

Averell Harriman and the postwar effort to undercut U.S. defense

by Kathleen Klenetsky

Part I of this article, which appeared in the June 14 issue of EIR, described Averell Harriman's allegiance to British imperial geopolitics and his efforts, through his influence in the Democratic Party and the U.S. State Department, to turn the United States into a powerless "post-industrial society." Harriman's activities in the Soviet Union in the 1920s were examined, along with his efforts during World War II on behalf of British, as opposed to American, strategic aims. The constant thread in Harriman's various postures toward the U.S.S.R. as a "Soviet handler" was shown to be his "back channel" collaboration with the KGB and its predecessors, as part of the British effort to use the Soviet Union for its own anti-American purposes while keeping it in check territorially.

As the war drew to an end, an open fight broke out among the Allies to determine who would dictate the contours of the postwar global map. The British—and their U.S. deputies in the Harriman circle—wanted to destroy any possibility for an alliance between the anti-Malthusians in the Soviet Union and those in United States. President Roosevelt represented a major obstacle to that goal.

Much to Winston Churchill's dismay, F.D.R. had already let it be known that one of his main objectives in the post-war period would be to rid the world of British colonialism and its "18th-century methods" and replace it with a program of world industrialization. Averell Harriman violently opposed F.D.R. on this point, going so far as to back Churchill when Roosevelt urged that Britain give India its freedom during the war.

There is every indication that Roosevelt thought it possible to draw the Soviets into this effort, and that, by encouraging the pro-Western city-building tendencies in the Soviet Union, to hold in check the blood-and-soil "Mother Russia" currents.

Harriman and his British friends played a crucial role in engineering the Cold War, which helped isolate those forces in the Soviet Union (such as Marshal Zhukov, Dwight Eisenhower's collaborator) who would have been amenable to a post-war arrangement with the West based on common interests. By doing so, Harriman gave an important boost to the Third Rome grouping in Russia.

During the latter part of the war, Harriman, in collaboration with Churchill, started an organized sniping campaign

against F.D.R., claiming that the President was either too ingenuous or too ill to deal with the Soviets in the hard, tough fashion that was required. (In one of his last messages to Churchill, dated March 24, F.D.R. responded to the British prime minister's repeated urgings that the United States adopt a tougher line toward the Soviets: "I would minimize the general Soviet problem as much as possible," the President wrote, "because these problems, in one form or another, seem to arise every day, and most of them straighten out.")

In early April 1945, aware that F.D.R. was quite ill, Harriman began sending back to Washington a series of cables warning of the Soviet danger. Immediately after Roosevelt's death on April 12, Harriman flew back to Washington, D.C. to take the new President, Harry Truman, in hand. "I felt that I had to see the President as soon as possible," Harriman later said, "in order to give him as accurate a picture as possible of our relations with the Soviet Union." Working in parallel with the British ambassador to Washington, Lord Halifax, Harriman primed Truman to scuttle F.D.R.'s postwar plans. Harriman told Truman that the Red Army was carrying on a new "barbarian invasion of Europe," and directed Truman to set up, under the rubrics of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and NATO, a system of blocs which successfully diverted the United States from its task of industrializing the underdeveloped world.

As Gen. Douglas MacArthur perceived at the time, there were two things the United States needed to do after World War II, both of which Harriman, as Truman's controller, sabotaged: first, to carry out Roosevelt's plan for bridge-building to the Soviets, by living up to the pledge to provide reconstruction aid in 1945-46; secondly, and simultaneously, to maintain a strong military establishment and make perfectly clear America's willingness to use it if attacked. Under Harriman's guidance, Truman did the opposite. He imposed a provocative strategy of putting impossible conditions on reconstruction aid to Moscow, blockading the U.S.S.R. and pecking away at its defense perimeter. And he unilaterally disarmed the United States, bringing troop strength from 11-12 million to half a million.

In early 1946, Truman named Harriman ambassador to Britain. Although he spent only six months as emissary to the Court of St. James, Harriman managed to inflict quite a bit of damage on the United States. One of his key accomplishments involved delivering United States nuclear secrets

to Britain. Shortly after the war ended, Congress passed the McMahon act, which had the effect of revoking the wartime alliance between the United States and Britain. Among other measures, the legislation specifically forbade the United States to share national security information, including that related to atomic weapons, with the British. Harriman was appalled by the act: The British, he moaned, "had given us everything during the war. Now the Congress of the United States made it illegal even to exchange information with them. I thought it was shameful. The British were determined to develop their own nuclear capability and we were suddenly debarred from helping them."

As he explains it "It took some wangling on Harriman's part, but he succeeded in arranging an invitation for Lord Portal, who was in charge of the British nuclear program, to visit the United States with several of his scientists. Portal and his associates were shown as much of the atomic energy facilities in the United States as the law allowed. When Harriman asked Portal on his return whether the visit had been satisfactory, he agreed, adding, 'We learned a lot of things that we should not do.' "

Cold warrior Harriman played a major role in handing China over to Mao Tse-tung's communist forces—an objective of the British, who had regarded China as "theirs" for centuries and preferred to see the secret-society-run Maoists continue China's primitive agrarianism, rather than allow America to launch economic development there. Harriman, taking the line put forth by such Mao sympathizers as John Paton Davies (whom he later vigorously defended against charges that he helped lose China to the communists), John Stewart Service, and his old ally, Gen. George Marshall, argued that Chiang Kai-shek was "too weak" to rule China alone and that "the best we could hope for was a divided China, with the communists holding the northern part and Chiang controlling the south." He vehemently opposed United States aid to Chiang, and urged the nationalist leader to forge a coalition government with the Maoists. The Harriman crew succeeded in overturning the strategy of support for Chiang's Nationalists which F.D.R. had worked out with Stalin and, by 1949, the Maoists had taken over mainland China. As part of the deal, the British were permitted to maintain Hong Kong as a Royal Colony. The United States got nothing.

Harriman next worked with Secretary of State Acheson and other anglophiles, including Dean Rusk, assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs (a post Harriman would hold in the early days of the Vietnam War), to sabotage the United States war effort in Korea—once Acheson had invited a North Korean/Chinese invasion by his notorious "defense perimeter" speech in January 1950.

Once the war had started, Harriman, Acheson, Rusk, et al. did everything in their power to sabotage General MacArthur's efforts, correctly viewing him as the one American leader capable of mobilizing the United States population to fulfill the great national purpose which F.D.R. had set: to develop the rest of the world, as MacArthur's occu-

pation policies in Japan proved could be done. Conspiring with their British allies, the Harrimanites deliberately sabotaged the Korean war effort, holding back supplies from MacArthur, refusing him permission to use a war-winning strategy, and, finally, getting Truman to fire him.

The British-Harrimanite goal in the Korean War fiasco was to create an international climate in which a recalcitrant European and United States citizenry would agree to a major military build-up in Europe against the Soviets. (NATO, though founded in 1949, had been little more than a paper organization when the Korean War began.)

Did the Harriman-British-engineered Cold War stop Soviet expansionism? Hardly. It had much the same effect as the British sabotage of the Soviet World War II effort. By building an extremely hostile, anti-Soviet environment, the British not only succeeded in diverting the United States from the policy laid out by F.D.R., but prompted the Soviet leadership to increase its grip over Eastern Europe. The Cold War strategy increased the power of the Third Rome faction by proving that entente with the West was unworkable.

Harriman disarms America

In 1955, the neo-Malthusians in Britain launched a new phase of their long-term strategy for keeping their empire free of industrial development, and manipulating the two great powers: the disarmament movement, which, underneath all the rhetoric of Lord Bertrand Russell's "ban the bomb" campaign, was an undeclared war against the United States, aimed at reducing its in-depth war-fighting capability, wrecking its industrial-technological infrastructure, and demoralizing its citizens.

The Harrimanites were willing collaborators, a fact underscored by Harriman's role in negotiating the destructive nuclear test ban treaty.

One of the immediate goals of the disarmament gambit was to put a cap on United States military development in those areas, such as the Pentagon's ABM research and development, which would have required an all-out mobilization of American industrial and scientific resources.

In the mid-1950s, the same British spokesmen who, before the U.S.S.R. developed atomic bomb capabilities, advocated preventive war against the Soviets, began to put forth, officially and otherwise, numerous disarmament schemes. They made special use of the United Nations, which they saw as the vehicle for their global-empire designs, and which had established several disarmament commissions beginning in 1956. Loudly supporting the British were the Soviets, who, still lagging behind the United States in military capability, were calling for "total and general disarmament." In 1959, shortly after Averell Harriman held several tête-à-têtes with Soviet Premier Khrushchev in Moscow, the British and Soviets joined forces to sponsor a joint disarmament resolution in the United Nations. The move took President Eisenhower completely by surprise.

Simultaneously, Harriman and his cronies began to use

Harriman's circle: racists, perverts, KGB agents

The Harriman family were the leading promoters of eugenics in the United States, advocating the unscientific view that an individual's intelligence, capabilities, and personality stem primarily from his racial inheritance. In the elaborate, peculiar scheme of racial supremacy developed by the Harrimans and their kept scientists, the Anglo-Saxons are on the top and their Russian (Slav) counterparts are near the bottom. In 1932, the Harriman family sponsored the Third International Congress of Eugenics at the Museum of Natural History in New York City, at which Dr. Ernst Rudin, the author of the later Nazi race laws, was elected president of the International Federation of Eugenics Organizations (see *EIR*, Sept. 7, 1982).

When Harriman returned from Russia to New York in 1927, he began attending the salon run by his elder sister, Mary Harriman Rumsey, whom Harriman credits with introducing him to politics. Rumsey was a raving eugenicist and promoter of Nazi race science. Through her salon, she patronized a variety of cults based on racialism and "ethnic identity."

Mary Rumsey had taken a particular interest in George Russell, an Irish poet who wrote under the pen name "A.E." He figured prominently in the so-called Irish literary renaissance which had been organized at Oxford University for the same reason the British promoted Pan-Slavism: to subvert nationalist sentiment into a fixation on blood and soil. Like others in his circle, notably avowed fascist William Butler Yeats, Russell was an early member of both the Theosophists and the Order of the Golden Dawn, the latter an occult group established by avowed Satan worshipper Aleister Crowley, who had traveled widely in Russia. Russell also knew Theosophy founder Madame Blavatsky quite well. His friend (and one of Yeats's few female lovers), fellow Theosophist Maude Goone, had served as an emissary between Olga Novikova and the British publisher and Round Table organizer W. T. Stead, two of the most important promoters of Pan-Slavism in the late 19th century.

This circle of occultists promoted the idea that the "real Ireland" resided in its pagan past and that the major problem represented by British domination was not the destruction of Irish efforts at industrialization but a failure to cultivate Ireland's ancient paganism.

Writing in 1975, Harriman cited George Russell as the source of his belief in world federalism: "[I] was fas-

cinated by Russell, a celebrated talker," Harriman noted, "when [we] met at Mrs. Rumsey's in the late twenties. Russell talked that evening of 'planetary understanding.' . . . [I] never forgot his words." In world-federalist terminology, "planetary understanding" refers to the global feudal empire Harriman et al. intend to bring into being.

Harriman and the *New York Times's* KGB agent

According to Harriman's own testimony, his best intelligence on the Soviet Union came from the *New York Times's* Moscow bureau chief, Walter Duranty. Harriman has written that it was Duranty who provided him with the best intelligence on Soviet Russia and that he "learned more from this journalist . . . than from any diplomat." This is a remarkable comment, given that Duranty, according to syndicated columnist and Anglo-American insider Joe Alsop, "was a great KGB agent and lied like a trooper."

Whether Duranty was working for the KGB, the British, or both, he was a fervid devotee of the cultist outlook the two share. British-born and Cambridge-educated, Duranty had become an ardent disciple of Crowley—the same Aleister Crowley with whom George Russell collaborated. Duranty participated in many of the black-magic rituals which Crowley presided over, including one which commenced with a homosexual act between Duranty and Crowley; proceeded through several stages of sexual sadism, including physical mutilation; and concluded with the group chanting a verse composed for the occasion by Duranty, which ran:

People upon the worlds are like maggots
upon an apple. . . . All worlds are excreta.
They waste wasted semen.
Therefore all is blasphemy.

Assigned by the *New York Times* to its Moscow bureau immediately after the Bolshevik seizure of power, Duranty established contact with one of the predecessor organizations of the KGB. He soon began to send back glowing dispatches about the Soviet experiment, which earned the *Times* the sobriquet, "The Uptown *Daily Worker*." By 1934, Duranty's pandering to the Soviet authorities had become so scandalous that the *Times* was forced to recall him. Harriman seemed unperturbed.

their considerable clout to make disarmament the Democratic Party's major issue.

This process had begun in early 1953, after Adlai Stevenson's dismal showing in the presidential election. Canadian economist J.K. Galbraith got together with his old crony Harriman to figure out how to secure control over the party's policymaking apparatus. Together with Stevenson, they decided to set up a high-powered study group which, despite its unofficial status, would be able to enforce its policy dictates on both the national and local party level. The idea was consciously modeled on the British parliamentary system, complete with provisions for an informal shadow cabinet and strict party discipline.

The group soon expanded to include former Air Force Secretary Thomas Finletter, a lawyer with the patrician firm of Coudert Brothers; Chester Bowles; George Kennan, who had been Harriman's aide in Moscow and succeeded him as ambassador; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.; George Ball; and a number of other prominent figures in the Harriman orbit—many of whom went on to serve in the Kennedy administration.

Described by Stevenson's biographer as "one of the most important, influential, and notable movements of American politics," the "Finletter Group" began to churn out policy studies, many of them on disarmament. One proposal was to establish a United States disarmament agency; this was implemented by John F. Kennedy in 1961. These papers became the basis of Stevenson's 1956 presidential platform, which stressed disarmament as a major theme, and, paralleling Bertrand Russell's propaganda, called specifically for a ban on atomic testing.

Shortly after the election, the Finletter Group decided to shed its "unofficial" status and turn itself into *the* policymaking body of the party. Though Harriman had gotten himself elected governor of New York in 1954, his circle was worried that their influence in the party might be slipping, especially in the wake of Stevenson's second trouncing by Eisenhower. They were particularly horrified that a number of leading middle-of-the-road Democrats, including Sen. Lyndon Johnson, had forged a bipartisan coalition with Eisenhower around foreign policy and had supported his anti-British position over the Suez incident.

Despite howls from Johnson and House Speaker Sam Rayburn (who were strong on political maneuvering but weak on policy), the Harrimanites succeeded in creating the Democratic Advisory Council (DAC), which almost overnight filled the vacuum as the party's chief policymaking group. Most of the leading members of the Finletter Group joined the DAC, including Harriman, Finletter, Stevenson, and Galbraith. Other key members included Dean Acheson and current Reagan administration arms negotiator Paul Nitze, who together chaired the DAC's foreign policy task force; and Walter Heller, Henry Fowler, Harlan Cleveland, George Ball, and United Autoworkers head Walter Reuther.

The DAC's general orientation is best summed up in a

1959 study called "The Basic Aims of United States Foreign Policy." Issued by the Council on Foreign Relations, the report was produced by a group that included such prominent DAC members as Harriman and Finletter, at the request of Harrimanite J. William Fulbright, then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The report made two things clear: that the disarmament campaign was to play a crucial role in helping to bring a world-federalist order into being; and that the developing "space race," with its ramifications for scientific development both in the U.S.S.R. and in the United States, made it imperative that the disarmament campaign be accelerated.

Stating that "undue emphasis on the military aspects [of national security] can be an obstacle to cooperation with nations important to us," the report went on to stress the importance of disarmament:

"Progress toward disarmament through the limitation and control of armaments is made urgent by the growing destructiveness of modern weapons, the projection of military power into outer space, and the prospective spread of nuclear weapons among an increasing number of states. . . . The whole process of working toward a better world order has a certain unreality in men's minds when they live under the threat of seeing all civilization engulfed by a nuclear war.

"These considerations make it imperative for the United States to conduct serious negotiations for international agreements on limitation, reduction and control of armaments. . . . a negative or perfunctory approach on the part of the United States cannot be permitted. It would compromise American influence abroad, jeopardize the aims of our foreign policy, and produce repercussions which might well impair the confidence of the American people in themselves and in their leadership.

"Even though it may be illusory and put forward for propaganda purposes, the Soviet proposal for complete disarmament has to be taken seriously and fully explored. . . .

"These points will probably have to be dealt with in direct and secret negotiations with the Soviet government. . . .

"There are really no sound alternatives to negotiation. We cannot be content with indefinite continuance of the present situation. We cannot look forward with equanimity to an all-out arms race extending even into the unlimited realms of space."

Secret negotiations were exactly what report author Averell Harriman had in mind when he flew off to Moscow in June of that year for lengthy talks with Khrushchev. The trip, widely publicized in the United States press, had been arranged by Harriman's old friend, Anastas Mikoyan, and took him throughout the Soviet Union. Upon returning home, the old cold warrior rushed into print a remarkable propaganda document, *Peace with Russia?*, which described in glowing terms the "tremendous strides" the Soviet Union had made under Khrushchev. The book played up the "great changes" which had occurred after Stalin's death—a freer intellectual atmosphere, an improved economy and standard of living,

etc. As for Khrushchev—who not long before had been banging his shoe and vowing “we will bury you”—Harriman described him as “intensely human” as well as “less ruthless and arbitrary” than Stalin.

He wrote this little gem to make the case that it was now possible for the United States to negotiate with the “new Russia.” Harriman concluded the book with a call for “reaching a constructive agreement on the control and possible limitations of armaments,” noting that “frequently during our talks [Khrushchev] spoke of his desire to limit armaments . . . [and] his readiness to accept various forms of controls for that purpose. . . .”

Harriman carefully cultivated his “back channel” to the Soviet leadership. Several months later, during Khrushchev’s trip to the United States for meetings with Eisenhower at Camp David, the Soviet premier stayed at Harriman’s New York townhouse. Harriman fêted him royally, introducing Khrushchev to a bunch of leading bankers and businessman. The topic of discussion was the relation between disarmament and expanded East-West trade.

Harriman and the test ban treaty

Although Eisenhower agreed to United States participation in the test-ban talks which began in 1958, he was by no means an enthusiastic proponent of disarmament. Neither, at the time, was Richard Nixon. It wasn’t until the Kennedy administration that an arms-control agreement was reached. (From this standpoint, it would be interesting to investigate whether Khrushchev’s opportunistic use of the U-2 incident to break up the May 1960 summit—and to badly damage Nixon’s election prospects in the process—was encouraged by the same kind of advice Harriman is now giving the Soviets against the Reagan administration; namely, informing the Soviets that there was every reason to embarrass the Eisenhower administration, since this could help elect a new and far more accommodating Democratic President in the next election.)

J.F.K. was not the Harriman crowd’s first choice for Democratic nominee; to them, Stevenson or Hubert Humphrey would have been preferable. But Kennedy clearly had the best chance of winning, and was judged to be malleable enough to present no real problems. In exchange for control over the top foreign policy posts in his administration, the Harrimanites threw their weight behind the Massachusetts Senator.

Immediately after the election, they sent an emissary, Robert Lovett, to the President-elect to collect their debt. Lovett, who had held a series of high government posts including that of Defense Secretary under Truman, had been closely allied with the Harriman family for decades. His father had been general counsel to the Harriman’s Union Pacific Railroad, becoming its president after E. H. Harriman died. He himself had gone to work for Averell Harriman’s Wall Street bank in the 1920s, negotiating the merger that created the powerful Brown Brothers, Harriman.

During their meeting, Lovett offered his “suggestions” to J.F.K.: Robert McNamara to Defense, Dean Rusk to State, Douglas Dillon to Treasury, and a host of other Harriman types, such as Harlan Cleveland, to lesser posts. Harriman himself was named roving ambassador and, later, assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs and undersecretary of state for political affairs. Another member of the patrician Harriman-Lovett circles, John J. McCloy, was named special adviser on disarmament.

The pressure on J.F.K. to make disarmament the central focus of his administration was intense from the beginning, especially after two of his top people, science adviser Jerome Wiesner and national security adviser Walt Rostow, returned from a Pugwash meeting in Moscow in December 1960 with a rosy report on Soviet desires to negotiate. (Harriman was a great fan of the Pugwash “process,” which Bertrand Russell had initiated in 1955 as part of his world government operation. “I think the Pugwash conferences . . . are useful,” Harriman wrote in 1970. “The intimacies established help further understanding on both sides.”)

Particularly emphatic on the disarmament question was Adlai Stevenson, whom Kennedy had appointed his U.N. ambassador. Stevenson deluged Kennedy with memos on the issue. In an Aug. 5, 1961 meeting that included Kennedy, Harlan Cleveland and Arthur Schlesinger, Stevenson told Kennedy that it was imperative that he make a major arms-control initiative at the upcoming U.N. General Assembly meeting and that, moreover, he must make a personal conversion to total disarmament. Kennedy was skeptical; he might do as Stevenson said, Kennedy observed, not because he thought there was any value in disarmament talks, but because it would be a good propaganda tool for calling the Soviets’ bluff. Significantly, Kennedy also was wary that the disarmament proposal which McCloy had worked out during a meeting with Khrushchev in June, would lead straight to world government. The proposal, which McCloy later introduced into the U.N. along with his Soviet counterpart Valentin Zorin, proposed to arrive at complete disarmament through a series of three stages during which nuclear and conventional arms would be proportionately reduced, while a U.N. Peace Force would build up until, at the end of Stage III, there would be a world government operating through the U.N.

Even though Kennedy made a proposal for complete disarmament in September 1961, and shortly thereafter set up the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency with Harriman protégé William C. Foster at its head, it wasn’t until the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis that Kennedy gave the go-ahead for serious negotiations. The Soviets, who had by now surpassed the United States in certain key areas of advanced Anti-Ballistic-Missile R&D, were now favorably inclined to a test ban treaty, counting on it to suppress further United States progress in this area. On July 2, 1963, Khrushchev proposed a nuclear test ban agreement; Kennedy responded by sending Harriman, who had been zealously lob-

bying for such an agreement himself, to Moscow. Six weeks later, on Aug. 5, 1964, the treaty was signed. Harriman later wrote that "The signing and ratification of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty marked a high-water mark in our relations with the Soviet Union."

The treaty, which banned nuclear testing in outer space, in the atmosphere, and underwater, represented a major step toward destroying United States military and scientific capabilities. The treaty helped pave the way for McNamara's fatal assault on the United States Project Defender ABM program, which required atmospheric testing to perfect its radar and tracking systems. It also put the final nail in the coffin of Project Plowshare, the ambitious Atoms for Peace spinoff which proposed using controlled nuclear explosions for big development projects, such as canal- and road-digging, creating artificial lakes for irrigation, and other vitally needed projects, particularly in the developing sector.

Testifying against ratification of the test ban treaty, Edward Teller told Congress of the chilling effects it would have on Plowshare: "The damage to our help that we could give other countries, to our relations with other countries, these damages could become very great. . . . I believe the most important applications of Plowshare which I have encountered lie outside the United States, such as, for example, the sea-level Isthmus Canal [the proposed Second Panama Canal]." In other words, not only would the test-ban treaty damage United States military development, it would also prevent the United States from developing a Third World policy based on industrial development.

Yet Harriman, in collaboration with the Pugwashian Wiesner, abandoned without a fight a United States negotiating position which would have exempted Plowshare testing from the treaty. In his 1970 book, *America and Russia in a Changing World*, Harriman wrote of the test-ban negotiations: "Of course, there were concessions we had to make. We broke some crockery in Washington by eliminating the exception we had proposed permitting atmospheric explosions for 'Plowshare.' . . . This was one of the subjects we had talked over in Washington before our departure. Jerome Wiesner . . . had been most helpful in pointing out that the Plowshare projects were remote and should not stand in the way of a test ban treaty." Wiesner, as Harriman knew, was lying through his teeth.

Wrecking the ABM

After helping to launch the consciously genocidal Vietnam war, as Kennedy's assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, Harriman emerged in the late 1960s as a big anti-war spokesman, praising student demonstrators and disruptors "as the most constructive generation in my lifetime" and calling the Vietnam Moratorium movement "a thrilling experience." At the same time, he unleashed a bitter attack on the American military and started publicly accusing the United States of "a growing arrogance of power." Typical of his tone was a piece he wrote for the Aug. 26, 1969 issue of

Look magazine, entitled "American Militarism: Our Security Lies Beyond Weapons." In it Harriman implicitly raised the spectre of a coup by the "military-industrial complex," saying he was "fearful about the present role of the military in our national life." He castigated the military's request for new weapons "that are less important than other national needs," and declared that "the United States doesn't have to be ahead [of the Soviets] in every aspect of capability." While assailing the traditional United States military, and suggesting that the United States adopt the British system instead, he portrayed the Soviets as the true peace-seekers. "From my talks with Mr. Kosygin and other Soviet officials," Harriman wrote, "I am satisfied that they want to stop the nuclear arms race"; but the Soviets are being thwarted "by advisers in our defense establishment who are on record as opposing an agreement with the Soviet Union on nuclear restraint."

One of Harriman's key objectives was to kill the United States ABM program, a process he had gotten off to a promising start with the test-ban treaty. In 1967, he accompanied President Johnson and McNamara to their meeting with Kosygin at Glasboro, New Jersey, where Johnson, on Harriman's and McNamara's urging, proposed an anti-ABM treaty to the Soviet leader. Though Kosygin rejected the proposal at the time, an anti-ABM agreement was reached as part of the SALT I pact in 1972. Harriman, who had earlier called the SALT talks "for the long run, the most vital negotiations being held today," mobilized his forces to secure passage of the Kissinger-negotiated treaty. He wrote and spoke extensively about what "folly" it was "to think we have to go ahead spending billions for ABMs" since the United States could always rely on its MAD doctrine.

In 1976, the disarmament campaign got a big push when Harriman's hand-picked candidate, Jimmy Carter, became President, and named long-time Harriman protégé Cyrus Vance as his Secretary of State. Within months of his inauguration, Carter had sent Vance off to Moscow with his "deep cuts" arms proposal. Though that gambit was not successful, the Carter administration continued its attempt to stop proposed United States weapons systems such as the MX missile.

By proposing to base United States military strategy on a defensive ABM system, President Reagan has threatened to undo all Harriman's hard work to disarm the United States on behalf of his friends in Moscow and London. That is why the Harriman crew's response to the President's March 23 speech has been so venomous—and why Harriman's treason must be stopped now. Though over ninety, Harriman is still doing his damndest to wreck the United States—as his May session with Yuri Andropov indicates. Nearly all the groups and individuals currently engaged in various aspects of the KGB-run nuclear freeze campaign—the Institute for Policy Studies, the Center for Defense Information, Gerard Smith, McGeorge Bundy, Jerome Wiesner, et al.—can be linked to Harriman or his immediate circle. Destroying the Harriman apparatus is an urgent task for those who don't want to see Yuri Andropov sitting in the Oval Office some day.