

U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe

The Soviet leadership question and the trials of Leonid Brezhnev

by Rachel Douglas, Soviet Sector Editor

On Dec. 19, 1981, Leonid Brezhnev celebrated his seventy-fifth birthday, in October he marked his seventeenth year in power, and in February, Brezhnev emerged from his fourth party congress as General Secretary, the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with his political machine intact and even strengthened by the promotion of his career associates and his family members to higher posts in the party and state security apparatus. The year-end birthday festivities found Brezhnev chastising Western statesmen who ventured to question whether the Soviet leadership was united behind all of Brezhnev's policies.

Yet the Western leader who had gone on record with that question was none other than Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany, the longest-surviving partner of Brezhnev's *Westpolitik* and one who has striven to disencumber East-West relations from ideologies and hysteria, so as to ground them in state-to-state agreements both on strategic stability and on economic development. When Schmidt spoke out on the sensitive matter of Soviet internal political skirmishing, it was evidently out of concern for the vitality of the Soviet faction agreeable to the same principles, namely Brezhnev's faction.

Brezhnev's disclaimer notwithstanding, 1981 saw Soviet and East European political groupings strain in different directions on crucial, interlocked issues of Soviet posture in the world outside Warsaw Pact boundaries and economic policy inside that alliance. Their disputes will intensify during the period of deciding the succession to Brezhnev and his Politburo colleagues.

Equally momentous for the shape of Soviet policy is the debate percolating in the West throughout 1981, over the future of the Soviet Union and of East-West relations. Behind reams of published speculation on the U.S.S.R. as a "crumbling empire," there were actions on the ground, notably in Poland and Yugoslavia, to further such fractures. This approach to the East, the opposite of Schmidt's, originates with the geopoliticians of England and the continental European oligarchy and descends to their subordinates, in Foreign Offices and State Departments as well as intelligence networks, for implementation. It is this century's version of the designs for dismem-

berment of the Russian and Ottoman Empires that bred World War I. This year, *EIR* founder Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. summarized the dangerous outcome of such strategic practice: "Under conditions of perceived threats to the 'Soviet fatherland,' key elements of nearly all Soviet factions will reunite as one fist around the memory of World War II."

Soviet foreign policy

There were three motors driving Soviet policy toward the rest of the world this year: Brezhnev's diplomacy, the machinations of a far-flung network we have called the "destabilization faction," and the distinct voice of the military. They are better understood as policy impulses than as perfectly defined factions, because Brezhnev rules in coalition, and frequent accommodation, with the other two. With the defeat of French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing on May 10 and the rapidly solidifying Soviet negative assessment of the Reagan administration, these tendencies drew closer together.

The manifest intent of Foreign Minister Lord Carrington and other British strategists, of the Socialist International that removed Giscard and still threatens Schmidt, was to abet the second of these Soviet impulses. For the "destabilization faction" is not essentially a Russian or a communist phenomenon. It is the East European branch of the supranational third force on the world scene—the neo-Malthusian conspiracy that abhors science, industrial progress and politics geared to their promotion.

In the U.S.S.R., it is comprised of the old Communist International (Comintern) machine centered in the party Central Committee's International Department, headed by Boris Ponomarev; the KGB (Committee for State Security), especially its overseas sections, where triple agent Gen. Kim Philby of Russian and British intelligence is housed; and a web of think tanks of which the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) is foremost. These networks are the outgrowth of an effort that spans the six decades of Soviet history and reaches back into the Czarist period: the effort of British and continental European

oligarchs to sabotage the development of Russia as an industrial republic.

In foreign policy, the Soviet advocates of Third World destabilization and confrontation with the West were expected to entertain the geopolitical gambits of Lord Carrington, respecting division of the Middle East and—in the plans of Lord Bethell, for one—even Eastern Europe. After a summer visit to Moscow, Carrington is reported to have claimed that the icy reception he and his Afghan settlement plan received there was but an ongoing maneuver, to be followed by eventual Soviet acceptance of his brand of global crisis management.

LaRouche warned, "Moscow will exploit the negotiations of the 'new Yalta' agreement [an Anglo-Soviet redrawing of the world map—ed.] without actually agreeing to such an agreement."

Brezhnev's diplomacy: At the beginning of 1981, the alignment dominating Europe was a Bonn-Paris-Moscow collaboration that provided a crucial margin of stability through the perils of Jimmy Carter's term in office. The jaundiced British view of that state of affairs was revealed by a senior British official in the spring of 1981. "The real threat to security in Europe is not Poland," he told the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, "but the Franco-German alliance."

Brezhnev looked for an early signal from incoming President Reagan that the United States might share the French and German policy of dialogue and trade. "Reagan's own statements and those of his advisers show," said Central Committee information official V. Kobyshev on New Year's Day, "that they see the normalization of Soviet-American relations as a top priority. . . . The significance of Soviet-American relations is substantially broader than the interests of just our two countries."

Brezhnev's March 23 speech to the 26th Party Congress affirmed Moscow's belief that Carter's exit had created vital opportunities for strategic stabilization. Brezhnev outlined an agenda of talks on the international crisis and on specific issues, including Afghanistan, which he offered to discuss in conjunction with Persian Gulf security guarantees. Most important, Brezhnev expressed hopes for a summit meeting with Reagan.

Nine months later, the summit meeting is still the subject of feelers between Moscow and Washington, but the only channel of discussion open between the two great powers is talks on intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe, which began in Geneva on Nov. 30. Chancellor Schmidt, who hosted Brezhnev in Bonn Nov. 22-25 on the Soviet leader's only trip to the West during 1981, arranged to make a continuing contribution to these "Euromissile" negotiations, through bilateral Soviet-German contacts. The entire undertaking, however, is on the chopping block, as the Reagan

administration considers its suspension as a possible punishment for the crackdown in Poland.

At the Party Congress, Brezhnev also restated his proposal for Persian Gulf security guarantees, first advanced during his visit to India in Dec. 1980. The plan called for the United States, U.S.S.R., Western Europe, Japan, and China to pledge protection of national sovereignty and safe sea transit in a demilitarized Persian Gulf. By mid-1981, even propaganda references to this idea had all but disappeared in the Soviet Union.


Brezhnev's diplomacy undermined: The defeat of Giscard smashed the heart out of Brezhnev's European diplomacy, even though his rendezvous with Schmidt in November could still witness finalization of one of the economic deals of the century, the multi-billion dollar Siberian natural gas pipeline project.

With Giscard's removal and with every salvo of rhetoric from Haig—so reminiscent of James R. Schlesinger's "aura of power" performances—the argument that nothing useful was to be obtained from *detente* gained ground in Moscow.

There was a veritable upsurge of chaos in which the Soviet "destabilization faction" was implicated. Even as Brezhnev prepared his trip to Germany, Soviet media cheered on the gangs of fascist environmentalists that assembled under banners of "peace"—a poorly named peace movement whose first target was none other than Helmut Schmidt! Ponomarev, who had not so covertly campaigned in France for the Socialist victory against Giscard, went among his foreign communist party networks to promote the mass demonstrations in West European capitals. The Moscow-based Russian Orthodox Church, which is intimately connected with the KGB, made plans for a 1982 peace conference where the Anglican Church intimates of British Intelligence would be prominent guests.

In the Middle East, the interlocking Anglo-Soviet and Anglican-Orthodox intelligence capabilities were implicated in the October assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Effusive apologies for Colonel Qaddafi of Libya replaced Soviet propaganda for the Brezhnev Persian Gulf plan, which called for the major powers to guarantee national sovereignty in a demilitarized Persian Gulf, and Soviet military officers made the tour: Libya-Ethiopia-South Yemen. The few, although important, Soviet spokesmen who ventured to welcome Saudi Prince Fahd's Mideast peace plan as a positive step were at odds with others, who found in this yet another "imperialist" plot.

The Russians, then, were playing games with the British. In his October document "Leonid Brezhnev must break with London before it's too late," LaRouche advised saying to Moscow, "Stop your babbling about peace movements and disarmament negotiations and



Brezhnev with West German Foreign Minister Genscher (r).

get out of the British bed. Then, dumb Russians and dumb Americans might finally grope their way toward solutions, establishing world peace without sacrificing the vital strategic interests of either nation." LaRouche continued, "Moscow's instinctive reply will be: 'We gave Reagan a chance, and it didn't work!' So typical of our simple, sentimental Russians! Perhaps it will not work, but it is the only course of action which could."

The military: In June and July, a parade of Soviet generals and marshals marched across the pages of the military daily *Red Star* and the party press, with a single message: the U.S.S.R. has committed resources to ready itself for "the possible war which the imperialists are preparing against the countries of socialism," as top political commissar Gen. Yepishev put it. Brezhnev, too, in his June 23 speech to the Supreme Soviet, denounced "bellicose-minded imperialist circles" and evoked images from World War II, "the holy war against the Nazis." In the monthly *Kommunist*, Chief of Staff Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov responded to NATO debates on "limited nuclear war," with a warning that any nuclear war would involve "all continents" and "the whole of mankind."

Some of the military's statements departed from Brezhnev in points of emphasis. Warsaw Pact commander Marshal Viktor Kulikov, for instance, had an interview published on the eve of Brezhnev's departure

for Bonn in November, in which he omitted all mention of East-West negotiations and named Brezhnev only in the context of the latter's commitment to the Soviet defense budget.

But the underlying truth to appreciate about the military's making itself heard was that there is a bottom line in Soviet security calculations, where Brezhnev and the military and the other factions converge, which simultaneously demarcates the limit of Lord Carrington's flirtations. In August the London *Economist* understandably editorialized about the noise from the Russian brass, "Those mutterings from Moscow should be ignored."

The Soviet economy and the Club of Rome

According to Moscow sources, that bottom line would be installation of the new generation of "Euro-missiles" in 1983, embodying NATO adherence to the fallacious "limited nuclear war" doctrine and, so the Soviets say aloud, NATO's intention to have a "first strike" capability. Whether or not those missiles go into place, the Soviets are not taking chances with their defense spending. The party and government, as one colonel wrote in June, "are compelled to earmark the necessary funds for the improvement of armaments and military equipment." Every ruble of surplus the Soviet economy generates, we learned, is going into defense.

Accepting the principle that a healthy economy is the best measure of a nation's defense, *EIR* found the strategically most important decision of the 26th Party Congress to be its decision in favor of the "infinitely developing nuclear power industry" described by Academy of Sciences President Anatolii Aleksandrov. We suggested that the Weinberger defense budget, by comparison, amounted to a worse security menace to the United States than any Soviet action on its own did.

The third straight bad harvest in the Soviet Union and the burden of aid to Poland posed new difficulties to the Soviet economic plans, but these were scant next to the parasite of neo-Malthusian systems analysis thriving inside the U.S.S.R. In July, Club of Rome founder Aurelio Peccei could boast that Dzhermen Gvishiani, the son-in-law of the late Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin who co-chairs the Vienna International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), and Academician Yevgenii Fyodorov had joined the board of his organization. In February, Fyodorov endorsed the Carter State Department's genocidalist *Global 2000* report as a step in the right direction. In the theoretical journal *Voprosy Filosofii*, their colleague Ivan Frolov made clear that this faction intends deindustrialization, anti-science policies for the Soviet Union, not just the "imperialist" West. The case of Frolov, a frequent collaborator of Ponomarev's top International Department aide, Vadim Zagladin, illuminated the identity of

the Malthusian faction in Soviet domestic economic debates and the "destabilization faction" of Soviet foreign policy.

Poland: the battleground

The Polish crisis, long before its year-end escalation to the Dec. 13 imposition of martial law, was a battleground where all these conflicts, both those internal to the Soviet Union and those in the West about policy toward the East, were fought out.

A keynote for the entire year in Poland came in the first weeks of January, when environmentalists forced shut-down of a factory in Krakow that had produced nearly one-half of the country's aluminum. Prepared in the 1976-80 period by "small is beautiful" ideologues both inside the regime and among the opposition grouplets patronized by British intelligence, the Polish crisis from the beginning was a deindustrializers' flank in Eastern Europe. That aspect of Poland's destruction reached a milestone in November 1981, with its application to join the International Monetary Fund. The economy is in shambles.

Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, the Defense Minister, became Polish Prime Minister in February and party chief Oct. 19, replacing Stanislaw Kania. In the interim, the Polish party congress swept 90 percent of the Central Committee, reformers and orthodox Marxist-Leninists alike, out of office, putting untested men in their place and leaving Jaruzelski all the more powerful. Jaruzelski attempted to effect "national conciliation" through talks with Solidarnosc union leader Lech Walasa and Catholic Church Primate Bishop Jozef Glemp. A rash of strikes and ever greater demands for power from the British-pedigreed extreme wing of Solidarnosc pushed Poland into the downward spiral toward the "state of war" Jaruzelski proclaimed.

Reports that Jaruzelski acted to head off a Soviet bid to replace him with Politburo member Stefan Olszowski ring true in light of the year's developments in Soviet policy toward Poland. While Brezhnev on several occasions gave Jaruzelski a green light to carry out what shake-ups and negotiations with the union and the Church he deemed necessary, the Czechoslovak media, which often reflects the views of Ponomarev and his associates, consistently pushed for the crackdown that finally came in December. When the Soviet party chose to turn up the pressure on Warsaw in the late spring, it was Ponomarev's senior partner Mikhail Suslov who went to deliver the message.

The fact that Olszowski and the ousted Tadeusz Grabski, would-be successors to Jaruzelski, were complicit in the 1980 ouster of Edward Gierek at the very inception of the Polish crisis does not bother their Soviet backers. It is not the first time that the KGB and British SIS back the same horse.

Mexico

Fresh start in Mexico-as LaRouche mounts a

by Robyn Quijano, Co-Editor

Mexican-American relations got a fresh start in 1981, a dramatic change from the open warfare of the Carter years. Presidents José López Portillo and Ronald Reagan held face-to-face discussions four times this year and developed a warm relationship based on mutual respect—a breakthrough that leaves the door open for further collaboration among these neighbors representing North and South.

Despite a lack of concrete progress on economic cooperation, and growing attacks by Mexican officials on the tight-credit policies of the U.S. Federal Reserve, the kind of economic sabotage directed from the Carter White House has significantly diminished. The hostilities caused by such affronts as Energy Secretary Schlesinger's veto of the successfully negotiated natural-gas deal have been cooled. Zbigniew Brzezinski's cocktail-party bragging that the U.S. "will not permit another Japan south of our border," a quote made infamous by *EIR*, has given way to Ronald Reagan's good intentions. We need "a strong, stable, free and prosperous Mexico," said Ambassador John Gavin as he took up his new post in Mexico. The "obstructionism" of the Carter era is over, and the United States will once again be a "reliable supplier" of nuclear energy, Gavin told a nuclear symposium in Mexico last September as U.S. companies joined the bidding for Mexico's ambitious nuclear program.

These changes represent more than just a "thaw." But the greatest potential for the kind of economic collaboration that could make both nations prosper have been stalled by Reagan administration bungling of the crucial economic issues which define North-South relations. And if Al Haig and David Rockefeller succeed in making "free-enterprise" collaboration with the drug-producing colony of Jamaica and not with Mexico, the model for U.S. relations with the developing sector, then Mexico's development prospects will come under renewed fire from Washington once again.

Mexico: a North-South model

Immediately after the Reagan victory in November, *EIR* and its founder, Lyndon H. LaRouche, moved to shape a new model for North-South relations based on