

submarines and nuclear bombers, by the use of only a portion of Russia's warheads. The surviving American submarines and bombers would still be available for a counter-attack, but they would be too inaccurate, or too slow, to destroy Russia's reserve of still unused warheads....

Second, and less generally realised, the vulnerability of Europe. It has long been suspected that NATO's armies in central Europe ... can probably fight for only a limited time—two days? a week?—before they will either have to use tactical nuclear weapons, or be overrun. The idea of using tactical nuclear weapons, however, begins to look increasingly implausible now that the Russians have caught up in these things too....

Nor can it be argued with any real assurance that this new weakness in NATO's defences can be made good by a threat to go one step further up the nuclear ladder....

Third, by extension from this, the vulnerability of areas important to the west in other parts of the world. Russia's dozen years of rearmament have equipped it with a fleet of transport aircraft and ships that can move chunks of its powerful army (or its Cuban and Vietnamese allies') to distant parts of the globe....

The western counter-arming that would rectify the odds would set out to do four specific things:

1. As soon as possible, to make some of America's land-based missiles invulnerable, by making them mobile.
2. To give America's nuclear force the ability to hit more of Russia's missile silos, so as to reduce the damage Russia can do to America.
3. To restore the balance of shorter-range nuclear weapons in Europe.
4. To strengthen the west's conventional forces, so that they have a better chance of holding off Russia's without resorting to the threat of going nuclear.

Get through the worst, and better will follow

Mr. Kissinger and a group of American senators are now calling on President Carter to increase America's defence spending over the next few years, as the price of their support for the ratification of SALT-2....

The difficulties of a policy of counter-armament should not be brushed aside. It cannot be left to the Americans alone: the European allies, the most obvious beneficiary, may have to contribute something too, over and above the 3 percent a year increase the whole of NATO has already promised. ...The counter-arming countries can console themselves with the thought that the need to counter-arm does not stretch out into the infinite future: it is a matter of getting through the particular problem period of the early and middle 1980s.



IISS: a limited

McGeorge Bundy: nuclear deterrent intact

The Sept. 11 editorial of the Italian newspaper La Stampa, by Arrigo Levi, was devoted to a report on McGeorge Bundy's refutation of Kissinger at the conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Villars, Switzerland.

"The efficacy of the American nuclear guarantee for Europe will foreseeably be just as great in the future as it has been in the past," declared McGeorge Bundy, ex national security advisor for Kennedy and Johnson, contradicting in a categorical way the pessimism expressed by Henry Kissinger a week ago in Brussels.

Last Friday at Villars, Bundy gave the opening speech at the annual conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies of London, the most prestigious strategic research center in the world. At the conference, which took place as usual behind closed doors, and whose theme this year was "The future of strategic dissuasion," 250 defense experts and policy-makers from the principal Western and Third World countries attended. Bundy's speech also signals his re-entry into public activity: in the last 10 years he has been president of the Ford Foundation; now he devotes himself to academic studies, but his return to political life is not ruled out.

Kissinger said at Brussels that the evolution of the relationship of forces in the field of strategic nuclear arms in favor of the Soviet Union makes the U.S. atomic guarantee to Europe no longer credible (the pledge, that is, to use, if necessary, strategic arms to stop a Soviet invasion), inasmuch as at this point this would be equivalent to "a promise of reciprocal suicide...."

To this speech Bundy replied, above all, with an analysis and an historic testimony. Even if the Nixon administration was the first to officially abandon ("to its credit") "the objective of strategic superiority, substituting that of 'sufficiency' and then that of 'parity'," a substantial equilibrium between the two superpowers existed de facto since 1959-1960, in the sense that even then (that is, since the U.S.S.R. had a strong number of

war is lunacy

H-bombs and the means to deploy them on U.S. territory), the U.S. could not "seriously threaten war." America continued, it's true, to boast of its superiority, but this "rhetorical emphasis," said Bundy, served above all "as a reassurance to the American public." Neither Kennedy nor Johnson "ever thought they could use (the pretended numerical superiority) deliberately and credibly for a first strike," which would have provoked a disaster for America as well.

According to Bundy, it is therefore not true that only now the U.S. has lost, or is about to lose, nuclear superiority (it has 11,000 nuclear warheads against the Soviets' 5,000—which however are of greater power). Nor is it true, therefore, that the U.S. nuclear guarantee in Europe is becoming valueless. Bundy argued this conviction of his with great vigor: "U.S. strategic protection of Western Europe," he said, "is a classic case of doctrinal confusion and practical success. It has functioned, after all, for 30 years, and during 20 of those 30 years there was a substantial parity of reciprocal destructive potential. The long-term effectiveness of the U.S. umbrella is not derived from strategic superiority; it is derived instead from two other factors: the visible deployment of conspicuous American military forces in Europe, and the highly evident risk that any large-scale conflict between Soviet and American forces would rapidly and uncontrollably become a disastrous general nuclear conflict."

"It's true," Bundy continued, "that no one can claim to be sure that a large-scale conflict in Europe would reach the strategic nuclear level. But the essential point is the opposite: no one can know absolutely that this escalation would *not* occur. Even a small risk of a large-scale nuclear conflict is decisively too large. My conclusion is that marginal changes in the strategic figures do not in fact represent a threat to the U.S. strategic umbrella over NATO. This guarantee does not rest on numbers of warheads, but on a commitment that offers to the opposing party risks that are completely unacceptable and by their nature unforeseeable. Nor do I think that the real effectiveness of this deterrent is responsive to the highs and lows of European faith in any particular American president. The shield of Europe is the American nuclear "Triad," credibly upheld by 300,000 Americans in Europe."

Bundy recognized that one of the three elements of the "Triad," that of Minutemen land-based intercontinental missiles (the other two are the airborne missiles

and submarine-based missiles, which together represent more than 70 percent of the U.S. nuclear force: but only the Minutemen have the precision to hit Soviet bases accurately), will not remain valid "in the long-term" following the installation of new super-precise Soviet missiles. It is therefore right to "prepare" (with the probable adoption of new mobile missiles, MX which will be invulnerable.) But, Bundy still said, "The Soviet Union is not going to launch a first strike against the Minutemen: the Soviet leaders know that it is unlikely that America would passively accept the simultaneous destruction of eight nations."

Dominant opinion among the experts at the Villars meeting is that the strategic equilibrium among the superpowers is not in danger; but it is indispensable in order to preserve it, to reinforce the nuclear arms with European bases (but Bundy is not completely convinced) and to beef up "conventional" forces, which is in any case already under way. The constant displacement of the relation of forces, in all fields, in favor of the U.S.S.R., could however, break the political equilibrium more than the military (and this is the true fear of Kissinger), to the detriment above all of Europe; at least if adequate countermeasures are not adopted.

Theo Sommer: quit painting things black

Following are excerpts from a front-page article authored by Theo Sommer in the Sept. 14 edition of his West German weekly Die Zeit.

Deterrence is dead, Henry Kissinger announced at the beginning of September in Brussels. ... Deterrence is alive and well, it has functioned for 30 long years and will continue to function McGeorge Bundy answered...

McGeorge Bundy, who, as Kennedy's security adviser in 1962 was the manager of the Cuban Missile crisis, does not dispute the Soviet armament, and not the loss of the American advantage to a situation of parity (if a situation with 11,000 American nuclear warheads, as

as opposed to 5,000 Russian ones, can be called parity). But he warns about collapsing into panic because of it. The men, who in the loneliness of the situation room in the Kremlin or in the White House must make their decisions, know that atomic weapons are a unique species in themselves, that their limited use is very hard to control—and because of this they will be on their guard against wantonly pressing on the button...

In reality it is inconceivable that a Soviet head of state would give the command for a surprise attack against U.S. land-based missiles. Even if the improbable were to occur and all 1,054 U.S. land-based missiles were to be destroyed, there would still remain 656 Polaris submarine missiles with more than 6,000 warheads.

Similar doubts about painting everything black occur over the situation in Europe. The new Soviet SS-20 rocket and the Backfire bomber perhaps, in a surprise attack, can be deployed against important military goals in the west of the continent. But not without devastating wide stretches of territory and requiring millions of dead. Are the Soviets actually operating on the assumption that the American president will simply take this?

What this comes down to for America is that it cannot allow itself to hunt for a sacrificial goat. Twenty years ago there was a lot of hammering about a "missile gap" about which it later turned out, that although there never was one, it did lead to a hectic, forced buildup in American missiles. And then nothing else remained for the Soviets but to catch up with the Western superpower. The same thing is going on with the MIRV and the cruise missile: The Americans march on ahead, and the Russians follow....

Lord Mountbatten: ban tactical weapons

In a speech delivered May 11, 1979 in Strasbourg, West Germany, the late Lord Mountbatten of Burma, a member of Britain's royal family and one of the monarchy's closest policy-advisors for half a century, revealed his opposition to the "limited nuclear war" doctrines associated with Haig and Kissinger. Below are excerpts.

Do the frightening facts about the arms race, which show that we are rushing headlong towards a precipice, make any of those responsible for this disastrous course pull themselves together and reach for the brakes?

The answer is 'No' and I only wish that I could be the bearer of the glad tidings that there has been a

change of attitude and we are beginning to see a steady rate of disarmament. Alas, that is not the case...

... The Western powers and the U.S.S.R. started by producing and stockpiling nuclear weapons as a deterrent to general war. The idea seemed simple enough. Because of the enormous amount of destruction that could be wreaked by a single nuclear explosion, the idea was that both sides, in what we still see as an East-West conflict, would be deterred from taking any aggressive action which might endanger the vital interests of the other.

It was not long, however, before smaller nuclear weapons of various designs were produced and deployed for use in what was assumed to be a tactical or theatre war. The belief was that were hostilities ever to break out in Western Europe, such weapons could be used in field warfare without triggering an all-out nuclear exchange leading to the final holocaust.

I have never found this idea credible. I have never been able to accept the reason for the belief that any class of nuclear weapons can be categorized in terms of their tactical or strategic purposes.

Next month I enter my eightieth year. I am one of the few survivors of the First World War who rose to high command in the Second and I know how impossible it is to pursue military operations in accordance with fixed plans and agreements. In warfare the unexpected is the rule and no one can anticipate what an opponent's reaction will be to the unexpected....

I am not asserting this without having deeply thought about the matter. When I was chief of the British Defence Staff I made my views known. I have heard the arguments against this view, but I have never found them convincing. So, I repeat in all sincerity as a military man, I can see no use for any nuclear weapons which would not end in escalation, with consequences that no one can conceive....

I regret enormously the delays which the Americans and Russians have experienced in reaching a SALT II agreement. ... I regret even more the fact that opposition to reaching any agreement which will bring about a restraint in the production and deployment of nuclear weapons is becoming so powerful in the United States. What can their motives be?

There are powerful voices around the world who still give credence to the old Roman precept—if you desire peace, prepare for war. This is absolute nuclear nonsense....