

have the consequence that the opponent will be forced into a similar mode of operation. Two armed camps provided primarily with shields present a lesser danger than two camps relying on the destructive power of swords.

Because the aggressor has to overcome distance there is good hope that defense will win on the score of efficiency and economy. On the other hand the element of surprise favors the aggressor. Thus the defense needs the exercise of intellect, invention and foresight to their utmost limit.

Therefore, I propose that in the earliest possible phase defense should be jointly conducted by the advanced free people whose common and supreme interest is the preservation of peace and their way of life. This also will put additional unity into our alliances. Active cooperation is the basis for realistic hope. Much technical knowledge is available in allied countries.

There have been proposals that the defense should be purely non-nuclear. This is a popular proposal. But defense will not be easy. We should not arbitrarily rule out any form of effective defense.

One highly hopeful development is a non-nuclear short wave laser based on the ground whose beams are guided to the attacking targets by a system of mirrors. Another essential development is specifically constructed nuclear weapons which utilize primarily the high energy *concentration* (or high temperatures) which they can produce for defensive purposes.

Another example of the same debate is the decision whether the terminal defense against incoming ballistic missiles should be nuclear or non-nuclear. In the non-nuclear kill greater weights must be lifted at a higher expense. Furthermore the agility of the defending missiles would be reduced. But, what is most important, a non-nuclear kill cannot prevent salvage fusing. This means that as soon as the incoming missile (which may have already reentered our atmosphere) is touched it will explode with full force, for instance one megaton. A small defensive nuclear missile can prevent such a big explosion. Its own energy need hardly exceed 100 tons TNT equivalent. This should happen at a high enough altitude so that the effects on the ground would be hardly observable. Thus the advocates of the non-nuclear kill may bring about a situation where truly big Soviet nuclear explosions would nonetheless occur over our country and possibly over allied countries.

The proper distinction in planning our military operations should not be the choice between nuclear and non-nuclear methods. It should be the vital difference between aggression and defense. The former should be ruled out, the latter fully encouraged.

At this time speed is of the essence. The development of a full defensive system will take a decade or more. But in half that time some defensive weapons may begin to pay off. In order to accomplish this, red tape has to be cut. The agency engaged in this vital activity must be set apart, exempted from many standard procedures and should have direct access to the White House.

It would seem appropriate and even necessary to explain the basic ideas of the new defensive weapons to the public. Otherwise the needed wide popular support cannot be secured. Furthermore the basic ideas are known to the Kremlin. Yet our strict secrecy regulations do not permit such an explanation. The details and stages of our development can and should be kept secret. The general ideas should be public.

It has been argued that defense cannot have a perfection of 100 percent. Even a small leakage will cause enormous damage. This is true. But war will always be connected with great damage. Active defense together with civil defense can ensure the survival of our country.

But the most important and final argument is that defense will deter war and do so in a thoroughly humane manner. Let us assume that an *initial* deployment of defense will reduce the fury of the attack 20 percent of what otherwise would hit us. It must be remembered that such a 20 percent figure is a paper-estimate. The actual figure may be anywhere between 50 percent and 5 percent. The decision makers in the Kremlin are exceedingly conservative. If they know that perhaps only 1 out of 20 of their missiles may reach their target and that we shall retain significant retaliatory capability then the Soviet Union will not start a nuclear war. That we shall not do so is entirely obvious.

Eventually a much higher protection percentage can be probably attained.

The People Protection Act wisely formulated and wisely applied will remove the steadily increasing threat of war. It will create the atmosphere in which mutual understanding, cooperative enterprises and all the other effective supports of peace can flourish and develop. . . .

I hardly can hope that the danger of war will entirely disappear in our lifetime. Our children and grandchildren may live to see the beginnings of real and permanent peace. Mutual assured destruction may be replaced by mutual assured survival.

This is why I dare to say that the "People Protection Act" might become one of the great historical documents of America.

## Armstrong: Defense is the moral policy

*From the testimony of Sen. William Armstrong (R-Colo.) on Nov. 10:*

On March 23rd of this year, President Reagan offered us a vision of a future free from the spectre of nuclear destruction which has haunted us all for nearly 40 years. The President offered us a vision of a world in which American security would be based chiefly upon our ability to protect the lives of our own people, rather than upon our ability to take the lives

of other people; a world in which peace would be built on a firmer foundation than the goodwill and humanitarian instincts of the generals in the Kremlin.

Enactment of the People Protection Act would be the first solid step toward making President Reagan's vision a reality.

Representative Kramer has described to you the provisions of H.R.3073. The provisions in my bill, S.2021, are identical. Essentially, what these bills do is to mandate a shift in U.S. strategic doctrine from Mutual Assured Destruction to what might be termed Assured Survival.

The doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction—MAD for short—is easier to describe than it is to defend. Essentially, it is a murder-suicide pact. The theory was that if both the United States and the Soviet Union possess the power to destroy each other, but not each other's weapons, then neither ever would attack the other, because the end result would be the destruction of both.

There was a sheen of plausibility to the MAD doctrine at the time when then Defense Secretary Robert McNamara succeeded in making it official U.S. policy in the mid-1960s. There was no known defense against the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile at that time, and ICBMs of 1960 vintage were too inaccurate to be used against "hard" targets such as missile silos or command and control bunkers, and could be used effectively only against "soft" targets such as population centers.

But the MAD doctrine was based on false premises; was never accepted by the Soviets, and is fundamentally immoral.

The first false premise was the notion that the ICBM of the late 1960s vintage would be the ultimate weapon. The MADmen assumed there would be no further advances in military technology, at least none that would matter.

This was an assumption that proved false within a few years after MAD became official U.S. policy. The development of independently targetable warheads with Circular Errors Probable of 300 feet or less undermined an essential component of the MAD doctrine. With accurate MIRVs on ICBMs, it was now at least theoretically possible for one nation to destroy the other's weapons under conditions of surprise attack.

Another fundamental flaw was that Soviet leaders never accepted this murder-suicide pact. The creators of the MAD doctrine confidently predicted that once the Soviets had obtained strategic parity with the United States, they would stop adding to their weapons stockpile. But as President Carter's Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, was to note, ruefully: "when we build, they build; and when we stop building, they build." From the beginning, Soviet leaders have derided the MAD doctrine as insane and immoral, and touted the virtues of military superiority.

There is something macabre, and worse, about basing our security on our ability to kill Russian civilians. And it is even more reprehensible to deliberately increase the exposure of our own people to nuclear destruction simply in order to fulfill the demands of an abstract, ahistorical, unproven and illogical theory.

NEW EIR REPORT NOW AVAILABLE:

## The Economic Impact of the Relativistic Beam Technology

A unique study of the impact of the new defense-related technologies—high power lasers, particle beams, and fusion—which will become available to basic industrial production as the March 23 defensive strategic doctrine proposed by President Reagan is developed. The report is a computer analysis incorporating the LaRouche-Riemann model, which examines the little-discussed revolutionary civilian economic "spinoff" effects of the new beam weapon development program.

The study reveals that with rapid introduction of new laser and related technologies into the civilian economy, the growth of the economy would be so rapid that:

- an estimated 4 million highly skilled industrial jobs could be added to the economy per year;
- the U.S. trade deficit could be eliminated in two years; and
- the rate of growth of real GNP could approach 25 percent per annum.

Over a period of two years, 50 percent of the current stock of machine tools in industry could be replaced with laser machining stations, increasing productivity in this sector 300 to 500 percent. Plasma steelmaking, now in the commercial development stage, could become available for large-scale use over the period of the next decade. The study concludes that the major constraint on how quickly the economy can expand and create wholly new industries is the speed with which new baseload electric-generating capacity can come on line.

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This EIR Special Report is available for \$250.00. Contact: William Engdahl, EIR Special Services, (212) 247-8820 or (800) 223-5594 x818