

Why Henry Kissinger loves Danny Graham

by Jeffrey Steinberg and Leo Scanlon

On Tuesday, Oct. 5, 1983, *Executive Intelligence Review* sponsored an historic conference in Bonn, West Germany, "Beam Weapons: Implications for Western Europe," which brought together leading European military and scientific specialists. It was an impressive show of Allied support for President Reagan's March 23, 1983 announcement, as U.S. Commander-in-Chief, that America would repudiate the Pugwash doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction and replace it with a strategic focus based on beam-weapon anti-ballistic missile defense (Mutually Assured Survival). The event—the first high-visibility discussion in Western Europe of President Reagan's return to classical military doctrine since March 23—was marred by a virtual boycott by the U.S. military and defense corporations—a boycott ordered and enforced by U.S. Ambassador Arthur Burns, acting under the likely orders of Henry A. Kissinger.

Not coincidentally, just one week prior to the Bonn seminar, Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, guru of the High Frontier mania, swept through West Germany speaking before conservative audiences sponsored by such institutions as the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and the KGB-contaminated Western Goals, Europe. According to West German sources, General Graham represented his High Frontier proposal—a potpourri of "quick fix" sure-loser conventional anti-ballistic missile defense systems, many of which were laughed off the drawing board in the early 1960s—as "official" White House policy. The retired general, coiffed in a pompadour out of the court of Marie Antoinette, reportedly flashed a letter on White House stationery acknowledging receipt of a complimentary copy of his booklength apologia for the High Frontier program of space-based conventional garbage as "proof" the President had embraced Graham's strategic defense plan on March 23.

The Graham road show through the Federal Republic was used by the State Department and other Kissingerian centers of opposition to the Reagan laser ABM program to mobilize a vicious personal smear effort against *EIR* founder and contributing editor Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.—the keynote speaker at the Bonn beam-weapons conference—and a broadside counter-organizing effort against the meeting. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, operating through the U.S.

Embassy legate office, and General Graham's own former agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), were also reportedly brought into the Arthur Burns campaign to sabotage public discussion of the truth about the White House's strategic policy break with the KGB's Pugwash crowd.

Curiously, General Graham had attempted—unsuccessfully—earlier this year to capitalize on the press blackout and disinformation effort against the President's March 23 speech by scheduling a tour of the Federal Republic to peddle his High Frontier wares. According to sources close to the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, a leading conservative think tank associated with the ruling Christian Democratic Union party, Graham's earlier overtures were rejected out of hand. "The general's proposals had no credibility in West Germany. . . . Neither did he."

According to West German sources, it was only on the basis of a heavy-handed personal intervention by U.S. Ambassador Arthur Burns that the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and other BRD institutions consented to host Graham.

On Sept. 30 in Washington, D.C., another Kissinger long-time asset, former State Department intelligence director William Hyland, a fellow at the nuclear freeze-linked Carnegie Endowment and the incoming editor of the New York Council on Foreign Relations' quarterly journal *Foreign Affairs*, used the occasion of the Middle East Institute's conference to add his name to the impressive list of Kissingerians embracing General Graham and denouncing President Reagan's ABM defense program. Hyland denounced the laser defense plan as a threat to world peace: "Whoever develops the laser defense first—the U.S. or the U.S.S.R.—will have a first strike advantage. This will upset the strategic balance. I prefer," Hyland asserted, "General Graham's High Frontier plan."

No sooner had General Graham returned to the United States from his West German jaunt than he repeated his overseas misrepresentation of the President's strategic doctrine shift—this time in the nation's capital. On Sept. 29, Graham hosted a press conference called to announce the formation of a new political action committee, attached to High Frontier. Dubbed "Space Frontier," the new PAC will lobby explicitly against the development and deployment of

a laser ABM system. Stated Graham, "We are calling for off-the-shelf technologies that have been technologically perfected for 20 years. We are not talking about lasers. This is the President's program," Graham lied.

Schlesinger's man at DIA

Daniel Graham has paraded himself around since 1979 as a Reagan conservative. What, the reader must ask, has catapulted the former DIA chief into the position of principal asset in the desperate efforts of the Kissinger crowd to wreck the President's beam-weapons ABM initiative on behalf of the insane Pugwash doctrine of MAD and Dr. Kissinger's friends and controllers at Moscow Central?

Some naive folk in Washington have suggested that the retired general is merely venting his infantile rage at the President for failing on two occasions to appoint Graham to the coveted post of deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, a post he had been led to believe would be his immediately after the Reagan inauguration in 1981.

However, preliminary inquiries by this intelligence service into the career record of the Man From High Frontier strongly suggest that General Graham—since his public emergence during the height of the LBJ-McNamara-Bundy Vietnam fiasco—has always been an asset of the Kissinger establishment, specifically of the oligarchical recruiting mill constituted back during World War II by Fritz Kraemer, the man who brought you Kissinger, James Rodney Schlesinger, and Alexander Haig. From the late 1960s, Graham was the "loose cannon" inserted into the military and intelligence establishment to obscure and divert strategic intelligence evaluations in a direction conducive to Henry Kissinger's successive betrayals of the United States in Vietnam, SALT I, the ABM Treaty, SALT II, and the developing strategic showdown between Washington and Moscow.

Body-counter

In 1967, after 20 years of apparent obscurity within the Western European and Pacific Commands of the U.S. Army, Daniel Graham arrived in Vietnam to assume the post of chief of Current Intelligence Indicators and Estimates, Division of the Military Assistance Command. In that capacity he was responsible for preparing the intelligence estimates of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troop strength and disposition—and for compiling the all important "body count" statistics used by McNamara and Kissinger to perpetuate the genocidal fraud that the United States was "winning the war."

During this period, the Central Intelligence Agency was preparing statistics showing the force strength of the North Vietnamese Army to be in the range of 450,000 combat-ready troops. The Graham statistics claimed a figure of half that number, a figure later proven to be disastrously understated. Graham later admitted that the figure prepared by his office was tailored to prevent a "press reaction." In recent testimony before a congressional committee, Graham

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shrugged off a question about his deflated force estimate of the North Vietnamese by stating, "This shows that intelligence isn't an exact science. It requires a lot of judgment."

Having demonstrated his willingness to place political considerations over accurate military intelligence, Graham completed his tour of duty in Vietnam in 1970, returning to Washington, D.C. to be promoted to the rank of major general and to assume the post of Assistant Director for Collection, U.S. Estimates Section, DIA. From no later than his return to the Pentagon, Graham, by his own admission, became an asset of the systems analysis—"limited nuclear war" clique of strategic madmen grouped around the person of James Rodney Schlesinger. When Schlesinger was axed as Secretary of Defense in the Halloween Massacre of 1975, the loyalist Graham immediately resigned his post as director of the DIA. In the intervening five years, however, Graham had played a central role in the dismantling of the CIA and related U.S. intelligence capabilities.

Intelligence estimates

In April 1973, on the eve of James Schlesinger's assumption of the post of director of Central Intelligence, Gen. Daniel Graham penned an article for *Army* magazine, the official journal of the Association of the U.S. Army. That article, titled "Estimating the Threat: A Soldier's Job," was the launching pad for an across-the-board attack against the CIA, an attack that would provide then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger with the intelligence smokescreen he needed to convince a blinded White House and Congress to approve a string of treasonous "strategic arms" treaties between the United States and Kissinger's Moscow masters.

Was Danny Graham witting in this effort? While the

verdict is still out on whether the former DIA chief was wholly witting in the Kissinger sellout of U.S. national security in the SALT and ABM treaties, Graham was clearly witting in his campaign to dismantle the CIA and scuttle certain programs of strategic modernization of the U.S. arsenal.

In his *Army* article, Graham argued for the dismantling of the CIA's Estimates Section and for the return of that entire function to the DIA: "The trend towards independent analysis has been gathering over the past two years and there are now analytical staffs in the civilian intelligence community paralleling those of the DIA on almost every military intelligence subject. . . . It stemmed from a series of bad overestimates, later dubbed 'bomber gap,' 'missile gap' and 'megaton gap'. . . . Fortunately, the somewhat dismal picture outlined above has brightened measurably over the past few years. . . . Several factors account for this: DIA pulled up its socks and put proper emphasis on the estimates job; a new crop of more professional, less conformist intelligence officers is available for estimating work and, most important, there is a new appreciation of the intelligence function among our military customers."

Washington Post columnist Victor Zorza led a pack of Eastern Establishment military commentators in instant published praise of the Graham piece, making the link to the Kissingerian disarmament fraud then being played out: "The real issue behind the struggle over the reorganization of the CIA concerns the whole direction of U.S. defense policy, and, therefore foreign policy. . . . Now a basic change, which is as yet barely perceptible, is taking place under the surface. The U.S.-Soviet agreements on the limitation of strategic arms, and Mr. Nixon's grand design for a 'generation of peace' have brought entirely new factors into military policy. The major weapons programs such as the B-1 bomber and the Trident submarine missile systems which are now pending are far more costly than any in history. . . . The issues involved in this conflict, which will have a major bearing on strategic arms limitations and disarmament, are so momentous that the next battle will be joined almost before the last is over."

Graham's aesopic language scarcely concealed a twofold plan: Flood the DIA with a herd of RAND-MIT vintage systems analysts and launch a "Stalin purge" of the CIA.

Thirty days after the appearance of the Graham article, the general's idol James Schlesinger became director of CIA. In his ensuing six-month tenure, the first of two major bloodlettings was unleashed that would leave the agency decimated.

In subsequent testimony before a string of congressional committees and blue ribbon panels, including the Pike Commission, one CIA veteran after another was paraded up to demonstrate in graphic detail that the results of the Schlesinger purges—harbingered in Graham's *Army* magazine battle cry—blinded the U.S. national security establishment to

the tremendous strides made by the Soviet Union under the umbrella of SALT and ABM, leading to the present serious and widening "window of vulnerability."

Team A-Team B

The wrecking process orchestrated by Fritz Kraemer's "Bobbsey twin" routine between Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger was temporarily aborted with the Halloween Massacre of 1975, which led to the instant resignation of General Graham from the directorship of DIA. As Graham told the *Washington Post*, "No one told me to do it. I left because I am a Schlesinger man."

Graham made an unsuccessful bid for electoral office in Virginia, and then moved quickly back into the old fight. He became the point man for a grouping which was loudly arguing against the creation of an intelligence czar with cabinet level responsibilities. He argued with the same litany of attacks he had brought up in 1973: "CIA today contains elements competing with the National Security Agency . . . Air Force . . . Navy . . . State Department . . . DIA . . . and even with the FBI's domestic counterespionage and counter-subversion mission. CIA staff elements have an adversary relationship growing up between that agency and all others in intelligence."

Graham's call went unheeded for the time being when President Gerald Ford reorganized the CIA's power giving greater authority to its new director, George Bush.

In an article written in 1979, Graham described his program—Schlesinger's program: "Neither the CIA nor the Pentagon nor any director of National Intelligence nor any single bureaucracy should have control over the analysis of the information the United States receives. . . [we must] decide that there should be more than one, and that both should have equal resources, and equal access to the nation's policy makers. This institution of competitive analysis might be achieved by strengthening the size, independence, and competence of the DIA, or by separating the analysis side of CIA from the Directorate of Operations, and then splitting it into the analytical agencies, each perhaps augmented by some of the assets which now belong to the DIA."

In layman's terms: Dismantle and cast to the wind the entire U.S. intelligence apparatus at the very moment that the Soviets were making decisive strides toward an unchallengeable first strike capability.

Under the 1977-80 Carter administration, Graham's proposal was activated with the notorious "Team A" versus "Team B" debate, a rigged rival evaluation study, pitting a selected crew of Kissinger and Schlesinger protégés, all wedded to the limited nuclear war doctrine, against the CIA's Strategic Estimates Group. The results were the predictable casting of a new level of fog over the strategic debacle being rigged by the Kissinger crowd—all to the delight of the Soviet high command.