

EIR Special Report

Moscow's unveiled war plan against the United States

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
Congressmen's offices around Washington will be numbed with shock after reading the top Soviet military commander's description of Soviet war-plans against the United States published in Moscow's *Izvestia* this past May 9. It has been a long time since any major power announced in the press that it has a definite war-plan against another power, especially a war-plan implied to be made ready to go into operation as early as this year. That is exactly what the author of the article, Soviet Chief of Staff Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, did.

The outline of the Soviet war-policy against the United States by Marshal Ogarkov contained nothing really new concerning Soviet military strategy as such. What Ogarkov wrote is only an update of the same strategic policy Moscow has maintained since Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii's *Soviet Military Strategy* was issued back in 1962. Since 1962, Soviet military policy for future war against the United States has been based on development and deployment of strategic anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) defense systems, to knock out a large portion of attacking NATO missiles, and to follow a massive thermonuclear barrage against the United States with a full-scale "conventional" assault against Western Europe, with aid of supporting nuclear weapons. Basically, Ogarkov simply restated the Sokolovskii doctrine, which has been continuous Soviet strategy for at least the past 20 years. The Soviets have been preparing to fight a full-scale thermonuclear war, to survive it, and to win it.

Sokolovskii in practice

It's true, that since Defense Secretary McNamara and his harem of "pug-washed" whiz-kids sold the fairy tale of "Mutual and Assured Destruction" (MAD) to President Johnson back during Good Old Vietnam War-days, many people have **actually** believed that neither superpower could survive a thermonuclear war. "The Soviets would never do it!" we hear over and over again. "Both sides would be destroyed!"

Technically, surviving (and actually winning) an all-out thermonuclear war is like walking a long tightrope across a pit filled with burning gasoline. It takes



The evidence adds up to the conclusion that the Soviet leadership is anything but "peaceloving." Above, a Norwegian Starfighter intercepts a U.S.S.R. intelligence plane.

professional training and exactly the right equipment. That is what *Soviet Military Strategy* said back in 1962. For example:

"Possibilities are being studied for the use, against rockets, of a stream of high-speed neutrons as small detonators for the nuclear charge of the rocket, and the use of electromagnetic energy to destroy the rocket charge in the descent phase of the trajectory or to deflect it from its target. Various radiation, anti-gravity, and anti-matter systems, plasma (ball lightning), etc., are also being studied as a means of destroying rockets. Special attention is devoted to lasers ("death rays"); it is considered that in the future, any missile and satellite can be destroyed with powerful lasers."

That was first published two years after the first successful laser had been developed in 1960. Today, we have lasers with power in the tens of kilowatts range; laboratory-tested lasers could be made operational in space as early as sometime between 1986 and 1988 by the United States, if we are really committed to getting the job done. Moscow is significantly ahead of us in developing such beam-weapons systems, but with a "crash program" we could overtake them.

What Marshal Ogarkov described as Soviet war-plans against the United States is completely sensible military doctrine—if Moscow is on the verge of deploying even a 50 percent effective directed-beam strategic ABM defense system. Moscow would pay a horrible price in such a war, but unless we have a directed-beam strategic ABM defense system, Moscow would win the war, and might rule the world for one or two hundred years thereafter. Thermonuclear war, like the election of President Jimmy Carter, is a horrible

threat to the entirety of civilization, but the horror of the fact does not make its happening impossible.

To a certain kind of mentality in the Soviet Union, especially carry-overs of the "Old Believers" and "Third Rome" cults—like the gang headed by former U.S. Air Force Intelligence official Joe Churba, that plans to set off the Battle of Armageddon by rebuilding Solomon's Temple on Jerusalem's Dome of the Rock—such a horrifying war might be an acceptable price to pay for world-rule by the pan-Slavic empire after the war. Those who insist that such a war is "unthinkable" to rational governments seem to overlook the kind of wild nuts, like Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini, taking over one government after the other around the world these days.

The content of what Marshal Ogarkov wrote in *Izvestia* on May 9, should not surprise anyone who knows that Sokolovskii's doctrine never ceased being Moscow's strategic policy. What is newsworthy, is the fact that this was published so prominently in the Soviet government's leading daily newspaper at this time.

In the second section of his *Izvestia* article Ogarkov underlines very plainly the reason his threatening statement is being published at this time.

"Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, referring to talks on intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe, noted that our position is that the U.S.S.R. should not have more missiles or warheads than the NATO side during any mutually-agreed period. If the number of warheads of the English and French missiles is reduced, we will reduce the number of warheads on our own intermediate-range missiles by an equal number. The same approach might be extended to that class of aviation

weapons deployed in Europe. In this way, there would be an approximate parity between the U.S.S.R. and NATO both in respect to intermediate-range nuclear delivery vehicles—that is, missiles and aircraft—and in respect to the number of warheads they carry, with that parity level being considerably lower than it is today.”

Ogarkov's threat

Does this sound like the typical sort of arms-control negotiations double talk? It is worse than that. The next sentence Ogarkov writes after this preceding paragraph is a lalalalooza!

At the present moment, the entire Soviet leadership is committed to forcing the United States into a 1962-style missiles crisis. This time, Andropov must intend to succeed where Khrushchev failed. Secretary Andropov has learned nothing from the President's March 23 address. The quality of command decision seen on March 23 is a repeatable quality.

“ ‘Anyone who says ‘No’ in response to this proposal of ours,’ said Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, ‘will be assuming a heavy responsibility before the nations of Europe and the entire world.’ ”

Nasty? It becomes much worse. A few sentences later, Ogarkov adds:

“These peace initiatives and far-reaching proposals have been received with understanding and hope by the world public.”

At least, Ogarkov says only “world public,” and spares us Moscow's populist litany about “progressive and peace-loving peoples.” In the next two sentences, he comes directly to the point.

“Unfortunately, there is as yet no positive reaction from the governments of the NATO countries, and this is necessarily a disturbing fact.”

In the next sentences, he writes the clincher.

“The lessons of the Second World War, and especially the Great Patriotic War, urgently demand of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community that they show the highest degree of vigilance and compel them to show unceasing concern about their defense capabilities.”

Ogarkov has included here a distinction which might be confusing to most readers in the West. He is insisting that the 1939-1945 wars of Britain, France, the United States, and so forth, against Germany, Italy, and Japan (the “Second World War”), was not the same war as the 1941-1945 war of the Soviet Union against the Axis Powers (the “Great Patriotic War”). The Second World War is classed by Soviet doctrine as an “inter-imperialist war,” whereas Soviet doctrine classifies the Great Patriotic War as a “justifiable war.” The Soviet war-plans against NATO and the U.S.A. are classed as “justifiable warfare.”

The threat is very plain: Accept Andropov's terms, or the Warsaw Pact forces will be mobilized and ready to face the risk of “justifiable” intercontinental thermonuclear warfare.

This threat is shocking, but not surprising. Since March 23, 1983, when President Ronald Reagan announced the new U.S. strategic doctrine, Soviet General Secretary Andropov has consistently shown that already, long before the President's March 23 announcement, he was preparing a 1983 replay of the 1962 missiles crisis. There is strong evidence that Andropov was already committed to orchestrating such a new 1962-style missiles crisis at the time his position as successor to the dying Secretary Leonid Brezhnev was settled, by June 1982.

At the present moment, the entire Soviet leadership is solidly committed to forcing the United States into a 1962-style missiles crisis, possibly months before December 1983. This time, Andropov must intend to succeed where Nikita Khrushchev failed in 1962. In 1962, the United States had overwhelming strategic preponderance; in 1983, the U.S.S.R. has a significant military edge. In 1983, Andropov has the open support of Henry A. Kissinger's business partner, Lord Peter Carrington, David Watt of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Lord Carver, the international nuclear freeze movement, and large bodies of clergy of many denominations. The apparent thinking is, that the international gang-up against President Reagan by Kissinger & Company, combined with worldwide economic depression, a monstrous international financial crisis, U.S. humiliation in Iran, U.S. failures orchestrated with help of Kissinger in the Lebanon crisis, crisis in Central America, and budget-crisis at home, will pile more crises on the President than he can handle all at one time. Andropov is conducting a psychological warfare campaign against both the White House and other countries. One day, Andropov makes a negotiations offer; a few days later, he explains his offer away, as he did in a speech in Finland this past week. He is working to soften the world up, before closing in for the showdown.

Unfortunately, Andropov is not merely bluffing. He is whipping up the Soviet population and institutions to be ready for a visit to the brink of thermonuclear war as early as sometime during 1983.

A closer look at some among the statements Marshal Ogarkov presents as “facts” show the direction of current Soviet policy most clearly.



Soviet troops simulate occupation of enemy territory after a nuclear blast.

Is Andropov really a 'peacenik'?

If the Soviet SS-20s are fully deployed in Europe, at about 28 to 30 minutes before zero-hour, on the day the Soviet attack begins, between 400 and 500 highly accurate thermonuclear warheads from those missiles will be directed against every significant military, logistical, and other major target in Western Europe. If the shorter-range missiles of the same "family" as the SS-20s are also deployed, within 8 to 10 minutes of such a launch there would not be anything left worth mentioning of the military capabilities or economic infrastructure of Western Europe. The SS-20 deployment-capability is a massive "overkill" directed against Western Europe, before counting any other weapons.

Some would argue that the United States and NATO started this proliferation of intermediate-range ballistic missiles back during the 1974 period, with Defense Secretary James Schlesinger's announcements of "Forward Nuclear Defense" and proposals for nuclear warfare limited to the European theater. Some would argue that Henry A. Kissinger personally started the present missiles-crisis countdown during 1979, when his shouting about the "Finlandization of Germany," plus his friend Helmut Schmidt, pushed the decision to deploy the Pershing-IIs through NATO, under the label of "Double-Track" strategic-arms negotiations. Whom-ever we choose to blame for this mess on our own side of the fence, this was the mess handed to President Reagan by the Trilateral Commission's Jimmy Carter.

We helped create the problem, but Moscow was already deploying the SS-20s before Kissinger pushed the Pershing-IIs through NATO in 1979. There is other evidence that Andropov is not exactly the distilled essence of the "progressive and peace-loving peoples of the world" current Moscow propaganda might attempt to make him appear.

On March 25, 1983, President Ronald Reagan made a generous offer to Secretary Andropov. He announced a new strategic doctrine of the United States, a doctrine which would make possible a takedown of the world's thermonuclear-missiles arsenals. In case Secretary Andropov missed the point of the offer, Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger and other administration officials repeated the offer in very clear language during the following days and weeks. If Moscow had offered to negotiate on the basis of that repeated offer from the Reagan administration, there would be no reason to face a new thermonuclear missiles crisis now.

How did Secretary Andropov react to this generous offer? Neither the entire text of the President's announcement, nor any reference at all to the last portion of the televised address, has appeared in any leading Soviet publication. After a few days, the denunciations of the President and his blacked-out speech began pouring out of the Soviet press, statements that many Soviet citizens would have recognized as outright lies if they had had opportunity to study what President Reagan had actually said.

Did Marshal Ogarkov tell the truth when he wrote in *Izvestia* on May 9: "Unfortunately, there is as yet no positive reaction from the governments of the NATO countries"? The truth is, that it has been Secretary Andropov who has said repeatedly words to the effect: "Either President Reagan submits to my demands, or I spit in the face of any offer of negotiations from him."

In any case, exactly how "peace-loving" are the terms of surrender Andropov demanded of NATO and France in his state-dinner address in East Germany? He offered to count one SS-20 warhead as equal to each British and French warhead. How fair, exactly how peace-loving was this demand? The fact is that the SS-20s are "fourth generation," mobile, precision missiles, which would hit any targeted British missile silo of choice within about eight minutes of launching, while the near-sighted British missile was out at the bank cashing its retirement check. Andropov's offer is like offering the British the right to arm its troops with one cricket bat for every Soviet machine gun. So much for Secretary Andropov's doctrine of fair weights-and-measures on the subject of strategic "parity."

Such propaganda tricks have become typical Andropovese. In an interview with the confessed drug-smuggler Rudolf Augstein, the publisher of West Germany's *Der Spiegel*, Andropov told the following bewitching little fairy tale. He said that the United States is a sea power, whose culture causes it to do such terrible things as putting thermonuclear missiles on naval vessels. We Soviets, he continued, are a continental power; Soviet land-loving missiles would not be comfortable except on land. As if it were not the massively expanding fleet of Soviet missile-carrying submarines, which Soviet circles have already hinted will be used to put about 250 thermonuclear warheads within about five minutes from

the cities of the U.S. Pacific and Atlantic coast.

There was a bit more to that fairy tale of Andropov's than almost denying the existence of Admiral Gorchkov's Soviet Navy.

He stated in the same interview, that the United States could do as it pleased in Nicaragua, but that the Soviet Union would do as it pleased with such nations on its own borders as Afghanistan. Since West Germany is on the border of the Warsaw Pact nations East Germany and Czechoslovakia, the Comrade Andropov's Soviet borders might prove soon to be the nations of France, the Low Countries, Denmark, and Austria, and then Italy, Spain, and then Portugal. It was an interesting suggestion to plant in the mind of *Der Spiegel's* German readership. It was most fortunate that Augstein, who had avoided attending his trial for international drug-smuggling in Italy at the time, was not too ill to conduct the interview in Moscow.

About a week after that interview was published in the April 25 edition of *Der Spiegel*, the Moscow press denounced the U.S. press for blacking out coverage of the *Der Spiegel* interview. We are still waiting for publication of President Reagan's March 23 announcement in a Soviet newspaper. Such are the present standards of "serious negotiations" visible from Secretary Andropov's Moscow.

How good is the president's offer?

Admittedly, the Soviet leadership does have two substantial objections to President Reagan's March 23 announcement.

The first objection is not of a nature to be negotiable. Over the period 1966-82, the NATO powers had destroyed most of their research-and-development activities, had slipped at increasing rates toward a position of military inferiority to growing Soviet military strength, and were turning their economies into the obsolescence, wreckage, and strategic impotence of "post-industrial societies." By 1982, the West is in the grip of a new, worldwide economic depression, and, since August 1982, has been teetering on the edge of the biggest international financial collapse in history. No uncommon brilliance in arithmetic was needed by Moscow to calculate that by about the 1990s the Soviet Empire would emerge as an unchallengeable world-power. If President Reagan were to suddenly launch a high-technology buildup of the U.S. economy, this would be viewed in Moscow (as I recently told a Washington, D.C. audience) with all of the enthusiasm and joy of a boy who, two days before Christmas, had just learned that his own father had killed Santa Claus.

The second objection, while related to the first, was of the sort which should have been one of the leading topics of serious negotiations, if Secretary Andropov had had any interest in negotiating anything but President Reagan's humiliating surrender. In large part, because of its own internal mismanagement of its economy, the Soviet civilian economy suffers from painful capital-goods bottlenecks. This implies that, if the two powers engage in a race to develop and deploy directed-beam strategic ABM defense systems, the spill-over

of new technologies would cause the U.S. economy to boom, racing ahead of Soviet economic growth rates. This would mean that, after two or three years, the U.S. economy could easily afford a high rate of growth in spending for better ABM systems, while the Soviet economy could not afford to keep up with our rates.

Not only does the Soviet agricultural problem drag down the average productivity of the economy as a whole. According to Soviet literature itself, the Soviet managers follow an approach to replacement-capital investments which I, as an economist, find downright lunacy. They invest in replacement of "old bricks" first, and, if there are any funds left over, they might invest in new technologies! They are as bad as a typical Harvard Business School graduate!

Unlike our own recently endangered species of American farmer, or the Mexican farmers of Sonora waiting for the irrigation water to make Sonora a new "Imperial Valley," the kind of farmer saturated with "traditionalist" methods of farming stubbornly resists "Westernizing" efforts to cause him to change his ways. Nineteenth-century Russian and early Soviet literature was steeped in anecdotes, sociological studies, and so forth, on this tendency among Russian serfs and ex-serfs.

If those organic cultural-philosophical outlooks spill over into the ranks of an administrative bureaucracy in industry, and if that bureaucracy gains control of the management in the way bureaucracies usually attempt to accomplish this, the result must be more or less the same reported by the indicated Soviet literature. Such a bureaucracy is very good at making things not work, and able to avoid generating any visible profits which a central government, once detecting to exist, might divert to uses not in keeping with the special preferences of a sly, hedonistic collection of nepotic, cliquish, conniving bureaucrats.

The "trick" of good industrial management is to use up the old machinery and equipment as fast as possible, in order to eliminate the old capital goods, in favor of the most advanced replacement, or even a brand-new approach to production of that category of output. Even an industrial plant which is temporarily operating below break-even can become prosperous, if it can apply a large part of its limited replacement-capital budget for capital-goods and related investments which represent a significant leap upward in levels of technology.

Soviet Academician Velikhov, one of the world's leading laser scientists, has been given one major industrial plant as a pilot model for changing Soviet managerial behavior for the better, but there is every indication that this case is an exception.

Soviet spokesmen often excuse the failings of their economy by pointing to the catastrophic effects of World War II, and other historical facts. The facts themselves are more or less true, but 30 years after the death of Stalin, and more than 25 years after Sputnik, their economic problems today are more the result of their mismanagement of their economy,

than either historic problems or the admittedly very high percentage of national output consumed by military expenditures. Reviewing some of the leading speeches delivered at recent Soviet Party and related categories of conferences, the Soviet leadership is more or less accurately aware of the fact that mismanagement is a major problem, if not perhaps the major problem. The relevant U.S. and Western European "Sovietologists" more or less share this writer's opinion that that greatest obstacle to attempted correction of mismanagement within the Soviet economy is less technical than sociological, cultural, and probably very, very political as well.

The essence of the 1983 missiles crisis is the simple fact that thermonuclear 'deterrents' have ceased to be deterrents. We have reached the 'point of no return' with this deterrence doctrine. Moscow refuses to negotiate scrapping the doctrine. Therefore, unless Moscow is very stupid, Moscow has chosen either to force a decisive U.S. strategic backdown, or to go directly to risk of total thermonuclear war.

Whether the Soviet leadership would admit this even privately, one cannot be certain, but we must suggest that the opposition to a technology race with the United States around Moscow today is not really that the Soviet economy could not accelerate its rate of technological progress in the civilian sectors; one must suggest that the Soviet leadership is afraid of the factional uproar and related political problems which would probably erupt in resistance to any effort to force an appropriate shift in habits of management practice in a general way.

Would they actually prefer to start World War III, rather than face the possible outburst of rage from the muzhik soul of Mother Russia's Tolstoyan children of blood and soil?

Otherwise, there is no basis for any technical objections to the President's doctrine.

The present U.S. strategic doctrine, announced on March 23, is a mirror-image of the Soviet Military Strategy of Marshal Sokolovskii et al. Moscow is not in a position to denounce our following the same doctrine which Marshal Ogarkov reaffirmed even after the President's announcement.

They accuse President Reagan of threatening a "first strike" with this new doctrine. Does that mean that the doctrine they have been following for 20 years has always been a buildup in preparation for a first strike against the United States? Did the President even suggest that he was going to build the U.S. equivalent of a Soviet G-1 rocket, to put more than 100 tons of space-based thermonuclear missiles into orbit, each shot of such a missile? Your repeated references to first strike make us begin to wonder, what packages weighing more than 100 tons each you Soviets have buried somewhere, waiting to be put in orbit by a G-1-series launcher!

The Soviet leadership knows that the war-winning policy for a power with a full strategic ABM defense system is not to launch either a first strike salvo or to "launch under attack." The war-winning scenario is to disarm the adversary by destroying the arsenal he launches, after which his assault-capabilities have been depleted, and he is put relatively at the pleasure of the force which he has foolishly assaulted. Furthermore, since strategic ABM defense systems based on the physical principles of directed-beam weapons can kill missiles at a cost an order of magnitude less than the cost of the missile killed, the preponderance of strategic power shifts to the defense, as Dr. Edward Teller has stated repeatedly, and as every relevant Soviet scientist and related analyst knows.

Unless Moscow has a suspicion that the United States intends to put something like General Daniel Graham's flying junk-pile into orbit, their repeated charges of first strike are worse than nonsense.

"First strike" is already a thing of the past. By developing highly accurate missiles, and by deploying highly accurate intermediate-range missiles, such as the Soviet SS-20s and our Pershing IIs, we have forced the strategic posture of both superpowers—and also France and Britain—out of the 1970s now-obsolete first-strike posture, into a present condition of "launch under attack." A missile targeted by a precision thermonuclear missile will be destroyed unless it is launched immediately, before a first strike success could occur. "First strike" no longer has any military value, unless "sneak attack" en-masse could be assured to the attacker.

Another fraudulent objection, is the Soviet allegation that directed-beam ABM systems cannot be developed. There are two facts which expose fully the depth and width of Soviet sincerity in bleating this objection over the international news media's pages. First, it is most curious to discover the exotic Soviet logic which, in one breath, insists that such weapons cannot be developed, and, in the next breath, insists that they will be developed to make possible an early first-strike attack on the U.S.S.R. by the U.S.A. Second, some among the patriotic Soviet figures who dutifully signed the statement, are among the leading experts in the world in successfully developing directed-beam systems of proven efficiency in destroying ballistic missiles in test runs. We must conclude that Moscow does not object to its own development of such weapons, but that they wish the United States to remain defenseless against Soviet missiles. One may wonder what

their motive for that might be?

Contrary to all such objections, unless we agree to scrap the existing arms-control negotiations agenda based on "Nuclear Deterrence," and adopt a new agenda based on the President's doctrine of Mutually Assured Survival, there is no conceivable result of the radioactive-eyeball contest shaping up rapidly now, but either a decisive strategic backdown by one of the superpowers, or an actual thermonuclear war.

The essence of the 1983 missiles crisis is the simple fact that thermonuclear "deterrents" have ceased to be deterrents. The development of first-strike-capable missiles, and the inevitable progress of deployments toward "Forward Defense," has caused the missiles crisis. We have reached the "point of no return" with this Nuclear Deterrence Doctrine. At this point, we have only three options: (1) Agree to scrap the doctrine; (2) One power must back down to the decisive strategic advantage of the other; (3) Have the damned war, and get it over with.

Moscow refuses to negotiate scrapping the doctrine. Therefore, unless Moscow is very stupid, Moscow has consciously chosen either option (2) Force a decisive strategic backdown to ensure Soviet world-rule by the 1990s, or (3) Go directly to risk of total thermonuclear war.

The obvious short-term alternative for 1983, under the first option, (1) Agreement to Mutually Assured Survival, is to pull back both U.S. and Soviet thermonuclear missiles to a minimum of 20 minutes time-to-target of the opposing superpower. This means no intermediate-range, medium-range, or short-range land-based missiles of either superpower in Europe or the Mediterranean littoral. The first step of takedown of deterrent capability is superpower deployment of homeland and sea-based thermonuclear weapons only. That stops the immediate countdown in Europe.

The negotiations' problems include:

(1) **Aircraft.** The "warning-time," or "time-to-target" distinction between aircraft and missiles is a matter of order of magnitude. Strategic bombers are inherently "second strike" strategic capabilities; they are a problem of technology circa 1960, at least on principled accounts. Perhaps this means that the SALT agreements were wrong? So be it! Make new agreements consistent with reality.

(2) **French and British missiles.** Historically, as we should all remember from the early 1960s, the British missiles-policy emerged around the British insistence on developing and maintaining a "sovereign thermonuclear capability" not under the control of the U.S.A. or NATO. The *force de frappe* was designed by President Charles de Gaulle also as a by-product of the policy of military sovereignty, but de Gaulle's logic was not comparable otherwise to that of the British. De Gaulle was determined to oblige NATO to keep the thermonuclear umbrella implicitly over France, and also to create a nuclear trip-wire-defense of France in the vicinity of the Rhine, thus weakening Warsaw Pact desire to enter a non-nuclearized Germany in the first place.

There are two relevant issues here. First, the question of

the durability of absolute U.S. thermonuclear or equivalent defense-system umbrella over Western Europe. Second, the not-irrelevant fact that a sovereign state has a sovereign right to a sovereign defense based within its own territory. There is no acceptable approach to the matter of British and French missiles, except to limit the negotiations to the issues of restricting the basing of thermonuclear missiles systems to the territory of the thermonuclear power responsible for those missiles.

Nuclear 'chicken'

All of these considerations we have cited are well known to the Soviet leadership. Their absolute objections to the President's proposed negotiations-agenda can only be the following.

(1) They are committed to ensuring that the United States does not cease its drift into qualitative strategic inferiority, by no later than the 1990s; and, are determined to prevent the U.S.A. from following any strategic policy which would ensure its strategic parity into the 1990s.

(2) Lest the United States react thermonuclearly to the threatened blinking-out of its strategic parity during the years immediately ahead, Moscow was determined, even well before March 1983, to break the will of the United States now, to force the U.S.A. into a strategic doctrine and pattern of capabilities which would ensure that the U.S.A. peacefully passes through the "point of no return" into qualitative strategic inferiority.

(3) That Secretary Andropov intends to dodge all serious negotiations, except de facto capitulation to his unilateral doctrine, until the peak of the missiles crisis has either been touched, or is clearly in sight to both parties.

The pattern of Secretary Andropov's behavior reminds us of an earlier Rand Corporation psychological-warfare simulation. This simulation was modeled on the suicidal-existentialist "game" called Chicken, in which two lunatics drove automobiles directly toward one another, accelerating along the center of a stretch of highway appropriated for this recreational activity. The first to blink and swerve was the Chicken, the loser.

Under the present mode, Moscow is quite capable of using its British-intelligence and other levers, to orchestrate the Khomeini regime into atrocities against a Soviet embassy or some caper of similar marketable value as a "political incident." If the U.S.A. is committed to defend Khomeini, so much the more convenient for Moscow. Soviet forces will crush Khomeini's Iran, and the United States will be unable to make any efficient response to oppose this. Such and other Hallowe'en practices, directed to a psychological-warfare process of attempting to disorient, humiliate, and cow the United States and its allies, are the weather forecasts for the strategic period ahead—very wet—if Moscow continues the present direction.

President Reagan's March 23, 1983 address did not trigger the indicated Soviet behavior; the Soviet game was al-

ready afoot months earlier. Reagan's proposed alternative to a crisis had the effect of unmasking the ongoing Soviet intentions. Once the President presented an offer of a real solution to the missiles-crisis threat, the Soviets were forced to expose the fact that they had not intended to have any serious pre-crisis negotiations.

There is no other explanation in sight, but that they are refusing to negotiate seriously with President Reagan for a very simple reason: They intend to plunge the world into the new missiles crisis, and have assured themselves that they will force the White House into a humiliating backdown into strategically decisive margins of concessions.

If so, and no other rational explanation of Andropov's behavior corresponds to the accumulation of evidence, then Andropov is a bigger fool than Khrushchev. Since Andropov's behavior presently is consistent with one relying on Tavistockian varieties of psychological-warfare tactics, we must presume that he imagines himself to be relying on the objective scientific foundation of psychology. Perhaps he sees himself as being psychologically scientific, objective,

and not an adventurer.

For my part, I shall do what lies within my means to persuade Secretary Andropov that his course of action is unscientific, and is objectively adventuristic lunacy.

It appears to be the case, that Secretary Andropov has learned nothing from the President's March 23, 1983 address. Had Secretary Andropov been scientific, he would have observed in the President's actions a quality of "command decision" which no President had shown in 20 years. This quality of personality is totally opposite to the Tavistock "cowboy profile" which fits precisely the psychological-warfare characteristics of Soviet preparations for a missiles crisis since November 1962. Secretary Andropov should seat himself comfortably, seating himself as any wise man would who was anticipating a new shock. The quality of command-decision seen on March 23, 1983 is a repeatable quality.

Secretary Andropov, you are facing something beyond Tavistock's comprehension. It would be better for all concerned, if you would stop the adventurous games and get down to negotiations.

Documentation

Ogarkov states war readiness is 'timely and appropriate'

The following article, titled "Victory and the Present," was published in the Soviet daily Izvestia, on May 9, 1983 by Nikolai Ogarkov, Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces, First Deputy Minister of Defense of the U.S.S.R., and Marshal of the Soviet Union.

May 9, 1945 occupies a special place in the historical annals of the first country of Soviets in the world. This was the day of our great victory over fascist Germany, the victory of the forces of progress and humanism over black reaction and barbarism. At the price of enormous sacrifice and deprivation, our people and its army not only defended the freedom and independence of the motherland, but they also provided international assistance to many peoples of Europe and Asia, thus opening the gates to the path towards further social progress and democracy on earth.

Soviet citizens and Soviet soldiers and sailors are celebrating the 38th anniversary of victory in an atmosphere of great success in the political and labor areas and under conditions of growing prestige of the Soviet state on the world scene.

Together with us, this holiday is being celebrated by the working people of the fraternal countries of socialism and all progressive humanity.

I.

Mankind has lived through many wars, great and small. But in terms of its political goals, scope and brutality, World War II has no equal in history. Sixty-one states and more than 80 percent of the world population were drawn into its crucible. The flames of war burned for 2,194 days and nights on the territory of 40 countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa and on the expanses of all the world oceans, and it claimed more than 50 million human lives.

The Second World War was unleashed by international imperialism. There is no question that the burden of responsibility for its preparation and unleashing lies above all with the Hitlerite fascist clique and the leaders of its satellites—Fascist Italy and militarist Japan. But in this context it must never be forgotten that a significant responsibility for the outbreak of the world conflagration lies with the ruling circles of the United States, England, France and a number of other