather than going for his head, in exchange for a renewal of Carter's formal commitment to SALT.

The result of their foolishness was all too evident in Carter's remarks. Conspicuous by its absence was any response to Soviet overtures for joint collaboration on world energy and economic development — for example, the Velikhov proposal for joint U.S.-Soviet construction of a "breakeven" thermonuclear fusion power experiment in a third country, which the Soviets presented at the recent United Nations disarmament conference. Nor did Carter himself present any rationale by which the U.S. and Soviet Union could collaborate in preventing the genocidal depopulation of the Third World which is inevitable under current World Bank-IMF zero-growth austerity policy.

Carter also avoided a substantive discussion of the

issues of the prospective SALT II treaty itself, despite the fact that even the *New York Times*, hardly a pro-Soviet newspaper, accused the Administration of creating "homegrown" difficulties for SALT. "What has been lacking during the Carter Presidency," said the *Times* in a lead editorial June 7, "is a detailed Presidential discussion of the strategic arms negotiations...a vigorous explanation of the treaty as it stands and a reasoned discussion of the principles at stake in the remaining issues."

Even in his Annapolis speech, Carter's commitment to SALT was equivocal, as it has been ever since Brzezinski raised the spectre of "linking" the SALT negotiations to Soviet "good behavior" in Africa last fall. Said Carter, "We have no desire to link these negotiations with our competitive relationships nor to impose other special conditions on the process. In a democratic society, however, when public opinion is an integral factor in the shaping and implementation of foreign policy, we recognize that tensions, sharp disputes and threats to peace will complicate the quest for an agreement. This is not a matter of our preference but a recognition of fact."

The Soviets are likely to read this as a Carter "hunting license" to Senate and other opponents of a SALT II treaty to walk all over him in the name of "public opinion," if and when a completed treaty comes up for ratification.

The rest of Carter's remarks seemed largely aimed at assuring that "public opinion" toward the Soviets grows increasingly hostile, as the President echoed the basic line used all year by Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, the

Congressmen Critical of Brzezinski Line, Deeply Suspicious on Zaire "Evidence"

Key members of Congress, including much of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, are openly expressing their outrage with the drift toward the viewpoint of National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski in Carter Administration foreign policy, and openly skeptical of Brzezinski and CIA Director Stansfield Turner's purported evidence of Soviet-Cuban involvement in the recent Katangese raid into Zaire.

Follow Committee to hear Turner June 9, committee chairman John Sparkman (D-Ala) found the evidence "substantial in quantity but circumstantial in nature, and not conclusive." Sen. Birch Bayh (D-Ind), chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, was equally unwilling to certify it as definitive proof of the Administration's charges. Sen. George McGovern (D-ND) said it would result at best in a "hung jury" if presented in a court of law.

McGovern and Sen. Frank Church (D-Id), after White House visits with Carter, both suggested that the President "cool the rhetoric" about the Soviets and Cubans if he wants to get a SALT treaty

through the Senate. McGovern was particularly blunt, saying he saw "no purpose in ginning the American people into a kind of anti-Soviet hysteria." Church called Carter's speech "the rhetorical image of the United States great seal, complete with the eagle's claws and talons. I don't believe in a demon theory of history....If the President's policy is actually postulated on the premise that the Russians should stop what they are doing in Africa and elsewhere, then it is doomed to failure....It is in the nature of governments to do all they can to increase their influence...let the Cubans and Russians make their own mistakes in Africa without duplicating them."

Following the Turner testimony, which was not made public, it was announced that the Foreign Relations Committee would conduct a full staff investigation and hold hearings on U.S. Africa policy. The Administration is itself preparing a Presidential Review Memorandum on Africa policy, in which the policy viewpoints of Vance, UN Ambassador Andrew Young, and Brzezinski will again clash. Present indications are the committee wants to counteract the Brzezinski influence at all costs.

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