

Therefore a special information center was necessary.

As for the evacuation of 50,000 Americans, there are also, as the American press says, special plans worked out for the deployment of the armed forces of the USA. Not coincidentally, a special team is working day and night in the U.S. State Department, registering every slightest change in the situation. This heightened "watchfulness" is to be explained not only by the investment which runs to 12 billions in arming the army of the Shah, and the 10 percent contribution that Iran makes to the USA's oil imports, but also by the wide-reaching political-strategic plans in which the Pentagon and NATO are interested.

The *Washington Post* remarked at the beginning of November in its commentary on events in Iran that the President's advisors regretted that the CIA had such a bad reputation. In this connection, Soviet experts underline the fact that the secret agency's "FM 30-31" plan, which is still in effect today, provides for an entire series of special operations in a "friendly country" in case the danger should arise there of a radical change in the political situation.

The goal of the above-mentioned measures to "destabilize" or "stabilize" a country's regime, according to its political and social orientation, is to keep in power, at any price, that circle which is acceptable to the USA and which follows policies friendly to

America. The plan also provides for an active and illegal intervention by the U.S. Army into that country's secret service, its police, and armed forces as well as into its civil and administrative organs, with the goal of influencing the policies of the host country's government.

The Soviet experts emphasized that the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force have their representatives in Iran and that there is also an extensive group of CIA operatives there. Only the naive would assume that this contingent is staying off to the side of those events that have developed in Iran in the last couple of months. In President Carter's message to the Shah, which Brzezinski passed on by telephone, Carter guaranteed the Shah his total support. When he received the Crown Prince Reza Cyrus, the President of the USA affirmed that "our friendship and our alliance with Iran is one of the most important points, on which our entire foreign policy is based."

When one takes into consideration that, according to the agreement signed between the USA and Iran in Ankara in 1959, the U.S. is allowed to march its troops into Iran in order to protect American citizens, then it is understandable that the Soviet Union's warning is totally well-founded, stating that an arbitrary intervention into the affairs of Iran, and even more, a military intervention, affects the security interests of the USSR as one of the states bordering on Iran.

## Kissinger demands a showdown

*In his interview with Newsweek's Arnaud de Borchgrave, Henry Kissinger pushed hard for a confrontation with the Soviets and all but accused the Carter Administration of a policy of "appeasement." The following is excerpted from that interview, which appeared in Newsweek's most recent issue.*

The Iranian situation is a tragedy for the West. The Shah is a leader who on every critical foreign-policy issue has been totally on the side of the West and who has been a stabilizing factor in every crisis in the area. . . . (But) the Shah is paying the price of modernization: he is being attacked by those who think he moves too fast and by those for whom he is not moving fast enough. Brezhnev's statement occurred when there had been no

U.S. military move of any kind. It was gratuitous and provocative.

In this context, our own answer was not very strong. I don't think it came across as a ringing affirmation of a commitment to a country that is so vital to us or as a warning to the Soviets not to meddle in Iranian affairs. It almost sounded as if we were declaring Iran an area of neutrality. . . .

In the context of (U.S.) weakness, some challenge was inevitable. It happened in Angola. That could and should have been contained. When it was not, Ethiopia followed as the next step. That sequence shook confidence in us not only in Africa but also in the Middle East. So I think the Soviet Union will certainly press to the limits of its geopolitical strength. That is its nature as a great power and as a Communist power. It's our responsibility to create the necessary counterweights. . . .

For the greater part of the post-World War II period we could defend most threatened areas by our nuclear superiority. . . . For a

variety of reasons, that superiority has eroded. . . . That means that we and our allies must have a capacity for regional defense inside and outside the NATO area. If we don't develop this, then in the '80s we're going to pay a very serious price. The first installments are already visible. . . .

There is to me inexplicable self-hatred (in some Carter Administration officials) that denigrates everything we attempt and despises those who associate with us. This was compounded by the President's Notre Dame speech, for example, when he said he would free our policy from the inordinate fear of Communism which had characterized it in the past. What were allies of the U.S., who had worked with us for a generation, to think? Had they become dispensable? Did our new attitude toward Communism weaken our previous commitment? These uncertainties account for some of the strains of the past year. . . .