

an impending fullscale anti-Khomeini upsurge. *Le Monde* notes that if Azerbaijan blows up it will set off a round of civil unrest in Kurdistan, Baluchistan, Gilan and Khorasan which will encircle Tehran and Qom, the headquarters of Khomeini.

Iran's second most powerful Ayatollah, Shariatmadari, is the religious leader in Azerbaijan and commands a powerful following in other minority regions. Earlier this month, Khomeini put Shariatmadari under house arrest and has forbidden him to leave Qom to return to Tabriz in Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan has historically been a center for Soviet penetration into Iran and with Soviet aid, seceded from Iran following World War II. It is the center for the underground guerilla activities of both the Fedayeen al Khalq and the Mujahadeen al Khalq which, according to Iranian sources, have recently developed indirect relations with the Soviet Union.

## The projected folly of U.S. deployments in the Indian Ocean

by Uwe Parpart

Count Schlieffen, the chief of the German General Staff before World War I, was known to demand of his officers that they strictly adhere to his precept of "mehr sein als scheinen" (to be more than you appear to be). U.S. strategic thinking, judging by the policy statements and proposals of Cyrus Vance and Harold Brown or Henry Kissinger at this point, is committed to exactly the opposite principle: substituting pathetic bluster and "aura of power" for the exercise of real strategic options and the actual deployment of credible force, neither of which are available in the context of present U.S. Middle East policy. Moreover, and perhaps most dangerous, there is the lingering suspicion that neither President Carter nor his national security advisor so-called are fully capable of making the distinction between "sein" and "schein" (reality and appearance).

With the move in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union put in place a strategic counter to the NATO decision to deploy Pershing II missiles in Western Europe and to the apparent U.S. commitment to go all the way with the China card. But at the same time, the massive military incursion into Afghanistan was intended to call the bluff

on U.S. Middle East policy and to deliver a clear warning against the further employment of the illusory "Islamic Card."

After recovering from the first shock over the Soviet move—"The Russians lied to me!"—the Carter administration has now made it clear through its activities and statements of the last week that they fail to understand the full scope of the Soviet warning and intend to deliberately ignore the part that is comprehensible to them.

There is no other explanation of Carter's foolish praise of "Islamic Fundamentalism" over the "evils of atheism," presumably designed to encourage the formation of an Islamic anti-Soviet bloc, and of moves to acquire U.S. military bases on and in the proximity of the Arab Peninsula to sprinkle such an Islamic alliance with reassuring U.S. military presence. Thus teams of Pentagon and State Department experts are touring East Africa and various Arabian countries to find suitable bases.


Mombasa in Kenya, the former Soviet base at Berbera in Somalia, and a once British-owned landing strip on the island of Masirah off the coast of Oman are being inspected, though in no case have any of the target countries so far agreed to receive U.S. facilities and personnel. Also under discussion is the former Israeli Sinai base of Etzion; but this is hushed up, since Anwar Sadat is persona non grata among several of Mr. Carter's desired Islamic fundamentalist allies.

### Reality of Afghan question

Now look at the military strategic realities in this situation, as well as at a significant point of history—the latter first. After a century of confrontation between Czarist Russia and Britain over control of strategically crucial Afghanistan (the *issue* was undisturbed British rule in India), the two powers finally agreed in the early 1920s to treat Afghanistan as an essentially neutral buffer state between Russian and British interests in the area.

The Soviet choice to now seize that buffer state, representing today the same unique strategic values as in the 19th century, was clearly a major strategic move which only a fool would be tempted and preoccupied to counter on a local basis. Indira Gandhi's now openly voiced support for the Soviet operation only makes the U.S. Indian Ocean game so much more ludicrous. Of course, one can in this kind of situation always count on Henry Kissinger to come up with the most manic, outrageous, and provocative proposal—that the United States should demand base rights in Pakistan.

To soberly evaluate the military realities in the Arabian-Indian Ocean theater, it is best to apply another of Count Schlieffen's precepts: in annual maneuvers designed to test the viability of strategic and tactical plan-



ning, and specifically in the attempt to discover any weaknesses in the German battle plan for the Western front, named after him, Schlieffen would always assume command of the enemy armies and try to defeat his own forces. Now consider the present and projected alignment of forces in Brzezinski's "Arc of Crisis" from this standpoint.

In any actual military confrontation and exchange, limited to conventional forces, the U.S. and potential Islamic U.S. allies would be faced with overwhelming and close-range Soviet superiority, and the Soviet commander could hardly avoid the conclusion that the U.S. side must attempt to offset that conventional superiority through the use of tactical nuclear weapons. This anticipation of course would, at the moment U.S. deployment indicated actual major use of force, have to invite a Soviet first strike against the principal areas and bases that could be used against Soviet home territory and strategic assets in the area: the Israeli air force, Chinese nuclear missile concentrations, and precisely those bases the U.S. is now projecting to construct in the area.

At that point, the U.S. has the choice to back down

and accept a major strategic defeat, or be engulfed in World War III. This is the inescapable logic of U.S. intended deployments. The analysis presented should not give the impression that we anticipate Soviet overall acceptance of limited nuclear warfare notions. Rather, the projected Soviet move would be the indicated one in any broader strategic confrontation, and be consistent with it, much as this fact was analyzed by Lyndon LaRouche in his analysis of Soviet options in response to the Chinese invasion of Vietnam last February 17. In fact, any planned or actual flimsy U.S. deployment in the Soviet perimeter allowing the Soviets to use the great logistical advantage of interior lines, must have the same and clearly predictable effect as just outlined.

Truman-style containment was a losing proposition already in the 1950s when the U.S. enjoyed major nuclear-strategic as well as conventional force advantages. For President Carter now to return to Truman's ideas, as he has said he intends to do—the ideas of the President who had the distinction of firing the one post-World War II U.S. general with any broader strategic sense, Douglas MacArthur—is more than ironic. It is suicidal.