

ballistic missiles, of the sort necessary to seriously upset parity. This underestimation of Soviet technological advance is discussed in an accompanying article.

Global projection of power

Despite the Carter administration's stated commitment to an arms build-up, the current state of the U.S. economy prohibits simultaneously beefing up the strategic deterrent, creating the new Rapid Deployment Force, and strengthening the general purpose forces to the extent required to actually wage war. Under the CFR's "controlled disintegration" of the world economy, not even outright Nazi-style austerity conditions could gouge sufficient funds out of the shrinking civilian economy to make such an all-around build-up possible. Therefore the administration is focusing on the global projection of power, while in-depth war-fighting capabilities continue to erode.

The most striking new item in the proposed defense budget is the funding of the first phase of a \$10 billion Rapid Deployment Force program, to make available 100,000 men for rapid dispatch outside the NATO area.

Brown threatens our "cavalier" NATO allies that they must gear up their economies for military production to fill the gap in general-purpose forces which the U.S. is unable to fill. The Carter administration is demanding that West Germany increase its role in patrolling the North Atlantic and other areas within the NATO sphere, so that British and American forces can be deployed "east of Suez." According to Brown:

Because we will bear by far the greatest load in strategic, theater nuclear, naval, and rapid deployment forces, our allies will have to carry the bulk of the burden of needed increases in their own regions. They may well have to increase their efforts by more than the three percent a year pledged by NATO.... (p. 24)

The Soviets continue to produce new tanks, guns, and aircraft at two or three times the rate of the United States. They are investing perhaps twice as much in defense research and development. We must count on our NATO allies to make up many of these differences. (p. 48)

If Washington succeeds in forcing such an arms build-up in Western Europe, it will destroy what remains of Europe's detente relationship with the Soviet Union and its allies. Moscow has hitherto looked to Paris and Bonn as representing virtually the only viable war-avoidance tendencies in the West. If those tendencies are destroyed, the Soviet Union will conclude that general war has become inevitable. It will then seek the best opportunity to launch a first strike; the United States will probably be completely destroyed.

The provisions

What the new spending is for

Defense Secretary Harold Brown's budget statement for Fiscal Year 1981 released on Jan. 29 claims that the budget effects a 4.6 percent real rise in defense spending over the previous year. Two and a half months later, adjusted inflation figures have already reduced the real military "build-up" to something closer to 1 percent.

In a remarkable sleight-of-hand, the administration early this month cut \$82 million from the FY 1980 budget, so as to be able to fulfill the obligation, undertaken by all NATO member countries, of showing a 3 percent real annual increase in defense spending from FY 1980 to FY 1981.

What effect will the new budget have on U.S. combat readiness? We review each of the key program categories, assessing the impact of major new programs.

Research and Development. Despite the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that "special emphasis be placed on revolutionary technological opportunities to harness the innovative spirit and capabilities of the American people," (*Military Posture for FY 1981*) R&D has for years been the "poor man" of the DOD budget. During the 1965-75 period, the overall research budget fell by nearly 50 percent in constant dollars. Since then it has risen by about 1 percent per year.

Meanwhile the Soviet Union spends at least twice as much as the U.S. military on research and development, and has more than double the number of scientists and engineers involved in research activity.

There is one technology which could revolutionize the military balance in much the same way the nuclear-tipped ICBM did 25 years ago, and that is the directed energy beam weapon. This device, if perfected, would be capable of directing intense energy (either laser energy or subatomic particles) in a beam travelling at or near the speed of light, capable of destroying an incoming missile or plane. Fired either from a satellite or from an

earth-based battery, the beam weapon is the first possibility for a true defense against the ICBM.

Numerous informed sources have reported in recent months that the Soviet Union is within 12 to 18 months of *deploying* such a weapon which, the DOD believes, would not be needed before the 1990s, if it could be developed at all. Harold Brown in his FY 1981 report is hardly optimistic:

Although the Soviets may be investigating the application of high-energy lasers and even charged particle beams to ABM defenses, severe technical obstacles remain in the way of converting this technology into a weapon system that would have any practical capability against ballistic missiles. We still have no evidence, moreover, that the Soviets have devised a way, even conceptually, to eliminate these obstacles.

Surely the Soviet testing earlier this month of a "killer satellite," following a two-year moratorium on launching antisatellite weapons, would give the Pentagon grounds for a reassessment. The Soviets also began quietly removing the ABM system around the city of Moscow this month, with no indication of what they intend to replace it with.

The strategic triad

Secretary Brown believes that U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles are becoming increasingly vulnerable due to the improved reliability and accuracy of Soviet missiles. This means that "for planning purposes... we must assume that the ICBM leg of our TRIAD could be destroyed within a very short time as one result of a Soviet surprise attack."

But from this vantage point of "deterrence" rather than war-fighting, this is not seen as a great problem for the present:

Still, even if the Soviets were able, in a surprise attack in the 1980s, to eliminate most of our ICBMs, all our non-alert bombers, and all our ballistic missile submarines in port, we would still be able to launch several thousand warheads at targets in the Soviet Union in retaliation. ... the United States, in these hypothetical circumstances, could lose an important leg of the TRIAD and a significant but not crippling number of valuable warheads. ... We can live temporarily with the vulnerability of one TRIAD leg, so long as the other two are in good working order. (pp. 85-89)

As we shall see however, two of the three legs of the TRIAD—ICBMs, and strategic bombers—are becoming increasingly vulnerable.

Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The ICBM force currently consists of 450 Minuteman II, 550 Minuteman III, and 54 Titan II missiles. While generally accurate and effective, these weapons are aging while Soviet ICBM capabilities improve. The DOD sees this problem as the most serious deficiency facing U.S. strategic nuclear forces today, and has budgeted \$1.6 billion to develop the MX mobile ICBM. The first test launch is scheduled for Jan. 1983, and the MX will not be fully operable until 1989 at the earliest.

Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Eight new Trident missile submarines have been authorized through FY 1980, and the FY 1981 budget requests \$1.2 billion funding for a ninth sub, along with \$899.8 million for 72 Trident I missiles. Ten obsolete Polaris submarines, built during the late 1950s and early 1960s, will be retired this year and next. This will mean an immediate net decrease of SLBMs from 656 to 544, for an interim period.

Strategic bombers/cruise missiles. The B-52 bomber, now in its third decade of service, is still the major element in the strategic bomber force and is expected to remain so into the next century. In case of a first strike by the Soviets, about 2/3 of the B-52s would be wiped out immediately on the ground, since Strategic Air Command bases are one military target the Soviet Union would definitely hit.

The B-52s are not effective for a U.S. first strike, since they cannot effectively penetrate Soviet air defenses, and were in fact vulnerable to now-obsolete surface-to-air missiles in the Vietnam War. To solve this problem, the DOD is fitting the bombers with cruise missiles that fly below Soviet radar. These would not be effective against a Soviet first strike, since 2/3 of the B-52 forces is on the ground at SAC bases in the United States at any given time, and therefore out of cruise range of Soviet territory.

As a study by the Council on Foreign Relations reports, the cruise is not yet well suited as a first-strike weapon, since it is too slow. "But as cruise missiles become faster, their value as a first-strike weapon will increase, and so widespread deployments of them could ultimately prove destabilizing..." (*Nuclear Weapons and World Politics*, 1977, p. 258).

Contrary to claims that the cruise is highly accurate, the results of their flight tests are very poor. Of the 14 missiles tested to date, fully half were unsuccessful. The targeting system is not effective over flat terrain. And if the Soviets develop an effective look-down radar capability, the cruise will quickly lose its present supposed advantages.

Department of Defense Financial Summary

(millions of FY1981 dollars)

Summary by budget title	Fiscal year						
	1964	1968	1972	1976	1979	1980	1981
Military personnel	39,468	51,897	45,600	37,128	33,520	33,291	33,371
Retired pay	3,681	5,442	7,661	10,696	12,030	12,939	13,736
Operation & maintenance	35,547	54,470	41,847	42,118	44,297	46,877	49,210
Procurement	45,685	58,573	36,496	30,850	36,701	38,655	40,546
Research, development, testing & evaluation	21,441	18,884	14,940	13,899	14,488	14,598	16,543
Special foreign currency program	2,970	---	24	4	16	11	3
Military construction	---	4,048	2,486	3,135	2,952	2,749	3,258
Family housing & homeowners asst. program	1,830	1,591	1,653	2,417	1,844	1,643	2,005
Revolving & management funds				197	118		68
TOTAL—direct program (Total obligational authority)	150,622	194,909	150,709	139,863	145,968	150,490	158,739
Summary by program							
Strategic forces	25,496	18,583	14,098	10,465	9,850	11,750	12,031
General Purpose forces	49,908	79,396	50,367	48,157	55,449	56,104	58,009
Intelligence & communication	13,315	14,409	10,738	9,741	9,427	9,846	10,668
Airlift & sealift	3,162	4,542	2,195	1,843	2,039	2,169	2,288
Guard & reserve forces	5,375	5,660	6,412	7,837	8,144	7,919	8,331
Research & development	14,695	11,102	11,340	12,636	12,651	12,714	14,025
Central supply and maintenance	14,100	21,801	17,066	14,191	15,011	15,634	16,731
Training, medical, other general pers. activity	21,040	31,593	29,940	31,444	30,111	30,996	32,704
Administration and assoc. activ.	3,280	3,221	3,325	3,162	2,746	2,775	2,975
Support of other nations	246	4,651	5,224	385	539	594	977
TOTAL—direct program (Total obligational authority)	150,622	194,909	150,709	139,863	145,968	150,490	158,739

Source: Adapted from Department of Defense Annual Report, FY1981. Totals are not exact due to rounding.

Theater nuclear forces

NATO's decision in Dec. 1979 to produce and deploy the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile in Western Europe is the most significant new development in this area. For the first time, U.S. nuclear missiles in Europe will be in range of the Soviet Union. The FY 1981 budget requests \$146 million for development of the Pershing II and \$187.8 million for the cruise.

The deployment of tactical nuclear missiles within 4 minutes' flight time of Soviet targets is a provocation comparable to the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba—a threat neither superpower can accept.

How will the Soviets respond? A Latin American communist with high connections in Moscow declared after a recent visit there that "the day those missiles are installed in West Germany will be the day that World War III begins." West German political analyst Theo

Sommer, editor of the weekly *Die Zeit*, described in his paper early this month his conversations with Soviet officials in Moscow. The Soviets are determined to catch up, he said. "How they will do this is only hinted at. Perhaps through deploying their own cruise missiles on Soviet ships off the American coast ('Then we would hear the screams'). One probability is the stationing of Soviet medium-range missiles or short-range systems like the SS-21, 22 and 23 on the border of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. ('Then you would only have one minute's warning and we would still have four.')

Tactical air force

The F-15 fighter is the Air Force's lead system for air-to-air combat, and the budget requests \$869.7 million for

30 planes. Additional requests include: \$804 million for 24 Navy F-14s, \$1.9 billion for 180 F-16s, and \$1.75 billion for 48 F-18s. While these production rates are low compared to recent years, the cutbacks in production have raised unit costs so that the price tag remains about the same.

Rep. Jack Edwards (R-Ala.) reports that the tactical air forces today are in a "truly appalling" condition. At the First Tactical Fighter Wing at Langley Air Force Base, only about 30 percent of the F-15s are capable of performing their missions. The remainder are grounded for parts and maintenance.

The Navy's West Coast fighter base at Miramar, California possesses about 110 F-14s. A typical squadron has about 15 F-14s assigned, of which only 5 are classified as mission capable. But because of last minute failures, only 2 to 3 of those would actually be launched. At some fighter bases spare parts are so hard to get that maintenance personnel spend their own money to purchase parts at local electronic supply outlets.

While the Air Force declares that its single most important priority is to improve the ability of its attack aircraft to operate in night/all weather conditions, this is not in fact being done, and only a small number of F-4s and F-111s have this capability.

Ground Forces

As we indicate in the accompanying article, the main portion of the anticipated conventional arms buildup is expected to come from our NATO allies. U.S. efforts concentrate on the XM-1 main battle tank which began to enter the inventory in FY 1980. The FY 1981 budget requests \$1.6 billion to buy 569 of the new tanks. The Army plans to procure 30 per month initially, expanding to 90 per month by FY 1986, until it reaches the initial

operational objective of 7,058 units. The new budget also requests \$538.4 million for 400 armored troop carriers and \$101.1 million for 12,000 TOW anti-tank missiles.

Conventional wisdom in the Pentagon has held that the acknowledged Soviet numerical superiority in armor was more than compensated for by American qualitative superiority. This is no longer the case; in fact top U.S. defense R and D officials now acknowledge that Soviet tanks are far superior. The new Soviet T-80 tank, which is expected to reach the field later this year, will probably be invulnerable to existing U.S. anti-tank weapons. It will be the best tank in the world.

By contrast, the XM-1 has glaring defects. The General Accounting Office produced a study early this year reporting that in Feb. 1979 tests the tank achieved a mean of only 145 miles between failures, as against the 272-mile goal. Problems have developed with the tank's turbine engine and fuel control. The hydraulic system of the gun turret sometimes failed to function properly, so that the crew could not swing the gun into firing position.


Just as significant from the Pentagon's standpoint is that the heavy XM-1 is difficult to transport to remote areas of the world as part of the Rapid Deployment Force concept. Large transport planes are being built for this purpose, but the Army is also considering a shift to light, mobile 16-ton tanks for airlift to the Third World.

Navy

Despite the need for increased naval power to support the Rapid Deployment Force, there will be a decrease in shipbuilding under the proposed FY 1981 budget. The \$6.1 billion shipbuilding request is \$564 million less than last year's program. The number of combatants will drop by 39 ships to a strength of 392. The United States currently maintains only 12 aircraft carriers, compared to 24 in 1964. The Congress may add on additional funds, as the House Armed Services Committee voted March 26 to recommend a \$2.2 billion addition to the shipbuilding program.

Gen. David Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reports that projected naval aircraft procurements are less than half those required even to sustain current force levels. There is a serious lack of skilled personnel, particularly pilots, and the Navy went so far as to take the oiler ship Canisteo out of operation temporarily due to lack of skilled crewmen. "We are approaching the point where we may have no realistic alternative but to consider standing down some ships and aviation units," Admiral Thomas Hayward, chief of naval operations, told the Congress recently.

The fleet is plagued by problems of repair and maintenance, so that only one-fourth of the Navy is deployed overseas at any given time. This means that in the event of war, approximately 3/4 of the Navy would be destroyed in port, without ever firing a shot.



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