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# Did Kennedy back down to Khrushchev in 1962?

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Although policy-making circles in Washington repeatedly insist that the United States is bound by a secret memorandum signed by President John F. Kennedy and Secretary Nikita Khrushchev in 1962, Congress has been repeatedly unsuccessful in efforts to discover whether such a memorandum actually exists.

The existence or non-existence of such a secret agreement, and the content of the agreement if it exists, is of the most vital strategic importance at the present moment. If President Kennedy consciously capitulated to Khrushchev's Cuba-missiles blackmail, as the sum total of objective evidence shows that Kennedy delivered such concessions through Bertrand Russell and other mediators, then this fact would be of decisive weight in encouraging the Soviet command to push through to a new thermonuclear confrontation now, during the first half of 1984.

The hypothetical Soviet calculation would be: 1) The United States traded off major strategic concessions to Moscow in 1962-63 in return for pulling back the delivery of nuclear missiles to Cuba. 2) If the United States backed down then, when it held overwhelming strategic superiority and its people had a determined political will, is it not certain that the United States would back down even more decisively today, when its political will and that of its allies are eroded, and the Soviet Union now has a significant margin of military superiority?

Although the Soviet government and military are now operating on a war-emergency-mobilization basis, with strike-commands deployed in position for a first strike against the United States, Soviet readiness for thermonuclear war does not mean that Moscow actually expects full-scale war to erupt. It must be assumed that Moscow is taking a calculated thermonuclear risk, gambling that President Reagan's political will can be broken by frightened political advisers, and that he will deliver much bigger concessions than did Kennedy back in 1962-63. By "Kennedy" we mean the forces actually controlling the Kennedy administration—including John J. McCloy, George Ball, and McGeorge Bundy, the forces behind today's Nuclear Freeze movement.

In any case, the only action which will deter Moscow

from continuing its present escalation toward a thermonuclear showdown during the first half of 1984 would be U.S. and related actions which convince Soviet military commanders that the risks and penalties of thermonuclear war are far greater than the Soviet command presently estimates. If the President leaves open the offer of Mutually Assured Survival negotiations he issued on March 23, 1983, this would give Moscow a clear choice between war and peace, which might bring Ustinov, Ogarkov, et al. to their senses before it is too late.

However, if Kennedy did sign agreements backing down to Khrushchev in 1962, even adequate U.S. actions forewarning Moscow of the risks and penalties of war would not deter Moscow under present circumstances. Moscow would say "So what? Kennedy backed down when he had overwhelming superiority. Reagan's advisers and the liberals in his party and Congress will force him to back down, too." Since a 1984 U.S. backdown to Moscow would mean Soviet military supremacy throughout the world for an indefinite period to come, Moscow's incentive for risking thermonuclear showdown this coming spring is very, very great.

Frightened, shallow-minded people who speak of "resolving differences between the superpowers" through mediators' interventions are playing the fool under these kinds of circumstances. (Imagine a "President" Walter Mondale negotiating with Ogarkov or Andropov! Mondale hasn't the guts to give a straight answer to a simple question even at a press conference! Faced with Andropov, Mondale would end up negotiating the terms of Soviet occupation of the U.S.A. In the vernacular, Mondale is a bully, but also a "yello' belly.")

If President Kennedy signed such a memorandum, then Moscow will not believe that President Reagan could not be pushed to capitulation unless the Reagan administration caused the release of such a memorandum to the Congress, and also stipulated that appropriate corrections must be made in such a standing agreement. If such an agreement exists and the United States does not repudiate unacceptable features, Moscow would be assured of virtual certainty of U.S. backdown in a spring 1984 showdown.

## Kennedy's backdown

Whether or not President Kennedy negotiated such an agreement through Bertrand Russell or other back-channels during 1962, the objective fact is that President Kennedy did back down massively to Moscow during the period covering the Berlin crisis

writer, like most moral Americans, ordinarily avoids saying things painful to the memory of an assassinated President, in this matter, where the fate of not only the United States, but civilization itself, is in jeopardy, we must dig out all the relevant truth bearing upon the issues of peace or war. To be fair to President Kennedy, we must emphasize two things about his administration. First, like most Presidents, he was a victim of his advisers—including John McCloy, George Ball, and McGeorge Bundy—we know where those fellows have stood on these issues for 20 years to date. Second, President Kennedy did not make more than marginal additions to the shaping of U.S. policy under his administration; the policies of his administration were already set into motion—with the force of the fabled juggernaut—before his inauguration.

The evidence that President Kennedy did back down to Khrushchev is overwhelming. At least, this is clear once one views that the Soviet pull-back of Cuban missiles was part of an overall tradeoff of Soviet concessions balanced against U.S. strategic concessions.

To be scrupulously fair to President Kennedy, and also to be honest with ourselves, we must view the President's actions within the setting in which he found himself, and which he lacked the resources of knowledge and physical means to resist effectively. We must see President Kennedy's concessions to Moscow within the setting of the leading features of U.S. strategic policy over the postwar period.

The first period of U.S. foreign policy, from 1945 through approximately 1953, was dominated by Bertrand Russell's insistence that the Anglo-American forces be mobilized for a "preventive nuclear war" against the Soviet Union. Russell presented the rationale for this "preventive nuclear war" doctrine in the October 1946 issue of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, with the support of the faction of scientists presently backing the Nuclear Freeze movement and opposing Mutually Assured Survival. Russell's plainly stated objective was to destroy the sovereignty of, and to disarm the United States, by creating a world-federalist supergovernment with a monopoly on possession and use of strategic weapons. Destroying Russia—before Russia could develop a nuclear arsenal—was seen by Russell and his atomic-scientist cronies as a step toward destroying the sovereignty of the United States in favor of world government. Presidential candidate Sen. Alan Cranston is a hard-core representative of that political faction to the present day.

With Soviet development of fission-weapon arsenals, and also development of an H-bomb, the policies of Russell and his world-federalists changed. Russell and his accomplices proposed to the post-Stalin Soviet government that Russia

become a full partner in Russell's world-government projects. He proposed to Moscow that the Yalta agreements be replaced by a "New Yalta" agreement, under which the entire world would be divided between a Russian empire in the East, and a Western division of a global world-federalist government. N. Khrushchev agreed. At the 1955 London conference of Russell's World Association of Parliamentarians for World Government, four official Soviet representatives participated, delivering an official Soviet statement of undying love and admiration for the "great scientist" Russell. Out of this back-channel agreement between Russell's circles and Khrushchev, Russell's Fabian friends created the first Pugwash Conference in 1957, sponsored by Rockefeller protégé Cyrus Eaton in Nova Scotia. By the time of the second Pugwash Conference, held in Quebec the following year, the secret deal with Khrushchev was already becoming official policy of a leading circle in the New York Council on Foreign Relations, and by Russell's accomplices around Chatham House in London, as well. This began Henry A. Kissinger's long career as a booster of the nuclear-deterrence doctrines secretly negotiated between Russell's circles and Khrushchev, which Kissinger has remained to the present day.

We have evidence pointing to the suspicion of Kissinger's direct connections to Moscow, but we do not believe that Kissinger is actually a Soviet agent. Rather, Kissinger is a "mole" for those Anglo-American interests which have adopted Russell's secret agreements with Moscow as policy.

It is a matter of record that not only did Khrushchev buy Russell's strategic package, but that Khrushchev attempted, unsuccessfully, to disarm significantly non-nuclear forces of the Soviet Union, as part of his subscription to the Nuclear Deterrence doctrine developed by Russell, Leo Szilard, et al.

The Soviet military countered Khrushchev's military policy with elaboration of what became known, beginning 1962, as the "Sokolovskii war-winning strategy" of Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii. We shall return our attention to this point after examining the 1962 missiles crisis itself.

The Nuclear Deterrence doctrine imposed upon the United States by McGeorge Bundy, Robert "Vietnam body-count" McNamara, and Henry A. Kissinger, among others, was designed for the purpose of ensuring the permanence of the borders between the two divisions of Russell's world-federalist one-world government—which Russell's circles have been working to bring into being through the present day. The nominal designer of this Nuclear Deterrence doctrine was Russell's crony, Leo Szilard, who laid it out publicly in his famous "Dr. Strangelove" keynote address to the 1958 Pugwash Conference in Quebec. It was these leaders of today's Nuclear Freeze movement who proposed, during 1958, and even earlier, to build up thermonuclear arsenals to the level that each superpower had the radioactive means to obliterate the other. Such are these celebrated "humanitarians"! They argued that by preventing the development of defensive weapons able to destroy missiles, the balance of terror would prevent either superpower from conducting war directly

against the other.

By the time Kennedy became President, this back-channel agreement between the New York Council on Foreign Relations and Moscow was in full swing. Gen. Maxwell Taylor, back from Britain to become Kennedy's military adviser, played a key part in selling this agreement with Moscow to the new President. The first step was to introduce Flexible Response; that was the first step down the road toward thermonuclear Hell—the Hell which threatens the world from Moscow today.

Under Flexible Response, the United States evaded a firm commitment to the defense of Western Europe, while at the

## Senator Symms: Disavow the 1962 agreements

In a Nov. 2 speech on the Senate floor, Idaho Republican Steve Symms called on the Reagan administration to renounce the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreements as a necessary step in showing the Soviets that the United States has rejected a policy of appeasement. Symms said, "I would like to make several summary propositions regarding the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement. U. S. disapproval of this agreement would be another act unshackling America from paralysis. It would also be an act of peacekeeping."

Although Symms does not openly charge President Kennedy with backing down in October 1962, he does catalogue the history of State Department appeasement regarding Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba which followed the agreement. Symms charged that "each time the Soviets have violated the 1962 Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement, the State Department has, in effect, accepted a new protocol to the agreement allowing the Soviet violation. This has happened in 1971, 1978, 1979, and 1982. These U. S. retreats from enforcing the original agreement have all occurred in secret."

Symms charged that access to the documents has been denied to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President's National Security Adviser, among others. He concludes that "the Soviets now have in Cuba a strategic nuclear offensive threat greater than they had in the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. . . . The Soviets have 52 operational long- and medium-range bombers, together with the precedent already established that they can have six or more submarine-launched nuclear missiles there. Thus the Soviet threat in Cuba today is twice what it was in 1962, fifty-eight delivery vehicles, compared to only 28 operational in 1962."

same time not saying definitely that we might not decide to defend Western Europe if the whim overcame us. President Charles de Gaulle, confronted with this obscene and immoral turn in U. S. strategic policy, adopted the policy of force de frappe, "French nuclear blackmail" intended to keep the United States to its agreements on defense of Europe.

In Moscow, Flexible Response meant to Khrushchev: "Let us test exactly how flexible the United States has become." Khrushchev had met President Kennedy in Vienna and thought him easily intimidated. Khrushchev indicated his plans to test United States will in West Berlin. Washington pretended not to notice the signals. Khrushchev pushed ahead with the Berlin Crisis, not exactly discouraged either by Kennedy or by Mayor Willy Brandt—the famous protégé of John J. McCloy. Khrushchev tested U. S. nerve at Berlin, and Kennedy flinched. Immediately, on the basis of the Berlin affair, Khrushchev moved ahead to test the U. S. will in Cuba. At the point of confrontation, Khrushchev pulled back from actually developing the nuclear emplacements in Cuba; what price, in long-range strategic concessions, did the Kennedy administration pay for that pull-back of the nuclear-blackmail threat? What did Bertrand Russell negotiate in his role as middle-man negotiator between Washington and Moscow?

Since 1962-1963, policy. On the one side, it has followed the long-range strategic doctrine of Sokolovskii et al., to the level of potential for winning thermonuclear war against the United States. However, since the Soviet economy could not keep pace with the economies of France and the NATO countries as long as economic growth persisted in those countries, the success of Sokolovskii's doctrine depended upon inducing the United States and Western Europe to turn their nations into the weakened wreckage of "post-industrial societies," as we have obligingly done since the middle 1960s. Therefore, to lull us into continuing Malthusian "post-industrial society" policies, since 1972 Moscow has worn the mask of "détente." Once Moscow's slow buildup and NATO's economic and military build-down had given Moscow a large margin of strategic edge, Moscow would drop the mask of "détente," and push for a new confrontation. They would be prepared for war, but convinced that U. S. backdown would make war unnecessary. That time has now been reached, greatly aided by the Carter-Mondale administration and Paul A. Volcker's economic build-down policies at the Federal Reserve.

It is imperative that we persuade Moscow's Marshals that the United States would never back down again. It is time to mobilize to convince them we have the power to resist. It is also the time to convince Moscow that President Reagan is not another John Kennedy. The fiddle-faddle at the State Department over the secret memorandum of 1962 must be brought immediately to an end. Bringing it out into the open now might be decisive in preventing thermonuclear war as early as spring 1984.