

ties in the sort of crash construction programs used by military forces. Mexico needs several Cam Rahn bays!

### Oil for technology

All three of these problems can be solved with a forceful application of investment paid for by oil revenues. The potential exists in Mexico's oil reserves to solve the dependence on those reserves. Like any endowment, this oil will have been successfully used, if, at the end of a generation, it is no longer needed. The FEF program provides a strategy for the transformation of Mexico from a raw material producing country to a capital goods-producing country.

The role of these oil exports is most dramatically shown in the way that they purchase the critical capital goods for Mexico. In 1982, we project that Mexico would use approximately 20 percent of its oil revenue for purchase of capital goods. This import of capital goods would represent about 75 percent of the capital goods needed in Mexico. However, by 1990, about 50 percent of the oil revenue would be used to purchase less than 60 percent of Mexico's capital goods needs—the other 40 percent would be produced domestically. By 1995, Mexico would be producing more than half of its capital goods requirements. And by the year 2000, Mexico would be producing 75 percent of its capital goods requirements.

### LaRouche-Riemann model

The FEF program presented here is a "proof of principle" experiment—we have shown that Mexico can become an industrialized country by the mid-1990s. The FEF program is *not* a prediction of how that development will happen; nor is it a statement of how this industrial development must happen. But, it is a demonstration that Mexico need settle for nothing less than rates of growth of national product of 12 percent per year, and the transition to a modern, industrialized country in the lifetimes of most Mexican citizens today. Any claim of the impossibility of these goals is scientifically false.

As has been described in more detail in several publications, the LaRouche-Riemann model reproduces in numerical form the dominant cause-and-effect relations of an economy. This model shows how investments are generated, how their disposition affects future production. It gives the economic planner, industrial manager, or governmental economist, the ability to derive impact evaluations for a given investment strategy. We have used the model to devise a specific investment strategy which shows without a doubt that Mexico can industrialize, and lays bare the principal causal features of the process of development.

The motor for the Mexican economy, as for any economy, is the gross profit in tangible terms which it produces. Every economy which is growing does so first

## The urgency of a full education drive

*From Part VII of the Fusion Energy Foundation's draft program for Mexico, headed "Education and Science: The Key to Mexico's Future."*

The task of education in Mexico is twofold: to bring into existence a world-class scientific elite, and to imbue the population at large with elementary scientific literacy and an understanding of how science is the key to national sovereignty and development.

The problems we face in reaching these goals are also dual. First, the objective skill-level profile of the Mexican population; and second, the political or ideological antiscientific prejudices prevailing in much of Mexico's education system. The domination of education in Mexico by the enemies of industrial progress must be addressed. . . .

Despite almost 40 years of fairly steady economic growth, Mexico is practically a nullity in scientific achievement and number and quality of scientists, outside the field of petroleum. The list of annual Ph.D.s awarded in Mexico is a disgrace. In ongoing basic research and development, Mexico has a pitiful 5,896 scientists actively engaged, one of the lowest in absolute numbers of significant countries in the world. . . .

Part of the problem is the cancerous expansion of "socially relevant" curricula at the expense of natural sciences. Compare Mexico to [South] Korea, a country that began less than 20 years ago as a very backward, nonindustrial nation, and that has now achieved a development level at least on a par with Mexico. Mexico had 112,942 students enrolled in the social sciences in 1975, compared to Korea's 37,247—while Korea, with half the total population of Mexico, had 17,022 students in natural science to Mexico's 14,042. And Korea had a far higher completion rate.

Mexico's enrollment in secondary education is also very insufficient. In 1976, Korea, with half the potential student body of Mexico, and enrolled 2,675,000 in secondary education, compared with Mexico's 2,142,800. In elementary education, while Mexico reports nearly universal attendance for three to six years of schooling, this has been achieved only with very large class sizes of 40 to 50 pupils, too large for efficient primary education.