
Foreign Policy

Henry Kissinger sharpens the knife

by Lonnie Wolfe

Henry Kissinger, the despised former Secretary of State whom President Ronald Reagan promised to keep away from all policy influence, has made a bid to direct the Reagan administration on a course toward early confrontation with the Soviet Union. Kissinger's assumption of such power emerged publicly in the pages of the *New York Times*, on Jan. 17 and 18, in a pair of op eds in which he intoned against the Reagan administration for being "weak on the Soviets."

Kissinger's directives do not merely signify the former Secretary of State's own pretensions to power; Kissinger is speaking for the Malthusian faction of the City of London—to whom Kissinger owes his training and career—which is determined to severely destabilize both the United States and the Soviet Union.

In his sizable *New York Times* articles, Kissinger demanded of the Reagan administration that it halt all financial credits to Poland and the Soviet Union; re-establish "linkage" in order to punish the Soviets diplomatically, economically, and politically for "bad behavior"; enjoin the NATO allies to build up conventional forces for possible limited wars; and formulate strict guidelines for trade with the East.

What Fat Henry is doing

Kissinger's public expostulations are intended to bolster his subordinates in the State Department, notably Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Deputy Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger, who for months have been promoting a Cold War posture toward the Soviet Union. On Kissinger's instructions, Undersecretary of State Robert Hormats, a former aide to Kissinger, has been dispatched to demand that the OECD nations adopt a tough sanction policy against the Soviet Union—despite the allies' repeated indications that they believe the policy will not be to the benefit of the West. Undersecretary of State for Security Affairs James Buckley is placing the same demand before the current NATO coordinating committee meeting in Brussels.

Meanwhile, State Department spokesmen announced that Haig's Jan. 26 meeting with Soviet For-

eign Minister Andrei Gromyko will not set a date for the beginning of new strategic arms limitations talks, nor would any contacts with the Russians do so, until Poland returns to pre-martial-law conditions. The change in the meeting, which will now only take one day instead of two, was attributed by foreign-policy observers to Kissinger's criticism of the administration for failing to link the arms talks to Poland.

Seeking reorganization

As we go to press, the White House has announced the appointment of Robert MacPharlane, Haig's chief counsel at the State Department and the former military affairs advisor to Henry Kissinger at the National Security Council, to be chief deputy to newly appointed National Security Adviser William Clark. In addition, three advocates of Kissinger's hardline—Thomas Reed, former Air Force Secretary, the ancient cold warrior Clare Booth Luce, and William F. Buckley, Jr.—have been named as 30-day consultants to reorganize the staff and the structure of the NSC.

In recent months Kissinger has been loudly calling for a reorganization of the NSC process, a point re-emphasized in the *Times* articles. In addition, Kissinger had pressed for someone he trusts to be named Clark's chief deputy, thinking that he could use that person to control Clark and the President. But some sources say that Clark still intends to pursue an "independent" policy. It is too early to tell whether Reagan-confidant Clark will acquiesce to a role as Kissinger's messenger.

Undeterred by the stabilization of the Polish situation so far under the martial law regime of Polish nationalist Wojciech Jaruzelski, Kissinger and his colleagues, both in the State Department and London, are now talking privately of detonating a series of crises along the Soviet Union's borders. Immediate targets for conflict are the Middle East and the Balkans. The timetable for these developments, according to foreign policy analysts, is March-April.

It is the hope of Kissinger's British sponsors that continued hot spots in the Mediterranean and the Balkans will make it impossible for the Soviet leadership to consolidate the centralization of power under the military and related cadre—the combination of power responsible for stabilizing Poland. Thus, Kissinger is madly summoning the West to a brinkmanship policy—despite the lack of military preparedness on the part of the allies and despite the Soviet Union's manifest signs that it will not be tricked into permitting the disintegration of the East bloc.

"I think old Henry has gone blind, and he must think it's contagious," was one policy analyst's comment on Kissinger's *New York Times* articles. "The West might win a blind man's bluff with the Soviets, maybe, but the Soviets are not blind."

State Department spokesman Dean Fisher refused Jan. 18 to confirm whether Kissinger had briefed Secretary of State Haig on his articles in the *New York Times*. However, Fisher did confirm that Kissinger speaks regularly with Haig on all foreign-policy matters. This consultation is reportedly intensified during periods of crisis.

But Kissinger is merely the bearer of the latest instructions from London, as a comparison of the Georgetown professor's remarks in the *Times* and the British press show. On the question of the Polish debt and financing, Kissinger states that the greatest weapon of the West is the Polish debt to Western banks. He calls for the West to end financing of this debt, forcing the Soviets to eat it, so to speak. Kissinger's formulation is identical to the London *Economist* editorial of Jan. 9.

The policy is now being implemented by leading British financial institutions, including the Bank of England, who have attempted to break up Polish debt renegotiation meetings. The National Bank of Westminster declared the Polish debt "non-performing," followed in suit by Dope, Inc.'s Hongkong and Shanghai Bank's American subsidiary, the Marine Midland Bank.

A day after the *Times* published Kissinger's diatribe, British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington went before the House of Commons Foreign Relations Committee and announced that Western financial institutions would refuse to renegotiate the Polish debt until martial law is ended and Solidarity leader Lech Walesa released.

Similarly, Kissinger argues that the 1945 Yalta Agreement specifically decreed that there be free elections in Poland. He also claims the 1975 Helsinki accords further modify Yalta, concluding what "is especially inadmissible is the proposition that the Red Army is the guarantor of irreversible history." These arguments for a provocative re-evaluation of Yalta—*itself a casus belli*—are also taken from the London *Economist* editorial of Jan. 9, as are his points on linkage, while Kissinger's recommendation on strict trade guidelines came from the London *Times* editorial of Jan. 13 and policy speeches by various British bankers during January.

As for his call for a conventional arms build-up, Kissinger echoes recommendations from the London International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and similar think tanks.

Kissinger, as his *Times* pieces make clear, hysterically believes his former theses that the Soviet bloc is unraveling and that this process can be sped by confrontation. However, this proposition is contested among more realistic Anglo-American policy circles. At least one official of the Royal Institute of International Affairs termed Kissinger's assessment of the East bloc "insane" and labeled those pushing confrontation under current circumstances "mad."

Dean Rusk dissents on brinksmanship

Dean Rusk, Secretary of State under President Kennedy, in a Jan. 18 interview agreed with the thesis that the Soviets may move into a military-based economic build-up from the Polish events. Rusk told a journalist that U.S. posture must now be to pull back so that "we don't shoot ourselves in the foot" and try to work out some common policy with Europe. "The Soviets are frightened of course by the Polish situation, but I get no comfort from that," he said, "because when the Soviets are frightened, they are very, very dangerous. One has to be very careful about these things."

Rusk, however, is only talking about pulling back in the short term, and holds all manner of fantasies that the Soviet bloc will fall apart. Neither does he have any reasonable policy proposal, although he agrees with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's assertion that we must get interest rates down. Rusk was Secretary of State when George Ball as Undersecretary set up the Office of Population Affairs; he is a core Democratic supporter of Global 2000. Rusk's one major policy proposal is for a nuclear-free zone not only in Europe but in the Mideast as well.

Q: Mr. Secretary, are you beginning to get the impression the Polish crisis has backfired on us, and that we have only provoked the Soviet military into taking charge and mobilizing the economic and military resources of the bloc?

A: This is possible, one has to watch the Polish military carefully to see if it's an old-style, non-ideological military dictatorship like in Latin America or the old Pilsudski regime, or if it is an ideological, strongly communist dictatorship. A very high-level Russian official told me at the end of the 1960s that they were concerned that China might emerge as a non-ideological military dictatorship, which Moscow might not be able to ideologically control.

It is possible that the present Polish regime is more military than ideological. The Soviets may not like this very much, but they like Solidarity even less. So they are playing it in two stages: 1) let the Polish military deal

with Solidarity; 2) the Soviets can later deal with getting ideological control over the Polish military.

But this is just Poland. The problem we are facing, as you said, is where the influence of the Soviet military on the Soviet leadership is more than usual. The very fact of the transition to new leadership means that no one can get in without the consent of the Soviet military, so everyone is jockeying for the favor of the military. And I think we have one appropriate response in the U.S., which is already occurring: a similar phenomenon where the need for a defense buildup is making all politicians jockey for public support of defense, which greatly increases the influence in Washington of the military.

But of course the Soviets do have problems of their own, nationalities problems, youth dissatisfaction, a strong nostalgia in Eastern Europe for Western culture. . . .

Q: Sir, I cannot accept that theory so popular with the British International Institute of Strategic Studies that the Soviet bloc will fall apart if we only let them. Besides, even if they do in the long run, in the short run, as Lord Keynes might have said, we could get blown up.

A: Well, as Secretary of State George Marshall once said during the Berlin crisis, "I've seen it worse." The issue of Poland, of what happens in Eastern Europe, is not an issue between the U.S. and the Soviets. There are no issues within the Soviet bloc which are an issue between us and them.

The fact is the Polish people are not ready to fight, and we cannot fight for them. I once spent an evening with 200 students at Oxford with Mahatma Gandhi and I remember he said: "They'll speak of me in spiritual terms." Then his voice became more harsh, "But they will forget that I have discovered the secret of raw power. We can't meet the British shot for shot, but we can sit down. And they can't run India without us. We may starve, we may be killed, but the British will have to go. That's raw power." But unfortunately there is no evidence that the Polish people have the will to do this. Neither did the Czechs before them.

So why should we get American steelworkers in the streets? We should express ourselves on the rhetorical level, but not do anything else—not shoot ourselves in the foot. We can keep propaganda pressure on, but not go beyond that. Food sanctions are wrong, they would just be sanctions against the Polish people. I rather favor shipping massively food into Poland through the U.N. and other international agencies.

High technology? I'd squeeze back, but no more than we've done. Not only can they get it from Western Europe, but as you said earlier, it will just encourage them to rev up their economy and generate it themselves. During the '60s we once stopped the Germans from building a pipeline between the Soviet Union and Europe, and later I was thanked heartily by one Soviet

official, who said that as a result of our efforts they had developed the technology themselves.

Q: What about Kissinger's plan to call in debt?

A: Ridiculous. Poland can't pay, so that would force them to renege and we'd just lose our money. That's a prime example of shooting oneself in the foot. Crazy.

Q: But U.S. banks are owed little, why not do it anyway and let the Germans take the dirty end of the stick?

A: Even crazier. That would be very bad for the alliance.

And unlike Poland, Europe is an issue between the U.S. and the Soviets—in fact, it is the only issue. There would be no issue that could possibly drive the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to war, were Europe and Japan safe from Soviet military threat. So these Europeans who accuse us of using them for a battleground are stupid—the only thing we could get killed for, in fact, is for their sakes.

NATO is suffering the problems of success, brilliant success. These complaints could hurt NATO. But the practical problem, as I said, is that someone has in fact to defend Europe, and the Europeans don't want to do so. Assume the Soviets invaded Poland tomorrow, and there was an emergency meeting of the NATO foreign ministers. Imagine if Secretary Haig rose and announced "Poland is a European problem. We want to get the views of our European allies before we reach any conclusions. I shall remain silent." Pandemonium would break loose, consternation among the Europeans, because they could never decide together on anything. They sit back like a pouting dowager, waiting for us to tell them what to do.

Q: Sir, are you saying one positive result from your standpoint of the Polish crisis could be a new impetus for a European Defense Community, in which Europe would have a stronger voice within NATO?

A: Yes, yes, I'd love it. We could work very well with Europe—if there was a Europe. But there is no Europe! So I'd hope that the administration will find a way to pass the ball to the Europeans. Hold their feet to the fire and have them come up with a policy for a change.

Q: Other than that, you think there's nothing we should do?

A: Nothing, just that, especially since the Polish people won't fight. If we just stay calm, my guess is that Poland will come out as a compromise. We can preserve some of the reforms of the last two years, liberalization can proceed on the quiet as it does in Hungary. In diplomacy, as in law, there is a fundamental difference between rape and seduction. We can get what we want, but only by seduction.

Q: But Mr. Secretary, I thought you said you were worried about the shift in Soviet thinking?

A: Yes, I am. The Soviets are a different kettle from Poland. There we have to be very careful.

There is one issue which is not an issue between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., but which is a life and death issue to the Soviets. That is their monopoly control over the Communist parties. If that frays, as it did in Czechoslovakia, they'll move. That is a fact which we must accept. We cannot do a thing about it. It is frustrating for us, but we can't. If we did, we could easily get our foot shot. Why go to war over that?

The Soviets are frightened about the Polish events, but I get no comfort from that, because when the Soviets are frightened, they are very dangerous. One has to be careful about those things.

Q: What do you think of Kissinger's *New York Times* proposal?

A: I'll tell you a story about Henry. When I got the news from Oslo that he'd been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, I called him to congratulate him. And I told him, "Henry, I guess now you will be needing to hire a tax expert—because the IRS knows damn well you didn't earn that." No one will listen to him.

Q: What then is the current discussion at the White House on what to do about the problem we've been talking about?

A: I have no idea. I presume Haig is thinking about what I said about Europe, we need to get them to adopt a point of view. I like the idea of a European Defense Community. I assume, it was discussed in the corridors of the European Defense Ministers' meeting.

Do you remember the old Rapacki-Morgenthau plan for the pull-back of all troops from both East and West Europe? Well, given these developments, I'm not sure it's such a bad idea. Especially if we also proposed making Scandinavia, West and East Europe, and the Middle East into a nuclear-free zone.

Q: Sir, why don't we just ask Brezhnev to move to Mars? The Soviets will never accept that.

A: Of course, but I disagree with George Kennan, who says don't make propositions they won't accept. We should lay our own desires clearly on the table.

Q: Isn't this just an extension of the President's "zero solution"?

A: Yes, it's a more extreme version of the zero solution. But some bold, simple proposal might have some value.

Q: Obviously this would have little practical effect on the Soviets. Are you hoping to influence our European allies to come up with, as you said, some sort of European policy?

A: It ought to help in that.

Abscam

Charges confirm FBI-DOJ crimes

by Andrew Rotstein

The Senate leadership has rescheduled to Feb. 2 deliberations on the expulsion motion against Abscam target Harrison Williams, Democrat of New Jersey, amidst a widening scandal which threatens to blow apart the entire Justice Department "sting" operation.

Senator Williams was convicted by Judge George Pratt in May 1980 on nine counts of bribery and conspiracy as part of the Justice Department's entrapment operation against elected officials known as Abscam (for "Arab scam"). FBI agents, who work for the Justice Department (DOJ), posed as Arab sheikhs offering bribes and investment opportunities. In Williams's case, contacts with the "sheikh" were arranged by a convicted criminal, Mel Weinberg, who was paid by the DOJ to "get their man." Four bribe scenarios were mounted over a 13-month period, and Williams still refused the bribes. He was convicted of a supposed disposition to use his influence, i.e., a supposed disposition to commit a crime that was never committed. Williams was viewed by President Jimmy Carter as a political enemy.

Cynthia Marie Weinberg, the estranged wife of the FBI's Weinberg, charged Jan. 16 that her husband perjured himself throughout the Abscam trials of 1980-81, and that FBI Abscam agents also lied under oath. As a result of those trials, half a dozen members of Congress have already been driven from office.

Attorneys representing Williams, a four-term Senate spokesman for the interests of labor and the elderly in particular, have announced that they will submit an affidavit from Mrs. Weinberg in a motion to vacate Williams's conviction. On Jan. 20, a lawyer for Stanley Weisz, who was found guilty in the Abscam trial which also convicted Rep. Richard Kelly (R-Fla.), included affidavits from Weinberg's wife among 300 pages of evidentiary material in a motion to reopen his client's due-process arguments before Federal District Judge William Bryant of Washington, D.C. Meanwhile, on Jan. 21 Williams's attorney asked for a sentencing postponement in view of the Weinberg perjury charges.

The charges were first brought to the attention of the DOJ by columnist Jack Anderson, whose associate Indy Badhwar had conducted exhaustive interviews with Mrs. Weinberg. The department, confronted with detailed