

NATO backs the British Empire military doctrine

by Susan Welsh

Strategic planners in London and their junior partners in Washington are looking ahead to the next phase of the broader global operation they have set in motion with the Malvinas crisis: the transformation of NATO into an instrument for a British Empire "recolonization" policy in the developing sector.

NATO's Nuclear Planning Group of Defense Ministers gave the go-ahead to such a radical reorganization in the communiqué released from its May 7 meeting. Effectively scrapping the North Atlantic Treaty that has governed military relations in the Western industrialized world since 1949, the ministers agreed for the first time to work together "to facilitate out-of-area deployments in support of the vital interests of all." NATO's area of operation is limited by law to Europe and the North Atlantic. Britain and the United States have been trying for years to get other NATO allies, particularly West Germany, to accept such an extension of NATO, either formally or informally.

"We have been urging this for a long time. NATO has now adopted the British Empire military doctrine," said Sir Anthony Kirshaw, foreign policy adviser to Britain's Tory Party, in an interview with *EIR*. An American strategist linked to Henry Kissinger stressed in another interview that the British deployment to the South Atlantic, combined with the NATO communiqué, have created "the basis for action beyond the NATO area. . . . We are on the verge of a much broader understanding of alliance interests and burden sharing. . . . The role the United States must have played in the communiqué's drafting means we are looking toward

NATO's role in other areas like the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean."

Where NATO's treaty defines it as a *defensive* organization limited to such military programs as are necessary to protect European and the North Atlantic from enemy attack, the "British Empire" doctrine is aimed toward *offensive* "rapid deployment force" capabilities worldwide. By endorsing this concept, the United States and Western European NATO members are underwriting the gunboat diplomacy which made the British monarchy one of the most hated institutions in world history. NATO forces are now given free rein to deploy out of area to "face down the Soviets," to enforce debt collection in impoverished "Third World" nations, and to bleed those countries in the "population wars" dreamed up by radical Malthusian strategic planners for the purpose of creating mass slaughter.

Winston Churchill III, in an interview with the West German magazine *Der Spiegel* dated May 10, described the way the Falkland/Malvinas Islands could become the centerpoint for a new geopolitical geometry. Churchill, grandson of the World War II British Prime Minister, is a defense-policy spokesman for the British Conservative Party who has advocated bombing air bases on the Argentine mainland.

"Don't forget the strategic position of the Falkland Islands!" he told *Der Spiegel*. "Should the Soviet Union attack the West one day, the Panama and Suez canals would certainly be blocked off. Then all the trade of Japan, Western Europe, and the U.S.A.—particularly oil supplies from the Middle East—would have to be trans-

ported around Cape Horn or the Cape of Good Hope, near the Antarctic and near the Falkland Islands. It is conceivable that an English-American base should therefore be constructed, to prevent the Soviets from gaining an advantage. A South Atlantic Pact is also conceivable, which would include countries like Chile, Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, and even South Africa."

A representative of Britain's semi-official Foreign Affairs Research Institute told *EIR* that the main point of the Falkland Islands adventure and British support for the extension of NATO into the Southern Hemisphere is that "Britain wants to become a great maritime power again, as it was in the heydays of the Empire." This will necessitate stripping down the British Army on the Rhine (the British troops assigned to continental Europe) for redeployment of troops to areas like the Persian Gulf, he said. He and his colleagues anticipate an early British role in quelling outbreaks in Yemen and in "mediating" NATO efforts to set up a new "security arrangement" with the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council (see article, page 39).

An Italian foreign-affairs analyst told *EIR* that the reorganization of NATO is already far advanced, and goes beyond anything his country's parliament has been told. Defense of Europe against the Soviet Union is no longer NATO's primary aim, he reported; rather the Eastern Mediterranean, the Arab countries, the Persian Gulf and other parts of the Third World will emerge as the chief areas of activity for NATO's southern flank and Italy.

How far will the U.S. go?

The strategic prize the British are seeking is not the recapture of the Malvinas Islands but the recapture of the United States as effectively the strategic cornerstone of British colonialism. Britain cannot invade the Malvinas without U.S. assistance, particularly as the downing of the H.M.S. *Sheffield* knocked out at least one-third of British electronic surveillance and warfare capabilities, British military experts report.

The Economist of London stresses in its current issue's editorial that "the first of this week's real diplomatic issues is how far the United States, after having tilted towards Britain too late to give itself quite enough leverage on either side, will now go to prevent a NATO ally from suffering naval or diplomatic reverse. It will give the fleet assistance in resupply, quite a help were the fleet to be stuck in the South Atlantic for months. But say, for instance, Britain were to lose either of its two aircraft carriers, an essential troop carrier or equipment ship. The British fleet would then be ineffective. Little force would be left to back diplomacy. Would America conceivably fill such a naval gap?"

U.S. intelligence sources claim that the U.S. armed forces already have sealed orders that if a British

invasion is repelled or the British are otherwise badly hurt, the United States will step in militarily. A U.S. commitment of troops would still require presidential and congressional approval, however, and is not yet assured.

The two top British agents of influence in Washington working to make sure the United States does intervene are Alexander Haig and Henry Kissinger, the same "inside team" that worked to "Watergate" President Nixon in order to remove any economic content from détente, prepare the Mideast oil hoax, and discredit the institution of the presidency. Haig, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee May 10, refused to say whether Great Britain is carrying nuclear weapons aboard any of its vessels in the South Atlantic. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), the only Senator who voted against U.S. support for Britain, asked Haig whether he did not think it an important question; Haig replied: "I think it's very important that it not be aired publicly," and refused to say more.

The same day, Haig joined the British in pressuring Western Europe to extend economic sanctions against Argentina past their May 17 expiration date. "In the present delicate situation," Haig said, the Europeans should immediately announce the renewal of the trade ban.

Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, resuming his role as "shuttle diplomat," and met with Margaret Thatcher in London the first week in May. In a major address before the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) May 10, Kissinger elaborated his undying allegiance to a "special relationship" with Britain, boasting about the fact that when he was Secretary of State, Britain largely made policy for the United States.

British miscalculations

The British gameplan cannot work, since the world—even in Washington—does not operate as London strategists believe it does. Latin American countries, far from lining up to join the kind of new treaty organization Winston Churchill III et al. foresee, are breaking away from London and Washington en masse. A British invasion of the Malvinas or bombing of the mainland will result in direct military involvement on the side of Argentina from at least a half-dozen Latin American countries.

The most profound British miscalculation, however, involves the Soviet Union. Churchill and others are quite convinced that the Soviets will do nothing. But Moscow will not sit by and watch NATO become a mechanism for intervention around the globe; it will respond in its own time and in the manner of its own choosing. The likely outcome, if British gains are not reversed, is World War III.



DOCUMENTATION

Kissinger reveals his 'special relationship'

Henry Kissinger, speaking May 10 before Britain's Royal Institute of International Affairs scope and the secrecy of the post-World War II Anglo-American "special relationship," and cited his own career as exemplary of British control over American policy making.

EIR will reprint next week the former Secretary of State's extraordinary remarks from the text provided by Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, Kissinger's current base. The speech to the RIIA was made during a two-week tour of Europe, during which Alexander Haig's mentor sought to shape a climate of opinion for turning the June summit meetings of Western heads of government into forums for consolidation of a British-dominated supranational system.

Excerpts follow from the RIIA speech, which is titled, "Reflections on a Partnership: British and American Attitudes to Postwar Foreign Policy." Emphasis and subtitle are in the original.

... Fortunately, Britain had a decisive influence over America's rapid awakening to maturity in the years following [World War II]. ... Britain has rarely proclaimed moral absolutes or rested her faith in the ultimate efficacy of technology, despite her achievements in this field. Philosophically, she remains Hobbesian: She expects the worst and is rarely disappointed. In moral matters Britain has traditionally practiced a convenient form of ethical egoism, believing that what was good for Britain was best for the rest. ... But she has always practiced it with an innate moderation and civilized humaneness such that her presumption was frequently justified. In the 19th century, British policy was a—perhaps *the*—principal factor in a European system that kept the peace for 99 years without a major war.

American foreign policy is the product of a very different tradition. ... Franklin Roosevelt, on his return from the Crimean Conference in 1945, told the Congress of his hope that the postwar era would "spell the end of the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balance of power, and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries—and have always failed." ... American attitudes until quite literally the recent decades have embodied a faith that historical experience can be transcended, that problems can be solved permanently. ... It was therefore a rude awakening when in the 1960s and 70s the United States became conscious of the limits of even *its* resources. ...

The Nature of the Special Relationship

... During the 1920s the U.S. Navy Department still maintained a "Red Plan" to deal with the contingency of conflict with the British fleet. It was not until the war with Hitler that the gap closed permanently. ... The Marshall Plan and North Atlantic Treaty, while formally American initiatives, were inconceivable without British advice and British efforts. ... [Prime Minister Ernest] Bevin shrewdly calculated that Britain was not powerful enough to influence American policy by conventional methods of pressure or balancing of risks. But by discreet advice, the wisdom of experience, and the presupposition of common aims, she could make herself indispensable, so that American leaders no longer thought of consultations with London as a special favor but as an inherent component of our own decision-making. ...

Our postwar diplomatic history is littered with Anglo-American "arrangements" and "understanding," sometimes on crucial issues, never put into formal documents. ...

The British were so matter-of-factly helpful that they became a participant in internal American deliberations to a degree probably never before practiced between sovereign nations. In my period in office, the British played a seminal part in certain American bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union—indeed, they helped draft the key document. In my White House incarnation then [as National Security Adviser], I kept the British Foreign Office better informed and more closely engaged than I did the American State Department—a practice which, with all affection for things British, I would not recommend be made permanent. But it was symptomatic. ... In my negotiations over Rhodesia [in 1976] I worked from a British draft with British spelling even when I did not fully grasp the distinction between a working paper and a Cabinet-approved document. The practice of collaboration thrives to our day, with occasional ups and downs but even in the recent Falkland crisis, an inevitable return to the main theme of the relationship. ...