

Arms-controllers take aim at the White House

by Richard Cohen, Washington Bureau Chief

Angry White House sources have confided that for three days leading up to President Ronald Reagan's prime time March 31 press conference, White House Chief of Staff James Baker III and other senior White House officials known to share Baker's views initiated an unrelenting campaign to convince the President to publicly endorse a "nuclear weapons freeze." The nuclear freeze concept was first introduced at a March press conference at American University in Washington, D.C., by Sens. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) and Mark Hatfield (R-Ore).

Baker's attempt to convince the President was reportedly joined by Richard Darmon, protégé of Club of Rome member Elliot Richardson and currently Baker's chief assistant; David Gergen, White House Communications Director and former senior official in George Bush's presidential campaign; and David Stockman, Director of the Office of Management and Budget. My sources report that Baker and his friends resorted to wielding recently conducted White House and other opinion polls and a series of front-page clippings from the leading Eastern press reporting a groundswell of support for the nuclear freeze, while telling the President that the best way to stall a growing, well-organized American "peace movement" which had already adopted the Kennedy-Hatfield nuclear freeze was to co-opt it by publicly embracing its cause.

Pressures on Reagan

Indeed, the day before the President's press conference, McGovernite Randall Forsberg of Cambridge, Massachusetts, the leader of the national campaign to

promote the nuclear freeze, warned that the Reagan administration would make "a mistake by opposing this movement rather than embracing it," and hardline Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.), who several weeks earlier had surprisingly signed on to the Kennedy-Hatfield freeze, was now echoing the arguments of the Baker group, asserting that if the President fails to take the leadership of the freeze movement, the present pressure for a bilateral freeze on nuclear weapons could turn into "a strong unilateral disarmament movement."

Instead, on March 31 Reagan not only repudiated Baker's advice, but went further in explicitly stating that the Soviet Union has "a definite margin of superiority over the United States in nuclear weapons." Reagan called the nuclear freeze concept "disadvantageous and, in fact, even dangerous" to the United States, while insisting that any freeze would maintain a Soviet advantage.

One day following the President's statements he came under intensive attack not only from those who support the Kennedy-Hatfield nuclear freeze approach, but other Senators including John Glenn (D-Ohio) and James Exon (D-Neb.), who said they were "astonished" by Reagan's statement on Soviet superiority. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff David Jones, a Carter appointee, contradicted the President by saying he would not swap the U.S. strategic defense capability for the Soviets'. Jones was backed up by Lew Allen, Jr., Air Force Chief of Staff. Indeed, neither Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger nor Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., who has consistently stressed that

“our systems are more sophisticated and reliable and more technologically sound” than the Soviets’, has ever come close to the charge Reagan had made. On April 4, anti-freeze advocate Sen. Scoop Jackson (D-Wash.), who had sponsored, along with Sen. John Warner (R-Va.), a joint resolution on March 29 countering the Kennedy-Hatfield approach, appeared on national television and attacked the President’s assertion of Soviet superiority.

Yet, in a question-and-answer session with reporters on April 5, the President responded to both the widespread criticism of his statement and spreading allegations throughout Washington that he had misrepresented himself, by reconfirming his earlier charge that the Soviet Union has a nuclear arms margin of superiority.

The signal from the President’s statement on Soviet superiority is that the President is still unprepared to play the arms-control game. Implicit in Reagan’s pronouncement is that he will not entertain serious arms-control negotiations with the Soviets until the United States has approached a level of strategic equality.

The President’s own defense program retains dangerous insufficiencies and misconceptions marked by an unwillingness to deal directly with the Federal Reserve Board’s ravaging of the industrial base required for any serious defense commitment, and by license for Stockman to decimate civilian R&D potentially important for the development of new weapons systems. Nevertheless the President has still refused to cross over into the arms-control trap as charted by variously the New York Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)-dominated nuclear freeze proponents or the Pentagon and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)-inspired “deep Soviet missile cuts” grouping. In fact, the only solution to the national security predicament of the United States—beyond firing Stockman and removing Volcker—must include a brute-force commitment to the development of anti-missile “beam” weapons, as proposed by *EIR* founder Lyndon LaRouche in a March memorandum titled “Only Beam Weapons Could Bring to an End the Kissingerian Age of Mutual Thermonuclear Terror: A Proposed Modern Military Policy for the United States.”

Three arms-control resolutions now circulating on Capitol Hill represent serious factional forces in both the Reagan administration and Capitol Hill. In the period between now and the end of the summer, Baker and Stockman’s friends at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and their Manhattan-based political allies headed by the New York Council on Foreign Relations are ready to pressure and blackmail the President into adopting one of those arms-control options while continuously generating headlines geared toward building a mass-based U.S. peace movement. This “peace movement,” already absorbing environmentalist, religious, women’s, and minority groups (see

article, page 54), is slated to be the banner under which growing numbers of unemployed are manipulated to march against the Reagan Presidency.

The ‘no-first-strike’ partisans

Signaling an escalation on April 17, the CFR for the first time intervened into the “arms-control debate” explicitly on the side of the “peace movement.” At a Washington, D.C. press conference, former Kennedy administration National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy administration Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, Harriman surrogate and former Ambassador to the Soviet Union George Kennan, and Richard Nixon’s arms-control negotiator Gerard Smith, urged the administration to adopt a policy of “no first use” of nuclear weapons in the European theater.

The CFR has not only openly identified itself with the stated goals of the European peace movement, but has more importantly put the administration on the spot on an emotionally explosive question—first use of nuclear weapons—that can be used to inspire the growth of the peace movement. Most of these individuals, most prominently McNamara and Smith, along with other leading figures of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Trilateral Commission including former Undersecretary of State George Ball, former Sen. J. William Fulbright, and Democratic Party patriarch W. Averell Harriman had already endorsed the initial Kennedy-Hatfield proposal on strategic weapons systems.

That **Joint Resolution 163**, now supported by 160 members of the House of Representatives and 26 members of the Senate, proposes that the United States and the Soviet Union completely halt production and deployment of nuclear weapons. They state: “proceeding from this freeze, the United States and Soviet Union should pursue major mutual and verifiable reductions in nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems through annual percentages and equally effective means in a manner that enhances stability.”

On cue, one day prior to the release of the CFR’s “no first use” position, Haig, in a major address before the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, took the opportunity to launch a defense of flexible response, and stated that the United States will not renounce “first use,” ostensibly to counter the argument of the four CFR spokesmen.

Haig’s dramatization of this issue was clearly aimed at fueling the fire of the emerging American peace movement. In reality, Haig, though he reportedly coached the President not to endorse a nuclear freeze the night prior to his March 31 press conference, is much closer to the Kennedy-Hatfield orientation, while he privately opposes the deep cuts position of ACDA and the Pentagon.

Those close to the State Department report that if Haig had the responsibility for arms-control negotiations, he would shoot for an overall agreement along the lines of the SALT II treaty.

Indeed, the Haig position is represented in **Joint Resolution 171**, sponsored by CFR Republicans Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Charles Percy (Ill.), along with Senators Mathias (Md.), Danforth (Mo.), and Cohen (Me.). This resolution proposes the immediate initiation of START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks), while "preserving present limitations and controls on current nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems," and "achieving substantial equitable and verifiable reductions on nuclear weapons."

The Pentagon position

In his implicit rejection of arms-control negotiations at his March 31 press conference, President Reagan stopped short of full endorsement of the Jackson-Warner **Joint Resolution 177** calling for "a major verifiable reduction of Soviet and U.S. nuclear weapons to equal force levels." Sources close to the White House report that the President's objection to this proposal is that it does not require a sizable U.S. strategic defense buildup prior to arms reduction negotiations. The Jackson-Warner Resolution—co-signed by 57 Senators, including a couple who also signed the Kennedy-Hatfield freeze resolution—proposes the same arms-control position that former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance took on his ill-fated mission to Moscow in early 1977. At that time it was reported that the basic outlines of this proposal for "deep cuts" in U.S. and Soviet strategic deployments had been drafted by the office of Senator Jackson. Then-assistant to Jackson and now Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Richard Perle, along with Undersecretary of Defense Fred Iklé, is reported to be the principal proponent of this proposal. Sources at the State Department also report that this "Pentagon" position is shared by ACDA head Eugene Rostow and the U.S. negotiator at the Intermediate Nuclear Force talks, Paul Nitze. This ACDA-Pentagon position has been carried forward earnestly on Capitol Hill by Sen. John Tower (R-Tex.), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Strategic planners close to the President were astonished when on April 1 the Senate Armed Services Committee under Tower's direction seriously cut presidential requests for a long-term civil defense program. That program is slated to be directed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), whose leadership, along with that of another Reagan favorite, the Bureau of Mines, has traditional ties to the military apparatus of Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Another aspect of in-depth war-fighting requirements long advocated by the MacArthurites, the purchase and stockpiling of

strategic mining reserves, a program administered jointly by FEMA and the Bureau of Mines, has also recently had its funding request significantly increased by the President.

The Armed Services Committee had also refused to approve \$715 million that Reagan had requested for preparing Minutemen ballistic missile silos to hold the proposed MX missile, and \$1.4 billion to buy the first nine MX missiles. Sources close to the Committee suggest that Tower, reflecting a growing sentiment at the Pentagon, is urging a multiple-deceptive basing mode for at least a proportion of the proposed MX's with a layer of protective antiballistic missiles (ABMs). These sources suggest that the Tower approach is consistent with both the Iklé-ACDA approach to negotiations and the Jackson-Warner resolution. The threat of a multiply based, ABM-protected new missile cutting into Soviet counterforce capability, while not the optimum, nevertheless could be provocatively put on the auction block in exchange for deep Soviet cuts.

In addition, there are those who believe that this alternative will scuttle the U.S.-Soviet ABM treaty, up for renegotiation this year. Yet on April 2 the House Armed Services Committee, directed by Chairman Melvin Price (D-Ill.), turned around and denied \$467 million for ABM research and only partially approved the President's MX request.

All three of the major resolutions circulating on Capitol Hill and sponsored by various forces in the administration—not including the President—and in the Democratic Party, stress limitations on the testing and deployment of new and "destabilizing" nuclear weapons: that is, weapons based on new or more advanced technologies.

Why the U.S. 'peace movement' is a hoax

by Lonnie Wolfe

"Peace movement? There is no such thing as a peace movement, not here, not in Europe." With these words, a former official of the Carter administration who is today a prominent spokesman for the nuclear freeze campaign, revealed that the peace movement is a hoax. "I get annoyed when people call this a peace movement," he said. "It makes it sound like we are trying to eliminate