

sevelt were faced with an exceptionally difficult position at the outbreak of World War II in each country, because first of all Churchill had a very powerful splinter factor in England that was concerned with sustaining peaceful relationships with Germany, and he had the extraordinary skill to incorporate all of these people into a cohesive government when he took office somewhat later.

It's quite clear to me that Roosevelt took a leaf out of Churchill's book. He saw disruptive and divisive elements in his own government; he saw that there were people who had vested interests in sustaining alliances; and he simply amalgamated all the conflicting elements into something approaching a cohesive government. And indeed no other policy would have been possible. Had he exposed certain people for their misbehavior, for their malfeasance, it would have disrupted public confidence . . . when the entire country was ablaze with individual and singleminded patriotism that probably is unrivaled, at least up into the hostages crisis. Indeed, President Roosevelt became a kind of instrument of his own propaganda, creating the impression that the country was as one. . . .

So it's quite clear to me that Churchill and Roosevelt took the view that certain things must be overlooked, that the world was at war, these times were difficult, and it would not help to expose certain malfeasances. . . .

**EIR:** You open many leads which, of course, in one volume you only have time to touch on. If you were to pursue these leads for another book or recommend to other researchers where to go from here, what would be the priority area?

**Higham:** Well, I am simply an investigative journalist, historian, and biographer, and I am certainly not an economist, or an economic historian or a political historian. I think that the first thing that this book will do is, from its somewhat racy and journalistic position, to open the door to scholarship. In other words, I don't claim this book is a major work of scholarship, and I'd be a fool if I did—the book is a work of investigative journalism. . . . What I should like to see now is the subject tackled on a much broader scale with far more political and historical inferences and references, by a really major economic historian. It could be—as mine couldn't be, since it was a popular work—exhaustively footnoted; it could contain massive documentation, which I didn't have room for, and I would have lost my audience if I had included it.


However—I must add a rider to this—I don't feel very optimistic that such a book will occur, simply because I regard the academic establishment as somewhat self-protective in these matters, and they tend to perpetuate statements that have been previously made—so that person would have to be extremely revisionist by temperament, and rather daring within the groves of academe.

I think a sequel might be in order, although I don't think I'd be qualified or even capable of writing it, which would deal with the issue of collusion with the Soviet Union in high places.

## Currency Rates


### The dollar in deutschemarks

New York late afternoon fixing




### The dollar in yen

New York late afternoon fixing



### The dollar in Swiss francs

New York late afternoon fixing



### The British pound in dollars

New York late afternoon fixing

