

Henry Kissinger committed treason in the SALT I negotiations

by Robert Gallagher

Analysis of the 1969-1972 Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT I) and the treaties that emerged from them in May 1972 provides clear, irrefutable evidence that then presidential National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger is guilty of representing the interests of foreign powers in his conduct and policies in the course of the negotiations.

Kissinger and his predecessor in SALT, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, were interested in arms control only as a vehicle for imposing a technological freeze on the United States, with assistance from the Soviet Union. To do so, they fabricated the notion that the Soviets—like themselves—were committed to the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction.

SALT I included a treaty limiting antiballistic missile (ABM) systems that limited the United States to one ABM site—destroying the U.S. program while granting the Soviets the ability to pursue construction of a limited nationwide system.

It included the Interim Agreement on strategic arms that granted the Soviets strategic nuclear superiority over the United States by imposition of a freeze on Soviet and U.S. levels of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and by granting the Soviets a 45 percent edge in submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), a level which they had not yet attained. The accompanying table shows the figures for U.S. and Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs agreed to in SALT I.

In order to win adoption of this incredible policy, Kissinger defined "ABM system" in the treaty to cover a specific ABM system design of which both the United States and the Soviet Union only had one, though Soviet deployments were not limited to that type. Further, he withheld intelligence on late-1960s Soviet commitments to development of directed-energy technologies from President Nixon and the general public so as to make it appear that the Soviets had renounced defense against nuclear attack by signing the ABM Treaty.

Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko emphasized the true nature of Soviet SALT strategy when he emerged from the Sept. 29, 1982 session of the Supreme Soviet that ratified the ABM Treaty. The treaty, he said specifically,

does not place any limits on carrying out research and experimental work directed towards solving the prob-

lems of defense of the country from nuclear missile attacks.

In fact, the same year the treaty was signed the Soviets conducted tests of their nationwide "Tallinn" perimeter air defense system—not covered by the treaty—in mock engagements with ICBM warheads.

The evidence presented here forms the basis for a case that Henry Kissinger acted as a de facto agent of the Soviet Committee on State Security (KGB). However, Kissinger himself made clear in a 1982 address to the Royal Institute for International Affairs that it was British, not Soviet, doctrine that guided his hand in SALT and other matters (see *EIR*, June 1, 1982). We leave final identification of the power that Kissinger represented to a formal investigation.

Soviet directed-energy work, 1969

Recent investigation demonstrates that the Soviet Union has always led the United States in understanding the ability of directed-energy technologies to form the basis for nuclear defense. As early as 1958 the Soviets knew of the "X-ray effect," the fact that X-ray radiation released from an H-bomb blast can be used to disable ICBM warheads. In early 1967, a Soviet scientist discussed the effect at a public conference, to the shock of Western scientists present at the meeting. Benson Adams cited one U.S. authority in his *Ballistic Missile Defense* as stating that conference attendees "found that the Russians not only had something, and were years ahead in theory, but had already tested it out in space and probably were starting to build their anti-missile system around it." A series of *New York Times* and *U.S. News and World Report* articles reported the details as they became known.

After discovery of the X-ray effect in 1958, the Soviets agitated for a moratorium on nuclear testing, which they

Limits on strategic arms in SALT I

	ICBMs	Heavy ICBMs	SLBMs
Soviet	1,618	313	950
U.S.	1,054	54	656



Christopher Stone/NSIPS

obtained. In 1961, they unilaterally broke the moratorium in a series of tests that included successful destruction of multiple incoming ICBM warheads with a single ABM missile warhead by use of the X-ray effect.

But Soviet efforts were not limited to application of the effect to anti-missile missiles. A May 1971 Rand Corporation report, *Effects of Strong Explosions (R-760)*, edited by S. Kassel, reported Soviet research on development of an X-ray laser. One design developed by Soviet scientist Yuri L. Stankevich and reported by Rand argued for the feasibility of electron-beam pumping of an X-ray laser.

The Tal'roze breakthrough

More important were concrete Soviet achievements in the laboratory in 1968 and 1969 in development of chemical lasers. A February 1971 Rand Corporation report, *Soviet Chemical Laser Research: Pulsed Lasers (R-921)* by Yuri Ksander, documented the success of V. L. Tal'roze at the Soviet Chemical Physics Institute in 1968 and 1969 in building a pure hydrogen-fluoride chemical laser with an efficiency "approximately one-half the energy stored in the system." Existing U.S. chemical lasers were represented by Pimentel's inefficient 1965 hydrogen and uranium-fluoride laser. Ksander wrote:

Although Pimentel's 1965 laser was hailed as a "principal achievement," the feeling at the Chemical Physics Institute was that the low chemical efficiency of such a laser was the result of an improper choice of a mixture in which self-sustaining reactions—even simple ones—were clearly impossible.

Tal'roze's laser solved this problem. Meanwhile, N. G. Basov of the Lebedev Physical Institute identified which atomic transitions were the causal basis for the laser effect, correcting Pimentel's theoretical work. By 1971, scientists at the Lebedev Institute could announce successful gener-

ation of a 300-gigawatt power pulse from a high-energy laser.

The Kassel and Ksander reports document extensive Soviet research on laser effects on various materials, such as aluminum and fiberglass, the materials that make up the skins of ICBMs. In September 1971, Ksander published a follow-up report in which he stated that the Soviets had increased resources devoted to beam technologies research 50 percent since the 1969 Tal'roze breakthrough, and that the Soviet program was highly integrated, directed step-by-step by Basov. But its purpose was not clear to Ksander. Soviet laser research, he wrote, is

complicated by the highly dominant leadership of the system by Basov, whose motives for the advancement of a specific laser field are not always altruistic, nor, for that matter, fully understood.

While the breakthroughs described in the Rand reports were in progress, all references to the use of directed-energy beams in ABM systems was dropped from the 1968, third edition of Marshall V. D. Sokolovskii's *Military Strategy*.

Soviet about-face on ABMs

In February 1967, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin had denounced Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's proposals for a ban on anti-missile missiles not linked to reductions in offensive arms, and ridiculed the notion that ABMs were "destabilizing" (see *EIR*, May 3, 1983). Two and half years later the Soviets completely reversed their position and opened the first session of SALT at Helsinki, Finland in November 1969 "making McNamara-like noises about the destabilizing effects of ABM deployment," as one U.S. official put it. Soviet motives for making this about-face were several. But Kissinger's "bargaining chip" of the U.S. Safeguard ABM system was not one of them (see below). The Tal'roze breakthrough and Soviet recognition that they led the West in

directed-energy technologies were deciding factors.

The Rand reports, prepared for and reviewed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's (DARPA) laser technologies committee in February 1971, resulted in special meetings of the National Security Council (NSC) SALT Verification Panel and issuance of National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM) 117 and 127 in July and August 1971. The State Department, the CIA, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) called for a total ban on directed-energy technologies, including research and development. Kissinger, knowing the Soviets would never go along with such proposals, rejected the proposed ban on R&D and denigrated the Soviet lead. NSDM 127 called for the U.S. SALT negotiating team to press for a ban on ABM systems based on directed energy, exclusive of research and development. Even this proposal flopped. The final treaty included Agreed Statement D, which stipulates that

in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion. . . .

President Nixon was kept totally in the dark regarding the directed-energy issue and many other SALT matters, as Kissinger himself testifies in his memoir, *The White House Years*:

Nixon took a keen interest in the strategy for SALT and in what channels it should be negotiated. But the details of the various plans bored him; in effect, he left the selection of options to me. Yet if the bureaucracy had become aware of this, all vestige of discipline would have disappeared. I therefore scheduled over Nixon's patient protests a series of NSC meetings where options were presented to a glassy-eyed and irritable President so that directives could be issued with some plausibility on his authority.

The origins of SALT

The purpose of SALT was always to bring to bear the weight of international negotiations to impose a technological freeze on the United States. The first step in this process was the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, through which McNamara dealt a severe blow to the U.S. Army ABM program. The treaty prevented the U.S. from learning of the "X-ray effect" until 1967 (and then from the Soviets themselves) and from developing a solution to ABM radar "blinding."

As reports of Soviet deployment of the Galosh system around Moscow and of the ABM capabilities of the Tallinn perimeter defense system intensified in the mid-1960s, McNamara could no longer defuse the movement towards ABM, as congressional committees increasingly caught him

lying to protect his repulsive MAD policy. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously called for a program to build a nationwide ABM system at a meeting with President Johnson Dec. 6, 1966, McNamara proposed to hold off on deployment until the State Department attempted to open negotiations with the Soviets to limit ABMs. The Soviet response to the U.S. proposal for an ABM ban was a swift "Nyet." Premier Kosygin ridiculed the proposal to ban systems "designed instead to prevent the death of people" and called for negotiations limiting offensive weapons instead. After Kosygin restated this position at his Glassboro, N.J. meeting with Johnson in June 1967, the purpose of subsequent U.S. strategic defense policy was to attempt to get the Soviets to the bargaining table—as allies against U.S. technology development.

The bargaining chip hoax

In September, McNamara announced deployment of the Sentinel ABM system, described absurdly as an anti-China system. McNamara motivated the system as a vehicle for forcing the Soviets into talks.

Subsequently, Kissinger emphasized that he succeeded in negotiating the SALT I treaties because of U.S. commitment to deploy the Safeguard ABM system, a redesign of Sentinel to protect U.S. Minuteman ICBM sites from attack. There is absolutely no truth to this contention. Both Soviet and U.S. experts knew that the Safeguard system would not function. There were two reasons for this.

First, all U.S. ABM system designs would suffer from "radar blinding" under attack. This refers to the fact that nuclear warheads of anti-missile missiles detonated against incoming ICBMs would blind the ground-based radars that acquire targets and guide the missiles to intercept. After the first interception and warhead detonation, there would be a significant period of time during which incoming ICBMs could descend undetected by Safeguard. According to Dr. Edward Teller and numerous other sources, the Soviets acquired knowledge in their 1961-63 test series with which to integrate radar with interception to avoid blinding. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 prevented the United States from ever acquiring that knowledge.

Second, Safeguard radars, designed for a system to protect cities, were not hardened. They could only withstand one-tenth the blast that the missiles they were supposed to protect could withstand. A Soviet attack could first blind the radar with a high altitude nuclear burst, then destroy the blinded radar and attack the Minuteman sites with impunity. Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky, director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator, presented this argument for redesigning Safeguard components to withstand a nuclear blast on March 28, 1969 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The redesign never occurred.

The actual reasons for Soviet agreement to SALT were three. First, breakthroughs in directed-energy beam technology opened the prospect of ABM systems that would be

cheaper and more effective than anti-missile missiles. The 1968-69 U.S. development of MIRVs, missiles with multiple warheads each able to be independently targeted, simply underscored the need for ABM systems to be based on directed-energy technologies.

Second, between 1967 and 1969 the Soviets achieved parity with the United States in numbers of ICBMs. By the time of the signing of the treaties, they had a 60 percent lead.

The third reason was Henry Kissinger.

Kissinger defined "ABM system" in the negotiations and in the treaty to mean the bankrupt Safeguard system. This definition covered only a fraction of Soviet ABMs. Article II reads:

For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of: a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode; b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.

This definition does cover the Soviet Galosh ABM at Moscow. But Soviet spokesmen, such as the late Defense Minister Andrei Grechko and Soviet Civil Defense head Vasily Chuikov, always referred to Soviet ABM systems. At the time of the negotiations, the Soviet "Tallinn" perimeter defense anti-aircraft and ABM system did not include large, phased array radars. Its radars were smaller, but nonetheless could guide its SA-5 surface-to-air missiles to ICBM intercepts. Kissinger deliberately overlooked the system to impose controls on U.S. ABM development. Large radars have since been deployed (See *EIR*, May 3, 1982).

This "concession" won Soviet agreement on an ABM treaty soon after the start of formal talks in November 1969. On offensive missiles, the Soviets had completely reversed themselves. Now that they were surpassing the United States in land-based ICBMs they were no longer eager to negotiate limits on offensive missiles. The extent of the Soviet build-up was staggering. Their ICBM force had grown from 570 in mid-1967 to 1,440 by the end of 1970, a 386-missile lead over the United States.

Because of this build-up Kissinger was pressed to negotiate limits on offensive arms as a precondition for U.S. agreement on ABMs. On May 20, 1971 came a "break-through," better described as surrender. The Soviets were very appreciative. Kissinger offered to freeze U.S. ICBMs at 1,054 and Soviet ICBMs at 1,618. This proposal was the basis of the joint letter between Nixon and Kosygin issued that day. By this time, the Soviets realized they could get whatever they wanted.

Kissinger pressed for a five-year freeze on all ballistic missiles. But the Soviets only had 510 submarine launched

ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to the United States's 656. They were opposed. Solution: Kissinger flew to Moscow in April 1972 at the suggestion of Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. Nixon gave Kissinger a mandate to negotiate on Vietnam and explicitly instructed him not to negotiate on SALT. Instead, Kissinger violated Nixon's orders and initiated negotiations on SLBMs. Nixon radioed Kissinger repeatedly warning him not to overstep his authority. Kissinger writes in his memoirs:

While my associates and I were aware of major breakthroughs, we were being bombarded with missives from Washington that we had been "taken in" by the wily Soviets.

Kissinger disregarded Nixon's instructions and offered the Soviets the right to build up to a level of 950 submarine missiles before their side of the freeze would go into effect. U.S. SLBMs remain frozen at 656.

In testimony before a congressional committee, Kissinger explained his SALT policy with the following incredible statement:

Since the middle 1960s, the growth of the Soviet strategic force has been massive. . . . This has happened without the U.S. attempting to make a significant effort to rectify that state of affairs. One reason was that it was not easy to rectify. But another was the growth of a school of thought to which I myself contributed . . . which considered that strategic stability was a military asset and in which the amazing theory developed, i.e., vulnerability contributed to peace and invulnerability contributed to the risks of war . . . opponents of (ABMs) saw in the strategic vulnerability of the United States a positive asset.

The military policy consistent with Kissinger's MAD SALT was never American. Lyndon LaRouche has emphasized in his *How to Prevent Nuclear Holocaust* that MAD's nuclear umbrella protects only the conduct of genocide in the developing sector. Kissinger recounted the origin of his negotiations policy in a speech before the Royal Institute for International Affairs May 10, 1982:

Fortunately, Britain had a decisive influence over America's rapid awakening to maturity in the years following [World War II]. In the 1940s and 50s our two countries responded together to the geopolitical challenge of the Soviet Union. . . .

In my period in office, the British played a seminal part in certain American bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union—indeed, they helped draft the key documents. In my White House incarnation then, I kept the British Foreign Office better informed and more closely engaged than I did the American State Department. . . .