

heading a slate which includes six candidates for Chicago alderman. None of the other candidates, which include machine politician Richard Daley Jr., Rep. Howard Washington, and incumbent Mayor Jane Byrne, have programs for reversing the destruction of Chicago's heavy industry. The de-industrialization of Chicago has been engineered out of the University of Chicago, home base for leading architect of Third World genocide, Milton Friedman, the economist who destroyed the economy of every country he ever "advised."

The NDPC has also announced the campaign of prominent Flint, Michigan attorney Max Dean for chairman of the Michigan Democratic Party, and has just completed a campaign for the chairmanship of the South Dakota Democratic Party, where NDPC-backed trade unionist Dennis Murphy addressed the state convention.

### **Southwest: no 'free enterprise'**

The NDPC campaign effort for the Southwest was initiated in January when nuclear engineer George Chamberlain announced his campaign for Congress in Texas's 6th C.D., only days after Rep. Phil Gramm initiated a special election with his announcement that he was switching from the Democratic to the Republican Party. On Feb. 5, Chamberlain reserved a half an hour of local television time to address the voters of the district with Lyndon LaRouche. In his address, Chamberlain charged that Gramm is a puppet of the British-dominated Mont Pelerin Society, and detailed how that group is trying to engineer the biggest financial collapse in history.

Chamberlain's address was filmed at a Jan. 31 fundraiser for the candidate, which was attended by 55 supporters, including four leaders from the American Agriculture Movement, and a large number of Chamberlain's co-workers at the Comanche Peak nuclear power plant. Chamberlain hit at the need for ordinary citizens to involve themselves in politics. "We have been so busy and blinded by our daily lives that we have let the party go to the kooks and nuts," he said. "Every time an office is up for grabs, run for it. . . . We can retake the party and bring back forces in Texas like Sam Rayburn and those behind the rural electrification project."

Chamberlain's approach is proving powerful in a district dominated by aerospace and defense workers and progress-oriented farmers. In response to his demand that Gramm face the issues, the head of the largest Veteran of Foreign Wars Post in the district has invited Gramm and Chamberlain to debate. Gramm has refused the invitation, a decision not likely to sit well with his constituents.

Chamberlain has announced that following the Feb. 12 primary, he plans to lead a delegation from Texas to the Washington D.C. Club of Life conference—the international organization founded by Lyndon and Helga Zepp LaRouche to fight for the "New World Economic Order." Chamberlain told his supporters that he would lead this delegation either as their Congressman or as a constituency leader.

## **How the McNamara antiballistic missile**

by Robert Gallagher

In July 1962, the U.S. Army anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) program staged a "contest" between its Nike-Zeus ABM missile system and the most advanced existing intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the U.S. Air Force's Atlas. The Nike-Zeus won the contest hands down. In the succeeding months, successful tests under even more difficult conditions followed. But U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Strange McNamara moved to terminate the Nike-Zeus program.

Prior to McNamara's tenure as Secretary of Defense, the United States had parallel development programs in both offensive and defensive strategic weapons. It would be no great exaggeration to say that as fast as the Air Force developed new, more destructive, more powerful ICBMs, the Army developed the systems to knock out their offensive warheads.

Early ABM work extended into areas beyond missile systems as well. In January 1958, President Eisenhower's Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy—in the same policy memorandum that established the Army as the service with the mission of ABM development—chartered the newly formed Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) with the responsibility to develop ABM technologies. DARPA was to support and back up the Army program, and at the same time investigate non-missile technologies with which to kill ICBM warheads. DARPA's Project Defender researched the use of plasmas, lasers, x-rays, and solid material impact as techniques for space-based ABM systems as early as 1961.

### **Results of deterrence**

None of these programs yielded a deployed ABM system armed to defend American citizens from nuclear attack. The Safeguard ABM system, deployed in 1975 and mothballed the same year, would have only defended the North Dakota Minuteman sites.

Today, there is no weapon system capable of preventing

# faction wrecked U.S. defense capability

Soviet ICBMs from striking and obliterating any urban or industrial target in the United States. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has a well-maintained, advanced ABM system deployed around Moscow, an elaborate civil defense program, and a lead of at least five years on the United States in the development of technologies for beam weapon ABMs.

The major U.S. policy initiatives in this area over the past 20 years have been the negotiation of two treaties to confound the development of systems of defense against ICBMs in either country—the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963) and the SALT I ABM treaty, negotiated by President Nixon's National Security Adviser and then-Secretary of State, the perverted Henry Kissinger.

Kissinger's own self-defense for this policy—made before a congressional committee in 1979—is a good start for understanding how this state of affairs developed:

"Since the middle 1960s, the growth of the Soviet strategic force has been massive. . . . This has happened without the U.S. attempting to make a significant effort to rectify that state of affairs. One reason was that it was not easy to rectify. But another was the growth of a school of thought to which I myself contributed . . . which considered that strategic stability was a military asset and in which the amazing theory developed, i.e., historically amazing, that vulnerability contributed to peace and invulnerability contributed to the risks of war.

"When the administration with which I was connected sought to implement an anti-ballistic missile program inherited from our predecessors, it became the subject of the most violent attacks from the theory that it was destabilizing, provocative, and an obstacle to arms control . . . because opponents of ballistic missile defense (BMD) saw in the strategic vulnerability of the U.S. a positive asset."

Perhaps only more amazing than Kissinger's statement is the fact that many Americans hold as popular gospel the fiction that ABM development is "an obstacle to peace." From 1967 to 1972, many Americans expressed outrage over

planned ABM deployment near their cities.

This insane, lemming-like behavior is not simply to be written off as the result of intensive, well-financed organizing by the former government officials who led the anti-ABM movement. A population that had capitulated morally during the Joe McCarthy period was open to any arguments that defense policy must "play by the rules of the game"—for this is the psychological essence of the doctrine of deterrence, the incompetent (British) doctrine that warfare must proceed by rules, that the ICBM is an "ultimate weapon," that the first principle of military strategy is that the threat of massive nuclear retaliation is sufficient to deter enemy nuclear attack.

## 'Go conventional'

Sotto voce, Kissinger and McNamara continue: the threat of massive retaliation is a "military asset," the nuclear umbrella under which Anglo-American policy can proceed with impunity to dominate and loot Europe and the developing sector and conduct wars against populations.

By 1962, McNamara had established a command structure to support a million troops in Vietnam. He openly counterposed ABM development against the conduct of the Vietnam war. In 1966, he told journalist Stewart Aslop that his research and development priorities were as follows: "Number one—R&D in Vietnam. Number two—assured penetration [of the Soviet Union by U.S. ICBMs in the event of war]. Number three—ABM."

The more successful the Army ABM program, the more McNamara waged a relentless campaign to kill or divert it.

The Army had begun ABM work in 1944 following intelligence reports that the Nazis were developing an ICBM. The Nike-Zeus program got underway in 1955. By 1960, the Nike-Zeus system employed of a three-stage missile directed by two radars. One radar performed target selection and launched the missile towards the incoming ICBM warhead. The second radar controlled firing the third stage for course correction as the missile bore down on the target for kill.

In the two succeeding years, the Army achieved breakthrough after breakthrough in mastering the technological problems of ABM development, such as the need to distinguish decoys from real warheads, and the development of phased-array radar. Prior to McNamara, ABM had received opposition from the Rand Corporation and the Rand-dominated U.S. Air Force as well as the then-existent gaggle of science advisers from the "flat earth" school of physics based at MIT. With McNamara, these forces had the power to kill the program.

In 1961, McNamara deferred production and deployment of the Nike-Zeus and downgraded it to a mere research and development program—at a time when it was known that the Soviets were producing an ABM system for deployment around Moscow.

Prior to the successful July 1962 Nike-Zeus kill against an Atlas ICBM, McNamara issued a directive restricting

public reporting on the test, on the grounds that publication must not reflect adversely upon the capabilities of the Air Force's Atlas. Following the Army's success, he downgraded the program to an investigation of the radar signatures of the warheads and decoys, an R&D program for offensive weapons. Finally, in 1967, when he could no longer contain support for the more advanced Nike-X system, he approved deployment of an ABM system, but only after dissolving the Nike-X and establishing Sentinel, a new program under separate management within the Army. Then just before leaving office, he released a fake intelligence report that the Chinese ICBM program—the threat he had assigned Sentinel to defend against—was farther from deployment than originally thought and that therefore Sentinel was unnecessary.

### **Treaty ban on ABM testing**

More important than any administrative action, in the year after the Cuban missile crisis, McNamara pushed for the negotiation and signing of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 that prohibits all nuclear testing in the atmosphere. This piece of deception was aimed at defensive, not offensive weapons.

The Nike-Zeus and all ABM systems developed to date are nuclear-armed. They achieve neutralization of incoming warheads either by physical destruction, or by the effects of the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) of x-rays and other radiation from detonation of their ABM warheads. With the second means, they are effective at considerable distance and disarm incoming warheads in a manner quite similar to beam weapons.

However, the potent EMP of the ABM interferes with the system's own ground-based radar that must, in a real engagement, direct other ABM missiles against other incoming warheads. Testing nuclear explosions in the atmosphere was thus absolutely critical to working the bugs out of such a defensive system. McNamara prevented that with the Test Ban Treaty.

Dr. Edward Teller attacked the Treaty, arguing that it would stimulate, rather than prevent, an arms race, since it was directed against knowledge.

The Soviets readily signed this treaty, as they did the SALT I ABM pact since it was to their advantage: they were behind the United States in offensive ICBMs and in ABM technology: both treaties gave them the breathing room to build up their ICBM force without the threat of a huge American ABM effort.

The signing of the Test Ban was followed by an offensive arms race in which the United States developed multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) for ICBM warheads—the ability to hit several cities with warheads from a single missile—and the Soviets developed ICBMs of increasing destructive capability.

### **Army resistance movement**

The McNamara campaign against ABM did not go un-

opposed. The Army emerged as a vocal opponent to the doctrine of deterrence. As Secretary of the Army, Wilbur Brucker told a congressional committee in 1960, "The Army has never subscribed to the theory that the ICBM is or will be the ultimate weapon."

In 1967, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Earle Wheeler struck right at deterrence in telling Congress, "Should the Soviets come to believe that their ballistic missile defense, coupled with a nuclear attack on the United States, would limit damage to the Soviet Union to a level acceptable to them. . . . Our forces would no longer deter. The first principle of our security would be gone."

Heeding such counsel, Congress authorized funds for ABM production and deployment each year of McNamara's tenure. He countered by refusing to spend the funds.

Throughout his campaign against the ABM, McNamara deployed a stable of "scientists" to justify his attack on the program. This group included members or descendants of the same flat-earth school of science that maintained in the early 1950s that no one could ever build a rocket powerful enough to throw an H-bomb 8000 miles, and that therefore an ICBM was impossible! With this record, they then held that "what goes up must come down," that defense against ICBMs was impossible.

Since many of these same persons are public spokesmen now against beam weapons, we present the leadership of the anti-ABM movement of 1967-72 here: George Kistiakowsky, James Killian, and Jerome Wiesner, all science advisers to Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy; Herbert York, director of Defense Research and Engineering, 1958-61; Jack Ruina and George Rathgens, director and chief scientist of DARPA, respectively, in the Kennedy administration; Richard Garwin, presently at I.B.M. Corporation.

With McNamara out in front, these persons are now spokesmen for the "nuclear freeze," whose named targets include President Reagan's stepped-up commitments to the Army's current ABM program, the Low-Altitude Defense System (LoADS), and DARPA's space-based beam weapon program.

This history reflects poorly upon the Heritage Foundation/High Frontier proposal for assembling off-the-shelf technology into a layered missile-only ABM system and for displacing beam weapon development many decades into the future. Since 1961, the U.S. ABM research and development program has been underfunded, restricted by treaties, and sabotaged by executive policies. The Soviet Union has since caught up with and then surpassed the United States in both offensive and defensive strategic systems. Under these conditions, the only "technological end-run" possible is the development of the most advanced technology for defense in a crash beam weapon program. Off-the-shelf technology is out of date. The irony of High Frontier's proposal for a space-based conventional missile ABM is that it would only be defensible by laser battlestations.