

Will Turkey volunteer to 'stem the red tide'?

The attempt to rope Turkey into an anti-Soviet stance is a key component of post-Camp-David efforts to establish a NATO-style "Middle East Treaty Organization," involving Turkey, Israel, the CENTO countries of Iran and Pakistan, and several bought-off or blackmailed Arab states, against the Soviet Union.

But there are emphatic signals from Ankara that Turkey will reject such a role.

'Revive the Truman Doctrine'

Turkey's role in the projected Middle East Treaty Organization was explicated by cold warrior J.C. Hurewitz, director of Columbia University's Middle East Institute, at an Oct. 5 symposium in New York sponsored by the American Turkish Society.

Fixing his sights on Turkey's commitment to detente and cooperation with the Soviet Union, Hurewitz claimed that the Soviet threat in the eastern Mediterranean is "greater than it was in 1947," and called for "full consultation and coordination . . . as we move into the new (post-embargo) relationship" with Turkey.

In particular, Hurewitz claimed to be alarmed about the growing "Soviet threat" to the Turkish

Straits, and on Turkey's expanding economic relations with the Arabs, namely Iraq and Libya, both of whom maintain friendly ties to the Soviet Union.

He also zeroed in on Turkey's reluctance to support the Camp David "solution" to the Middle East crisis. Turkey, he noted, can play an important role in selling the Camp David fiasco to the Arabs, despite the fact that Foreign Minister Okçün, in his speech before the United Nations General Assembly, made it clear that while Turkey recognizes the "importance" of Camp David, "negotiations for a just and lasting settlement could not take place in the absence of the Palestine Liberation Organization."

Camp David, Hurewitz announced to a doubtful audience, contributes to detente. Since the Turks are so committed to detente, and since Camp David will further detente, then Turkey *must* support Camp David. "As I understand it, there has been no really detailed, formal communication between Washington and Ankara on the results of Camp David," said Hurewitz. "I get the feeling from talking to your Foreign Minister that this is a matter that certainly needs repair, but clearly from remarks that he has made I get the feeling that the attitude of the Turkish

Turkish official: no nostalgia for Cold War

Exclusive to NSIPS

We print below the rebuttal by former Turkish UN ambassador Iler Türkmen to a presentation by J.C. Hurewitz of Columbia University at a Turkish-American Society symposium in New York on Oct. 5.

At a time when we are trying to reassess Turkish-American relations with a view to reviving the old partnership, we have to be clear on certain concepts and also on our assessments of our past cooperation.

Professor Hurewitz mentioned, for instance, detente, and he said that it seemed to him that the

perceptions of our two countries on detente were not convergent but to a certain extent divergent. I think this is a very difficult statement to make because I think the perception of detente in the United States itself changes very often and sometimes daily. . . .

Today, perhaps, we are looking a little more enthusiastically (toward detente — ed.). Perhaps we have thought that your reactions to what has happened in Africa a bit overdone. This is normal, and I think that the same reactions exist in the United States itself.

I think that one should be very careful not to request from Turkey an automatic identification with the more extremist views expressed in the United States.

Relations with Soviets 'normal and healthy'

As far as our relations with the Soviet Union, I think that this is a

very normal and healthy development which has happened and since the Soviets have abandoned their claims over the Straits and eastern Turkey and embarked on a policy of good neighborliness, it was quite normal that we should respond to it. Although we have now extensive economic relations, I think that one should also bear in mind that this relationship is no more than that of France or Germany. There has been nothing in the economic relationship or political consultations with the Soviet Union which goes beyond what any other NATO member is doing at the present time.

As far as the Straits are concerned, and Professor Hurewitz has touched upon that (the growing Soviet threat in the Straits — ed.), I don't think that anything has changed. I think that the Montreux Convention is being applied faithfully and to the letter. The over-

government is quite different from the attitude of Washington."

Lamenting that "we cannot dictate to Turkey," Hurewitz wistfully recalled Turkey's past capitulations to Cold War threats: its acceptance of the Truman Doctrine, its call for a Middle East defense organization in 1951, and its pivotal role in the establishment of the anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact in 1956. These types of policy decisions, asserted Hurewitz, must be made again today. "I would suggest," he said, "that the conditions today, if anything are even more urgently in need of that kind of cooperation."

Hurewitz's presentation was followed by a similar Cold War speech by John C. Campbell, former Director of Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Campbell belittled Turkey's desire for detente with the Soviet Union, by pointing out that just because there is detente between the Soviet Union and West Germany, it does not necessarily mean that there can be detente between the Soviet Union and Turkey.

But the Turks balk

At the symposium, Ilter Türkmen, the former Turkish Ambassador to the United Nations and currently a top aide to Foreign Minister Okçün, sharply rebutted Hurewitz's Cold War diatribe. Türkmen defended Ankara's policy of cooperation with Moscow, and rebuffed Hurewitz's insulting insinuations that Turkey

was being naive in cooperating with the Soviets because of the Soviets' growing military strength. "If the Soviet Union is becoming much more powerful," stated Türkmen ironically, "this is all the more reason to consult with each other and reach agreement."

It is difficult to say whether Turkey and the U.S. differ on what detente should mean, since "the perception of detente in the United States changes very often and sometimes daily," Türkmen said, and added that "one should be very careful not to request from Turkey an automatic identification with the more extremist views expressed in the United States."

Türkmen's rebuttal to Hurewitz appears below.

Terror on the rise

Terror bombings and killings, used for months in an attempt to destabilize the Turkish government and weaken its foreign policy and economic resolve, have escalated dramatically in recent weeks. The latest and most brutal of these atrocities was the massacre of six student members of the Turkish Labor Party as they slept in an Ankara flat. Gunmen from the neo-Nazi Nationalist Action Party of ex-Col. Alparslan Türkeş were responsible. Türkeş's armed commando bands have unleashed an unprecedented wave of terror in Turkey that this year alone has killed 500 and left thousands wounded.

Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit targeted the

flights (routing of Soviet flights to the Arab world over Turkey — ed.), if there has been any liberalism toward overflights, this was not the consequence of the embargo, but I believe it was rather something to do with our relations with the Arab countries.

So I don't believe also that as far as the Straits are concerned we can detect at the present time any differences in our policies. If the Soviet Union has become much more powerful, as Professor Hurewitz charged, this is all the more reason to consult with each other and to agree among ourselves on the Straits.

No return to mistakes of the past

Now, Professor Hurewitz mentioned Camp David, and I would like to say something, because he implied also that our approaches to the Middle East perhaps are different. They might

be different, but what we did about Camp David was to put out that we considered this an important meeting. Our Foreign Minister said this to the General Assembly of the United Nations. But if we are going to play a role in the Middle East, even in the direction of helping the U.S., we have to be careful in our public statements. There is no use in making public statements which some Arab countries will disapprove of and which will render our relations much more difficult with them.

There is one final point I would like to make that has to do with our past associations. Of course, we are all looking back with nostalgia to our partnership and close relationship with the United States. But we should not look with nostalgia to some common mistakes that were committed, and one of them was certainly the Middle East. The Baghdad Pact

was a colossal mistake in which we were all involved, and I think that looking into the future we should try to avoid such undertakings.

As far as Cyprus is concerned, the only thing I would like to say is that . . . we welcome all help and assistance of the United States diplomatically to resolve this issue. (Hurewitz mentioned the possibilities for a Camp David for resolving Cyprus — ed.) I think that any *direct* involvement of the United States would not be really very opportune.