

there were really no fundamental differences between Bertrand Russell and Lord Milner's group (the Coefficients-Round Table group) behind Russell's storming-out of the group in 1902.

The "right wing" faction of British-Hapsburg forces proposes to turn back the clock of world technology for civilian economy, and accepts the genocidal mass-depopulation this will cause. However, the British-Hapsburg right-wing group wishes to keep an "island" of high-technology within the military domain, and to maintain a continuity of British-led parameters of power during the course of the transition to a New Dark Age. The Russell, or "left" faction, is opposed to any stabilizing policy; the Russellites wish to go directly to massive chaos and confusion, to wreck everything now.

The philosophical arguments these various criminal lunatics employ to argue for their policies are directed to discrediting, denouncing, and eliminating the influence of what they often denounce as the "Cartesian tyranny of reason." Like Tavistock agents Michel Foucault, Jean-Paul Sartre, and the pro-Nazi Martin Heidigger, these avowed irrationalists, existentialists, hate reason.

These types insist that the so-called inner psychological needs of the isolated individual are the ultimate reality to which political life must submit. Their view is the "right of the individual" to "do my own thing." They argue that to attempt to oblige an individual not to take mind-destroying drugs, for example, is a form of "oppression" of that individual's "freedom of choice."

This is the essence of the politics of the Zen-Buddhist kook, Governor Jerry Brown, the sodden alcoholic Senator Edward Kennedy, the profascist Milton Friedman of the Mont Pelerin Society, and the "energy doctrine" of James R. Schlesinger. **They are all morally insane.**

Carter "doing his own thing" in the White House will probably mean the early thermonuclear destruction and Soviet conquest of this nation. The key to the insanity shown by Carter is his essential post-Navy, personal fear of radioactivity, his dedication to the environmentalist cause.

## West German to USSR:

*Speaking in Moscow on Jan. 22, on the eve of Teng Hsiao-ping's trip to the U.S., the State Minister of the West German Foreign Ministry, Dr. Klaus von Dohnanyi, delivered a forecast of detente and mutual prosperity between West Germany and the Soviet Union. Detailing how trade has grown between the two countries, the State Minister also outlined perspectives for trade between the USSR and West Germany to continue growing — and pointedly rejected the "China card" strategy of leading U.S. and British policymakers.*

...Any attempt to describe the relations between the BRD and the Soviet Union in the coming decades first has to take into account the past and present of these relations. Here a problem already begins in our dialogue.

We know the past; the "facts" are allegedly given. We experience the present in common, we observe the same events. But we consider facts and events from different perspectives. We give various interpretations according to our location, our interests, our history and our present.

I want, nevertheless, to give a short description of the past and present, one we can probably agree on. I will not be able, of course, to limit myself to German-Soviet relations. These have to be seen and understood in the context of East-West relations and world political developments.

Our common history reaches very far back. I am going to begin, though, with the end of the Second World War. The most important consequences of the Second World War were a divided Germany and a divided Europe. A Soviet Union, having become a world power, but which was at first only a really equally weighty partner (and then counter-player) to the USA. The final shattering of prewar colonial powers: the unavoidable reduction, for this reason, of the political and economic importance of traditional West European powers. A previously unknown technological boost to armaments and the discovery of new weapons, whose effect took the classical form of war as "continuation of politics with other means" into an absurdity...

The Moscow treaty of 1970 up to the final act of Helsinki, the development of economic relations up to the 1978 long-term economic cooperation agreement, characterizes a successful policy of detente and cooperation on both sides.

Thus, our starting point for the 1980s is not bad: the Federal Republic, whose security interests are anchored in the Western Alliance and whose economy (is integrated) in the European Community, wishes to continue the policy of detente and cooperation in the 1980s. We also assume that the Soviet Union wants to maintain such a policy as well. But it would be crass light-mindedness if one were to assume that the continuation of this policy which has secured us peace in Europe were to be seen as something self-evident. Rather, there are not only considerable chances, but considerable risks for detente. To use our chances and to recognize the risks — to limit them and overcome them — will be our common political task.

The chances lie mostly in the agreement of our most impor-

# we will play no China card

tant interests, especially in the development of economic and cultural relations...

The further development of our economic relations with the Soviet Union in the 1980s will depend on the degree to which we are able to use the bilateral agreement at hand, and fill it with life. I am especially thinking of the visit of General Secretary Brezhnev in May 1978 to Bonn when the long-term economic agreement was signed, and seen on both sides as a document from which valuable impulses for a further positive development could emerge...

The instruments are, thus, ready. In order to be able to evaluate our economic relations in the 1980s, we need an overview of the present structure of our trade and an overview of the perspectives for its development.

## Soviet-West German trade

The BRD's imports from the Soviet Union are presently about 20 percent raw materials, about 55 percent semi-finished commodities, and about 24 percent finished products altogether. The BRD delivers nearly exclusively, finished products to the Soviet Union. As a percentage of total exports to the Soviet Union, that would be about 97 percent in finished products, while semifinished products account for a mere 2 percent, and raw material exports are as good as nothing.

In this respect, the Soviet export structure has very favorably developed, in our view, since at the beginning of this decade the percentage of finished products exported from the Soviet Union to the BRD was less than 11 percent, that of semi-finished products was about 45 percent, and raw materials, at 32 percent, accounted for almost a third of total Soviet exports.

Raw materials, primary energy and semi-finished products in exchange for machines, equipment and other technologically highly developed commodities: in my opinion, not very much is going to change in this structure over the short term. I refer, for example to the large natural gas pipeline business, in which the Soviet supplies are only going to reach their peak in the 1980s. The same hold for a whole series of agreements in the chemicals area.

However, the primary substitution-exchange of commodities between western industrial nations is going to make itself increasingly felt in trade between our two countries as well. The degree of industrialization of the Soviet Union has created the preconditions for that, especially in resource- and capital-intensive semi-finished and finished products. In this area, the USSR will increasingly be able to set foot on our markets as a serious competitor. This tendency will surely contribute to significantly expanding the momentarily still-limited avenues for expanding the trade volumes.

Of course, this is heading toward a long-term process which can only be initiated in the 1980s. Such a structural change presupposes a large degree of adjustability on both sides. Among us, that means the ability to accelerate the current process of restructuring in the direction of differentiated technologies,

without having to suffer social turmoil. With you, it means increased planning flexibility to be able to offer a broader pallet of marketable products, in technology, quality and design, products which will be competitive.

In that context, the limits of so-called compensation business has to be soberly and realistically faced... I would like to mention only two reservations on the part of the federal government with respect to this form of trade, out of economic policy considerations:

- Compensation business favors primarily large businesses, since the middle and small, which are highly productive, often have no, or only very few options to market compensation commodities in their own distribution networks. Thus the danger exists that the middle level industries would be gradually squeezed out of our trade. This would have damaging consequences for the industries concerned — especially in terms of their power to implement innovations — but would also inevitably limit our trade volume. The federal government will have to follow this development very closely.

- Compensation business with mass products also bear the danger of leading the disruptions of the balance on the market through volumes and prices...

Middle-level firms, which have a very rich experience and high technological knowledge at their disposal, could make a decisive contribution to renewing capital formation in the Soviet Union. This would amount to a structural change at the same time for us, because branches of production with highly developed technology and utilizing especially skilled labor forces, would then be promoted. Such businesses in the middle level areas are especially interested in cooperation with countries which have already reached an appropriate level of technological development on their own part. This is where I see a chance. To use it, though, means more decentralization of economic decision-making in the Soviet Union, and more flexibility in the planning process...

## Integrating the Third World

The chances of cooperation should also lie in our common interest to promote the Third World economically...

The EEC has created a recognized model for cooperation between industrial and developing nations in the Lome agreement. Negotiations about the adjustments and improvements of this agreement have begun.

We are negotiating in the context of UNCTAD over the creation of a common raw material fund with credit facilities, and will, as far as I can see, soon come to a result. Here is where all the industrial states, including the Soviet Union, are challenged. Over the long term, no industrial country will be able to pull away from the demands of the developing countries. But here, in the Third World, the risks already outweigh the chances of the coming decades. The states of Europe, the Soviet Union, the USA, are states with relatively fixed, even all too fixed, structures. In a constellation of bipolar balance, the rela-

tions of these states to each other gave us fewer problems than relations to the states of the Third World. These countries are just becoming countries, and, in their relations to each other and the developed world, are subject to rapid and abrupt changes. No one, in these countries or outside, is secure against surprises.

World powers and those who belong to the various camps, will obviously be affected by these changes. The Third World is no vacuum, but a grouping of striving countries looking for independent relations, and it will rapidly become a part of world politics to the extent that it is not already so. The opportunities of the 1980s consist in the commonality of the task in the risks of the competition for power among the existing blocs....

Realists will see that and make little of it if both sides again declare that they don't want these struggles for position. The battle for economic and politically advantageous positions in the Third World is going to happen. This is the reality we have to assume. What is decisive is how these oppositions develop. The independence of the states of the Third World must remain the goal of every development and aid. This must be an inviolable rule. Political pressure upon this independence is not an acceptable instrument. Military intervention — direct or indirect — from the outside for settling inter-state problems in the Third World is incompatible with the principles of detente and can create dangerous precedents which unleash chain reactions which could get out of control.

To that extent detente is in fact indivisible. But this principle can of course not be understood as though every confrontation of different interests between East and West in the Third World immediately must weigh upon our work for detente in Europe. Detente as an intention is indivisible: but crisis areas;

these we must isolate as far as possible. Tensions must remain "divisible." There must be such security that it can be avoided that all-too-high tensions from the Third World travel onto our "detente lines" unmediated.

This danger grows wherever struggles for position — direct or indirect, are striven for with military means. The danger becomes considerable where the positional gain of the "winner" is not viewed as merely an extension of a zone of influence, but where this could be understood by the other power as an immediate threat to itself. Therefore, the Cuba crisis was an immediate threat to world peace....

We, for our part will do everything to make sure that these deep changes in the Third World do not negatively affect our relations with the Soviet Union.... The policy of the Federal Government knows of no Chinese card. We will deliver no weapons to China. We are, besides, not creating a policy merely to postpone a world war, but to prevent one.

Another risk for the continuation of detente policy remains, despite repeated exclamations, the growing tempo of armaments. We understand that the Soviet Union in the 1950s-60s had to catch up with the USA in its own view. We recognize the psychological and historically understandable security needs of the Soviet people and the thus explainable Soviet defense and strategic considerations. We presume that the Soviet Union has created and maintains its rapidly growing military potential for defensive purposes....

But that thus-created potential is a factor.... It will be decisive that SALT II is rapidly signed. SALT II is an example which makes clear how we should all be interested in not permitting movements in the Third World to negatively affect detente....