


Western Europe, and the Soviet Union and its allies, might be able to suspend the charter of the IMF and the World Bank and establish a new world credit organization to finance Third World industrialization. A prerequisite for this is a further normalization of East-West relations on the European continent in matters of collective security and economic and cultural cooperation.

Such further normalization is very much in evidence. The principal reason why Kissinger and Haig were so strongly rebuked by the West German and French governments is that Kissinger and Haig now represent the main threat against this process of normalization. In all three principal nations, France, West German and the Soviet Union, there are powerful forces at work which, with each passing day, strengthen the impetus for further peaceful cooperation and normalization. This process was formally started with the historic agreements between Chancellor Schmidt and Soviet President Brezhnev in the spring of 1978. The policy was further strengthened by the agreements signed between Presidents Giscard and Brezhnev during the former's visit to Moscow this year. All three principal statesmen, Giscard, Schmidt and Brezhnev, have been strengthened very substantially in their domestic positions.

The intervention by Kissinger and Haig in Brussels was principally aimed at creating an international climate which would give certain "hard line" opponents of President Brezhnev the opportunity to gain the upper hand. Such a reversal of the domestic political situation in the USSR was then meant to be taken advantage of and exploited in West Germany and France to undermine the position of Schmidt and Giscard.

This strategy, so much reminiscent of well studied Jesuit maneuvers of past centuries, has so far backfired dramatically. The net effect of Kissinger and Haig's efforts has been an increase in the potential for NATO to split. Right now, the West German and French governments are working on a political timetable which culminates during the month of December, in which two major events will further clarify the world situation: the annual meeting of NATO in which basic conflicting concepts of what national security is will be clarified and, secondly, the scheduled East-West "European Security and Cooperation" ("Helsinki") Conference in Madrid, which will attempt to expand industrial, scientific and cultural cooperation on the basis of the Schmidt-Brezhnev and the Giscard-Brezhnev agreements. The government of the Federal Republic of Germany is presently anticipating the possibility of a "breakthrough agreement" on security with the Soviet Union which, observers believe, will probably include a spectacular final settlement of the Berlin question.

—*Criton Zoakos*
Contributing Editor



CSIS: prepare

Henry Kissinger: arm for tactical war

The following are the central portions of Henry Kissinger's speech to the CSIS conference in Brussels.

... My proposition to this group is that NATO is reaching a point where the strategic assumptions on which it has been operating, the force structures that it has been generating, and the joint policies it has been developing, will be inadequate for the 1980s...

The dominant fact of the current military situation is that the NATO countries are falling behind in every significant military category with the possible exception of naval forces where the gap in our favor is closing. Never in history has it happened that a nation achieved superiority in all significant weapons categories without seeking to translate it at some point into some foreign policy benefit. It is, therefore, almost irrelevant to debate whether there exists a Soviet master plan for world domination or whether there is some magic date at which Soviet armies will head in some direction or another...

I do not believe the Soviet Union planned Angola or created a deadline for the revolution in Afghanistan. But, all of these events happened to the detriment of general relationships. I would consider it a rash Western policy that did not take into account that in the decade ahead we will face simultaneously an unfavorable balance of power, a world in turmoil, a potential economic crisis and a massive energy problem...

Nostalgia for a missile crisis

... When NATO was created, the U.S. possessed an overwhelming strategic nuclear superiority ... for a long period of time we were likely to prevail in a nuclear war, certainly if we struck first and for a decade perhaps even if we struck second. We were in a position to wipe out the Soviet strategic forces and to reduce the counterblow to an acceptable level...

If we think back to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, which all the policymakers of the time were

for a tactical nuclear war

viewing with a consciousness of an approaching Armageddon, one is almost seized with nostalgia for the ease of their decisions....

No one disputes any longer that in the 1980s—and perhaps even today, but surely in the 1980s—the U.S. will no longer be in a strategic position to reduce a Soviet counterblow against the United States to tolerable levels.... The growth of the Soviet strategic forces has been massive ... and the amazing phenomenon about which historians will ponder is that all of this has happened without the United States attempting to make a significant effort to rectify that state of affairs...

The change in the strategic situation that is produced by our limited vulnerability is more fundamental for the United States than even total vulnerability would be for the Soviet Union because our strategic doctrine has relied extraordinarily, perhaps exclusively, on our superior strategic power. The Soviet Union has never relied on its strategic power. It has always depended more on its local and regional power; even assured destruction for both sides is a revolution in NATO doctrine as we have known it. ... I have recently argued that the United States build a counterforce capability of its own for two reasons. One, the answer of our NATO friends to the situation that I have described has invariably been to demand additional reassurances of ... American military commitment. And I have sat around the NATO Council table in Brussels and have uttered the magic words which had a profoundly reassuring effect ... and my successors have uttered the same reassurances, and yet if my analysis is correct, those words cannot be true, and ... we must face the fact that it is absurd to base the strategy of the West on the credibility of the threat of mutual suicide....

... The European allies should not keep asking us to multiply strategic assurances that we cannot possibly mean, or if we do mean, we should not want to execute because if we execute, we risk the destruction of civilization....

A theater nuclear buildup

The second part of this problem is the imbalance that has grown up in theater nuclear forces ... Now, one reason we did not have a rational analysis for the use of these forces was for the very reason that led to the strategic theory of assured destruction. Let us face it: The intellectually predominant position in the United

States was that we had to retain full control of the conduct of nuclear war and we therefore had a vested interest in avoiding any firebreak between tactical nuclear weapons and the strategic nuclear weapons. The very reasoning that operated against giving a rational purpose to strategic forces also operated against giving a military role to tactical nuclear forces, and this was compounded by the fact that—to be tactless—the secret dream of every European was, of course, to avoid nuclear war, but ... if there had to be nuclear war, to have it conducted over their heads by the strategic forces of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Be that as it may, the fact is that the strategic imbalance that I have predicted for the '80s will also be accompanied by a theater imbalance in the '80s. How is it possible to survive with these imbalances in the face of the already demonstrated inferiority in conventional forces?

Therefore, I believe that it is urgently necessary either that the Soviets be deprived of their counterforce capability in strategic forces or that a U.S. counterforce capability in strategic forces be rapidly built. It is also necessary that either the Soviet nuclear threat in theater nuclear forces against Europe be eliminated (which I do not see is possible) or an immediate effort be made to build up theater nuclear forces. Just as I believe it is necessary that we develop a military purpose for our strategic forces and move away from the senseless and demoralizing strategy of massive civilian destruction for our strategic forces, so it is imperative that we finally try to develop some credible military purposes for the tactical and theater nuclear forces that we are building.

I know that my friend whom I admire enormously, General Haig, has done enormous work in improving the situation: nevertheless, I would be amazed if even he would believe that we can now say that our ground forces by themselves can offer a sustained defense without massive, rapid improvement....

Forget detente

... There is a tendency in the West to treat detente quite theatrically: that is to say, not as a balancing of national interests and negotiations on the basis of strategic realities, but rather as an exercise in strenuous goodwill, in which one removes by understanding the suspiciousness of a nation that otherwise would have no motive to attack. This tendency to treat detente as an exercise in psychotherapy, or an attempt in personal relations,

or as an effort in which individual leaders try to gain domestic support by proving that they have a special way with Moscow—this is disastrous for the West. And it is the corollary to the assured destruction theory in the sense that it always provides an alibi for not doing what must be done. ... We must have a detente, but the detente must be on a broad front, in the sense that all of the NATO nations must pursue comparable policies. ... The illusion that some countries can achieve a preferential position with the U.S.S.R. is theoretically correct, but it is the best means of dividing the alliance. The illusion that some subjects can be separated for individual treatment of detente, while conflict goes on in all other areas—that turns detente into a safety valve for aggression...

I know we have many alibis. We have the alibi that none of the things I said are inevitable because there is China. And we have the alibi that, after all, the Soviets have never stayed anywhere, and they're in deep trouble themselves. And we have the alibi that we can make such great progress in the Third World that all of this is irrelevant.

In my view the Chinese have survived for 3,000 years by being the most unsentimental practitioners of the balance of power, the most sophisticated and the ones most free of illusion. China will be an alibi for us only if we do what is necessary. China will not be on barricades that we refuse to man as the victim of the forces which we have unleashed: So certainly, we can have cooperation with China, only if we create a balance of power.

... And the final nostalgia—that for the noble savage—the Third World ... we're going to sweep them over to our side. I have to confess, I cannot give this an operational definition, or even what it actually means. As for the Third World nations, now meeting in Cuba, when I was in office I never read their resolutions, I regret to tell you, which is just as well because I might have said something rather nasty...

General Haig threatens West Europe

The following is the major portion of General Alexander Haig's speech to the CSIS conference in Brussels. General Haig spoke on Sept. 1, and began with an endorsement of Henry Kissinger's portrayal of "the changed strategic situation confronting NATO."

If it is to continue as an effective instrument in preserving the security of industrial democracies, NATO must adapt to these changes. Parochial concerns of member

states must give way to interests shared by all members. Moreover, a spirit of cooperation must be fostered at a time when serious decisions could be sparked by economic crises or lack of confidence in the national will of member states to perform their duties. Finally, despite the changed strategic environment, the United States continues to face the special responsibility of providing assertive but sensitive leadership within the alliance...

... Shifts in the military balance between East and West are not the only change in the contemporary environment that should create concern in NATO councils. Another factor is the heightened importance of the Third World to the West, both politically and economically. The growing dependence of industrial democracies on imports from volatile regions in the Third World—from the Middle East in the case of petroleum, or from southern Africa with respect to vital minerals—demands that the close attention of all NATO members be given to developments within those regions. If instability in those areas is sparked by internal conflict or external meddling, the spillover effects for the West could be disastrous. ...

China and NATO

... From the NATO perspective, an important actor of some influence in global politics is the People's Republic of China. While no match for the Soviet Union militarily, the People's Republic of China does provide an alternative, and frequently attractive, model of Marxist development to many Third World countries that has shattered any monolithic Marxist threat that might have existed in NATO's early years. ... The Chinese have also been one of NATO's staunchest supporters outside Europe in recent years. Chinese contacts with NATO members have increased tremendously, particularly in Europe. ... The advantages of the Chinese relationship will continue only if the Chinese leaders are convinced that ties with the West ameliorate their existing weaknesses vis-à-vis the Russians...

The emerging international environment is loosely clustered around three influential actors—the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and the United States.

The foregoing changes in the international environment ... most significantly, changes in the central strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, underline the growing significance of regional nuclear and conventional balances...

While the world is changing externally, the NATO alliance is also changing internally. The allies confront a gloomy economic prospect: low growth and rampant inflation. In part, the prevailing danger to economic security stems from energy dependence on the volatile Persian Gulf countries. As great trading partners and importers of OPEC petroleum, the members of NATO will be hard put to prevent their economic woes from impinging upon their political solidarity.

A threat to Germany

In addition, two changes within the alliance during the last decade must be highlighted: a novel sense of the limits of American power, and the growing strength of the Federal Republic of Germany...

Ironically, disenchantment with the United States may promote that European union which has been an American policy objective for decades. Recent movement toward some form of greater European integration, such as the European monetary unity, is a manifestation. Monetary union has been established as a goalpost along the road to closer political union, but the persistent weakness of the dollar forced the final European initiative, in the name of self-protection. Thus, we may be witnessing progress toward long sought European unity, but for reasons which cannot be a comfort to those with an Atlantic perspective...

Despite its growing influence, the Federal Republic of Germany confronts something of a dilemma. It remains difficult for the alliance to accept German leadership, especially when the FRG remains the most vulnerable and highly exposed member of NATO. Furthermore, a "revanchist" Germany is still a hardy propaganda staple in Eastern Europe. For this reason, the Schmidt government has been reluctant to maximize the influence it might enjoy. Rather, it has sought to work in concert with other European nations to resolve their common problems. The most active vehicle for these efforts has been a new "entente cordiale" with France through which the spectre of German dominance is diminished. But it has also prodded the Germans to discuss their options. If these options were to be seriously pursued in the future, the alliance could find the Federal Republic following an independent course that, in the worst case from NATO's perspective, would take it out of the alliance. Such a course would be extremely detrimental to the interests of the alliance and the Federal Republic. ...

NATO and Third World

In the past, NATO's sphere of activities has been limited by a barrier on the map: the Tropic of Cancer. ... At a time when the severe issues confronting the alliance are not contained within its arbitrary boundaries, this traditional attitude creates an inflexibility and artificial constraint on alliance action that will seriously impede its effectiveness in finding workable solutions. Fortunately, there is some evidence that attitudes are changing...

A threat to Europe

If NATO as an organization is unable to respond to these external changes, there is every reason to expect that the more influential members of the alliance will combine to see some resolution of important issues. Moreover, they are also likely to address European questions if they conclude that existing organizations

are incapable of dealing with them effectively ... The prospect of the creation of these "Great Power Directorships" is of fundamental concern not only to the smaller members of the Atlantic alliance, but also to the smaller nations throughout the globe. Clearly, a development of this kind would shake the structure of the alliance.

While permanent directorships are clearly detrimental, one should not adhere to the purist view that they should never be forged, at least for temporary crises...

Economist: the West has to counterarm

The following are excerpts of the London Economist's Sept. 8 editorial entitled "A call to counterarms," endorsing and elaborating upon the Kissinger-Haig policy.

... The Soviet Union has achieved by its past dozen or more years of rearmament, increasing its military spending in real terms by 3-5 percent ... a long-range nuclear striking force on the point of surpassing America's; a shorter-range nuclear force threatening to become predominant in Europe; and a nonnuclear or "conventional" armoury even better than NATO's in most respects than it already was that lopsided dozen years ago.

Last weekend a worried gathering of distinguished north Americans and west Europeans, meeting in Brussels, heard Mr. Henry Kissinger describe the consequences of this long spell of unchallenged Soviet rearmament...

Ever since the early 1970s a few rather lonely voices, including this newspaper's, have been saying that it was dangerous to let Russia go on building more arms while the west, under the lulling spell of detente, did not. Mr. Kissinger has now put his authority into a trumpet call for a new policy. The west has to counterarm.

Three holes to plug

This programme of counter-armament needs to deal with three emerging causes for dismay. First, and best known, the potential vulnerability of the United States itself. Let this be repeated as dispassionately as possible.

At some time in the early 1980s—the best guess is about 1982—the growth of Russia's missile force will, if nothing is done, reach the point at which it can destroy virtually all the Americans' land-based missiles in a surprise attack, together with many of their missile

submarines and nuclear bombers, by the use of only a portion of Russia's warheads. The surviving American submarines and bombers would still be available for a counter-attack, but they would be too inaccurate, or too slow, to destroy Russia's reserve of still unused warheads....

Second, and less generally realised, the vulnerability of Europe. It has long been suspected that NATO's armies in central Europe ... can probably fight for only a limited time—two days? a week?—before they will either have to use tactical nuclear weapons, or be overrun. The idea of using tactical nuclear weapons, however, begins to look increasingly implausible now that the Russians have caught up in these things too....

Nor can it be argued with any real assurance that this new weakness in NATO's defences can be made good by a threat to go one step further up the nuclear ladder....

Third, by extension from this, the vulnerability of areas important to the west in other parts of the world. Russia's dozen years of rearmament have equipped it with a fleet of transport aircraft and ships that can move chunks of its powerful army (or its Cuban and Vietnamese allies') to distant parts of the globe....


The western counter-arming that would rectify the odds would set out to do four specific things:

1. As soon as possible, to make some of America's land-based missiles invulnerable, by making them mobile.
2. To give America's nuclear force the ability to hit more of Russia's missile silos, so as to reduce the damage Russia can do to America.
3. To restore the balance of shorter-range nuclear weapons in Europe.
4. To strengthen the west's conventional forces, so that they have a better chance of holding off Russia's without resorting to the threat of going nuclear.

Get through the worst, and better will follow

Mr. Kissinger and a group of American senators are now calling on President Carter to increase America's defence spending over the next few years, as the price of their support for the ratification of SALT-2....

The difficulties of a policy of counter-armament should not be brushed aside. It cannot be left to the Americans alone: the European allies, the most obvious beneficiary, may have to contribute something too, over and above the 3 percent a year increase the whole of NATO has already promised. ...The counter-arming countries can console themselves with the thought that the need to counter-arm does not stretch out into the infinite future: it is a matter of getting through the particular problem period of the early and middle 1980s.



IISS: a limited

McGeorge Bundy: nuclear deterrent intact

The Sept. 11 editorial of the Italian newspaper La Stampa, by Arrigo Levi, was devoted to a report on McGeorge Bundy's refutation of Kissinger at the conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Villars, Switzerland.

"The efficacy of the American nuclear guarantee for Europe will foreseeably be just as great in the future as it has been in the past," declared McGeorge Bundy, ex national security advisor for Kennedy and Johnson, contradicting in a categorical way the pessimism expressed by Henry Kissinger a week ago in Brussels.

Last Friday at Villars, Bundy gave the opening speech at the annual conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies of London, the most prestigious strategic research center in the world. At the conference, which took place as usual behind closed doors, and whose theme this year was "The future of strategic dissuasion," 250 defense experts and policy-makers from the principal Western and Third World countries attended. Bundy's speech also signals his re-entry into public activity: in the last 10 years he has been president of the Ford Foundation; now he devotes himself to academic studies, but his return to political life is not ruled out.

Kissinger said at Brussels that the evolution of the relationship of forces in the field of strategic nuclear arms in favor of the Soviet Union makes the U.S. atomic guarantee to Europe no longer credible (the pledge, that is, to use, if necessary, strategic arms to stop a Soviet invasion), inasmuch as at this point this would be equivalent to "a promise of reciprocal suicide...."

To this speech Bundy replied, above all, with an analysis and an historic testimony. Even if the Nixon administration was the first to officially abandon ("to its credit") "the objective of strategic superiority, substituting that of 'sufficiency' and then that of 'parity,'" a substantial equilibrium between the two superpowers existed de facto since 1959-1960, in the sense that even then (that is, since the U.S.S.R. had a strong number of