

### 3. Two brands of insanity on SALT and detente

While the U.S. press promised its readers that the Soviets have been overwhelmed by Camp David and the Carter Administration's other foreign policy triumphs, Henry Kissinger and his shadow Zbigniew Brzezinski were out in the hustings attempting to undermine the SALT disarmament accords.

In two speeches never reported in the daily U.S. press, Kissinger and Brzezinski called for a beefed-up NATO and a developed mobile strike force capability capable of intervening anywhere in the world. They also read the riot act to American industrialists seeking trade with the Soviets, charging that such trade "serves Soviet expansion" (in Kissinger's words) and hinted broadly at plans for destabilization operations against the Soviets' Eastern European allies.

Not accidentally, the London *Times* gave prominent editorial-page coverage to its own version of the same theme, making it clear that British policy's hope is to convince the U.S. to keep up the pressure of military competition so that the Soviets will have no choice but to sacrifice economic development to continued military build-up.

Back in the U.S., however, the media continued the

charade of "peace in our time." Not only did Kissinger's and Brzezinski's sabre-rattling go unreported, but columnists and editorial writers insisted again and again that the Soviets and the rest of the world will certainly knuckle under to Camp David and the rest of the Administration's policies, especially now that the SALT treaty is so close to being signed. The same came directly from Disneyland-on-the-Potomac, when Vice-President Mondale appeared on ABC-TV's "Issues and Answers" Oct. 8 to laud Camp David and nonchalantly dismiss Soviet criticisms and any possibility of a Mideast crisis.

What might appear to justify Mondale et al.'s nonchalance is the fact that the Soviets are not responding to the warlike rhetoric of Kissinger, Brzezinski, and the like. But viewed in terms of reality — most particularly the reality of the Soviets' public commitment to the development goals of the European's new monetary system — it is clear that the Soviet attitude is intended to give the U.S. every opportunity to come to its senses. Exactly the opposite is obviously the aim of the game being played by the U.S. media on the one side and Kissinger and his echoes on the other.

#### What the press told the U.S.

The Washington Post typified the media's "soft Russians" routine. From the Post's Oct. 10 editorial, titled "Cease-fire in Lebanon":

(The Syrians) are probably less interested in provoking the collapse of the Arab-Israeli peace effort than in leaving open an eventual place in it for themselves. They are poorly placed to challenge, at the same time, the United States, which provides aid and a certain political support, and the Soviet Union, their military patron; and France, a traditional friend. All supported the (UN) cease-fire call (in Lebanon).

Why the Russians? Jimmy Carter personally approached Leonid Brezhnev. Evidently the Kremlin did not want to cause trouble — trouble that could easily get out of hand in a way that could seriously discomfit Moscow — at an otherwise quite propitious moment in Soviet-American relations. . . .

*In the same newspaper, on the same day, columnist Joseph Kraft ran the same line:*

Out of the fog of battle in Beirut comes potent evidence that the Camp David accords are taking hold. For the cease-fire in Lebanon is the work of the two countries supposedly most interested in sabotaging Camp David: Syria and Russia.

That the Syrians and Russians elect to dampen the Lebanese firecracker rather than let it explode shows they would at bottom prefer to be in, rather than against, the peace process now getting underway. So the United States, far from having to pay a high price to win acceptance of Camp David, can afford to lay back a little. . . .

The Russian motive for being so obliging is not doubtful. The Soviets have been shut out of the Middle East by the prospect of a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace. The cease-fire offered them a way to get back on board. So they were agreeable. . . . Certainly there is

no need to stick it to Moscow in the Middle East on the eve of a possible arms control agreement. . . .

#### What Kissinger, Zbig, and London said

*From Henry Kissinger's speech to the International Iron and Steel Institute in Colorado Springs, as reported in the Oct. 5 edition of the French business daily Les Echos:*

The extension of Soviet spheres is a process which must be stopped. But it is helped by free East-West trade. Just as we cannot ask industrialists to make foreign policy, so the Western governments must establish an East-West code in order to stop the escalation which serves Soviet expansion. . . . The Communist countries have not won the battle of economic management. The only area in which they have demonstrated their effectiveness is in the application of technology to military ends.

In the 1950s, the United States benefited from a situation of

monopoly in the field of strategic weapons. . . . In 1980, numerical equivalence will be reestablished, but the Soviet weapons will be more powerful. Under these circumstances, to ask for SALT guarantees would be ridiculous, because in this state of equivalence, military means would be aimed solely at the annihilation of civilians. . . .

It is necessary to redefine the military objectives of the United States. First, to reconstitute our tactical supremacy. Then, to give the United States better means of intervention in cases of local conflicts (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Morocco). What chances do these countries have of surviving without foreign interference? Their freedom is a function of our military capacities: witness, the recent Russian success in Ethiopia, and the coups d'etat in South Yemen and Afghanistan, against which we have no remedies here. . . .

*From the column in the London Times editorial page Oct. 9 by Richard Davy, coming off a conference of the London Institute for International and Strategic Studies: What sort of Soviet Union are we going to be dealing with over the next ten years or so? . . . Western*

policy-makers. . . want to know whether there is likely to be continuity in Soviet policies or whether they are going to be facing some basic re-thinking. For instance, will the Soviet Union's military effort proceed undiminished or will slower economic growth constrain it? . . .

Whatever the answer, it still leaves western policy-makers profoundly uncertain whether there is any real hope of drawing the Soviet Union into a sense of joint responsibility for world order and economic development, or whether all-out rivalry is going to be unavoidable. This will be one of the key questions of the decade and there is simply no answer to it at the moment. . . .

The Russians would like to cut their military spending but will not succeed in doing so to any great extent unless there are big unexpected changes in East-West relations. Arms control agreements could help a little but will not in themselves make a big difference to defence budgets. . . .

*From a speech given by Zbigniew Brzezinski to the Weizmann Institute in Chicago on Oct. 8:*

In seeking U.S.-Soviet detente, we have also attempted to foster

greater American ties with Eastern Europe. We do not believe that our relations with Eastern Europe should be subordinated to our relations with Moscow and we are pleased by the progress we have made in our relations with several Eastern European countries. . . .

The President stressed more than a year ago that we see American-Chinese relations as a major element in our global policy. We believe that a strong and secure China can contribute to international stability. . . .

To be sure, to be globally effective, the U.S. must be militarily secure. Hence the President also ordered in Presidential Directive 18, issued in June 1977, a comprehensive review of U.S. military posture. At his direction we will maintain strategic equivalence, strengthen NATO, develop a more rapidly deployable force capable of defining our major interests worldwide. . . as for example in the Persian Gulf or Korea, maintain an effective military presence in the Far East and the Atlantic and re-examine our strategic doctrines in terms of changed needs of the 1980s. . . .

## 4. Policy disaster in Africa

Not to be outdone by the stupidity of the White House, 27 conservative U.S. Senators hosted the Prime Minister of outlaw Rhodesia for a visit to the United States that began Oct. 7. These duped conservatives have demonstrated their blindness to the danger of U.S.-Soviet confrontation in southern Africa, and turned their back on legitimate American and development interests in the region to support Ian Smith's slave-based economy in Rhodesia.

The State Department and the White House compounded the policy mess by allowing Smith a visa, thereby putting the U.S. in direct violation of the United Nations sanctions against Smith's racist regime.

Then, while Smith declared on U.S. television that he was only following Henry Kissinger's plan for

resolving the region's problems, the Carter Administration found itself simultaneously:

(1) effectively endorsing Smith and his "role in the major confrontation...between the free world and the non-free world," as Smith put it on the eve of his arrival in America;

(2) fronting for Britain's declared plans to intervene in the area, while allowing London — which refused Smith's request for a stopover there — to lay the onus of the entire business on the Carter Administration;

(3) championing a provocatively anti-Soviet "China card" strategy in the region;

(4) and overseeing an International Monetary Fund assault on Rhodesia's neighbor, Zambia, that promises to unleash region-wide war as its immediate consequence.