

EIR Special Report

The real gap for the U.S. military: Global 2000 policy

by Susan Johnson, Managing Editor

Over recent months concern has mounted in official Washington as the new administration, rather than preparing to reverse U.S. military weaknesses, seemed to carry forward the Schlesinger-Brzezinski policy of bluff and provocation vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R., backed only by an increasingly shrunken, shallow defense capability. To address that growing crisis, *EIR* convened a seminar on Sept. 30 in Washington on "U.S. and Soviet Strategic Doctrine for the 1980s: Military and Economic Implications."

At the seminar, *EIR* intelligence directors argued that the deficiencies in U.S. strategic weapons development, the utterly inadequate quality and quantity of armed-forces personnel, the deep and growing problems of most defense-production sectors, and the resort to brinksmanship which is fissuring NATO—none of these can be addressed in themselves, but must be assessed as consequences of a deeper national failure. That failure, as *EIR* Editor-in-Chief Criton Zoakos characterized it, is that Americans have allowed a group of policy-makers to insinuate themselves into power who are, and have been for decades, committed to depopulation and "post-industrialism," domestically and internationally, to the policy of technology restriction and depopulation developed by the Club of Rome under NATO's guiding body, the OECD.

It is they who used the Vietnam war to undercut the traditionalist military and build a Jacobin anti-progress movement; it is they who have destroyed U.S. education, and are in the process of gutting American nuclear-research and space programs, while, through the Federal Reserve, Treasury Department, and Office of Management and Budget, they have thrown the productive economy as a whole into what they expect will be an irreversible process of decay and collapse. Until that profound destruction of the national purpose is recognized, said Zoakos, and Americans understand that "limited war" is a euphemism for neo-colonial mass extermination, U.S. military and economic strength—which are inseparable—cannot be restored.

Attending the seminar were diplomats from 22 countries, equally divided among the NATO member nations, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East



West Coast anti-nuclear environmentalists: the national commitment to science has eroded.

and Africa, and Eastern Europe. The U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China were also represented. Twenty-five members of the U.S. Defense Department and 14 members of the Commerce Department were present, along with representatives of the Departments of State, Treasury, Energy, Transportation, Interior, and the Government Accounting Office, NASA, the CIA, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Many of the seminar attendees came especially to hear the results of the latest *EIR* LaRouche-Riemann econometric study, presented by Economics Editor David Goldman and summarized at the end of this Special Report. On the question of the physical economy's ability to sustain the modest demands of the Weinberger DOD's military budget, Goldman concluded from the econometric model results that: 1) if the United States were to regain a 3 percent trend of annual productivity growth, even the \$500 billion yearly defense budget proposed by *EIR* Founder Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. in his recent White Paper, "A Democratic U.S. Defense Policy," would be quite sustainable; but that 2) under current conditions of costly credit and industrial disinvestment, the Weinberger budget's principal effect will be to drain further resources from housing, auto production, consumer durables, and social services, the prerequisites for U.S. family formation, without revitalizing U.S. defense.

Preparedness

Each seminar speaker, with one exception, expressed the view that something is fundamentally wrong with U.S. military policy. The most narrowly focused was

John Landicho, Senior Associate Director of the Procurement, Logistics, and Readiness Division of the U.S. General Accounting Office. Mr. Landicho heads the newly created Readiness Subdivision and coordinated preparation of the influential May 1981 report to Congress titled "DOD's Industrial Preparedness Program Needs National Policy to Effectively Meet Emergency Needs." He cited a "lack of high-level commitment" in past administrations to funding the studies and contingency plans required for war-preparedness, and demanded that Congress develop "a national policy." Citing the Weinberger pamphlet released the day before which advertises Soviet military-industrial power, he said, "The Russians have an impressive industrial base; we have some, I question whether we have enough." He indicated, however, that nothing fundamental can be done to rectify the U.S. economic situation, describing industrial preparedness as a matter of defining warning times, durations of combat, and making the best of "limited resources."

Dr. John D. Morgan, Chief Staff Officer of the Bureau of Mines, addressed at length one component of military preparedness: strategic resources development and procurement. Having served as an expert in mining and metallurgical engineering with the National Security Resources Board, the Defense Production Administration, and the Office of Defense Mobilization, after working under General MacArthur to rebuild the Japanese economy during the occupation, he hearkened back to the era "when we won wars." Taking a bill-of-materials approach to strategic requirements, Morgan

began with a junior high-school text on "Popular Geochemistry" published in 1948 in the Soviet Union, which identifies the components of an airplane in terms of chemical elements. Noting the Soviets' pioneering work in titanium development, and asking how many U.S. students know what makes up a plane, he went on to stress the Warsaw Pact's self-sufficiency in petroleum and most other strategic materials, and the fact that each nation needs those not simply for military equipment but for agricultural machinery, machine tools, and the other elements of a modern industrial base overall. The Club of Rome is wrong, he said: "The only resource we can run out of is common sense, and we may have crossed that line some years back."

Dr. Morgan proposed to expand both government and private stockpiles, and improve U.S. merchant shipping and port infrastructure to facilitate raw-materials imports, since, he said, the United States will remain import-dependent. How these imports are to be secured—whether through mutually beneficial economic accords with producing nations, through neo-colonial grabs, or through "limited war for control of resources," he did not specify; he focused on the evidence that the U.S. is lagging behind the rest of the Western industrial nations, not to speak of the U.S.S.R., in militarily essential fields like steel production.

With his practiced Yankee twinkle, Morgan added during a question-and-answer session that the obstacle to greater private-sector reserves of petroleum and other strategic resources is that "high interest rates make it hard to finance stock levels. I am not an economist, but I believe we must make essential activity more remunerative, and less essential activity less attractive, or we won't survive as a country."

On the stockpiling question, David Goldman commented that nuclear energy development would both secure domestic power production and open the way for development of new resources through high-temperature processing and ionization techniques. To Landicho's implicit pessimism, Mr. Goldman replied that there is no great disjuncture between making the civilian economy function again and ensuring war-preparedness, once Americans stop accepting the fact that the McDonalds fast-foods chain is now the single largest employer in the United States. It would be perfectly feasible, Goldman said, to provide gold-backed Treasury credit to the banking system at the 6 percent interest-rate level, with "first dibs for productive investment"—gold backing is required, he insisted, "to convince people we're serious, after our bad record."

Defining the gap

Two other seminar presentations, excerpted below, directly addressed the question of U.S.-U.S.S.R. military imbalance. Dr. Franklyn Holzman of the George F.

Kennan Advanced Russian Studies Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center, who is a professor at Henry Kissinger's Harvard Russian Research Center, took price-tags on manpower and equipment as the criterion of strength, and asserted that the CIA has overestimated Soviet defense spending. While conceding that he is not an expert on strategic matters, he claimed that in any case, a major portion of Soviet capabilities is directed against China, and thus somehow permanently unavailable for deployment against NATO. His conclusion was not only that the Soviets are not moving ahead of the United States militarily, but that the U.S. defense budget should be cut.

Dr. Steven Bardwell of the Fusion Energy Foundation, a plasma physicist well acquainted with the leading edges of Soviet R&D, asserted that the gap is defined by the great and growing disadvantage suffered by the United States in industrial productivity, broad-based scientific and technical training, and commitment to the West Point tradition of "winning the peace" for industrial development, as opposed to the technetronic, body-count conception of limited wars like the Vietnam war.

What the latter policy has already inflicted in Southeast Asia, was recalled in a new and extraordinarily chilling way as *EIR* Asia Editor Daniel Sneider reported on his recent trip to Cambodia (see *EIR*, Sept. 29), where he discovered the extent of complicity between Peking and the Kissinger State Department to depopulate and destroy every potential for modernization and independence of nations that could threaten China's "hegemony"; Latin American Editor Dennis Small described how veterans of the Cambodia betrayal like Thomas Enders of the DOS are preparing civil wars throughout Central America, with the explicit purpose of eliminating population there.

Prof. Holzman compares defense expenditures

Dr. Franklyn Holzman, currently at the Woodrow Wilson Center's Kennedy Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, is a professor of economics at Tufts and the Harvard Russian Research Center. He has written two books Financial Checks on Soviet Defense Expenditures and Inter-