

Soviets answer NATO strategists

Encirclement, counterforce will lead to war

An interview with Soviet Army General Semyon Ivanov was released to this news service in Paris by Novosti Press Agency March 22. The General made his remarks, which we excerpt here, on the occasion of the upcoming 30th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

(Many) measures have been adopted for the purpose of consolidating NATO's advantages; this was, notably, the goal of U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in his trip to the Middle East. The American General Alexander Haig, Supreme Commander of the Atlantic Forces, is making a visit to Turkey in order to consolidate NATO's southern flank. It has already been stated often in our press and the foreign press, that the strategic rapprochement of the United States and China is also an act of consolidating NATO, whose end is to create a sort of "third flank" for NATO.

Asked to comment on the staff exercise Wintex-79, Ivanov said,

The goal of the new strategic general staff exercise

should follow from the new program of armed forces development adopted at the Washington session of the NATO Council last May. It is certain that it will also take into account the new doctrines and new strategic conceptions which the U.S. and NATO have adopted. In short, the goal of the exercise is apparently to proceed with a complex test of plans for the transition of the economy of the bloc's members and of their armed forces from a state of peace to a state of war, which is to be accomplished by the civilian and military organs of NATO, as well as of plans for opening operations in the initial period of war in Europe and the Atlantic, using both conventional and tactical nuclear forces....

Novosti: How is it proposed to rehearse the use of nuclear arms during the exercise? At what stage will they be 'used'? He answered:

According to the information we possess, tactical nuclear weapons will be used on the seventh day of military operations. As for the extension of tactical nuclear arms use and the transition to their unlimited use, this is to be carried out during the NATO staff exercises in Europe next November.

'Limited nuclear war' is first strike plot

The following article, "In Search of 'A New Strategy'," authored by Soviet Major General R. Simonyan, Doctor of Military Science, is excerpted from the March 19 edition of the Soviet Communist Party's Pravda newspaper.

There has been a lot of persistent talk in Washington of late about "serious changes" effected by the present administration in the area of military, and particularly nuclear, strategy. "Officials at the Department of Defense and the National Security Council," the *New York Times* noted recently, "have pointed to certain military measures as signs that the government is on the

threshold of a 'revolution' in nuclear strategy...."

The President's concrete directives "on a comprehensive review of American military positions" were laid out in Special Directive No. 18, issued by the White House in the summer of 1977. Two years have passed from the moment that the Carter administration came to power, and although the "new strategy" has not yet received a special name, its basic aspects are clearly delineated. One of them, the conception of "limited" nuclear war, deserves some attention in detail.

Questions connected with the preparation and conduct of such a war (with the Soviet Union named as the enemy of the U.S.) have been the subject of statements by high-ranking officials in the present administration, above all the president's Special Assistant on National Security questions Z. Brzezinski and Secretary of Defense H. Brown. They are also being openly discussed in the American press. The *New York Times*, for example, published a lengthy article by R. Burt, which said

that the White House was engaged in a revision of the strategy for waging nuclear war. "The goal of these measures," noted the author, "is to give the United States the capability of waging limited nuclear war in addition to its capability for general nuclear war."

The question arises: why has the conception of "limited" nuclear war again attracted such attention?

It is well known that according to the strategy of a "credible deterrent," now in effect, the basic variant of nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union is considered to be strategic (general) nuclear war. In the course of such a war, both the armed forces and military targets, as well as economic and political administration centers, are subjected to massive strikes by strategic offensive forces.

The scenario for "limited" nuclear war, on the other hand, provides for inflicting a sudden strike by the strategic offensive forces "only against carefully chosen military targets," such as the launch shafts of strategic rockets, airplanes in the hangars, command points, major troop groupings, and other important military targets. The basic goal of such a war is to annihilate the military — and above all the nuclear — power of "the potential enemy" and put him in a position where he is unable to inflict a crushing retaliatory strike against U.S. territory, or at least to weaken the strength of that strike. But to achieve this goal, it is necessary to have the "potential" capable of hitting these "precision" targets. It is easily understandable that the arsenal of strategic offensive weapons created for strategic (general) war cannot be used for this. After all, to destroy a city it was not necessary to build high-accuracy weapons.

In other words, the "limited" nuclear war conception was required by U.S. militarist circles in order to broaden the spectrum of wars being prepared against the Soviet Union and on this basis obtain the "potential" to conduct limited nuclear war as well as their existing potential for general nuclear war....

It should be noted that the idea of developing a conception of "limited" nuclear war and incorporating it into American military strategy is not new. It has a history, understanding which helps sort out more thoroughly the current maneuvers of U.S. militarist circles who oppose concluding a SALT II agreement and favor further escalation of the arms race.

In 1962, then Secretary of Defense R. McNamara, motivating his "counterforce strategy," or "strategy of excluding cities" as it was called then, stated that, "The main goal of the United States in the event of nuclear war ought to be the destruction of the enemy's armed forces." In 1974, J. Schlesinger (when he was Secretary of Defense) came out with approximately the same thesis, and the conception of "limited" nuclear war was given a shove closer to being adopted....

In truth, a power which sets as its goal the destruc-

tion of the military targets of the "potential enemy," has to strike first, since otherwise its nuclear warheads will land on empty launch shafts and hangars.

The present leadership of the Pentagon, manipulating the thesis on defending "national security interests," is attempting to revive the ancient first strike ideas of the reactionary circles of the American military.

Alongside the theoretical calculations regarding the development of this conception, U.S. militarist circles are working intensively on creating the material and technological base, especially qualitatively new types of strategic arms, for carrying it out. These include, first off, the MX (mobile basing) intercontinental ballistic missile, with a multi-charged warhead (12-14 400 kiloton combat units with independent targetability)....

Another type of strategic weapon for a first strike is the marine based system Trident-2, which has 24 ICBMs with 8 to 10 150-300 kiloton warheads a piece. Long term plans provide for building 14 Trident submarines.... The White House has also announced a decision to arm new MK-12A type warheads, which are twice as powerful and accurate as the present MK-12 warheads. This new warhead will be placed on Minuteman-3 missiles. "Because the accuracy of the MK-12A warhead is doubled," notes the *Washington Post*, "its destructive power is increased by a factor of eight. Doubling both the power and the accuracy of the MK-12A makes its effectiveness against missile shafts grow 16 times, in comparison with the warheads now carried by the Minuteman-3."

The list of first strike strategic weapons would be incomplete, if we omitted the air-launched cruise missile created in the U.S. It will have a 200 kiloton warhead and a sensing system that allows very high target accuracy.

These are the facts, which obviously testify that the Pentagon's conception of "limited" nuclear war presents a huge danger for the cause of peace. Furthermore, its adoption as Washington's official military doctrine would open the road to the use of nuclear arms in conflict situations, and would make nuclear arms a threatening instrument of political pressure in relations among states....

The Soviet people understand better than anybody else, from their own experience, what war is and what huge sacrifices and destruction an aggressor's actions can inflict. The Soviet people cannot remain indifferent to arguments for "powerful, annihilating, preemptive" and other strikes and cannot fail to take necessary defense measures in light of these arguments. Only slanderers can find in these arguments the preparation for an attack on anyone whomsoever....