

British arranging confrontation

Carter gov't extends 'arc of crisis' to Mideast, East Europe

Behind a smokescreen of Carter Administration "admonitions" to China to cease its invasion of Vietnam, the sobering reality is that the Administration remains committed to a course of confrontation with the Soviet Union. That policy is being dictated and shaped not in Washington but London, where British policymakers are desperately seeking to salvage the London-centered Bretton Woods economic system, and block implementation of a European Monetary System-centered Europe-Moscow-Tokyo development bloc.

British policymakers went "public" with their confrontation perspective as *Survey*, the magazine of the Royal Institute for International Affairs, published predictions that world war is on the agenda for 1980, and a near-certainty by 1985. *Survey* author General Hackett went on to warn that President Carter is geopolitically weak, and called for his replacement in the coming presidential term with a "Republican strongman" of the Alexander Haig-Henry Kissinger stripe. At the same time he urged, western economies must be regimented and built up geared for war preparations, while the Soviet Union is progressively weakened by spreading provocations along its entire border — including new destabilizations in Eastern Europe.

In this context, admonitions of restraint by both the Carter Administration and British Prime Minister Callaghan to the Chinese (Callaghan expressed concern in a BBC interview that the Soviets might launch a preemptive strike against China, because of Soviet perception that "the NATO countries" are in a bloc with Teng) are properly taken as an attempt to restrict the Sino-Vietnamese conflict to a level below the threshold of Soviet intervention, or, to at least restrict Soviet intervention to a level which would not decisively knock out the "China card."

With the Chinese conflict "controlled" on the USSR's eastern front, London and Washington strategists are shifting their focus to the Middle East, and the renewed "Camp David" push for an anti-USSR military bloc in the region (see ENERGY). And other "limited conflicts" designed to weaken the Soviet posture globally are being prepared in Africa and Eastern Europe.

Overall, the operative London-Washington strategy is to progressively weaken the Soviets in controlled,

step-wise escalation so that by 1985 the Anglo-American axis can decisively confront Soviet power with limited risk that the Soviets could effectively respond.

Elements of the scenario

Analysts point to the following components of the Anglo-U.S. confrontation policy:

* The decision to send Treasury Secretary Blumenthal to Peking for 11 days was — contrary to all published reports — expressly to buy time for Peking. Washington and London are gambling that Moscow will hesitate to attack China so long as a U.S. cabinet official is in the country. The simultaneous Peking visits of British Industry Minister Eric Varley and British EC official Roy Jenkins fall in the same category.

* Warnings by such spokesmen as General Alexander Haig (to San Francisco's Commonwealth Club, to the Senate Armed Services Committee, and in private conference with Zbigniew Brzezinski) that "we cannot afford to ignore Russian activities in Afghanistan, South Yemen, Angola, Ethiopia, and Vietnam." Similar warnings have been uttered by high-level Anglo-American policymaker Fritz Kraemer (see page 27) and by Kraemer's protégé Henry Kissinger.

* Mootings by the State Department, by Marshall Shulman (Secretary of State Vance's personal advisor on Soviet policy and, like Vance himself, an admitted disciple of arch "Soviet handler" Averell Harriman), and by General Hackett's *Survey* article, of destabilizations in Eastern Europe. Hackett and Shulman predicted that Poland would be "the next Czechoslovakia," while State Department sources have for months been speaking of an upcoming "Balkan" crisis variously involving Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, etc. The complete conformity of the British military, the RIIA, and Harriman protégés Vance and Shulman to the commitment to the more "Czechoslovakia's" blows the myth of the so-called "Vance-Brzezinski" split.

* Bombing of Soviet-allied Angola by Britain's African client, Rhodesia.

* Declarations by Haig that NATO must prepare to fight a "limited nuclear war" in Europe.

* Transparent U.S. and British efforts to bludgeon Europe and Japan into acquiescence to the confrontational approach using the threat of oil supply cut-backs. The Europeans are furious at these threats; the Soviets are monitoring European response with concern.

Chicken game

In sum, as Kraemer states in an interview appearing exclusively in this publication, Washington and London are back to their old game of thermonuclear "chicken" with the Soviets, the "Mutt and Jeff" policy outlined by Gordon Deane in dictating Henry Kissinger's 1957 *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, the Herman Kahn "escalation ladder" scenario, the 1975 Schlesinger "limited nuclear war" doctrine (for which Schlesinger was fired by President Ford), and now recoined the "arc of crisis" policy by Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Anglo-American policymakers are taking several gambles.

First, the Soviets have never played by the "rules" outlined in the "limited nuclear war" scenario, and are not doing so now. The Soviets are seeking to avoid war, and they are dangling the prospect of a profitable U.S.-USSR trade package along the lines of the Schmidt-Brezhnev accords signed last May as an alternative to conflict. The proposal was floated in the *Journal of Commerce* this week.

If they are forced to respond militarily, the Soviets have two options. First, a nuclear counterforce strike to "take out" the Chinese and humiliate London, Carter, et al. Such an option realistically could include, as Kraemer admits, Soviet replacement of the Teng leadership with a more pro-Soviet leadership in Peking. Should NATO intervene on the side of China, the only Soviet option is total ABC thermonuclear war, targeting U.S. industrial and population centers as the primary first target.

Second, is China willing to play the "China card"? Although their fortunes are more tied to the British than the Chinese probably ever thought they would be, the Chinese strategy has always been to embroil *NATO* directly in a conflict with the Soviets — the "America card." It is no secret that some Chinese strategists believe that China could emerge the "victor" from a U.S.-Soviet nuclear war, by virtue of its vast population. Some analysts see Chinese Vice-Premier Teng's taunt that President Carter is afraid to confront the Soviets as an indication that China might not hesitate to provoke such a conflict, rather than be a chesspiece in a broader, London-run scenario. As the Soviet government repeatedly and precisely singles out London and Washington as responsible for endangering world peace, the question is, who's fooling whom?

—Paul Arnest

Shulman: Soviets to face more crises

In a briefing to regional reporters Feb. 21, Marshall Shulman, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's personal advisor on Soviet affairs and hitherto a prominent spokesman for detente within the Administration, declared that the Soviet Union will face severe internal difficulties in making the transition

Soviets will at the same time face troubles in Eastern Europe, where nations, particularly Poland, are looking for an alternative model to the Soviet Union. He forecast "mixed" U.S. relations with the Soviets. Excerpts from the briefing follow:

We should not interpret recent Soviet activity as the result of aggressive thrusts of the Soviet Union but as the result of turbulence in the international terrain. We are going to have a mixed relationship with the Soviet

Union for a long time. Our efforts have been concerned with reducing the chance of war....Although there are tacit understandings related to local conflicts ... in 1973 we came dangerously close in the Middle East war. We see Angola in the Ethiopian war. That's the way things are and will be. There will not be war, but there will not be a coincidence of interest.

I am totally opposed to linkage. SALT is not a prize.

The Soviets have severe domestic economic problems, low productivity, and problems with low technology. They have problems with nationalities. They have problems with Eastern Europe, and are likely to face another Czechoslovakia in the near future. They are having problems with China. The Soviet Union has not become a model for any other nation. They are not a guide for economic development.

(On the war in Indochina.) "We took a strong position opposed to acts of aggression by Vietnam. We don't know what the Soviet involvement was in the invasion of Cambodia. We are quite concerned about the Chinese invasion...and seek to avoid expanding conflict. We will go ahead with normalization of Chinese relations, but further intimacy could be impaired by the war."