

# I. The Trilateraloids speak

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MIYAZAWA

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## *'Sacrifice the interest of your nation-states'*

*The following are excerpts from the speech of Kiichi Miyazawa, delivered before the Trilateral Commission's March 23 London Plenary Meeting. Miyazawa is a former Japanese foreign minister, now a member of the Diet, Japan's parliament.*

This alliance-relationship is presently undergoing a testing period, calling for the mobilization of the wisdom, imagination and skill of the leaders of the industrialized democracies if the alliance is going to maintain its cohesion and vitality. There is obviously no need for me to recount the events and trends of the history of the past three decades during which we have witnessed enormous structural changes of the international community in the political, military and economic fields. We are all aware of the fact that as a result of these changes, we no longer live in a world in which America occupied the dominant position and exercised her leadership in a way befitting her position on such global issues as the security of the free world and the reconstruction and development of the international economy. Gone is the time when America carried almost singlehandedly the burden of responsibility as the leader of the free world because she alone had the power and influence commensurate with such responsibility. Today, with the global diffusion of power, America has lost her once dominant position, though, in relative terms, she is still by far the greatest power among the industrialized democracies and the stronger of the two superpowers. Thus, we are now confronted with a twofold question:

- Have we adjusted our mutual concepts of the alliance relationship to the reality of the new power structure of the world? And

- What are the requirements to make this relationship truly responsive to the needs of the times?

When the alliance relationship between America and her partners was overwhelmingly one-sided, it was America that defined the interests of the alliance and the policies to be pursued. In short, what was good for America was also good for the alliance as a whole. And America's partners concurred in this proposition....

Since then, the power structure of the world has undergone a profound change. The Soviet Union has established herself as one of the two superpowers after two decades of persistent efforts to build up an enormous military might, and there is yet no sign of the Soviet efforts slackening in the near future. Moreover, recent events culminating in the Afghan crisis have demonstrated in no uncertain terms that the Soviet Union continues to pursue an aggressive policy to use her military power, directly if necessary, to expand the area of political influence whenever opportunities present themselves. In the sphere of international economy, the power relations between America and the rest of the world have also changed in a significant way. Among the industrialized democracies, the relative positions of Western Europe and Japan have considerably risen. And the dramatic development in the 1970s, which no one can overlook today, is of course the geometric increase in the power of the OPEC countries.

Chancellor Schmidt of West Germany, during his recent visit to Washington, is reported to have said that it is in America "that there is the greatest reservoir of talent, energy and untapped resources, and this remains the main hope." I believe that all of us here share this recognition with Chancellor Schmidt. Yet, faced with the new power structure of the world, it has become somewhat fashionable these days to talk about "the decline of America." This, it seems to me, is inherently dangerous despite its ostensible innocence of objectivity, for this kind of argument tends to lead us astray by diverting our attention from the real issue. Does "the decline of America" mean that the main hope of the free world, as described by Chancellor Schmidt, is being betrayed? Is

the diffused power structure which we witness today something essentially undesirable? Do we want to see America regain the dominant role she used to play, assuming that is possible? If we look back in perspective at the history of nation states, we will find that there is nothing unusual about our particular state being unable to monopolize the dominating position. Nor is there anything basically undesirable about a diffused structure of power relations among states. The crucial issue is not the power structure as such but whether states can cooperate among themselves to share the responsibility for maintaining a stable political order and for undertaking sound management of the world economy in the absence of a single dominant power. And this is the central question on which the attention of the industrialized democracies must be focused today.

America in the 1970s began to assume a more modest role in global political and economic issues, compared with the role she played in the preceding decades, in order to adapt herself to the new circumstances brought about by the structural change in international power relations. In doing so, it was only natural for America to ask her alliance partners of Western Europe and Japan to take up that part of responsibility which she now felt neither able nor appropriate to shoulder. As America's role diminished, a corresponding increase in the responsibility of the allies became imperative if a drastic change in the existing international order detrimental to our interest was to be avoided. For the allies, however, this was an entirely new kind of challenge which was by no means easy to cope with. I am not so presumptuous as to think that I could speak with any confidence about the European reaction to this challenge. Insofar as the Japanese were concerned, however, they were far from being ready to assume her share of global responsibility. . . . The Japanese have only recently become aware of the fact that a major economic power cannot shun a certain degree of political responsibility. We witness now in Japan a steady growth of public opinion in support of self-defense efforts and our security ties with America. And yet no national consensus exists on the need for a steady and substantial improvement in the nation's defense capabilities. There is still little public awareness that Japan should participate in the concerted efforts of America and her alliance partners to maintain a global military balance in order to defend our basic values.

It takes two to form an alliance. Without mutual commitments to the common objective based on a fair mutual sharing of the common responsibility, no alliance can be effective. The vital importance of this recognition cannot be overemphasized in today's world with its new power structure, for the danger of the alliance relationship among the industrialized democracies in the coming decade is what may be termed as an "imbalance between power and responsibility." If Europe and Japan are

unwilling to share the global responsibility with America in a way commensurate with their respective powers because their conceptual understanding of their own roles remains local or, at best, regional, the alliance will not be able to serve its . . . objective . . . . In this regard, let me briefly quote a distinguished former British diplomat who recently wrote:

... the most disturbing aspect of European attitudes toward the relationship with America was the degree to which American involvement in Europe is taken for granted. . . . There is little appreciation that in the long run the political roots of America's commitment have to be nurtured by a comparable European commitment to collective security, open economic exchange, a cooperative monetary system and some degree of broad understanding of and support for America's global responsibilities.

I can only say that no advice could be more relevant than this observation to current Japan-U.S. relations...the danger of an "imbalance between power and responsibility" may be regarded as real not only across the Pacific but across the Atlantic as well.

The industrialized democracies have accumulated considerable experience over the past two decades in sharing the common responsibility for dealing with the global economic issues of trade, finance, development and energy, though the present state of the world economy acutely reminds us of the need for further efforts in terms of conceptual adjustments, stronger commitments and better coordination. In the political and security fields, however, Europe and Japan have had little experience in undertaking a joint enterprise with America on an issue of global nature until when the armed Soviet intervention in Afghanistan took place. In spite of the fact that the crisis has occurred in a region far away from both Europe and Japan, its geopolitical implications are such that a concerted response of the entire free world is called for. Thus, the Afghanistan problem has turned out to be the first global issue on which the effectiveness of the alliance relationship among the industrialized democracies in the politico-security field is being tested...

Whether or not we succeed in this untried and yet crucial undertaking—that is to say, to initiate concerted efforts to establish an effective political deterrence against a further Soviet expansion into the region where all of us have vital stakes for obvious reasons—will depend, in my view, on four factors.

First is what I have just talked about—namely, the willingness of Western Europe and Japan to perceive the global implications of the Afghanistan issue and to assume accordingly the respective shares of the common global responsibility with America. The European and Japanese responses to the challenge so far have been on the whole encouraging in this respect but not without

some disturbing notes, which probably signify that further conceptual adjustments are required among us.

This leads me in turn to the second factor on which the success of our joint undertaking hinges—that is conscious efforts by the European partners and Japan to redefine what they consider to be their own national interests. Every country, large or small, has its own interests to promote or defend for good and justifiable reasons. And yet, it is also true that there are occasions on which national interests defined solely from the limited viewpoints of the individual countries militate against cooperative action. If the alliance relationship of the industrialized democracies is to be meaningful in relation to global issues, we must surely be ready to redefine our respective national interests in terms of our global responsibility not so much as to have one identical interest, which is beyond the realm of the possible, but as to have mutually compatible interests, under which we can submerge differences of secondary importance for the sake of our common objectives. This, I realize, is by no means easy since it calls for a great deal of skilled political leadership to create domestic support for making immediate and tangible sacrifices in exchange for longer-term gains which are often not apparent. Nevertheless, it must be done if we all agree that we should act together...

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## BERTRAM

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### 'Can the U.S. project its power globally?'

*The following are excerpts from the speech of Christoph Bertram to the Trilateral Commission in London. Bertram is the head of Great Britain's International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a leading agency of the British intelligence services.*

(1) There is no such thing as a global security balance. What we do have is a network of East-West military competitions which are closely intertwined: in the nuclear-strategic field ... in Europe ... in East Asia, and in potential crises points in the Third World.

(2) In the nuclear strategic field, a rough balance of forces in the sense of providing adequate deterrence against major nuclear and conventional attack in vital areas exists....

(3) ... It may well be that in a more distant future the trend toward the vulnerability of all strategic delivery

systems will undermine the periphery of deterrence as we have known it, namely the credibility of extending America's nuclear "guarantee" to allies. But this point has not yet been reached, and there is time to adjust to such change if it were to materialize.

(4) As long as deterrence remains effective, the deficiencies of Western conventional and theatre-nuclear forces can partly be offset. But the strains are already visible: in Europe in the vulnerability of theatre nuclear forces to pre-emptive strikes which has made NATO's modernization decision of last December necessary; in Europe also the manpower and equipment problems of some allied forces, including those of the United States; in the Far East the growing imbalance caused by the increasing Soviet naval investment around Japan. These deficiencies could become even more marked if Third World contingencies require the United States to deploy forces earmarked for Europe or Japan elsewhere.

(5) There is not, and cannot be, a military balance in the sense of mutually offsetting forces in Third World conflict areas. Even if the United States were able—and this remains the most critical element in her long-term interventionary capabilities—to recruit and maintain the personnel needed in order to project military power credibly into the Gulf or South Asia, she could not balance Soviet geographic and infrastructural advantages there, just as the Soviet Union cannot offset the military advantages of the United States in Central America and the Caribbean. Rather than seeking isolated balances of military force or a general stance of military containment of Soviet power wherever it could be used, the deployment of outside military force in distant regions should be defined by the specific task it has to perform.

(6) This task is much more difficult than public discussion sometimes suggests. ... Anyone who has analyzed the problems involved by the attempt to assure the production of oil through military force against a hostile population will, at best, see some value in the threat of occupying oil fields in the Gulf, but very little in the implementation. The effectiveness of outside military force in Third World crises remains highly circumscribed.

(7) This does not mean that it is without effects. These can be to deter a defined, clear-cut military aggression against an ally such as Saudi Arabia; to reassure, through visible security commitments to the leadership of countries in the region; to demonstrate a vital interest to the Soviet Union; to protect personal and physical national assets in case of upheaval and turbulence.

In each case, however, commitments will only be credible if there are the means and the will to back them

up. One means, that of military bases, will be increasingly difficult to obtain. The costs of projecting effective power abroad will thus be higher than it has been in the past. . . .

Given the geostrategic disadvantages of the West, as compared to the Soviet Union, in the Gulf and in South Asia, as well as the potential brittleness of many regimes in the area, commitments, to be credible, cannot be open-ended, and there will be a risk that the demonstration of military force, if not clearly defined in its purpose, can instead, in the event, amount to a demonstration of military impotence.

(8) . . . Military developments can only partially indicate the direction of major trends in international security. . . . What are these trends?


(a) The frequency of conflicts in the Third World is likely to increase, for reasons other than East-West antagonisms; but to what extent will East-West security considerations overshadow these conflicts, and East-West competition be sharpened by them?

(b) The Soviet Union is faced, in the 1980s, with a series of adverse trends: a weak economic base, increased U.S. strategic power, China's development, potential turbulence at its periphery, both in Eastern Europe and along its borders with the Third World. Will she react to this by searching to improve the dividends for her of East-West cooperation, in the economic, technological and arms control fields? Or will she respond by a "fortress Russia" strategy, implying greater rigidity at home and in the socialist camp, a further increase in the emphasis on military power to shore up her expansive notion of national security, an exploitation of Third World crises to damage the Western interests and of gaps in Western cohesion by seeking to separate America from her allies through pressure and promises?

(c) The United States seem to have found a new consensus for their international role in the 1980s, emphasizing military effort, assertiveness and nationalism, even if it means of usable military power—i.e., conventional forces—will take time to bring up to the state required by this new mood. But how durable is this consensus? How will it affect relations with the Soviet Union and with America's allies?

(d) America's allies—in Europe and in the Far East—still seem to be ill-prepared for the change that America's new stance implies for the respective alliances. Will Western European governments and Japan respond by taking a more active role—politically and, perhaps, militarily—in shoring up the alliance, or will they instead pursue, in their turn, more nationalistic policies too?

## II. The chosen



### MIDDLE EAST

## *Igniting Iran to blackmail Europe*

by Robert Dreyfuss

The April 7 announcement that the United States will launch economic and political sanctions against Iran, although those sanctions will have virtually no effect in Iran itself, is meant to serve as a critical test of whether or not Western Europe and Japan will abandon their independent policy initiatives and agree to return to the Anglo-American NATO umbrella. Should the Europeans and Japanese, who have already indicated repeatedly that they think the Carter Administration is "incalculable" and unreliable as a partner, refuse to join the American-sponsored confrontation with Iran, Washington has indicated that it is fully prepared to launch unilateral military action in the Persian Gulf that would cut off the supply of oil to European and Japanese industry.

In other words, the Carter administration is engaged in the crudest sort of blackmail in regard to its nominal allies.

To understand the dimensions of the present crisis, it