

televised interview, Brzezinski asserted that "there are reports, credible reports, of a Soviet buildup in the Transcaucasian Military District" north of Iran that, he said, were "in some patterns reminiscent of the Soviet buildup north of Afghanistan" last December, before the Soviet intervention there.

Yet, according to Washington analysts, the United States has set a May 11 deadline for European compliance with U.S. demands for sanctions and breaking diplomatic relations with Iran. Otherwise, reports the Boston Globe, Carter is ready to order a naval blockade of Iran, halting vessels coming from or going to Iranian ports in the Arabian Sea. Such action would be ordered despite the urgent danger that the Soviet Union would attempt to break the cordon sanitaire by sailing a cargo ship toward Iran.

At the same time, American officials began an unending stream of invective and rough language concerning Europe's alleged refusal to live up to its commitments as part of the Atlantic Alliance. President Carter, speaking to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, issued a virtual ultimatum to Europe and Japan: "I expect them to comply with the political and economic sanctions against Iran," said Carter, adding that otherwise the U.S. response "may well involve military means."

The following day, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced on the ABC-TV "Issues and Answers" that regarding Europe, "Washington is looking for action, not words." Also on April 13, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Frank Church attacked Europe for what he called its "policy of appeasement."

In Europe, Undersecretary of Defense Robert W. Komer, the administrator of the Phoenix Project during the Vietnam War, met with the NATO Military Committee in Brussels to present a brutal set of demands. He requested the immediate acceleration of nuclear and conventional weapons "modernization," the buildup of military reserves, war materiel stockpiling, and NATO rights to requisition the capacity of West European commercial airlines for military airlifts in the Middle East.

The Soviet Union responded with some pressure of its own on Europe. On April 15, President Brezhnev issued an urgent personal invitation to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany to visit Moscow, an offer that was merely taken under consideration "depending on the climate of East-West relations." The same day, the Soviet Ambassador to Paris Stepan V. Chervonenko, speaking to the Diplomatic Academy in Paris, broke tradition and delivered a harsh speech in Russian, charging that the "brutal hardening" of American policy had collapsed the basis for arms limitation talks in Europe.

And on April 22, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko

arrives in Paris. According to Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Trilateral Commission member and Kissinger protege, the Soviet Union has placed a "precondition" over talks with Western Europe to stabilize the Gulf situation: "The Europeans have to lobby in Washington to get the Americans not to escalate militarily in the region."

But the consecutive visits of Egypt's Anwar Sadat and then Israel's Menachem Begin to Washington underscored the American commitment to make matters worse. Both Israel and Egypt are viewed as the cornerstones of a new, NATO-style Middle East pact that would have as its first task the implanting of a permanent U.S. military presence in the area. Sadat, just before he left, told an interviewer that he would be happy to offer the U.S. facilities for direct intervention into the Gulf. The small Gulf states like Kuwait and Bahrain, along with Saudi Arabia, "are shaking," said Sadat. As he spoke, the commander of the U.S. Air Force General Lew Allen was reviewing facilities in Egypt on a tour of the Middle East.

West Germany pressured to join in war policy

by Rachel Douglas

The Carter administration and the supranational institutions that control it are sparing no effort to press West Germany into line with their policies. The immediate issue is whether Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's government will join Carter in economic sanctions against Iran; but what is at stake is the survival of the Franco-German alliance for economic recovery and preserving peace.

Despite the fact that West Germany's leaders know, and have said, that the world is now on the very brink of World War III, thanks to the Carter administration's conduct of foreign policy, they appear to be yielding to the extreme pressure. Despite the fact that the Germans were shocked and outraged at Carter's latest ultimatum to them on boycotting Iran, delivered this past weekend through the undiplomatic channel of a TV interview, leaders of Schmidt's own party are reportedly calling German participation in the sanctions "inevitable."

Two days ago Handelsblatt newspaper, the mouthpiece of German industry, leveled an unprecedentedly blunt editorial attack on Washington's failure of leadership and declared that the Bonn government will not growl on command like a dog at an obedience school.

But the West Germans are being brought to heel behind what Handelsblatt scored as "dilettantism" contributing to a "security risk."

In the United States, the press of the Council on Foreign Relations-centered "Eastern establishment" has targeted Schmidt as the weak link in continental Europe's resistance to Carter's policies, especially now that Italy is under the thumb of a new government that is congenial to Washington and London. A series of editorials such as "What Is An Ally?" (*Washington Post*, April 11) and "Allies Are What Allies Do" (*New York Times*, April 13) put Schmidt on notice that, even if he wished to sit tight while Carter's overseas endeavors played themselves out, he would not be allowed to.

An inside-outside job

West Germany is a bullseye for Washington and London because, with France, it is a founder of the European Monetary System, the institution for financial stabilization and potentially a global trade and development-based economic recovery. Without Germany, they surmise, the French will be isolated and ineffective.

In an April 13 column on the European community's declining to go along with Carter's sanctions against Iran, the *New York Times'* Tom Wicker specified, "Chancellor Helmut Schmidt appears to be the key to the case, not only because his nation is the most powerful of the allies, but because he also seems the most inclined to take action." Schmidt should be privately "brought around," then turned loose on France, concluded Wicker.

The operation to bring Schmidt around—or down—is a classic inside-outside job. The external leverage is straightforward: if, failing European endorsement of the sanctions, the U.S. went ahead with unilateral military blockade of Iran, West Germany would face a cutoff in its oil supplies from Iran just as certainly as it would by applying sanctions.

The inside effort aims to topple Schmidt's government. For this purpose, an Anglo-American fifth column consisting of the environmentalist "greenies," opposition candidate Franz Josef Strauss, and Schmidt's own coalition partner, the Free Democratic Party.

The FDP, whose tiny number of seats in parliament is the margin for the government majority, is functioning as a lever of influence and blackmail against Schmidt. His Foreign Minister, FDP leader Hans-Dietrich Genscher, is always the first to second the latest demands from Washington that are couched as a requirement for "Atlantic solidarity." The threat of FDP withdrawal from the government, to ally instead with the Christian Union opposition parties, is always implicit.

Tomorrow a meeting of the elite Bilderberg Club will convene in the West German city of Aachen. Fully one-

fourth of its 20 German participants will be FDP executive committee members. Furthermore, as the Bilderberg conspiratorial group will elevate its first new president in 20 years: Walter Scheel of the FDP.

Strauss, who had a glowing reception from Carter and elite policymakers in Washington last month, has gone on the offensive against Schmidt. Seizing on Schmidt's warnings about the world moving inexorably towards war, Strauss accused Schmidt of playing "a pitiful game mixed of megalomania and irresponsibility," preparing to take West Germany out of NATO, and forcing the country to choose either "war or total capitulation."

Helmut Kohl, the Christian Democrat leader, told his party's presidium that Schmidt was to blame for "drastic deterioration" in relations between Bonn and Washington.

'Germany is not America's shepherd dog'

The West German business daily Handelsblatt published the following editorial on April 14. It was headlined: "Europe and the U.S.A.—Entente Triste."

Often enough, history takes place across the back doorstep. Contrary to the materialist historical conceptions of the communists, it takes place because a German Kaiser insists on imposing a "bodyguard" spirit on politics; or because a Bohemian corporal becomes a megalomaniac; or because an American president was a gentleman who had hooligans for alliance partners and they remained loyal to him even after victory was achieved.

Wars are tragic, when they happen, especially when it is because people's leaders were schizoid, criminal or merely naive. The world is in a crisis today because a Persian scholar who was born at least 1,000 years too late wants to make the Koran the rule book for a people. It is also in crisis because a Red Czar in Moscow believes he has the right to domesticate a free people with helicopters and tanks. But it is also in crisis because an unfortunate constellation of personnel in the Western world has prevented the formation of an entente cordiale to respond to these events.

To put the matter most clearly: the security risk to us all is immense indeed, when the American President, Carter, who never knows whether he would rather be a Methodist preacher or a bulldog, deals with his alliance partners in ultimata, as happened this weekend, and

when such an ultimatum is even delivered via a press interview.

That is a bit too much diletantism. In 1980, telephone calls can be patched through at the speed of light. If Carter thinks he has to deliver an ultimatum to the Federal Republic through a press conference, specifying that the Federal Republic is supposed to act the way the U.S.A. wants it to act within a certain time span, this is a policy which would lead to dismissal in any international company.

It is naturally the duty of the Germans to represent American interests without reservations and, more to the point and in the interest of the hostages in Iran, without any "ifs" or "buts." Naturally, too, the Federal Republic must reject invasions like that of the Russians into Afghanistan in its own interests, even at the expense of its idea—or *idée fixe*?—of an understanding between East and West. But since such a policy signifies increased risk for the Federal Republic, its government should at least be able to expect that these risks be calculable. The government is not a German Shepherd dog which bares its teeth on the command of "sic 'em." One must convince the government that a concept is rational. An ultimatum is not persuasion. Helmut Schmidt is right: the leading powers of the East and the West are presently sailing without a compass. There is a great danger that they will run aground.

Schmidt: 'superpowers are moving toward war'

What follows are excerpts from West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's April 11 address to a Hamburg conference of his Social Democratic Party.

Policy concerns over world peace make it difficult for me to concentrate on the electoral race. Unlike the situation in the summer of 1914 that led to the First World War, today the military no longer plays a decisive role. Yet military doctrine continues to have great significance, especially for the Soviet Union.

We have four spheres of crisis to contend with: the Mideast, the hostage seizure in Teheran, the continuing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and the danger of a gigantic arms race stemming from the failure to ratify SALT II and the Soviet refusal to negotiate on medium-term missiles. Neither world power wants war; on both sides, however, there exists no adequate war-prevention

strategy, and both sides speak with insufficient frequency about their basic goals and interests....

We have abstained from military action. For a long time, however, we have declared our readiness to participate in economic sanctions on a European-wide basis, with the qualification that we do not consider them practical. Since this is a matter of American hostages, however, this must be an American decision....

The interests of the Soviet Union must also be taken into consideration in this situation. Only once, and that was three months ago, has the Soviet Union called for the freeing of the hostages. I deeply feel that this is insufficient. I believe that the Soviet Union is holding open the possibility of its military intervention, especially in the event that the United States becomes militarily active. The Afghan occupation has considerably improved the Soviets' position for such an intervention. For its part, the Soviet Union must hope that Iran seeks to align itself with the U.S.S.R. Europe's interests are above all to preserve peace and the system of international law, and naturally we also have an interest in the continued flow of oil supplies. And our vital interests in the alliance require solidarity with the United States even if the economic damage is greater for ourselves than for others....

Afghanistan neutrality

If the U.S.S.R. was compelled by its own security requirements to invade Afghanistan, at the very least this was a strong exaggeration of its own security needs. If they believed that the world would accept this as a move internal to the Soviet sphere of influence, this has proven a dangerous miscalculation. Assisting a solution to the Afghanistan problem can only involve a combination of diplomatic pressure on the Soviet Union, measures which the Soviets consider face-saving, steps guaranteeing the justified security interests of the U.S.S.R. This is the background for the European Community states' proposal to guarantee the neutrality, independence, and integrity of Afghanistan. I do not expect too much from the concept of neutralization, because it is impossible to enforce neutrality from the outside.

I read a few days ago in the widely circulated American foreign policy journal *Foreign Affairs*, one scholar comparing today's situation with the situation in 1914. This comparison is not far-fetched. In 1914, too, none of the involved powers wanted a world war. Although then events took only a few months to develop to the outbreak of war, nobody should be confused today just because the process is slower. ... As Defense Minister Apel has said, "From which cannons do we shoot once the propaganda guns have used up their ammunition? We do not need a tough, muscle-flexing policy! We are fed up with this."