
Why Admiral Inman left his CIA position

by Paul Goldstein



According to high-level intelligence community sources, up until the most recent round of strategic crises, Inman was working in total oposition to the maneuverings of British and Israeli intelligence. According to one source, he was blocking the flow of information to British intelligence during the initial phases of the Malvinas Islands conflict, while passing critical military intelligence to sources for the Argentine military.

Inman's attitude reflected a growing concern among intelligence professionals, even those most cynical and skeptical, that the British intelligence establishment and its U.S. agents and assets were making a bid to take over the foreign-policy and intelligence operations of the United States. EIR's long-standing charges of British efforts to destroy American intelligence capabilities, according to one intelligence source, have been "vindicated beyond belief. Your attacks against the British are fully confirmed as the result of events this week. No one questions your credibility on this issue—that is, anyone who knows how British intelligence works."

Factional battle

Under the Reagan administration, the CIA has had two policy orientations, one policy represented by anglophile William Casey and the other represented by Inman. The fight was carried out in two primary areas: foreign covert operations and counterintelligence.

On the first level, Casey continues to forge a foreign covert-operations policy which basically subordinates those operations to foreign intelligence agencies, nota-



bly the British and Israeli. Casey and Secretary of State Alexander Haig, a factional ally of Casey on these matters, proposed and implemented these joint intelligence operations in especially Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Ostensibly, the purpose is to counter Soviet operations. However, their included result is crucial support for British intelligence interventions on behalf of the reorganized British Empire. Part of British intelligence activity enjoying the use of CIA assets is devoted to the destabilization of such key U.S. allies as West Germany, Japan, and Mexico.

Inman opposed the effort to reorganize U.S. counterintelligence, as proposed by a staff member of the National Security Council, so that the CIA and its rival, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, would be subordinate to new centralized structure. This proposal has been a longstanding project of former CIA counterintelligence chief James Jesus Angleton, a longtime friend of William Casey.

British-Soviet collusion

According to sources in the CIA, highly sensitive investigations into joint Anglo-Soviet intelligence operations were being conducted at the point of Inman's resignation. Sorces close to this inquiry told EIR that the investigation was prompted by information that officials in the British Admiralty, Royal Household, and the British naval fleet deployments in the South Atlantic were giving their Soviet counterparts precise and detailed plans of British fleet deployments so that Argentine military intelligence could come to rely on the Soviets instead of the intelligence conduited by the CIA into Argentina. Inman's resignation might bring to the surface this duplicitous operation and the way in which Casey and his associates such as William F. Buckley were covering up the double-dealing. Yet despite Inman's resignation, the factional battle within the intelligence community is continuing.

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