

Reagan bows to Dr. K.'s demand to stifle beam defense program

by Criton Zoakos

President Reagan met with Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, a partner in the consulting firm Kissinger Associates, Inc., on April 9, and following the meeting announced that he has accepted the Scowcroft Commission's restrictions on this nation's anti-missile beam-weapons program, originally announced by Reagan himself on March 23, 1983. The political conditions agreed to by Mr. Reagan amount to a decision to abandon the beam program, whatever the President might imagine himself to be doing.

Ronald Reagan said that he was acting on behalf of the spirit of "bipartisanship" in foreign policy, a theme he has been increasingly extolling since his infamous speech on April 6 at the Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies. President Reagan also praised General Scowcroft's earlier work in the Scowcroft Commission, whose formation as a "bipartisan" body early last year had set the stage for the comeback of Soviet agent of influence Henry A. Kissinger into dominant position in foreign policy and security policy-making circles in Washington.

Kissinger's associate Scowcroft took the opportunity to add insult to injury: Having just met the President, General Scowcroft addressed the White House press corps and emphasized that U.S.-Soviet relations were at their worst level in years because of the Reagan White House's earlier policies, before the President had fallen under the influence of Kissinger (and the Scowcroft Commission). Said Scowcroft: "The political and psychological atmosphere between Moscow and Washington is as bad as it's been in my memory. The administration's rhetoric has certainly given the Soviets a negative view of the possibilities of dealing with this administration."

Further on, Scowcroft added: "The Soviets are not interested in doing anything which would contribute to the reelection of the President. . . ." In fact, coming out of the previous week's Trilateral Commission conference and April 1 reception at the White House, Scowcroft was making a specific sort of allusion that Reagan will not be allowed to be re-elected unless he first agrees to name Kissinger his next Secretary of State either before or after the November election. This message from the Trilaterals was privately communicated to Reagan, who was also told that the banking interests behind the Commission have enough clout to trigger

an all-out financial collapse before election day and then blame it all on the White House. In fact, Reagan was told to watch the next week's movement of interest rates if he didn't believe their threat.

With that, Kissinger and the Trilaterals sent Scowcroft into the White House to receive the President's surrender. Reagan surrendered, in the form of a unique statement in which he promised that the ballistic-missile defense policies he had announced back in March 23, 1983 will be downgraded to a mere "research project." Reagan's instrument of surrender further praised the Scowcroft Commission's earlier treacherous work and paid homage to the so-called "bipartisan" foreign policy-making process, a term used to denote Henry Kissinger's dominance in both Democratic and Republican foreign policy-making circles.

It will be recalled that Kissinger personally relaunched the fashion of "bipartisanship" with his March 5, 1984 *Time* magazine article and a series of subsequent speeches in which he insisted that this year's presidential election process, no matter who wins, must first and foremost produce a "bipartisan consensus" on foreign policy around two, principal issues: abandonment of laser-beam anti-missile defense and "decoupling" of Europe from the United States.

No newspaper or other publication reported on Reagan's "instrument of surrender" statement which was made public by the White House right after Scowcroft had finished briefing the White House press corps. Senior officials attempted to downplay the catastrophic significance of the event by offering the opinion that "this will delay the beam program by about one year." Others preferred to remain silent, in preparation for making their peace with Dr. Kissinger. Given the otherwise general press blackout on Reagan's "instrument of surrender," we print below excerpts of that document, with emphasis added.

What the President said

"On Jan. 3, 1983 I established a *bipartisan* Commission to examine issues raised by the Congress concerning the strategic modernization program, especially the Peacekeeper (MX) missile. On April 19, 1983, I was very pleased to report to the Congress and the American people that the Commission unanimously agreed on strategic force modernization

recommendations, which I strongly endorsed. *Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the National Security Council also endorsed the recommendations of the Commission.* At that time, I affirmed my commitment to pursue ambitious arms-reduction negotiations as an integral part of the package.

"Despite the range of views which existed in the past, the Congress joined us in supporting this *bipartisan* effort to modernize our strategic deterrent. This consensus was a major accomplishment in our common effort to enhance national security. The willingness of all parties to re-examine their previous positions allowed us to end a decade of political paralysis over arms control and modernization.

"Last week, the Commission issued its final report. The report focuses on the arms control portion of its earlier recommendations. Once again, the Commission members and their counselors have performed a tough job extraordinarily well. Again, we all owe this distinguished group of Americans special thanks.

"This final report reiterates the original recommendations, that is, an integrated strategic program consisting of an arms control structure with incentives to enhance stability at reduced levels of strategic arsenals. . . . In particular, arms control can make a substantial contribution to U.S. security by increasing strategic stability, allowing some types of defense expenditures to be avoided, and offering a useful forum for dialogue on strategic concepts and priorities. . . .

"The Commission recognizes the significance of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and notes that research permitted under the treaty is important to ascertain realistic technological possibilities as well as to guard against Soviet ABM breakout. The Commission also recommends extreme caution in proceeding to engineering development of an active strategic defense system.

"Our proposed strategic defense initiative is limited to technology research. The initiative also includes continued study of strategic policy and arms control implications of strategic defense concepts. The program is consistent with all treaty obligations and there is no conflict between our initiative and the recommendations made by the Commission.

"I am pleased to announce that I, along with Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the National Security Council, strongly endorse the Commission's final report.

"I urge continuing support by the Congress and the American people for this *bipartisan consensus* which unites us in our common objective of strengthening our national security and moving toward significant reductions in nuclear arms."

President Ronald Reagan has sold out to Henry Kissinger the only major positive achievement of his tenure in office, his March 23, 1983 Anti-Ballistic Missile doctrine, in the belief that by thus selling out, he would be re-elected President. His March 23 speech alone would have ensured Reagan an indelible place in history. Now he has been bypassed.

House committee cuts defense by \$19 billion

The knives are out, in more ways than one, since Ronald Reagan signaled he would not fight for his Strategic Defense Initiative by his endorsement of the Kissinger-concocted "Scowcroft Commission Report" April 9.

The House Armed Services Committee has cut a total of \$19.7 billion from the Reagan administration's proposed 1985 defense budget. The committee slashed \$8.8 billion from the Pentagon's proposed \$108-billion weapons budget by eliminating 10 of 40 MX missiles, 8 of 48 F-15 fighters, 2 C-5 military transports, and 4 of 9 Lockheed P-3 anti-submarine aircraft. The committee also cut the proposed military R&D budget by \$3.4 billion with the largest slash—\$400 million—taken from the Strategic Defense Initiative.

The committee's action reduced the "real" growth rate in military spending to a paltry 6%. The administration had originally asked for a 13% real growth in defense,

then agreed to lower it to 7.5%. Congressional sources believe that the highest increase which Congress is likely to approve by the time it finishes with the budget will be 5%.

Moreover, three leading "Moscow Democrats"—Reps. Les Aspin of Wisconsin, Norm Dicks of Washington, and Albert Gore of Tennessee—have come up with an "arms control" package aimed at destroying the U.S. beam-weapons program:

- A "limitation on testing of anti-satellite weapons" and "advanced anti-satellite weapons" which prohibits any funds being used "for the flight testing against an object in space of any anti-satellite weapon so long as the Soviet Union continues to observe its existing moratorium against testing anti-satellite weapons in space."

- An order that the Defense Department put all the related research programs together in a separate title in the annual budget. This, says Aspin, will prevent specific components of the Strategic Defense Initiative "from getting out of hand" in the future.

- A "limitation on amounts for Strategic Defense Initiative." This limits the funding increases for SDI to 5% real growth in the FY 85 budget over FY 84.