

development plans, leading to the onset of a major economic depression in West Germany and Japan. At a single stroke, the European plan to institutionalize some sort of the Trialogue proposal, whereby OPEC would funnel petrodollar holdings through the EMS into Africa and other developing countries, would be wrecked, and the IMF would emerge on top of the ensuing chaos.

Or so London hopes.

But will the Saudis go along? Observers noted recently that just before the arrival of Lord Carrington in Saudi Arabia, the Iraqis initiated a major anti-British propaganda campaign, accusing London of using its Baghdad embassy to subvert the Iraqi state, and accusing Britain of orchestrating the worldwide propaganda campaign aimed at stopping the Iraqi nuclear development program. The Iraqi campaign was aimed as much at the Saudis as it was at the British, in an attempt to dissuade the kingdom from moving too close to the British. But there are signs that the Saudis may be considering going along with at least some part of the British plan, as evidenced by Riyadh's apparent willingness to put forward a plan for indexing oil prices to inflation, as has been rumored in OPEC circles recently.

In fact, despite the shutdown of Iran's enormous production, OPEC still faces a glut of several million barrels of oil per day, and worldwide stocks of oil are overflowing the storage tanks. Thus, the Saudis must consider their own strategy to deal with that glut—including possible production cuts. The problem that the Saudis and OPEC are facing is: Unless they can come up with some strategy for reviving industrial production in the West, and thereby reviving demand for OPEC oil, they will face an increasingly shrinking oil market and fewer and fewer nations capable of supplying them with the industrial technology they need for the era when oil will have run out.

Reportedly, the British are making offers to sweeten the deal as far as the Saudis are concerned. Carrington may have told the Saudis that London can help bring about a change in the Israeli government which would speed the Palestinian autonomy negotiations. But far more important is the club that Carrington is wielding.

The threat of U.S.-NATO military occupation of the Gulf, mentioned as early as 1974 by then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, is now being revived by both the Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan forces in the election campaign, and serious plans are underway to establish a permanent U.S. on-the-ground presence in the Gulf.

With such plans already underway, the danger of Iran-inspired terrorism in Saudi Arabia—possibly in the context of the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca, the *hajj*—and other terrorism by Palestinian radicals or Iranian kooks sponsored by British and Israeli intelligence, is a heavy threat which Carrington and his government can use against Riyadh.

'Resource warfare' and 'recolonization'

by Mark Burdman

Top-level strategists in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and in various strategic planning institutes in Great Britain and Israel have recently made operational a political-military strategy for the conquest and recolonization of the oil-producing regions of the Arabian Gulf.

The prime target in this strategy is Saudi Arabia.

This strategy derives from the increasing hegemony in these planning circles of the geopolitical doctrine of "warfare for control of scarce resources."

This doctrine is the updated version of the concept of warfare-subordinated-to-control-of-resources developed by the East India Company and other British feudal institutions over the past 300 years. Its increasing acceptance in Washington and other Western capitals reflects the extent to which traditionalist-republican military planners have been removed from the NATO chain-of-command over the past decade.

In adopting the strategy that control over Arabian oil requires recolonizing Saudi Arabia and other states, the NATO-centered planners are playing with fire. No sane military strategist believes that substantial military action in Saudi Arabia is possible without provoking either a total shut-off of oil by "anti-Western" terrorists and saboteurs throughout the Gulf or a confrontation with the Soviet Union.

The Gulf area, after all, is not distant from the southern borders of the Soviet Union, and under conditions in which the United States has adopted the PD-59 "limited nuclear warfare" doctrine, the U.S.S.R. will undoubtedly perceive military conquest in the Gulf as part of an effort to establish "forward-defense" nuclear weapons across their southern rim.

The NATO strategists think they can pursue this "nuclear encirclement" policy without penalty *now* because they claim that they have the Soviets "off-balance" and "on the defensive" because of developments in Poland.

This is a drastic miscalculation. Soviet restraint vis-à-vis Poland has everything to do with the nearness of the West German federal elections, since the Soviets are eager to pursue détente policies with the government of

Helmut Schmidt and not aid the campaign of Bavarian Franz-Josef Strauss. Once the early-October date for the West German elections has passed, all NATO's bets on Soviet "restraint" in respect to Poland are off.

Furthermore, the NATO recolonization strategy will at a minimum strengthen the hand within the Warsaw Pact of the "national liberation front" radicals associated with British operative General Kim Philby, and thus hasten the likelihood of a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation over Saudi Arabia.

Given these evident realities, one might reasonably ask: have the geopoliticians determined that the Saudi Arabian government's increasingly Europe-centered oil and financial policy has become so threatening to Anglo-American influence in the Western alliance that the flow of Arabian Gulf oil must be shut down altogether?

A Sept. 5 op-ed in the *Jerusalem Post* by Washington correspondent Wolf Blitzer provides a blunt expression of how the Saudis and other oil-producers are being targeted. In his piece, Blitzer claimed that the scenario to invade the oil fields outlined by Johns Hopkins University strategist Robert Tucker in 1975 is becoming increasingly popular in Washington.

In an interview following the appearance of the Blitzer piece, Tucker asserted that his ultimate aim was indeed the "recolonization" of the Gulf.

A similar thesis is being propounded by several Israeli strategists. The Tel Aviv Center for Strategic Studies, a sister-institute to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), has recently circulated a policy document outlining how and why the U.S. must establish a significant ground-force presence in the Middle East.

One Israeli-born strategist (and adviser to the Reagan-for-President campaign) Amos Perlmutter of American University in Washington, D.C., recently espoused the same thesis in blunt language during a background briefing.

Perlmutter asserted:

An American interventionist force has to be created, *not* a surrogate. An American force should make use of the airfields in the Sinai being vacated by Israel, which should now go to America, and not to Egypt. The U.S. should also use Ras Banas on the Egyptian border with Sudan; Kenya; areas in the Indian Ocean theatre; and Oman, which needs support badly. What I am talking about is an American expeditionary force, a naval force, and an air force.

The U.S. has built 30 airfields in Saudi Arabia, and the Saudis only really need one or two, the others are just there because of recycling of petrodollars. America should just take over the rest. It should give Saudi Arabia an ultimatum: "*We're*

concerned with the Soviet threats, and we don't really care what you think."

The Saudi regime will fall, there are many threats facing it. The situation there is plainly untenable. Anything can happen there: two years from now or tomorrow.

Therefore, the U.S. must give the Saudis an ultimatum; it's in America's interest for God's sake. The U.S. should say, "Too bad, you don't like it, we're taking over."

Major conferences have been held during the month of September to elaborate the more comprehensive doctrine of how NATO can be extended into the Third World and how a military build-up in the Gulf can be achieved.

One such conference, held from Sept. 11-14 in Stresa outside Milan, Italy, under the auspices of the IISS, dealt with Third World conflicts and superpower relations and included speeches entitled "Sources of Third World Conflict" and "Third World Conflict and International Security." From several discussions, *EIR* correspondents gleaned that a major concern was "conflicts in the oil-producing areas, such as the Iraq-Iran war and others possibly involving Saudi Arabia."

One speaker, James R. Schlesinger, former U.S. energy secretary and defense secretary and a known advocate of "limited nuclear wars" in Third World "theaters," criticized U.S. failure to create a "necessary base structure to exercise its military power worldwide." This has created a "potential for conflagration" in the oil-producing regions. "The military forces presently and prospectively in place in the region are not sufficient by themselves adequately to constrain Soviet moves," Schlesinger stated.

From Sept. 3-5, the NATO-associated Atlantic Treaty Association held a conference in Madeira, an island off Portugal, again on crises in the Third World and on extending NATO's dominion into the oil-producing regions. One conference speaker, Belgium's General Robert Close, advocated the creation of a European "rapid deployment force" modeled after and integrated with the "rapid deployment force" of the Carter administration. A Johns Hopkins University colleague of Tucker's, Dean Robert Osgood, followed Close by itemizing the several potential triggers or flashpoints that necessitated the immediate development of such a force. According to Osgood, these flashpoints could include a coup in Saudi Arabia, the unification of the two Yemens, new outbreaks of rebellions in Oman, the assassination of Anwar Sadat in Egypt, or civil war in Turkey.

One conference participant, Francis Wilcox of the Atlantic Council in Washington, recounted afterward that the Close proposal was "heatedly discussed." The "breakthrough" in the discussion, Wilcox asserted, "was that it was being seriously thought about and discussed

at all. Some delegates particularly from France and West Germany, were reticent about the idea of extending NATO in this way outside of the juridical NATO arena, so they proposed instead strengthening European capacity to act on the European continent. By sharing the burden in this way, certain pressures could be relieved on the U.S., which would then be able to divert forces to the Middle East.”

Wilcox revealed that one substantive strategic reality was accomplished at the Madeira conference: the “greater role charted out for Portugal in NATO.” Wilcox noted that the conference was attended by the Portuguese Defense Minister, Foreign Minister, Prime Minister, and Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “This helped to develop the strategic triangle of Madeira, the Azores, and Portugal. Because of this meeting, it is now likely that the Portuguese will grant Azores facilities to the U.S. for action in the Middle East.”

If so, this could be a breakthrough for the conceptual architect of the American RDF strategy, Undersecretary of Defense Robert Komer. Throughout the year, Komer has been making a series of jaunts to Europe to armtwist the Europeans into integrating their planning into his RDF. He has met consistent opposition from the French, Germans, and others—but not from the British nor the Italians.

A protégé of the British geopoliticians, Komer has scored his greatest successes in Britain. In recent weeks, the British have granted base facility rights to the United States on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia. Also, in exchange for gaining access to the technology of the American Trident submarine, the British have agreed to form a structure in the United Kingdom parallel to and integrated with the American RDF.

Thirdly, the British have reportedly begun to step up activity at the base of Akotiri on the island of Cyprus. According to Cypriot sources, these expanded activities are geared to intervention either in Iran or in the Arabian Gulf.

Facilities, airbases and ground forces

In Italy, a transformation has developed in strategic orientation, under the guidance of Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga and Defense Minister Lelio Lagorio, the latter a favored protégé of Italy’s vice regent, U.S. Ambassador Richard Gardner. These men are now evolving a “southern-directed” military perspective, centered around deployment into the Mediterranean, but also into the Gulf. The test-case for this new strategy is Malta, where the Italians are now emerging as the “protectors” of the Mediterranean island against the timely incursions and provocations of Libya’s Colonel Qaddafi. The set-up in this is that Qaddafi is a pawn of the same Italian “black nobility” families who control the Cossiga-Lagoria government!

The pressure on Europe to incorporate its thinking into the RDF configuration is an important but subsidiary preoccupation of the Komer crowd in the Carter administration. Their primary idea is to build up a capability for the projection of American units into the Gulf arena, by gaining rights for “facilities” in the Mediterranean-Indian Ocean theater that can be used as supply-logistics “pre-positions” for “rapid deployment forces” based in “over-the-horizon” locations in North America and elsewhere.

The strange military strategy behind this is the *threat* of preemptively injecting minimal ground forces into the area, with the included intent (or bluff) of escalating to the nuclear level if American ground units are challenged by the Soviets.

As many commentators have pointed out, this is a relatively useless strategy in comparison to the massive throw-weight the Soviets are able to bring to bear in the Middle East. Hence, it is clear that the RDF is only a first step—a stalling action—on the road to the direct emplacement of American interventionist units in the region.

In the viewpoint of Komer, the process of installing a major American military presence will take place during a 2-4 year period. In the interim, an aura of “credible threats” must be maintained, to up the black-mail pressure on the Saudis and their neighbors.

To implement this perspective, the Carter administration is working on several tiers at once.


Most immediately, to establish the RDF “pre-position” capabilities, the administration has won facilities in Ras Banas in southern Egypt; in Berbera in Somalia; in Kenya; in Oman; and in the British-run base of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

At the same time, the administration is negotiating for usage of airbase capabilities at Ras Banas, at the Etzion base being evacuated by Israel in the Sinai, and possibly at the Ovda base in Israel’s Negev region. “All these bases are Saudi-directed,” an Arab diplomatic source commented. “Because of them, the Saudis feel claustrophobic, surrounded.”

On a third tier, the administration has begun to place ground forces in the region; 1,800 Marines were deployed last month to the Gulf of Oman right off the coast of Iran, not far from the U.S. Arabian Sea fleet which has been substantially built up by the administration.

The administration is also on the verge of airlifting 2,000 soldiers to Egypt “to hold major military exercises . . . to test the abilities of a rapid intervention force the U.S. decided to set up,” according to a Sept. 12 Agence France Presse dispatch from Washington. AFP claimed that in early December “2,000 parachutists and other combat units would be flown to Egypt’s Ras Banas air base on the Red Sea.” This is only the first step, AFP

U.S. military facilities and air base rights in the Middle East and Persian Gulf



affirmed: the U.S. wants to “modernize the Ras Banas military airport, so that a U.S. army division—16,000 strong—could be encamped there.”

According to a related Sept. 12 *New York Times* dispatch, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat is “determined to assist the U.S. in increasing its military presence in the Middle East.”

A strategy in search of a pretext

As the military pieces of the resource-warfare strategy begin to fall into place, London-centered NATO planners are increasingly seeking a pretext either to move troops into the Gulf unsolicited or to force the Gulf countries to do the soliciting. Recolonization and protection racket are almost synonymous under this scheme.

With the Saudis the key target in this game, the Iranians are the convenient bogeyman in the arsenal of the Anglo-Americans.

According to reliable intelligence estimates, the Khomeini regime is intended to send agents-provocateur into Saudi Arabia during the October *hajj*, or pilgrimage to Mecca, to try to carry out a more dangerous re-run of last year’s takeover of the Mecca mosque. For weeks, the Iranians have been broadcasting vitriolic anti-Saudi propaganda, calling on the population in Saudi Arabia to rebel against the government and labelling the Saudis’ oil-production policy “imperialist.”

Israel’s Mossad and agents of British intelligence are reportedly busily at work building opposition net-

works inside Saudi Arabia. According to one well-informed Lebanese source, the Mossad intends to “manufacture a seemingly pro-Soviet coup attempt, which would force the current regime to call in American assistance to crush the rebels.” Amos Perlmutter, who maintains close relations with the Mossad, admitted that the agency “maintains contacts with the opposition in Saudi Arabia.”

Perlmutter then recited a litany of potential problems facing the Saudi regime to prove that a U.S. presence there was required. Among others, Perlmutter pinpointed “the fifth column of Yemeni workers”; the “fight between the primitive, conservative base of society and the whiskey-drinkers like Yamani”; “fights within the dynasty”; “the 100,000 Saudis all over the world who are being trained abroad and don’t want to go back to the camels”; and “dissident elements in the Saudi National Guard.”

The British, who control many of the tribal networks in Saudi Arabia, are offering the Saudis “protection” against the “hordes.” This was the evident purpose of Foreign Minister Carrington’s trip to the region. Since Carrington’s mid-August visit, persistent rumors have developed that the Saudis have accepted a full Pakistani division within their borders to provide security. If this proves to be true, this would be the first time ever that the Saudis had admitted foreign troops. It would also be a major coup for the Anglo-Americans, since the Zia regime in Pakistan is the most persistent advocate of forming a regional anti-Soviet “Islamic Pact” allied to the Red Chinese. Zia has also been given a cover to sidle up to the Saudis by the Iranians, who have persistently attacked him as an American imperialist agent. Zia attributes these attacks to “communists in the Iranian media,” as distinct from the Iranian mullahs who would be willing to make a deal with Pakistan.

‘Thinking the unthinkable: invading the oilfields’

In a Sept. 5 feature in the Jerusalem Post entitled “Crude Threats,” Post Washington correspondent Wolf Blitzer reports on the growing mood in Washington in favor of military action against the oil-producing countries.

Blitzer begins his piece by noting that “oil experts here in Washington are predicting . . . a global financial crisis, of catastrophic proportions within the next five years” resulting from “the continued, unprecedented transfer of wealth from the oil-importing to the oil-exporting countries.” He quotes from a recent article appearing in Foreign Affairs, the house organ of the New York Council on Foreign Relations, authored by Walter J. Levy, the favored oil analyst of the CFR, the Trilateral Commission and the Bilderberg Society: “We will probably be confronted by a series of major oil crises which might take any or all of several forms: fighting for control over oil resources among importing countries or between the superpowers; an economic-financial crisis in importing countries; regional conflicts affecting the oil-producing area; or internal revolutions or other upheavals in the Middle East.”

Excerpts from the remainder of his piece follow.

. . . America’s weakness and decline have been advertised to the entire world—merely emboldening OPEC to pursue its policies of creeping strangulation of the West.

“We’re heading for the greatest smash in history,” one American expert told me during a recent interview. The official, not known for hyperbole, lamented the fact that none of the candidates was really facing up to the situation. Like others in sensitive positions in and out of government, this official is privately beginning to “think the unthinkable”—a reference to Prof. Robert Tucker’s controversial article five years ago in *Commentary* magazine (“Oil: The Issue of American Intervention”). Tucker, who teaches at Johns Hopkins University, suggested that the U.S. consider military moves to take over the oil fields in the Persian Gulf, if necessary, to avert the looming crisis now facing the West.

“Tucker may have been right all along,” the official said, explaining that even a credible threat to use force would probably have been enough to check the successive oil price increases that followed the first one in 1973. . . .

Quietly and without much fanfare, some respected Washington insiders are letting it be known that breaking OPEC and its stranglehold on the West is now, more than ever, the single most important chore of the day. Levy senses that it may already be too late, but others, including Prof. Tucker, disagree. The only way to resolve the crisis, they suggest, is to have determined, consistent leadership—beginning right after the elections.

Specifically, these critics are proposing that the U.S. beef up its air, naval and ground presence in the Middle East, starting with the actual takeover of the soon-to-be evacuated Israeli air base in Sinai. . . .

The British are also probing among certain of Saudi Arabia's neighbors, such as Bahrain and Kuwait, to see if the regimes there will accept British "protection" against internal rebels and dissidents. Both Bahrain and Kuwait have been hit with increasing internal unrest, largely from Iran-run rebels, during the past two months.

On Sept. 15, Bahrain's Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa Bin Salman Khalifa arrived in London for a two-day official visit with Prime Minister Thatcher and Lord Carrington. According to AFP, citing British sources, "the military situation in the Gulf" was one of the subjects being discussed.

'We're talking of recolonization'

Professor Robert Tucker, the author of the 1975 Commentary magazine article calling for a military takeover of the Gulf oilfields, recently offered his assessment on the current Arabian Gulf situation from his post at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland. This assessment, presented to a journalist who made it available to EIR, locates the invade-the-Gulf concept within the more comprehensive scheme of recolonizing the oil-rich region.

The *real* calculation involved in the question of the Gulf area is that the Saudi regime, according to all accounts, is growing more unstable; the only thing there is some dispute about is the extent, the growth of the instability. If this instability gets to a point where the regime is in jeopardy, what would we do? Would we have the ability to move in and do something? Right now, I doubt it.

The bottom line is that we need a ground presence in the Middle East Gulf area. The most likely spot for this is Egypt. We should give much more serious thought to the Sinai base. The best thing for us is if we could move into Saudi Arabia directly with a base so that we could breathe easier and be prepared to directly intervene if there is a coup, while at the same time having an on-site deterrence capability against the Soviet Union. . . .

The regime will fall some time between now and the next five years. There's a consensus on that in Washington, among the sources I'm privy to. They'll be destabilized by all kinds of things: there are gigantic fissures, groups in conflict, on a collision course. The collision course is even in the armed forces: the National Guard against the Army. The large foreign labor force is per-

manently disaffected. And the Palestinians are a source of discontent. More generally, the regime is losing its legitimacy by the way it's behaved. There is growing hatred for the corruption of the monarchy among various layers: the middle ranks of the bureaucracy, the technocratic elite, among traditional Islamic layers, and so on. . . .

We've in reality been in confrontation with OPEC for five years. But we've not decided on war with OPEC, even though it's obvious what we have to do. There must be a political-military confrontation. Not over price of oil but over *access* to oil. We must build up our military posture. We must give the Soviets extreme pause. We must show them that we can easily escalate the situation, and that it's not in their interest to mess around. Once there have been positive changes in our *position*, we can deal in a firmer way with the OPEC countries. If OPEC under the new conditions were to raise prices in a way similar to what they did in 1979, then I'd say, "No!" and I would resort to all kinds of pressures on the Arab states, not just using the food weapon. I'd make clear that no regime is sacrosanct, that I don't care about any of the regimes of the Gulf, I just care about access to oil. Once we have the access, the regimes are expendable. I don't care about them. Making that attitude clear to the OPEC countries would be a considerable threat to them. . . .

Once we deal with the problem of *physical access*, we can deal with the problem of pricing. The problem of pricing comes from the liquidation of the Western position in the region since 1969. . . .

A Mideast NATO and recolonization

Acquiring facilities is fine as a first step, and I applaud the Carter administration for that. I'm only concerned with what they *haven't* done. They've neglected the *supreme* importance of naval presence in the Arabian Sea. We need a Middle East version of NATO, but not *with* the states of the region but rather enacted by ourselves in terms of level of commitment to the region. In the next 4-5 years, we must improve our strength in that area considerably. We can't bring the states of that region into a stable alliance; this region will be unstable for as long as we can see.

So, precisely what I am talking about, the most exact way of putting it, is that the Middle East oil regions must be recolonized. That's what I mean, if you take some of the discretion away. You can put any kind of shading you want on the word, but that's what it is we're talking about. A blind man knows that a critical area cannot be allowed to go its own way. It's madness to ever liquidate a power-position as important as the Middle East. The converse is obviously also true as well; the area has to go through a process of recolonization.