

billion this year and \$55 billion in 1980, compared with \$31 billion in 1978 and \$21 billion in 1977. Even more staggering is the expected increase in the net debt of the non oil-exporting developing countries: \$82 billion over the years 1979-1980, to a total amount of \$358 billion. Worse, an astounding 70 percent of all private loans to the LDCs will fall due by 1982. Not surprisingly, the number of countries "having difficulties" in paying back their debts has grown from three to eighteen between 1974 and 1978, with the latter's total debt representing 12 percent of the overall LDC debt.

The above figures put in proper perspective the 4.9 percent growth rate attributed to all LDCs (major oil producers excluded)—more than a full percentage point above the industrialized countries—as the World Bank reported in its annual report.

In effect, disparities have kept widening between the so-called newly industrialized countries (NICs) like India, Taiwan, Brazil, etc., and the overwhelming majority of the Third World countries, whose situation by and large is worsening.

The pattern of credit flows last year reflected this situation. Two thirds of Eurodollar loans went to ten of the so-called NICs. Similarly, lending by the World Bank and its affiliates (\$10.44 billion in fiscal 1979) concentrated on the NICs with India getting \$1.2 billion, Indonesia \$700 million, Brazil \$670 million, and Mexico \$550 million.

—Alain LeMal

## FOREIGN AID

### U.S. can meet emergency food needs

Kampuchea (Cambodia) and Nicaragua's emergency food needs can readily be supplied by a tiny fraction of U.S. farm surpluses, much of which would otherwise rot for lack of an outlet.

Kampuchea requires, for subsistence maintenance of the 4 million survivors of Pol Pot's genocidal Maoist regime 16,000 tons of rice per month until production can be restored. This would ensure that each Cambodian at least gets 400 grams of rice—a little under one pound—per day.

Nicaragua requires slightly above 9,000 metric tons per month for eight months of each of the following products: beans (black or red); rice; oil; flour.

#### Logistics

Transportation of the emergency food supplies in neither case poses any problems for the United States, which has the most developed logistical capacity in history, a capacity wielded in World War II, the Berlin airlift, the Korean War, and Vietnam. It is time to put that capacity to a moral purpose again, as it was during World War II.

The monthly rice requirements of the entire Kampuchean nation can be carried—with room to spare—in the hold of one containerized ship (25,000-30,000 tons) or by one and a half of the smaller, older ships whose "break-bulk" cargo capacity is 10-12,000 tons.

Nicaragua is but several days sailing from New Orleans, a leading U.S. grain port. Sailing time to Kampuchea is considerably longer—about 20 days, depending on the

weather. Therefore, the first three weeks of rice shipments should be sent in large cargo planes such as the U.S. Air Force's C-5 cargo plane, which can carry 100 tons of cargo. Only a few days' air shipments would actually be necessary, since grain elsewhere in Southeast Asia or in maritime transit in the region could be rerouted to Kampuchea and replaced by later compensating supplies from the United States.

Transportation problems once the food supplies arrive at destination points are manageable. The Nicaraguan government is prepared to receive air or maritime shipments at Corinto or Puerto Sandino. There is an intact transportation network, the hub of which is the capital city of Managua, from which the food will be distributed throughout the nation.

In Kampuchea, distribution must go through the Heng Samrin government, which controls virtually the entire country.

#### Marginal Aid Efforts to Date

Only marginal food aid has been received from Western government or private sources by either Nicaragua or Kampuchea to date. In Nicaragua's case, the aid received has been principally supplied by the Agency for International Development—a division of Cyrus Vance's State Department. The AID shipments received in August and September met only about 10 percent of actual needs.

In the case of Kampuchea, the combined UNICEF-Red Cross relief effort has managed to supply but one plane per week of supplies since late July, each planeload bringing in about 40 tons of food—1 percent of the country's emergency food aid requirements. Since the campaign for food aid began, the Red Cross has

come up with plans for an escalated aid program. The plan is described in the Oct. 6 New York Times as a "\$100 million joint appeal for a six-month program of emergency medical and food aid" for Cambodia. The Times emphasizes that the Red Cross's program will also succor "the forces of Iol I 6ot" along the Thai border—the murderers of 3 million Cambodians and the same forces who by deliberately burning Cambodia's crops, created the present starvation.

#### **Huge U.S. Surpluses Available**

For the past several years, the U.S. farm sector—the most productive in the world—has registered record increases in grain surpluses.

The U.S. not only has the food surpluses—foodstuffs which would otherwise rot—but existing federal legislation allows for *grants* of food aid in circumstances of emergency—through Title II of Public Law 480.

The U.S. surplus food situation for products urgently needed by Kampuchea and Nicaragua is as follows;

- *Rice* (needed by both Kampuchea and Nicaragua). U.S. rice surpluses—the rice left over after exports and domestic consumption are satisfied—will be so large at the end of the 1979-80 season that eight months' supply of rice for Nicaragua and one year's supply for Kampuchea would only absorb 13.6 percent of the U.S. rice surplus stocks.

- *Oil*. Nicaragua's needs for eight months' oil would only diminish existing U.S. surplus soybean oil stocks by 11 percent; if corn oil were to be supplied, the diminution of U.S. stocks would be even less.

- *Dried beans (red or black)*. Supplying Nicaraguan requirements for beans with any combination of a dozen or so comparable U.S. varieties would subtract less than 10 percent of 1979-80 U.S. surplus stocks.

- *Flour*. Nicaraguan flour needs will diminish U.S. flour and wheat stocks by only 1-2 percent—even less if other surplus grains are taken into account.

—Richard Shulman

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